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This dissertation analyzes how Livy’s internal narrators mediate between his and 
his predecessors’ texts. Chapter One surveys the theoretical frameworks lying behind the 
project to show how Livy uses narrators as part of his intertextual approach to writing 
history. Chapters Two through Four explore the relationship between opsis, exemplarity, 
and the historiographic methods of Livy and Polybius. Chapter Two argues that Livy 
integrates comments made by the Polybian external narrator into Hannibal’s speeches, 
thereby allowing Hannibal to speak with a Polybian voice throughout the Third Decade. 
While Hannibal in the Histories uses language modelled on Polybius’ methods of opsis 
and autopsy, Livy’s Hannibal actually speaks with Polybius’ own words. Hannibal’s 
referential speeches in the AUC create an intertextual relationship that identifies Hannibal 
as a modello-esemplare to Polybius’ Histories. Chapter Three analyzes the presentation 
of Scipio in both works. Scipio in the Histories speaks with a focus on Polybian language 
and methodology. In the AUC, however, Scipio uses exemplarity to guide the actions of 
his internal audience, incorporating language in his speeches that mirrors Livy’s own 
methodology. He also shows his superior ability to use exemplarity by presenting a more 
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compelling interpretation of the Regulus exemplum in his debate with Fabius about the 
proposed invasion of Africa.  
Chapter Four combines the analyses from the previous two chapters to argue that 
the portrayals of Hannibal and Scipio allow the two internal narrators to stage a 
competition on behalf of the authors whose approaches each represents. As Hannibal and 
Scipio face off at Zama, their speeches and interactions represent a battle of authorial 
reference as they stand as analogues for the methodologies of Polybius and Livy, 
respectively. As Scipio triumphs over Hannibal in the battle, the Roman victory 
represents a victory for Livy’s exemplary method of historiography over Polybius’ 
reliance on pragmatic decision-making based on opsis and autopsy. Chapter Five surveys 
how acts of internal narration integrate aspects of the texts of Coelius Antipater and 
Valerius Antias. The integration of source texts into acts of internal narration shows Livy 
giving a voice to the Greco-Roman historiographic tradition throughout the Third 
Decade.  
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Introduction 
 
In Euripides’ Hecuba, Talthybius, as he so often does, enters the stage as a 
messenger to deliver the news of Polyxena’s death.1 His messenger-speech includes 
several quotes from the meeting of the Greek army that led to Polyxena’s sacrifice. 
Among these are two quotes from Polyxena herself. In the first (ll. 546-52), she gives 
herself up for death and, after an attempted intervention by the assembled body of 
soldiers, Talthybius then gives her final words addressed to her killer, Neoptolemus: 
…καὶ καθεῖσα πρὸς γαῖαν γόνυ 
ἔλεξε πάντων τλημονέστατον λόγον· 
Ἰδού, τόδ', εἰ μὲν στέρνον, ὦ νεανία,   
παίειν προθυμῆι, παῖσον, εἰ δ' ὑπ' αὐχένα 
χρήιζεις πάρεστι λαιμὸς εὐτρεπὴς ὅδε. (561-565) 
 
…and she dropped to the ground on her knee 
and said her most stout-hearted words of all:  
“Behold, here it is, young man, if it is my breast 
that you are so eager to strike, then strike! But if it is my  
throat that you want, here is my neck ready for your blow.2  
 
Polyxena’s bold speeches causes only a momentary hesitation on Neoptolemus’ part 
before he cuts her throat (566-67). The soldiers, who had earlier opposed her death, step 
forward to prepare her pyre and some scatter leaves over her corpse (τὴν θανοῦσαν ἐκ 
χερῶν / φύλλοις ἔβαλλον; 573-74). The falling leaves likely reference the famous simile 
of Iliad 6 where Glaucus tells Diomedes, “as the generations of leaves fall, so, too, do 
                                               
1 Talthybius serves a similar role in Trojan Women, where he mediates between the conquered Trojans and 
their Greek captors. On Euripidean messenger-speeches: de Jong 1991. For a summary of the position of 
the messenger-speech in Greek tragedy more broadly: Halleran 2008: 173-75 and on the episodic nature of 
tragedy: Aichelé 1971.  
2 English translations given throughout this dissertation are those of the author.  
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men” (οἵη περ φύλλων γενεὴ τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν; Il. 6.146). The deaths of the Trojan 
youths and the subsequent loss of the potential for future generations of Trojans is a 
major theme for the play and for Euripides’ Trojan Women as well. An allusion to 
Glaucus’ famous line heightens the dramatic tension felt for Hecuba as she ponders the 
loss of so many of her children in such a short time.  
The intertext to Glaucus’ simile can also draw upon the rich tradition of the line in 
subsequent Greek literature. However, the episodes’ intratextual and dramatic qualities 
are far more intriguing. While Polyxena does claim (ll. 342-78) to advance toward her 
death willingly before the character leaves the stage for the last time, upon first hearing 
that she would die, she had earlier described her death by comparing it to a wretched, 
mewling calf (205-08). Talthybius’ report of Polyxena’s final speech then allows her to 
rewrite her own valuation of her death: she is no longer a pitiable victim, but willing, 
brave, and resolute in accepting her demise. The dramatic convention of the “three-actor 
rule” necessitates the three speaking actors to fulfill multiple roles within the play.3 For 
Euripides’ Hecuba, the most straightforward division of the roles involves the actor who 
played Polyxena doubling as Talthybius.4 When Talthybius reports Polyxena’s final 
words, the actor playing him could modulate his speech to evoke the voice used earlier 
for Polyxena. For the external audience of the play, Talthybius’ report of her death does 
                                               
3 On the three-actor rule and three-actor scenes: e.g. Ashby 1995 and Halleran 2008: 172-73.  
4 One actor likely plays the following roles in the tragedy: Polyxena, Talthybius, the maidservant, and 
Polymestor; another: Polydorus, Odysseus, and Agamemnon. The protagonist likely only played the lead 
role of Hecuba. Cohen 2015 describes this division of roles and the effect that this ancient convention had 
on a recent performance put on at Randolph College. Dudek 2011 review the performance and discusses 
the meaningful theatrical effects brought on by the actors’ doubling of roles.  
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more than simply record her last words. Her voice resonates in the quote recounting her 
final moments.  
This dissertation examines how Livy incorporates the voices of the 
historiographic tradition into his Ab Urbe Condita (AUC) in a similar fashion. Through 
the combined lenses of narratology and intertextuality, I argue that Livy integrates 
characteristics of his source texts, and at times their exact words, into acts of internal 
narration in the Third Decade. As Livy incorporates and recontextualizes previously 
existing accounts of the Hannibalic war within his text, he creates intertextual 
relationships to his predecessors’ works that enable him to assert his authority over the 
historiographic tradition and allow the voices of his predecessors’ texts to speak within 
the multiple layers of his narrative. This argument also allows for a more critical 
understanding of Livy’s reception of the Roman historical and historiographic past. This 
project thus evokes a more nuanced appreciation of Livy’s use of his sources and a 
deeper understanding of the narratological complexities of the AUC. Through these two 
separate but related strands, this dissertation opens avenues for subsequent research in the 
field of Roman historiography by advocating a less reductive relationship between Livy 
and his sources, by setting an example for further narratological research on the AUC and 
its predecessors, and by demonstrating a richer textual tradition at the heart of Livy’s 
narrative.  
The relationship between Livy and his sources has long been at the heart of the 
scholarly discussion about the AUC. The practitioners of Quellenforschung dismissed the 
author’s work as a poor compilation of his sources. The resulting analyses fragmented 
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Livy’s work into a collection of episodes copied wholesale from earlier Latin authors or 
(usually badly) translated from his Greek predecessors.5 These Quellenforscher operated 
under the premise that at any given time Livy works from a single source, which he 
largely transcribes without remark or analysis. As a result, Quellenforschung leaves no 
room for a perception of Livy as a critical historian or even as a literary author. A 
separate but simultaneous trend of scholarship isolated and evaluated individual episodes 
(or Einzelerzählungen) of the AUC and found them to be highly polished literary 
narratives.6 While Witte’s episode-analysis demonstrated that Livy was capable of 
literary artistry, he failed to tackle the larger issues of Quellenforschung directly, leaving 
open the question of Livy’s relationship to his sources outside contained narratives. 
Burck’s work subsequently showed how these smaller episodes fit into the larger 
rhetorical and thematic architecture of books or entire decades of the AUC, but he largely 
examined portions of Livy’s narrative for which there were direct comparisons available 
between the AUC and surviving texts (e.g. Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus). 
Early Livian scholarship was therefore divided into two disparate and seemingly 
antithetical opinions: while the Quellenforscher were disregarding Livy as a mindless 
transcriber, the “Rhetorical-Thematic” school was simultaneously hailing him as a 
literary artist.7  
                                               
5 e.g. Nissen 1863 and Klotz [1941] 1964.  
6 e.g. Witte 1910 and Burck 1964. 
7 Chaplin and Kraus 2009: 1-4 provides a succinct introduction to these two trends and their effect on early 
Livian scholarship.  
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Subsequent work on the AUC favored the perceived historicity of the “more 
critical” histories of his predecessors—especially Polybius—over the text of Livy, who 
was therefore labeled as a mendacious and, consequentially, useless historian, best known 
for his “howlers,” the points at which he provided completely incongruous 
representations of the past.8 Luce’s influential work on Livy’s compositional methods 
combated the long-entrenched criticisms of Livy as mindless copyist and uncritical 
historian and subsequently opened the door for the more recent treatments of the AUC as 
a literary and historiographic work.9 Luce argues that Livy consulted various texts in 
preparation for the composition of each pentad or decade in order to lay out the overall 
architecture of each narrative section before composing his account largely from his 
recollection of these sources.10 Luce’s analysis largely closed the door on 
Quellenforschung and opened up new avenues of research for Livy as a literary 
historian.11  
In recent decades, scholars have analyzed the AUC using a variety of literary 
theories and focusing on a number of themes that have allowed Livian scholarship to 
move beyond the questions of historicity and the strictures of Quellenforschung. Levene, 
for instance, surveys Livy’s use of religion within the AUC and, more recently, he 
demonstrates the larger unity of the third decade and argues that moralism is at the heart 
                                               
8 For the term “howlers” and this type of analysis of Livy’s work: Walsh 1958 and 1961. 
9 Luce 1977.  
10 Luce 1977: 185-229. 
11 Detractors still remain, however: against recent historiographical analysis and its effect on modern 
historians: e.g. Lendon in Feldherr 2009: 41-61.  
 6 
 
of Livy’s construction of causation within the decade.12 Jaeger examines both the 
physical and literary aspects of monumentality within the AUC and Feldherr argues that 
the visual quality of Livy’s narrative produces the same effect on the external audience of 
the AUC that the spectacles recounted had on his internal audiences.13 Exemplarity has 
become a common theme in recent Livian scholarship. Chaplin and Roller have 
convincingly shown that exemplarity is the key heuristic tool employed by Livy.14 Much 
of Chaplin’s argument examines the exemplary qualities of Livy’s speeches and Haimson 
Lushkov has expanded upon this idea to demonstrate that speeches and debates about 
magistracy also serve as a form of exemplum within the AUC.15 In addition to Luce's 
more literary approach to Livy, these new analyses also largely follow Wiseman’s and 
Woodman’s rhetorically themed school of literary historiography.16 
While Wiseman, Woodman, and others have greatly advanced scholars’ 
understanding of the nature of historiographic oratory and the rhetorical quality of the 
works of ancient historians, they often treat speeches within these texts as standalone set 
pieces apart from the main narrative or they do not nuance the language of these internal 
speakers vis-à-vis its relation to that of the primary narrator. The application of the 
methods of narratology to Livy’s speeches and his relationship to his predecessors sheds 
further light on the role that internal narrators play in ancient historiographic works and 
                                               
12 Levene 1993 and 2010, respectively.  
13 Jaeger 1997 and Feldherr 1998. 
14 Chaplin 2000 and 2014 and Roller 2004, 2009, and 2011.  
15 Haimson Lushkov 2015.  
16 e.g. Wiseman 1979 and Woodman 1988.  
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also demonstrates how other types of secondary narration provide a means through which 
scholars can examine Livy’s engagement with his source texts.  
 Narratological theory seeks to explain and analyze texts that are considered 
largely narrative; that is, those that aim to convey a story over time through the voice of a 
narrator. Genette’s analysis of Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu was influential in 
the development of narratological theory, while Bal’s work provides a succinct 
introduction to its central tenets.17 Narratology analyzes the account of a “narrator,” or 
narrative agent, at three distinct levels: the text, story, and fabula.18 While the narratee, 
the audience or recipient of the account, only directly interacts with the “text,” these three 
levels are revealed through narratological analysis as distinct from one another and each 
is composed of its own characteristics.19 At the textual level, the narrator orders and 
constructs the story and employs focalizing agents in order to color the perception of the 
fabula, thereby providing meaning and guiding the narratee toward an interpretation of 
the text. The historiographic genre is well suited for narratological analysis as it 
ostensibly claims to relate the historical past as the fabula at the heart of its narrative and 
in that its generic tradition calls for elements of secondary narration through its use of 
deliberative and battlefield speeches.20 These internal, secondary narrators provide 
                                               
17 Genette [1972] 1980 and Bal [1985] 2009. In following Genette and Bal for my analysis, I have chosen 
to follow a school within the larger set of theories employed by narratologists that I feel best matches my 
approach to Livy’s AUC. For an introduction to four of narratology’s major trends (Rhetorical, Feminist, 
Mind-Oriented, and Antimimetic): Herman et al. 2012.  
18 On these three levels and how I see them functioning within the AUC, cf. Chapter 1, Part 2 below.   
19 I have defined “narratee” here with what I consider to be the simplest and most direct meaning of the 
term. For a discussion of the topic, with relevant bibliography, Bal [1985] 2009: 68 and 73.  
20 On the narratological use of speeches in historiography: de Jong 2004: 8-9. 
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embedded texts through which the primary narrator can construct and convey meaning to 
the narratee through the lens of a different speaker or from the perspective of a separate 
focalizer.  
 While narratology was developed to analyze fictional texts,21 there are a number 
of reasons to support its applicability to an analysis of Livy’s narrative: Hayden White 
argues that even modern historical works generally share many features in common with 
fictional narratives, much like their ancient historiographical counterparts.22 Furthermore, 
narratology has been widely applied to Greek literature and, more specifically, de Jong 
has examined the intricate structures and complex organization revealed by a 
narratological analysis of Herodotus’ Histories.23 Despite the forays made into this 
theoretical framework by students of Greek historiography, scholars have made little use 
of it for studies of the AUC. For instance, work on Livy’s chronological organization has 
not often been done from an explicitly narratological point of view but rather more 
generally by evaluating the overall “shape” or structure of his narrative.24 Pausch, 
however, has incorporated several features of narratology, including focalization, 
narrative sequence and anticipation, and pacing, in his analysis of how Livy engages his 
readers and sustains their interest throughout the text by communicating directly to that 
                                               
21 e.g. Gennette 1991 and Cohn 1999.  
22 Hayden White 1978 and 1987; cf. also Feeney 1993 on the interplay between fact, fiction, and 
believability in ancient historical narrative.  
23 On Greek literature generally: de Jong et al. 2004. Narratological analysis of Herodotus’ Histories: de 
Jong 1999, 2001, and 2002.  
24 e.g. Rich 1997, Levene 2010: 1-81 
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external audience.25 Beyond the generic association that Livy shares with Herodotus, the 
arrangement and tone of Livy’s narrative has many parallels with Herodotus’ Histories, 
as was recognized among even ancient critics (e.g. Quint. Inst. Orat. 10.1.101). While 
there is room for more work directly comparing these two historians, the similarities 
between their narratives reinforces the soundness of a narratological approach to Livy’s 
Third Decade.  
Since this dissertation explores how the primary narrator of the AUC places his 
work within and among various source texts using acts of secondary narration, Livy's 
Third Decade offers an ideal situation for this type of analysis: First, Livy constructs this 
decade as a narrative whole, as Levene has recently demonstrated.26 Second, whole or at 
least extended portions of Polybius' parallel narrative of the Hannibalic war are extant.27 
Third, numerous fragments of Livy's Roman historiographic predecessors survive that 
correspond to the span of the narrative of the Third Decade. The Third Decade of the 
AUC therefore provides the opportunity to examine both the previously existing texts (in 
various states of survival) and Livy's use of these sources. Additionally, the Third Decade 
remains underrepresented in modern scholarship, although the episodes found within 
these books of the AUC describe some of the most exciting and pivotal events in the 
history of the Roman Republic: Hannibal’s sack of Saguntum and crossing of the Alps, 
                                               
25 Pausch 2010: 183-209 and 2011. Pausch’s discussion of focalization as a means of conveying meaning to 
Livy’s external audience is particularly rich: Pausch 2011: 125-90.  
26 Levene 2010.  
27 Polybius’ account of the Hannibalic War comprises the entirety of his third book—which narrates the 
war up to the crisis that arises in Rome after the disaster at Cannae—and then fragments of the symploke 
from Books Six to Fifteen. Many of the fragments from these books survive in large, extended narratives.  
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the battles of Trasimene, Cannae, and Zama, the campaigns of Fabius Maximus and 
Scipio Africanus, and the political and social turmoil that transpired in Capua, Syracuse, 
and Rome, to name but a few chief examples. Both Livy (21.1.1-3) and Polybius (1.1.5-
2.8) note their enthusiasm for taking up the task of describing the Second Punic War and 
claim that its impact on history surpasses that of all other periods of the past. Livy’s 
Third Decade, as the longest extended narrative of that war, holds an iconic and pivotal 
status within the Roman tradition of debate about Hannibal.  
Chapter One demonstrates how I use the two major methodological approaches 
that lie at the heart of my analysis: intertextuality and narratological theory. I survey a 
series of well-known intertexts in the opening to the Third Decade to develop a richer 
appreciation of Livy’s allusive program. I then compare limited details of the narratives 
of Nepos, Polybius, and Livy for the fabula of Hannibal’s trek across the Alps to 
demonstrate how the three levels of a narrative (text, story, fabula) work within 
historiographic texts. I close the chapter with close readings of the speeches of Mago and 
Varro in reaction to the Battle of Cannae to show how narratology and intertextuality 
work together for Livy in his most overt type of secondary narration: internal speakers. 
These speeches demonstrate how Livy incorporates and subsequently caps his 
predecessor's narratives in the text of the AUC.  
 Chapters Two and Three work together to establish a paradigm for my argument 
of Livy’s methodological approach to integrating his source texts through acts of internal 
narration. These two chapters focus on two key figures for the Third Decade, Hannibal 
and Scipio, and on the relationship between Polybius’ and Livy’s use of these two 
 11 
 
generals as internal narrators. Chapter Two comprises a narratological study of the figure 
of Hannibal in Polybius’ and Livy’s texts. First, Polybius makes frequent use of Hannibal 
as an internal narrator in his Histories and creates within his speeches a rhetoric that 
corresponds to the language Polybius uses to describe his own historiographic process 
centering on opsis and autopsy. Building on this argument, the second half of Chapter 
Two shows how Livy incorporates Polybius’ characterizations of Hannibal into his own 
narrative through Hannibal’s role as an internal narrator within the AUC. Hannibal speaks 
with a Polybian voice in the Third Decade and, as such, Livy creates an analogous 
relationship between Hannibal and Polybius in his narrative. Chapter Three performs a 
similar analysis of Scipio’s role in both historians’ texts. For Polybius, Scipio too reflects 
his own methodological approach. When compared to Polybius’ account, however, Livy 
often removes elements of Polybian opsis and replaces them with a focus on 
exemplarity—a key component of Livy’s historiographic methodology—in Scipio’s role 
as an internal narrator.  
These two chapters largely focus on several pivotal and well-known episodes in 
the Hannibalic War: the Carthaginians’ trek across the Alps, the Battles in Northern Italy 
in the opening stages of the war, the opening of Scipio’s campaign in Spain, his debate 
with Fabius over the invasion of Africa, and, finally, the narrative surrounding the Battle 
of Zama. I concentrate my analysis on these familiar episodes for two reasons: First, each 
of them has a rich narrative that includes speeches from various characters, detailed 
descriptions of the behavior of various characters, and often comments made by the 
external narrator in an effort to explain the significance of these events. Second, the 
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sections of Polybius’ Histories corresponding to these episodes survive largely intact.28 
Together, Chapters Two and Three offer a rich case-study of Livian narratological 
practice, as they analyze the most explicit type of secondary narration (character-bound 
speeches) and show Livy’s direct incorporation of and engagement with the 
narratological features of a surviving text (Polybius).  
Livy’s relationship with Polybius has continued to be a contentious topic among 
scholars. Nissen’s Law argues that Livy worked from one main source at a time in the 
composition of his narrative and that Polybius did not become a major source for Livy 
until Book 24.29 Nissen’s argument long held sway and most scholars who worked on 
Livy’s use of sources operated under the belief that Polybius came to be an important 
source for Livy at various later points within the Decade.30 Tränkle argued that Livy only 
turns to Polybius’ account for his discussion of the Macedonian Wars at the start of Book 
31 of the AUC, at which point the Greek author becomes his primary source.31 Tränkle 
has remained a vital figure on the topic. Levene, however, has recently demonstrated in 
his analysis of Livy’s Third Decade that Polybius’ Histories were, in fact, a major source 
for the later author’s account of the Hannibalic War, even though Livy refers to him by 
                                               
28 Polyb. 3 survives in full and covers the origins of the war through the end of the Battle of Cannae. 
Scipio’s initial campaigns in Spain survive in the lengthy fragments of Book 10 and Zama in the fragments 
of Book 15.  
29 Nissen 1863: 83-85. Briscoe 1993: 39 discusses the impact of Nissen on studies of Livy’s methods of 
working with his sources.  
30 e.g., Walsh 1961: 124-32, Treptow 1964: 209, de Sanctis 1968: 168-73. cf. the discussion about the 
Battle of Zama in Chapter 4, Part 3 below.  
31 Tränkle 1977: 193-241.  
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name only once in the decade (30.45.5).32 Levene makes a direct comparison of these two 
authors in their narratives of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, but his overall conclusion 
applies to the whole decade in that he demonstrates that the parallels in content are 
enough to maintain the allusive relationship.33  
At the heart of my analysis of Livy’s and Polybius’ portrayals of Hannibal and 
Scipio is a comparison between opsis, a key component of Polybius’ historiographic 
method, and exemplarity, the primary heuristic tool that Livy employs in writing his 
history. For Polybius, opsis and his own autopsy establish his credibility and authority as 
a historian. His claims to have examined places, inscriptions, and to have interviewed 
direct eyewitnesses make him a more trustworthy historian than his predecessors (e.g. 
3.33.17-18, 3.48.12, 4.2.2, or his well-known attack on Timaeus at 12.25g.1-4). Polybius 
also infuses his narrative with language oriented toward sight and spectacle so that his 
Histories evoke in the mind of the reader a clear image of the events described in order to 
accomplish its didactic aims (e.g. 1.1.2-4, 1.4.1-2, 1.35.1-7). In Chapters Two and Three I 
argue that Polybius creates a similar aura of visual expression within his depictions of 
Hannibal and Scipio in their campaigns in Italy and Spain, respectively. These two 
internal narrators use language modeled on Polybius’ own historiographic methods and 
serve roles analogous to the external narrator and historian. 
                                               
32 Levene 2010: esp. Ch. 2, pp. 82-163 on “Sources and Intertexts” generally and pp. 135-63 for his 
argument that Polybius is a major source for the Third Decade and whose text Livy reworks in his 
incorporation to a greater degree than he does in the Fourth Decade.  
33 Levene 2010:  126-63 deals with the question of Livy’s sources for the third decade at length. On the sole 
reference to Polybius in the Third Decade, cf. Chapter 4, Part 4, below.  
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Livy’s historiographic method makes ample use of exemplarity. As an external 
narrator Livy notes how exempla are useful as a means of providing instruction for proper 
moral behavior (praef.10-12). Internal narrators, too, make frequent use of exemplary 
language in their speeches.34 Livy’s method of exemplarity is built upon the ability of the 
commemoration of valorous acts through speeches and monuments that call for repetition 
of similar types of behaviors.35 In the second half of the Third Decade, Scipio takes on a 
central role as an internal narrator that uses Livian methods of exemplarity.36 In Chapter 
Three I explore how Livy integrates into the speeches of Scipio elements drawn from 
Polybius’ text but removes the elements of opsis and instead highlights Scipio’s use of 
exempla. As such, Livy creates a role for Scipio as an internal narrator that parallels and 
mirrors his own function and methodology as an external narrator.  
Chapters Two and Three combine to establish that within the Third Decade 
Hannibal and Scipio serve as internal narrators whose language and functions are 
analogous to those of Polybius and Livy, respectively. Chapter Four picks up this thread 
and examines the interpretive payoff that this has for each historian’s narrative of the 
Battle of Zama by focusing on the meeting between the two generals and their battlefield 
exhortations. For Polybius, the Battle of Zama allows him to contrast two aspects of his 
opsis-based approach to historiography, with Hannibal and Polybius each representing 
one type of visual means of instruction. Livy exploits the relationship between Hannibal 
as a Polybian narrator and Scipio as a Livian exemplary speaker in the Battle of Zama 
                                               
34 esp. Chaplin 2000.  
35 Roller 2004, 2009, and 2011.  
36 Chaplin 2000: esp. 61-65, 80-85, 90-97, and 121-34.  
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and has these two generals serve as analogues for the approaches of the historians whom 
they analogously represent. Scipio’s victory at Zama signifies a triumph of Livian 
historiography over Polybius.  
Using Chapters Two through Four as a paradigm for my analysis of Livy’s 
engagement with his predecessors, Chapter Five examines the incorporation into the AUC 
of other narratives of the Roman historiographic tradition. The now fragmentary remains 
of Livy’s Roman predecessors leave open larger questions for their narrative structures or 
their relationship to the AUC. These texts are preserved mainly through literary and 
lexicographic sources, with only a few culled from the exegetical tradition, and only very 
rarely do identifiable fragments survive from physical remnants, such as papyrological or 
epigraphic remains.37 Badian provides the basic, though reductive, narrative of the 
development of historiography at Rome up to the Late Republic.38 His article, while 
seminal, focuses on the similarities between the surviving bodies of fragments and he 
thereby posits nearly identical structures for the authors’ works and extrapolates very few 
divergences within this tradition aside from the basic annalist-monograph split. Still, this 
article has informed much of the work on early Roman historiography. Recent editions of 
the corpora of the fragmentary historians of Rome have created an atmosphere primed for 
                                               
37 Of the three papyrological fragments catalogued in FRHist, two (Anon. 1 [109] F1 = POxy 2088 and 
Anon. 2 [110] F1 = POxy 30) are of unidentifiable authorship and the third ([Hadrian (97) F7 = PFayum 
19) consists of a letter that has been suggested as the possible opening of Hadrian’s autobiography. The 
sole epigraphic fragment (Lutatius [32] F10 = Inscr.Ital. 13.2.122-3) comes from a section of the Fasti 
Praenestini. Hoyos 2001 also makes the case that P.Ryl. III 491 is a fragment of Fabius Pictor, but Cornell 
2014: 1.167, n. 33 dismisses Hoyos’ argument, based on the timing of the events it contains, and claims 
instead that the fragment likely derives from one of the Pro-Carthaginian sources on the Hannibalic War, 
Sosylus (FGrHist 176) or Silenus (FGrHist 175), for instance.  
38 Badian 1966.  
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work on these authors. Chassignet’s Budé volumes of the fragments comprised the first 
complete edition of the fragmentary corpora since Peter’s influential Historicorum 
Romanorum Reliquiae.39 Chassignet has since been followed by Beck and Walter and 
now, most recently, Cornell et al., whose monumental edition of The Fragments of the 
Roman Historians provides new insight into the corpora of Livy’s Roman predecessors in 
that Cornell and his co-editors have reorganized and produced new commentary for all of 
the fragments of these historians.40 This long-awaited collection allows for a reappraisal 
of even basic facts maintained about these now fragmentary authors. Chapter Five 
analyzes the remains of Livy’s Roman historiographic predecessors on the Hannibalic 
War with a focus on Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias, who are Livy’s two main 
sources as explicitly cited within the third decade.41 For Coelius and Antias, I first 
examine the fragments of these authors from non-Livian cover texts before comparing 
them to Livy’s citation of their texts or moments where Livy incorporates aspects of their 
narratives into his own, in much the same way as he did with features of Polybius’ 
Histories.42 This analysis demonstrates that Livy integrates the larger Roman 
historiographic tradition into the AUC and allows the voices of his predecessors to speak 
through his text.  
                                               
39 Chassignet 1996-2004; Peter 1906 and 1914.  
40 Beck and Walter 2001 and 2004; Cornell et al. 2014.  
41 Livy’s citations of Coelius Antipater in the Third Decade: 21.38.6, 21.46.10, 21.47.4, 22.31.8-9, 23.6.8, 
26.11.10, 27.27.13, 28.46.14, 29.25.3, 29.27.14, 29.35.2; of Valerius Antias: 25.39.14, 26.49.3, 26.49.5, 
28.46.14, 29.35.2, 30.3.6, 30.19.11, 30.29.7).  
42 In separating the Livian and non-Livian fragments of these authors for my analysis, I am following the 
methodology of Elliot 2013, whose recent work on Ennius’ Annales in relation to Vergil’s Aeneid. This 
will allow me to minimize the potential for circularity in arguing that Livy incorporates these narratives by 
first establishing what trends are present in the non-Livian fragments.  
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Chapter One 
Narrative, Intertext, and Speech in Livy’s Third Decade  
 
Part 1: The Intertextual Program at the Opening of the Third Decade:  
 
In parte operis mei licet mihi praefari, quod in principio summae 
totius professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores, bellum maxime 
omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint me scripturum, quod 
Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere.1 (Livy 
21.1.1) 
 
I am able to make a preface for just a part of my work that most writers 
of history have declared in the opening of their whole account: that I will 
write about the most memorable of all the wars that have ever been 
fought, namely, the one which the Carthaginians—with Hannibal as their 
leader—waged against the Roman people. 
 
Livy begins the Third Decade of the AUC with a new preface to set it apart from what has 
preceded it.2 Here the narrator lays out the text’s topic (the war with Hannibal) and offers 
a qualification of how that subject compares to the accounts of previous historians. 
Beyond the overt competitive nature of these lines, Livy draws intertextual connections 
with his predecessors by starting his Third Decade with comments relating back to other 
historiographic texts. 
Intertextual approaches to the AUC have been in vogue of late.3 From the preface 
to several of the opening episodes, Livy opens his account of the Hannibalic War with a 
series of conspicuous allusions that illustrate the types of complex textual connections of 
                                               
1 For the Latin text of Livy given throughout the dissertation I follow the OCT texts of Walters and 
Conway (Bks 21-25) and Conway and Johnson (26-30), except where noted.  
2 On this preface and its contribution to the overall narrative structure of the decade, Levene 2010: 9-15. 
3 v. O’Gorman 2009, Levene 2010, 2011, and 2014, Polleichtner 2010, and Haimson Lushkov 2013b, e.g.  
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which his narrative is capable. Some of these references have been recognized and 
studied in isolation. I will review these allusions in succession, with a focus on the 
methodology the historian uses to mark them, in order to demonstrate the kind of allusive 
program that the historian builds into the opening of his Third Decade. I will explore how 
Livy’s work heightens his audience’s awareness of his approach to intertextuality through 
the employment of increasingly vague—though still recognizable—allusive techniques. 
Livy’s amplificatio, a common trope employed by historians at the openings of their 
works, is here an overt act of one-upmanship: he will write the history of the greatest war 
ever fought in only a part of his work.4 Livy makes an anonymous citation to the group of 
earlier authors: plerique...rerum scriptores.5 This type of reference is a step removed 
from an explicit, named citation, but it does heighten the audience’s awareness of the 
author’s relation to target texts. Of these potential sources, one prior historian in 
particular stands out: Thucydides.6 In the preface to his account of the Peloponnesian 
War, the Greek historian makes the following claim:  
                                               
4 Marincola 1997: 34-43 discusses the larger trend of amplificatio or auxēsis in the openings of the works 
of ancient historians.  
5 On the designation “anonymous citation” and other types of historiographic citation and reference, v. 
Haimson Lushkov 2013b. 
6 For the Thucydidean intertext here, v. also Rodgers 1986: 336; Marincola 1997: 41-2; Polleichtner 2010: 
74-77; and Pausch 2011: 144. Levene 2010: p. 9, n. 13 also notes a Sallustian turn of phrase in Livy’s me 
scripturum: cf. Sall. BJ 5.1: scripturus sum. cf. also Levene 1992: 55-6 on Sallust’s preface and its break 
from the convention of amplificatio. Thucydides’ preface likewise is an amplification of Herodotus’: 
Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα 
γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, 
τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι (1.1). “This is the publication of the inquiry of 
Herodotus of Halicarnassus so that the deeds done by men would not become forgotten in time, and so that 
the great and marvelous deeds, performed by both Greeks and barbarians, would not be without fame, both 
other things and, in particular, the cause for which they went to war with one another.” Thucydides’ μέγαν 
recalls Herodotus’ μεγάλα; his ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους a cap of Herodotus’ ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι. 
Thucydides replaces Herodotus’ θωμαστά with ἀξιολογώτατον, pointing to a characteristic difference 
between the two authors’ accounts: while Herodotus recounts the marvelous, Thucydides focuses on events 
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Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων 
καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς 
καθισταμένου καὶ ἐλπίσας μέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν 
προγεγενημένων (1.1.1) 
 
Thucydides of Athens recorded the war between the Peloponnesians 
and Athenians, how they made war against each other, and taking it up 
right from the beginning, as he thought that it would be great and the 
most worthy of mention of those that have occurred. 
 
Thucydides’ superlative ἀξιολογώτατον is recalled through Livy’s maxime…memorabile. 
In each text the war to be discussed is compared through the superlative phrase to those 
that have occurred in the past (τῶν προγεγενημένων; omnium…quae unquam gesta sint). 
The authors’ presences as recorders of these events are noted in both texts 
(Θουκυδίδης…ξυνέγραψε; mei…praefari…me scripturum). While Livy does not name 
himself, compared to Thucydides’ third person, he uses a more vivid first person after the 
impersonal main verb (licet) and as the subject of the indirect statement that follows 
(after professi sunt).7 Livy also repeats the first person pronoun (mei…me), doubling his 
appearance in the opening lines to the decade, compared to Thucydides’ single 
appearance (Θουκυδίδης). The references found in Livy’s amplificatio mark Thucydides’ 
Histories as the one of the texts which Livy claims to be able to surpass.8 Thucydides 
makes his grandstanding claim for his entire work, a practice followed by Livy’s other 
                                               
worthy of logos. Whether Livy purposefully recalls the Herodotean preface with parallel language (μεγάλα, 
maxime; ἐπολέμησαν, bellum) or merely through the lens of his Thucydidean amplicatio, the all-inclusive 
nature of Livy’s claim props the AUC over even Herodotus’ Histories.  
7 In his general praefatio, too, Livy does not mention himself by name, but similarly appears through first 
person references (facturus…sim, perscripserim, scio, sciam, ausim, videam, consoler; praef.1.1-3). Livy 
does, however, allude to his birthplace by describing the foundation of Padua (1.1.2-3), but in the preface 
and elsewhere he breaks from tradition by making no explicit mention of his name and birthplace: Kraus 
1994: 1-2.  
8 cf. also Clauss 1997: 173-4.  
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anonymous predecessors, as indicated by summae totius. Livy, however, does so for only 
a part (partis). Through the synecdoche of his replacement of summae totius with partis, 
Livy takes a metonymic precedence over the anonymous authors he mentions in his 
preface.  
The connection between Livy and Thucydides is further strengthened as each 
justifies their grand claims. Livy’s intertextual one-upmanship continues in the next 
section of his preface to the Third Decade:  
Nam neque ualidiores opibus ullae inter se ciuitates gentesque con-
tulerunt arma neque his ipsis tantum unquam uirium aut roboris fuit. et 
haud ignotas belli artes inter sese sed expertas primo Punico conferebant 
bello, et adeo uaria fortuna belli ancepsque Mars fuit ut propius 
periculum fuerint qui uicerunt. (21.1.2) 
 
For neither did any states and nations that were more powerful in 
wealth and resources ever bear arms against each other, nor was there 
ever such a strength or power as that which these very people had. The 
arts of war they practiced were not unknown to each other, but were 
tried and tested in the First Punic War, and the fortune of the war was 
so varied and Mars so fickle that those who conquered in the end came 
nearer to ruin. 
 
Livy claims that the strength of Rome and Carthage exceeds all those that had come 
before, including, logically, Sparta and Athens. In his preface, Thucydides offers the 
following rationale as proof of his assertion that his account covers events that are worth 
mention: “He takes as proof of this that both sides were at their peak in terms of all their 
preparations and resources for this war” (τεκμαιρόμενος ὅτι ἀκμάζοντές τε ᾖσαν ἐς αὐτὸν 
ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ; Thuc. Hist. 1.1.1). While Thucydides merely states that 
his two combatant nations were at their own respective peaks, Livy caps his Greek 
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predecessor’s claim. The correlatives neque…ullae, neque…unquam, the latter of which 
recalls unquam from a relative clause in the opening sentence of the internal preface, 
highlight Livy’s separation from his predecessors’ subjects. As Livy opens the Third 
Decade with his reference to Thucydides’ preface, he subsumes into his own work the 
traditions of Greek historiography and demonstrates how his subject matter transcends 
that of his famous predecessor. Livy’s use of the anonymous citation to Thucydides, 
moreover, augments the amplificatio of his preface and stands as more than just a generic 
marker, but as an indication of his intertextual approach to the forthcoming narrative.  
Livy’s claim also notes how he surpasses Thucydides with an account that 
features more alternations of fortune for each side (varia fortuna belli ancepsque Mars). 
Two other allusions also stand out: First, Livy mentions varia fortuna and anceps Mars, 
concepts that echo Polybius’ central emphasis on Tychē and the role that history plays in 
helping people deal with the vicissitudes of human life.9 While Livy’s use of Polybius as 
early as Book 21 remains a contested point, Levene has recently and convincingly argued 
that Livy’s narrative draws on Polybius’ Histories for Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps 
and all but the harshest critics of the relationship between Livy and Polybius find some 
reference to the latter by at least the later parts of the Third Decade.10 An allusive 
                                               
9 On Polybian Tychē, v. esp. RE Polybios 1532-43; Pédech 1964: Cap. VII and passim; Walbank 1985: 
210-23, 2002: 245-57, and 2011; Eckstein 1995: 254-71. Polybius presents the role of fortune in historical 
events as early as his proem: 1.1.2 and 1.4; for several of his other comments about Tychē and history, v. 
also 1.63.9, 29.21.5-6, 29.27.12, 36.17.2-4, and 38.21.3. For Polybius’ comments about the role of history 
in helping one deal with the vagaries of the human condition, v. 1.1.2 and 1.1.4, e.g. On Fortuna in Livy: 
Levene 1993, esp. 30-33, and Kajanto 1957.  
10 Levene 2010: 135-63. For further discussion of Livy’s use of Polybius in the Third Decade, see the 
Introduction, above. For an argument against the use of Polybius before Book 31: Tränkle 1977: 193-241.  
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reference to varia fortuna within the proem for the Third Decade suggests that Polybius’ 
Histories and his approach to Tychē should not be absent from the minds of Livy’s 
audience.  
Another allusion drawn in the second line of the decade’s preface originates from 
Livy’s note that the Romans and Carthaginians became experienced (expertas) with each 
other’s arts of war during their previous engagements. This serves, on the one hand, as an 
allusion to the first two books of Polybius’ Histories, which narrate the First Punic War 
in detail. On the other hand, the note of the earlier war is also an intratextual reference to 
an earlier section of the AUC. Books Sixteen to Nineteen, now lost, narrate the events of 
the First Punic War.11 As Livy self-referentially looks back to his own text, the 
implication that the Romans and Carthaginians are well versed in or understand each 
other’s tactics suggests that the audience’s engagement with Livy’s AUC can similarly 
remove ignorance (ignotas) and create better comprehension of the past, thus fulfilling 
the didactic aims that Livy sets out in his general preface.12 
After Livy completes his prefatory remarks to the Third Decade, he opens his 
narrative of the Hannibalic war with a brief flashback relating the famous story of 
Hannibal’s childhood oath. As Livy makes very few striking chronological analepses in 
                                               
11 While these books are, unfortunately, now lost, the Periochae for these four books mention the highlights 
of the First Punic War, beginning with the origin of the Carthaginians (Origo Carthaginiensium et 
primordia urbis eorum referuntur: Per. 16.1), and concluding in the nineteenth book with the treaty 
between the two states (petentibus Carthaginiensibus pax data est: Per. 19.25). For a summary of the 
issues surrounding the Periochae in general, v. Bessone 2015. Begbie 1967, Bingham 1978, and Jal 1984 
create different lists of discrepancies between the surviving books and the corresponding Periochae, they 
generally point to more harmony than alteration. On other sources for the Periochae and possible 
intermediaries: Begbie 1967, Bingham, 1978, Hellegouarc’h 1994, and Hose 1994. 
12 On the general preface, Moles 1993.  
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the AUC, the inclusion of one at such an important point in his narrative is striking.13 
Livy describes the vow as follows:  
Fama est etiam Hannibalem annorum ferme nouem, pueriliter 
blandientem patri Hamilcari ut duceretur in Hispaniam, cum perfecto 
Africo bello exercitum eo traiecturus sacrificaret, altaribus admotum 
tactis sacris iure iurando adactum se cum primum posset hostem fore 
populo Romano. (21.1.4) 
 
There is even a story that Hannibal, when he was around nine years old, 
was boyishly coaxing his father, Hamilcar, to take him to Spain. After 
the completion of the African war, when Hamilcar was making a 
sacrifice as he was about to cross over to Spain, Hannibal was forced to 
approach the altar, touch the sacred objects, and to swear with an oath 
that he would be an enemy to the Roman people as soon as he was 
able.  
 
Livy opens his account with an Alexandrian footnote: fama est.14 As an impersonal 
citation, the phrase frames the story and demonstrates Livy’s awareness of the larger 
tradition of accounts or debates about Hannibal’s oath: the tradition is the fama to which 
the historian refers. Additionally, the Alexandrian footnote indicates Livy’s contention 
                                               
13 On Livy’s overall narrative organization in the Third Decade, Levene 2010: 34-63. Levene shows how 
Livy uses language feigning simultaneity to events that could not be synchronous as a way of tying various 
elements of his narrative together. Livy’s analepses are often very brief summaries or reminders of events 
that he marks as having significance at that point in his narrative: Levene 2010: 68-70. Some of these minor 
analepses include: 29.23.3, where the alliance of Hasdrubal and Syphax warrants mention of their first 
meeting with Scipio (28.18), or 29.6.1, where the recapture of Locri prompts a reminder of when it 
defected from Rome (24.1). While it is conceivable that Livy also recounted the event in its proper 
chronological sequence somewhere in Books 16-19, there is no indication of this in the Periochae or 
surviving fragments.  
14 On the Alexandrian footnote, v. esp. Ross 1975: 78; on its use in intertextual and self-referential passages 
especially, Hinds 1998: 1-5. Moore 2010: 151-59 on uncertain citations like the Alexandrian footnote and 
how Livy uses them to cast doubt on the authority of tradition. cf. Miles 1995: 38. Haimson Lushkov 
2013b, in her typology of practices of historiographic citation, designates the Alexandrian footnote as an 
impersonal citation, unnamed in a fashion similar to the anonymous citation noted above, but slightly more 
vague and often indicative of Livy’s awareness of an existing tradition or scholarly debate surrounding the 
topic or event in question, as she notes for his satis constat at 1.1.1.  
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that the story is merely a rumor and not historical fact.15 Most importantly, however, just 
as it highlights the presence of a previously existing literary discourse about the oath, the 
Alexandrian footnote also mobilizes any intertexts that influence the passage.  
Two accounts of Hannibal’s oath that predate Livy survive: Polybius’ Histories 
and Nepos’ biography of the Carthaginian general.16 Each of these authors sets the story 
within the context of Hannibal’s period of exile in the court of King Antiochus after the 
conclusion of the Second Punic War. Both texts also relate the tale of the oath as an 
internal narrative text spoken by Hannibal himself. First, Polybius’ account of the oath 
appears as part of his discussion of the origins of the Hannibalic War (3.6-12), as he 
describes the importance of the personal enmity of the Barcids toward Rome in bringing 
about the renewed conflict:  
ἔφη γάρ, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον μέλλοι 
στρατεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἔτη μὲν ἔχειν ἐννέα, θύοντος δ' αὐτοῦ 
τῷ Διὶ παρεστάναι παρὰ τὸν βωμόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καλλιερήσας κατασπείσαι 
τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ ποιήσαι τὰ νομιζόμενα, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους τοὺς περὶ τὴν 
θυσίαν ἀποστῆναι κελεῦσαι μικρόν, αὐτὸν δὲ προσκαλεσάμενον ἐρέσθαι 
φιλοφρόνως εἰ βούλεται συνεξορμᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν στρατείαν. ἀσμένως δὲ 
κατανεύσαντος αὐτοῦ καί τι καὶ προςαξιώσαντος παιδικῶς, λαβόμενον 
                                               
15 For the use of the Alexandrian footnote as a means of discounting the historical truth behind an account, 
cf. Lucretius dRN 5.395 and 5.412. In both instances Lucretius uses ut fama est to discount the reliability of 
the myth of Deucalion.  
16 On the date of Nepos’ On Foreign Generals, Stem 2012: 12-14 and 29-30, who dates the composition of 
the collection to 35-32 BCE. This should certainly predate even the earliest estimates for Livy’s 
composition of the Third Decade, which likely has a terminus post quem of 25 BCE or 19 BCE, depending 
on whether his mention of the subjugation of Spain under Augustus at 28.12.12 refers to the princeps’ own 
campaign from 27-25 BCE or Agrippa’s in 20-19 BCE. On the dating of the reference as well as that of the 
First Decade, Luce 1965, esp. 209-10. Haehling 1989 discusses the dating of Livy’s texts with internal 
references at length. On issues of dating and its importance to interpretations of the text, Henderson 1989 
and Moles 1993. cf., too, Foucault 1968: 214-19 on these two versions and their potential influence on 
Livy. 
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τῆς δεξιᾶς προςαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸς τὸν βωμὸν καὶ κελεύειν ἁψάμενον 
τῶν ἱερῶν ὀμνύναι μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις εὐνοήσειν.17 (3.11.5-7) 
 
He said that at the time his father was about to make a military 
expedition to Spain with his forces he was nine years old and stood next 
to the altar as his father was making a sacrifice to Zeus. After he 
obtained favorable omens, he poured a libation to the gods and made the 
customary rites. He then asked the others at the sacrifice to stand a little 
farther away and kindly asked Hannibal, whom he called forward, if he 
wished to accompany him on the campaign. After Hannibal gladly 
assented and additionally demanded in a childlike fashion, he took hold 
of his right hand and led him to the altar and ordered him, after laying 
his hand on the sacrificial offerings, to swear never to be a friend to 
the Romans.  
 
Nepos places the narrative of the oath immediately after his introduction and, like 
Polybius, uses it to demonstrate a familial hatred toward Rome shared by both father and 
son.18 He too has Hannibal tell the story, but, unlike Polybius, uses direct speech for the 
general’s recollection of the tale:19  
'pater meus' inquit 'Hamilcar puerulo me, utpote non amplius nouem 
annos nato, in Hispaniam imperator proficiscens Karthagine Ioui 
optimo maximo hostias immolauit. quae diuina res dum conficiebatur, 
quaesiuit a me uellemne secum in castra proficisci. id cum libenter 
accepissem atque ab eo petere coepissem ne dubitaret ducere, tum ille 
“faciam” inquit, “si mihi fidem quam postulo dederis.” simul me ad 
aram adduxit, apud quam sacrificare instituerat, eamque ceteris remotis 
tenentem iurare iussit numquam me in amicitia cum Romanis fore.' 
(Nep. Hann. 2.3-4) 
 
“My father Hamilcar,” he says, “when I was a little boy, no more than 
nine years old, and he was setting out as a commander from Carthage 
                                               
17 The Greek text of Polybius used throughout the dissertation is copied from the TLG database and follows 
the numbering system of Paton, Walbank, and Habicht’s Loeb Classical Library volumes.  
18 Though the tale is recounted as a flashback told by Hannibal while in exile, the story of the oath itself is 
the earliest event narrated in the Carthaginian’s life, which also makes its placement at the opening of the 
vita fitting. For a recent discussion of Nepos’ Hannibal and solutions for some of the problems it has 
presented to scholars, both for the biographer’s corpus as a whole and within the narrative of the life itself, 
Stem 2012: 23-29 and 40-44.  
19 Nepos’ frame for Hannibal recounting the oath while in Antiochus’ court is set up in Hann. 2.1-3.  
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into Spain, made a sacrificial offering to Juppiter Optimus Maximus. 
While this divine rite was being completed, he asked me if I wanted to 
set out to the camp with him. After I had gladly accepted and had begun 
to ask him not to hesitate to take me, he said: ‘I will, if you make me the 
promise that I demand.’ So, he led me to the altar where he had made the 
sacrifice, had everyone else removed, and ordered me to swear, holding 
onto the altar, that I would never be a friend to the Romans.”  
 
Nepos’ and Polybius’ accounts bear striking similarities to one another.20 Each text 
provides the frame of Antiochus’ court and a debate about the king’s intentions toward 
Rome. Each also sets the sacrifice and the oath itself at the point of Hamilcar’s departure 
for a campaign as Hannibal is nine years old. The sacrifice is made to the chief divinity 
(τῷ Διὶ/Ioui optimo maximo).21 Most importantly, too, the actual oath taken by the young 
Carthaginian has the same intention in each version, and both focus on the prohibition 
(μηδέποτε/numquam) on having a friendly disposition (εὐνοήσειν/in amicitia…fore) 
toward the Romans.  
Similarly, there are many parallels between the two predecessors’ accounts and 
Livy’s. Hannibal is nine years old. Hamilcar performs the sacrifice before setting out on a 
campaign, though, like Polybius, Livy favors the description of his goal—Spain (in 
Hispaniam/τὴν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν ἔξοδον)—over Nepos’ note of the point of departure, 
Carthage (Karthagine). The physical contact that Hannibal makes with the altar or 
offerings when he swears the oath is present in all three, though in perhaps another note 
                                               
20 To such a degree that I would suggest that Polybius’ Histories are a source for the biographer’s account 
of the episode, as I intend to explore in a forthcoming article on Hannibal’s exile within Nepos’ vita of the 
Carthaginian general.  
21 On the syncretism evident in the sacrifice to the markedly Roman Iovi optimo maximo, cf. Stem 2012: 
148. Stem notes the template is meant to communicate to his Roman audience that Hannibal swears the 
oath before his city’s chief deity.  
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of correction, Livy uses tactis sacris to describe the action. While tactis sacris is perhaps 
a direct translation of Polybius’ ἁψάμενον τῶν ἱερῶν, the substantive sacer can also 
designate the sacred apparatus or the altar, in a way that ἱερά generally does not. The 
connotation allows Livy’s description to mirror both Polybius’ note of contact with the 
offerings and Nepos’ account of the position of the child’s hand on the altar 
(eam…tenentem…me). Livy’s version of the oath conflates the two previously existing 
versions through a window reference that makes the connection to Polybius’ text visible 
through a correction of Nepos’ account of the oath.22  
The actual words of the pledge, however, are markedly different between Livy 
and his predecessors: While Polybius and Nepos describe the oath with the passive 
prohibition that Hannibal “never be a friend to the Romans” (μηδέποτε Ῥωμαίοις 
εὐνοήσειν/ numquam me in amicitia cum Romanis fore), Livy’s version of the oath 
suggests a more actively militant and hostile promise made by the young Carthaginian: 
“to make war on Rome as soon as possible” (se cum primum posset hostem fore populo 
Romano). The change coincides with the aggressive and bellicose portrayal of Hannibal 
that Livy draws in his account of the attack on Saguntum and the events that provoke 
Hannibal’s war with the Romans (21.5-15).23 Additionally, Nepos and Polybius both 
bookend their accounts of the oath within the setting of Hannibal’s exile in the east after 
                                               
22 On the term “window reference,” which is the adaptation of a model in such a way that makes the 
ultimate source of the model visible: Thomas 1986: 188-89.  
23 For instance, Hannibal’s decision to attack Saguntum knowing that it will provoke a Roman response 
(21.5.3), Hanno’s speech to the Carthaginian senate that describes the Barcid bloodlust for war with Rome 
(21.10), or Hannibal’s orders that all male Saguntines be executed (21.14.3-4) portray the Carthaginian 
general in a particularly bellicose light.  
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being ousted from Carthage. Livy, however, removes these notes of the fallen general’s 
time in the court of Antiochus in his depiction of the oath. This downplays at the early 
stage of the narrative the hints found in Nepos and Polybius of Hannibal's eventual defeat 
and instead keeps the focus solely on the war at hand: Hannibal's first chance to wage a 
campaign against the Romans, as Livy has him swear to do. Lastly, the fama alluded to 
by Livy’s Alexandrian footnote is the story that Hannibal relates and, in so doing, 
controls in both Polybius’ and Nepos’ versions of the oath. Livy’s appropriation of the 
account with the impersonal citation fama est allows him to subsume the Carthaginian’s 
speech act into the AUC while altering the actual words of the oath simultaneously asserts 
Livy’s authority over the narrative. This change in turn requires the character of Hannibal 
within Livy’s text to live up to an oath that the traditional literary depiction of the 
Carthaginian general never made. 
Perhaps the best known and most studied allusions in the Third Decade occur 
shortly after Livy’s account of Hannibal’s oath. As the historian begins to unfold the 
narrative of the general’s time in Spain early in the third decade, he pauses for a brief 
digression on the Carthaginian’s character. That the character sketch has verbal echoes 
with Sallust’s descriptions of the central figures of his two monographs—Catiline and 
Jugurtha—is well established.24 Instead of a thorough survey of this well plowed field, I 
                                               
24 v., e.g., Walsh 1973: 127, in his student commentary ad loc. notes that Livy even adopts a more 
Sallustian style in the character sketch; Ramsey 1984 ad Sall. BC 5.3-5; Clauss 1997 details these 
connections and shows that they extend beyond the opening to other parts of the Third Decade; Rossi 2004: 
376-8; Levene 2010: 99-104 discusses more fully the Jugurthan parallels and notes how these connections 
tie into Livy’s treatment and structuring of the Third Decade as a monograph, like Sallust’s BC and BJ, and 
that these three figures—Hannibal, Catiline, Jugurtha—share a key component in the threat that they pose 
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will take a brief look at one part of this passage to reveal the nature and function of the 
allusion to Sallust’s Catiline. One part of Livy’s digression describes Hannibal's physical 
and mental qualities:  
Plurimum audaciae ad pericula capessenda, plurimum consilii inter ipsa 
pericula erat. Nullo labore aut corpus fatigari aut animus uinci poterat. 
Caloris ac frigoris patientia par; cibi potionisque desiderio naturali, non 
uoluptate modus finitus; uigiliarum somnique nec die nec nocte 
discriminata tempora. (21.4.5-6) 
 
Hannibal was very bold when it came to facing dangers, and was very 
resourceful when in the midst of those dangers. No hardship was able to 
fatigue his body or conquer his mind. He was able to withstand heat and 
cold alike; his eating and drinking habits were set by the requirements of 
nature, not pleasure. Neither day nor night determined when he was 
awake or asleep.  
 
Livy’s characterization of Hannibal as a super-human able to withstand hardships beyond 
the ordinary recalls a digressive character sketch employed by Sallust in his monograph 
on the Catilinarian conspiracy. Sallust describes the qualities of Catiline as follows: 
L. Catilina, nobili genere natus, fuit magna vi et animi et corporis, sed 
ingenio malo pravoque. huic ab adulescentia bella intestina caedes 
rapinae discordia civilis grata fuere, ibique iuventutem suam exercuit. 
Corpus patiens inediae algoris vigiliae, supra quam quoiquam credibile 
est. (BC 5.1-3) 
 
Lucius Catiline, born from a noble family, had great vigor of both mind 
and body, but was evil and perverse in nature. From his youth, he took 
pleasure in civil wars, slaughter, plundering, and political discord, and he 
kept himself busy at these things in his early adulthood. His body could 
endure hunger, cold, and want of sleep beyond what would seem 
believable.  
 
                                               
to Rome. Clauss 1997: 170-72 also notes that some of Catiline’s physical qualities, such as his extreme 
endurance, are also present in Cicero’s Catilinarians.  
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Although the thematic parallels between these two passages are easily apparent, there are, 
perhaps surprisingly, no direct verbal parallels. Livy instead relies on the generic 
convention of the digressive character sketch, the passage’s position at the beginning of 
the Third Decade, and the comparable qualities of the characters to mobilize the allusions 
between his text and Sallust’s. Nevertheless, a brief comparison of these passages reveals 
several instances of one-upmanship on Livy's part.25 While Sallust's Catiline merely has 
great vigor of mind and body, the mind and body of Livy's Hannibal cannot be conquered 
by any hardship. Catiline can endure cold, but Hannibal thrives in heat and cold equally. 
Catiline can cope with some level of sleeplessness, while Hannibal has no need to resort 
to the circadian rhythms that dictate the lives of lesser humans. In appropriating Sallust's 
depiction into the AUC, Livy draws a lasting connection between Hannibal and Catiline 
through the intertext.  
 The three passages I have so far quoted, in the order in which they appear in the 
text, trace a pattern of allusive engagement. In the first instance, Livy employs an 
anonymous citation. In the second, he uses the slightly vaguer and impersonal 
Alexandrian footnote. Lastly, he resorts to unmarked allusion, relying on thematic 
similarities and a generic topos—historiography’s familiar digressive characterization—
to activate the reference. Livy thus moves from one of the more explicit types of intertext 
to the most opaque.  Taken as a whole, these three passages reveal the network of 
intertextuality that is woven into the opening of the Third Decade and provide a 
                                               
25 There are similar allusions to Sallust’s Jugurtha in these and other parts of Livy’s character sketch: v. 
Levene 2010: 99-104. Livy combines these two villainous figures into one through his description of 
Hannibal, another example of how he caps and surpasses Sallust in his account.  
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representative—and programmatic—sample of how Livy appropriates the historiographic 
tradition into his text. He not merely copies but also subsumes his predecessors' works 
into his narrative and ultimately outdoes or corrects them as he proceeds through his 
subject matter. Importantly, too, these allusions reveal the wealth and range of source 
material from which Livy draws in his composition of the Third Decade, including—
most notably for the subject at hand—Polybius. Livy’s referential display in the opening 
to the Third Decade mirrors the common and well known practice of Latin poets. 
Catullus and Horace, for example, each make allusive references to their predecessors to 
establish their place in the poetic tradition.26 
 
  
                                               
26 Horace as the “Roman Alcaeus,” e.g. in Ode 1.1.32, Lesboum…barbiton, or in the string of references 
made throughout the “Parade Odes”: Santirocco 1986, Woodman 2002, Lyne 2006. Catullus, too, makes a 
catalogue of references to his predecessors in the opening section of Cat. 64: e.g. Thomas 1982. Hubbard 
1995 has argued in his analysis of Vergil’s Eclogues and Theocritus’ Idylls that bucolic poetry iss 
particularly marked by allusive language that demonstrates the anxiety of influence bucolic poets felt 
toward their predecessors. cf., too, Lucretius in dRN as the Roman Epicurus and Prop. 3.  
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Part 2: Narratology and Historical Narrative 
 I now return to the preface to the Third Decade to examine how narrators and 
narrative structure function for Livy. Just as the internal preface reveals several facets of 
Livy’s intertextual techniques, as I argued above, it also demonstrates how Livy 
constructs the identity of his external narrator. The preface displays the strong presence 
of the narrating persona and makes resolute claims of the significance of the events to be 
recounted in the ensuing narrative:  
In parte operis mei licet mihi praefari, quod in principio summae totius 
professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores, bellum maxime omnium 
memorabile quae unquam gesta sint me scripturum, quod Hannibale 
duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. (Livy 21.1.1) 
 
I am able to make a preface for just a part of my work that most writers of 
history have declared in the opening of the their whole account: that I will 
write about the most memorable of all the wars that have ever been fought, 
namely, the one which the Carthaginians—with Hannibal as their leader—
waged against the Roman people. 
  
The narrating voice asserts the importance of the events to be recounted before starting 
the narrative proper: that they represent the most memorable of all those that have 
occurred. The intertextual qualities, discussed above, are limited to the comparison only 
with events that have been recorded. Here, however, the narrator claims a greater 
significance for his account because it surpasses all prior events, not just those that have 
previously been reported. Livy’s comments demonstrate the ability of an external narrator 
to provide explicit meaning and an external interpretation for a text outside of the story’s 
content. The narrating persona is removed from the acts being described and thereby has 
an ability to stake a claim to significance that lies outside the events depicted. The 
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separation between the raw material of the actions reported and the form that the 
narrative text takes is at the core of narratological theory.  
Ancient historical writing aims to construct a narrative of past events and to 
convey the meaning of those events to the text’s audience. Narratological theory seeks to 
explain the construction of various types of narration and the planes within them to 
determine how the structure and manner of the narrative provide an interpretation of the 
events related by the text. Accordingly, scholars have often used certain facets of 
narratology to examine historiographic texts.27 The various levels of narrative are a key 
component to narratological theory and were first explicated by Gérard Genette in his 
Figures series.28 At the heart of Genette’s schematization is the distinction between the 
histoire, the content being narrated, and the récit or discours, terms that variously 
describe the manner in which the histoire is narrated. Genette further breaks down the 
planes of a narrative act as follows: diegesis refers to any narrative act and the diegetic 
level is the plane in which the narrative occurs, the level at which the characters complete 
actions and express thoughts.29 The extradiegetic plane is the point of narration, 
containing the narrative’s telling and the comments, concerns, and interpretations of the 
narrator. A third level, alternatively called metadiegetic or hypodiegetic, describes frame 
narrative, in which an internal narrator recounts a narrative within the story itself. This 
                                               
27 Ankersmit 1983; de Jong 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2004; Rood 2004; Pausch 2010 and 2011, e.g. 
28 Genette Figures I-III (1967-70), translated into English in two works: Narrative Discourse: An Essay in 
Method (1980) and Figures of Literary Discourse (1982). Genette’s Figures lays out these concepts in a 
thorough analysis of Proust’s novel À la recherche du temps perdu.  
29 The diegetic level is sometimes also referred to as the intradiegetic level.  
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level often appears in the many speeches that are found in ancient historical writing and 
to which we will return to below.  
Mieke Bal’s Narratology simplifies the terminology, and organizes narrative into 
three levels: the text, the story, and the fabula.30 Throughout this dissertation I follow her 
definitions of these terms, which are as follows: the fabula consists of a series of events 
caused or experienced by actors. The fabula is the raw material of the acts recounted in 
the narrative, equivalent to Genette’s histoire. The story is a particular manifestation or 
inflection of the fabula, the narrator’s specific construction and arrangement of the basic 
tale. The text conveys that story along with other extradiegetic comments and 
explanations to an addressee. These three levels are concentric: the text, which for the 
purposes of this dissertation consists of the words on the page as we encounter them, 
contains within it the story, which, in turn, retains as its core constituent part a particular 
version of the fabula.  
As the narrator constructs the elements of the fabula into a specific story, the 
presentation of the events effects a particular coloring of that fabula. Potential 
modifications include: the sequential ordering of the events—a narrator may, for 
instance, present the events in strict chronological order or relate them in anachronism, 
using prolepses and analepses to flash forward and back in time. The pace of the 
narration may change between various manifestations of the fabula or even within a 
                                               
30 The term fabula, referring to the raw material of the content of the narrative as it is employed in 
narratological theory, is originally drawn from Russian formalism, in which it is juxtaposed with the term 
syuzhet, the manner of narration, equivalent to Bal’s story and Genette’s discours or récit. For these terms 
in Russian Formalist literature, v. Viktor Shklovsky 1991 [1925] and Vladimir Propp 1958 [1928].  
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particular story. The perspective of the narrative or—in other words—its point of 
focalization may change between one story and the next. Even when two narrative texts 
present the same or very similar stories, the texts themselves can differ widely in the 
identity of the narrator, the non-narrative comments made in the text, or the narrator’s use 
of description or embedded narration.  
Consider, for example, the fabula of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps. Any 
narrated version of the fabula includes a set of events and common details that make it 
recognizable as such (i.e., Hannibal has to lead the Carthaginian army over the Alps and 
into Italy). As the narrator constructs the fabula into a story, however, there is room for 
choice and innovation in the manner of the presentation. The following examples drawn 
from Nepos’ Life of Hannibal, Polybius’ Histories, and Livy’s Third Decade demonstrate 
the value of the three diegetic levels within an analysis of historiographic texts.  
Nepos’ biography of Hannibal takes a different focus and pace when narrating the 
events of the Second Punic War than the fuller histories of Polybius and Livy.31 The 
condensed scope of his biographical narrative allows his entire account of Hannibal’s 
crossing from Spain to Italy to be examined easily:  
saltum Pyrenaeum transiit. quacumque iter fecit, cum omnibus incolis 
conflixit: neminem nisi uictum dimisit. ad Alpes posteaquam uenit, quae 
Italiam ab Gallia seiungunt, quas nemo umquam cum exercitu ante eum 
praeter Herculem Graium transierat (quo facto is hodie saltus Graius 
appellatur), Alpicos conantes prohibere transitu concidit, loca patefecit, 
itinera muniit, effecit ut ea elephantus ornatus ire posset, qua antea unus 
homo inermis uix poterat repere. hac copias traduxit in Italiamque 
                                               
31 While condensed in scope, Nepos’ biographies remain capable of serious moral and political thought: 
Stem 2012. Stem examines how the brief and impressionistic facets of Nepos’ narratives are best 
understood as products of the Late Republican political climate. Nepos emphasizes details for his subjects 
that highlight the exemplary perspectives of their behavior.  
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peruenit. conflixerat apud Rhodanum cum P. Cornelio Scipione consule 
eumque pepulerat. cum hoc eodem Clastidii apud Padum decernit 
sauciumque inde ac fugatum dimittit. tertio idem Scipio cum collega 
Tiberio Longo apud Trebiam aduersus eum uenit. cum his manum 
conseruit, utrosque profligauit. (Nep. Hann. 3.3-4.2) 
 
He crossed over the range of the Pyrenees. Wherever he made his way, 
he fought with all the inhabitants: he sent away no one unless they were 
conquered. After he came to the Alps, which divide Italy from Gaul and 
which no one ever before him had crossed with an army except the Greek 
Hercules (from which deed the path is today called the “Greek pass”), he 
cut down the Alpine peoples that tried to prevent him from crossing. He 
opened places, he built up paths, he made it such that a fully-equipped 
elephant could go on a path that before a single unarmed man could 
scarcely crawl. He led his troops by this path and arrived in Italy. He had 
fought at the Rhone with P. Cornelius Scipio the Consul and had driven 
him back.32 He fights with this same man at Clastidium on the Po and 
sends him from there wounded and routed. For a third time, that same 
Scipio, with his colleague Tiberius Longus, comes against him at the 
Trebia. He joined battle with them and crushed them both.  
 
The essential events of the fabula of Hannibal’s crossing and initial engagements in Italy 
all appear. In simplest terms, the chronological sequence of these events within the fabula 
is as follows: Hannibal crosses the Pyrenees (F1), fights with Publius Scipio at the Rhone 
(F2), arrives at the Alps (F3), during the crossing fights with inhabitants (F4), builds up 
the pathways during crossing (F5), arrives in Italy (F6), engages Publius Scipio at 
Clastidium (F7), defeats Publius Scipio and Longus at the Trebia (F8). The narrator in 
Nepos’ text, however, breaks the strict chronology between these events and presents the 
engagement at the Rhone (F2) in the sixth position, just before he recounts Hannibal’s 
two other battles with Publius Scipio, at Clastidium (F7) and Trebia (F8).33 The 
                                               
32 This P. Cornelius Scipio is the father of the famous Scipio “Africanus.” To differentiate between the two, 
I refer to the father as “Publius Scipio” and the son simply as “Scipio.” 
33 The following sequence appears in Nepos’ text: cross the Pyrenees (F1), arrive at the Alps (F3), during 
the crossing fight with inhabitants (F4), build up the pathways during crossing (F5), arrive in Italy (F6), 
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anachronism is marked in the text by the sudden shift in verb tense to the pluperfect 
(conflixerat…pepulerat) to describe the battle at the Rhone, following what had been 
consistently narrated in the perfect tense up to that point (transiit, fecit, conflixit, dimisit, 
venit, concidit, patefecit, muniit, effecit, traduxit, pervenit). The change in tense is further 
emphasized by the narrator’s subsequent shift to the historical present in the sentence 
following (decernit, dimittit). These careful modifications in verb tenses, as well as the 
natural geographical location of the Rhone when compared to the Po or the Trebia, 
maintain the logical and chronological position of the engagement on the Rhone within 
the fabula despite Nepos’ manipulation of the order of narration.  
As Nepos moves the mention of the battle at the Rhone to a position after 
Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, he effectively couples the Roman defeat with the 
subsequent losses that Publius Scipio suffers in Italy at Clastidium and Trebia. This 
compounds the effect of the Roman losses on the narrative and suggests an interpretation 
of the fabula that emphasizes Hannibal’s victories and Rome’s losses in the opening 
stages of the war. Further, the anachronistic order of narration Nepos employs creates an 
ascending effect to three successive stages of opposition that Hannibal faces along his 
path. First, he engages unnamed local peoples (incolis) he happens to encounter; second, 
he cuts down the Alpine tribes (Alpicos), whose actions are specifically geared toward 
preventing his crossing; finally, he defeats Roman troops under the command of the 
consul Publius Scipio and his colleague Tiberius Longus. The narrator works his way 
                                               
fight with Scipio at the Rhone (F2), engage Scipio at Clastidium (F7), defeat Scipio and Longus at the 
Trebia (F8).  
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from the most general (incolis) to increasingly specific designations for Hannibal’s 
opponents, ending with two forces explicitly described as under the commands of the 
Roman consuls.  
Livy and Polybius, by contrast, each preserve these eight events in the expected 
chronological sequence.34 The scope of their narratives of Hannibal’s crossing extends far 
beyond the small scale employed by Nepos.35 Their pace is slower and they add far more 
details to the narrative than the more austere biography. While there are noticeable 
differences between the stories of Livy and Polybius concerning their treatments of the 
fabula of Hannibal’s crossing, here I examine a marked distinction in the narrative texts 
of these two historians.36 After Hannibal crosses the Rhone and convenes an assembly to 
encourage his troops in their coming journey across the Alps, Publius’ troops arrive at the 
mouth of the river. Polybius’ description of the event is largely void of narratorial asides: 
Λυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἧκον τῶν Νομάδων οἱ προαποσταλέντες ἐπὶ 
τὴν κατασκοπήν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους αὑτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ 
προτροπάδην πεφευγότες. συμπεσόντες γὰρ οὐ μακρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας 
στρατοπεδείας τοῖς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῦσι τοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν χρείαν 
ἐξαπεσταλμένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποπλίου τοιαύτην ἐποιήσαντο φιλοτιμίαν 
ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν ὥστε τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Κελτῶν εἰς 
ἑκατὸν ἱππεῖς καὶ τετταράκοντα διαφθαρῆναι, τῶν δὲ Νομάδων ὑπὲρ 
τοὺς διακοσίους. γενομένων δὲ τούτων οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι συνεγγίσαντες κατὰ 
τὸ δίωγμα τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων χάρακι καὶ κατοπτεύσαντες αὖθις ἐξ 
ὑποστροφῆς ἠπείγοντο, διασαφήσοντες τῷ στρατηγῷ τὴν παρουσίαν 
τῶν πολεμίων· ἀφικόμενοι δ' εἰς τὴν παρεμβολὴν ἀνήγγειλαν. (3.45.1-3) 
 
                                               
34 Hoyos 2006 directly compares details in the two accounts to discover Hannibal’s route across the 
Durance. He notes that while Polybius provides few geographical names, Livy’s added topographical 
details aid in the identification of Hannibal’s path into Italy.  
35 Polybius’ narrative of these same events totals 40 chapters (3.35-74), while Livy’s encompasses 38 
(21.22-59).  
36 Hoyos 2006 and Levene 2010: 136-40 both set portions of Polybius’ and Livy’s narratives side-by-side 
to compare the details of their accounts of Hannibal’s crossing.  
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After the assembly was broken up, the Numidian advance scouts sent 
out for reconnaissance came back, the majority of them lost and the rest 
of them in full retreat. Not far from their own camp they encountered the 
Roman cavalry who were sent out by Publius for the same purpose and 
both of them made such a demonstration of honor in the skirmish that 
nearly one hundred and forty of the Roman and Celtic cavalry were 
killed, but around two hundred of the Numidians died. After that, the 
Romans drew near in their pursuit to the Carthaginian camp and after 
they reconnoitered they wheeled about and drove back to explain to the 
general the arrival of the enemy. They arrived at the camp and reported.  
 
The qualification of the cavalrymen’s philotimia is the most explicit addition that the 
narrator makes at the textual level. Instead he allows the events of the fabula to come 
through in a clear manner at the story level. He offers no direct, suggested interpretation 
of the fabula through the addition of editorial (i.e., extradiegetic) comments or 
descriptions. Instead, the details of the event stand for themselves and allow the external 
audience of the text to draw a range of interpretations from the fabula.  
 Livy’s narrative of the skirmish at the Rhone provides further descriptive details 
and an explanatory narratorial aside to close the account: 
dum elephanti traiciuntur, interim Hannibal Numidas equites quingentos 
ad castra Romana miserat speculatum ubi et quantae copiae essent et 
quid pararent. huic alae equitum missi, ut ante dictum est, ab ostio 
Rhodani trecenti Romanorum equites occurrunt. proelium atrocius 
quam pro numero pugnantium editur; nam praeter multa uolnera 
caedes etiam prope par utrimque fuit, fugaque et pauor Numidarum 
Romanis iam admodum fessis uictoriam dedit. uictores ad centum 
sexaginta, nec omnes Romani sed pars Gallorum, uicti amplius ducenti 
ceciderunt. (21.29.1-3) 
 
While the elephants were led across, Hannibal had in the meantime sent 
five hundred Numidian cavalry to the Roman camp to spy out where it 
was, how many troops there were, and what they were planning to do. 
The three hundred horsemen who had been sent out, as was mentioned 
above, from the mouth of the Rhone came upon this party of cavalry. 
There followed a battle more ferocious than is proportionate to the 
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number of combatants; for, in addition to the many wounds, the 
casualties were also almost equal on each side, and the flight and dread 
of the Numidians granted victory to the Romans who were already 
quite exhausted. For the victors around one hundred and sixty fell, not 
all Romans but some of the Gauls as well, and more than two hundred of 
the losers.  
 
Livy’s narrator here provides the same basic details, ordered in the same fashion such 
that, at the story level, Polybius’ and Livy’s versions of the events are remarkably 
similar.  Additional extradiegetic descriptions and comments made by the Livian 
narrator, however, provide for the reading audience a suggested meaning and 
interpretation for the encounter. Livy describes the ferocity of the battle as surprisingly 
disproportionate to the size of the forces (atrocius quam pro numero pugnantium) and 
notes that the casualties were nearly equal on both sides (prope par utrimque), before 
providing the estimated total losses later in his account. These casualty figures do present 
a small change between Livy’s and Polybius’ accounts at the story level. While Polybius 
claims that one hundred and forty Romans were lost, Livy asserts that the total was one 
hundred and sixty. Whether Livy uses Polybius as his main source for the account and, 
consequently, actively increased the total or is drawing the larger number from another 
source, the greater casualties in Livy’s account supports the interpretation he offers of the 
event.37 Additionally, he notes that the Romans were thoroughly exhausted (iam 
admodum fessis) before they were able to find victory. The extra fatigued state of 
                                               
37 On Polybius as a potential source for Livy’s Third Decade, cf. Introduction and Part 1 in this chapter, 
above.  
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Publius’ troops reinforces the idea that the Romans suffered additional casualties in an 
encounter that is more difficult than the version Polybius describes.  
These descriptive qualifications foreground the eventual interpretation of the 
event with which Livy closes the account: 
hoc principium simul omenque belli ut summae rerum prosperum 
euentum, ita haud sane incruentam ancipitisque certaminis uictoriam 
Romanis portendit. (21.29.4) 
 
This battle was at the same time the start of the war and an omen that its 
outcome would be positive at the conclusion, as it portends that the 
victory for the Romans would certainly not be bloodless and would 
come after an uncertain struggle. 
 
The claim that the battle is a portent of the ensuing war is borne out by the rest of the 
Decade’s narrative, as it is full of reversals of fortune, battles of uncertain outcome, and 
great losses suffered on each side. Livy’s extradiegetic comment in the text therefore 
prioritizes the interpretation of the event that allows a small skirmish to stand as an 
analogue for the entire ensuing war. Livy’s narratorial aside creates an expectation of 
Roman success only after a bitter and precipitous struggle for the events of the fabula in 
the subsequent narrative. Polybius makes no explicit suggestion of the interpretation in 
his extradiegetic comments and, when compared directly to Livy’s account, the details 
Polybius provides for the battle do not hint at the possible significance. The skirmish at 
the Rhone between the Numidian scouts and Publius’ cavalry only gains the 
interpretation suggested by Livy through the differences between the two stories and 
supported by the comments made by Livian external narrator.  
 42 
 
 Livy’s claim that the skirmish’s qualities represent the entire war also repeats the 
sentiments of the opening preface to the decade.38 After he notes the unprecedented 
magnitude and scope of the war, and the familiarity of its combatants, Livy’s narrator 
claims that “the fortune of the war was so varied and the fighting so dangerous that those 
who won were closer to ruin” (adeo uaria fortuna belli ancepsque Mars fuit ut propius 
periculum fuerint qui uicerunt; 21.1.2). The adjective anceps, repeated in each of these 
passages, strengthens the connection shared between the portentous skirmish at the 
Rhone and the foregrounding description Livy makes in the preface to the decade. 
Additionally, as I noted above, the focus on uncertainty in the repetition of anceps recalls 
the concept of Tychē so prevalent in Polybius’ text.39 Though Livy alludes to Polybian 
fortune in his summary of the skirmish at the Rhone, he differs from Polybius in the total 
of Roman losses he lists in his account.  
The placement of and explanation provided for the small skirmish between 
Hannibal’s and Publius Scipio’s scouts along the Rhone River demonstrate the utility of 
examining the narratives of historiographic texts through the tripartite lens of fabula-
story-text. As each of these three authors ordered the events of the fabula to create their 
own story, they necessarily made choices about the presentation of particular episodes 
which could, in turn, suggest or indicate various interpretations. Nepos, in opposition to 
the strict chronology preserved by Polybius and Livy, places his account of the skirmish 
at the Rhone in proximity to Publius Scipio’s other defeats in the opening stages of the 
                                               
38 On the preface, Levene 2010: 9-15 and cf. Part 1 of this chapter, above.  
39 cf. Part 1 in this chapter, above.  
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war. The narrative sequence compounds the effect of the consequences suffered by the 
Romans in these three now defeats successive only in the narrative and not 
chronologically. While Polybius and Livy record the events of the fabula in strict 
chronological sequence and the specific event of the battle at the Rhone in largely similar 
fashion at the story level, Polybius allows the actions to stand on their own and makes no 
explicit suggestion for how to interpret the small encounter. Livy, on the other hand, 
includes a narrative aside at the textual level that explains that the skirmish is an analogue 
for the entire Hannibalic War that will be the subject of the subsequent ten books of his 
narrative. A single event with relatively few and minor changes takes on three different 
nuances and interpretations when examined through the narratological lens of the levels 
of fabula, story, and text. In all three texts, however, the fabula is the same; it is only the 
manner in which it is organized into a story and explicated in the narrative that differs, 
lending three distinct interpretations to three accounts of the same event.  
Finally, the role of the external narrator in asserting and explaining the 
significance of the events he is about to describe becomes clearer as a function of the 
extradiegetic level of the narrative, at which Livy’s narrating persona can offer 
interpretation and impart meaning to the acts proffered in the narrative. The intertextual 
references in the preface, discussed above, further the idea that the historian is qualified 
to provide explanation of the events in his text. Since the deeds contained in the account 
surpass all those that preceded them, the extradiegetic narrator, too, has authority that 
transcends that of his predecessors.  
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Part 3: Livy’s Internal Narrators and their Sources 
 The presence of rhetoric in Greco-Roman historiography has been a hot topic 
since Wiseman and Woodman championed this case.40 Set speeches of several kinds are 
common tropes in ancient historical writing. The composition of these speeches, their 
overall historicity, and the probability that they reflect the ipsissima verba of any 
genuine, delivered orations remain lively topics of debate.41 Historiographic speeches fall 
in the metadiegetic plane of narratology. Each speech is, in essence, a narrative act within 
a larger frame narrative. The internal narrator offers a meaningful explanation of the 
events that they describe, but the extradiegetic narrator can support, question, or 
reinterpret these metadiegetic comments. The internal narrators in Livy’s Third Decade 
demonstrate his use of source texts and allusion in the composition of these speeches.42 
Additionally, a comparison of the comments made about these events at both levels of 
narration (intra- and extra-diegetic) reveals how the Livian external narrator controls and 
asserts his authority over a source text by incorporating it into the intradiegetic level of 
his narrative. Two speeches that Livy transmits following Hannibal’s victory at Cannae—
Mago’s embassy to Carthage and Varro’s speech to the Capuans—reveal Livy’s use of 
                                               
40 Wiseman 1979 and Woodman 1988.  
41 For arguments against the historicity of the speeches found in the ancient historians, v.: Hansen 1993, 
Erhardt 1995, Yunis 2002, and Damon 2007:400, among others. The opposite case is made by Fornara 
1983: 142-68 and Pritchett 2002: 1-80. Adler 2011: 6-8 succinctly summarizes the key aspects of the 
debate.  
42 For more on Livian narrators, v. esp. Pausch 2010: 183-209 and 2011. Pausch’s work undertakes a 
narratological survey of the AUC and demonstrates, above all, how Livy’s narratorial practices 
communicate to and create expectations for his reader.  
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source texts in the composition of his speeches and how he as external narrator can 
reinterpret these sources through his extradiegetic comments and asides.  
 To open Book 23, Livy describes the various reactions of Romans, Italians, and 
Carthaginians to Hannibal’s victory at Cannae. The account includes the report of an 
embassy made to the senate at Carthage by Hannibal’s brother, Mago (23.11.7-13.7; 
23.11.7 nuntius uictoriae ad Cannas Carthaginem uenerat Mago Hamilcaris filius), who 
describes the various successes Hannibal has had during the battles and then provides a 
display to drive home the Carthaginian success so far in the Italian campaign: 
ad fidem deinde tam laetarum rerum effundi in uestibulo curiae iussit 
anulos aureos, qui tantus aceruus fuit ut metientibus dimidium supra tres 
modios explesse sint quidam auctores: fama tenuit quae propior uero 
est, haud plus fuisse modio. adiecit deinde uerbis, quo maioris cladis 
indicium esset, neminem nisi equitem, atque eorum ipsorum primores, id 
gerere insigne. summa fuit orationis, quo propius spem belli perficiendi 
sit, eo magis omni ope iuuandum Hannibalem esse (23.12.1-3) 
 
To add to the confidence of such successful endeavors, he ordered the 
golden rings to be poured out in the entrance of the Senate chamber. This 
made such a heaping pile that some authors claim that they filled more 
than three and a half measures when counted. A report which is nearer 
to the truth holds that it was not more than a single measure. He then 
added these words, in order that the significance of the disaster be more 
clear, that no one outside the equestrian order—and even then just the 
chief among them—wears this as a token of honor. The gist of the speech 
was that by as much as they were closer to the hope of finishing the war, 
there was that much more need of providing help to Hannibal.  
 
In the sections preceding this one, Mago’s speech focuses on the incredible numbers of 
enemies faced and defeated by Hannibal, concluding with the Carthaginians’ encouraging 
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success at Cannae.43 Livy breaks up the general’s speech here with an anonymous 
citation (quidam auctores) to highlight other accounts of the oration and its associated 
scene. The reference alludes to other texts of Mago’s speech and thereby calls to the mind 
of Livy’s audience his sources for the oration in Carthage. The position of the citation in 
the middle of the speech underscores the presence of these predecessor texts and the 
external audience’s awareness of them. Notably, too, the allusion to Livy’s sources for 
the oration comes during the relation of a speech offered by a Punic general in the Senate 
chamber at Carthage.44 Pausch has argued that Livy includes the foreign perspective to 
add to his credibility.45 Livy therefore turns to the outsider’s point of view in Mago’s 
speech to give a sense of impartiality to his work in a moment where he ultimately 
discusses the veracity of his account compared to his predecessors’ works. These 
anonymous authors total the rings displayed during Mago’s speech to more than three 
modii.46 However, Livy then makes a reference to another surviving version of the 
                                               
43 Mago concludes the first section of his speech with this description: 23.11.12 pro his tantis totque 
uictoriis, emphasizing both the magnitude and the quantity of their victories to that point. Coelius F24 
FRHist = Prisc. GL 2.198 likely suggests that at least part of this speech draws on Coelius’ account of 
Mago’s speech. On the fragment, Cornell 2014: 3.251-52.  
44 The composition of speeches generally and those that could not actually be known to the author, 
specifically, is a well-documented trend in historiographic works. The bibliography on speeches in 
Classical Historiography is vast. For a brief introduction to the topic: Marincola 2008b. On speeches in the 
genre generally: Fornara 1983: 142-68, Walbank 1985: 242-61, Brock 1995. On general’s speeches in the 
ancient historians: Keitel 1987, Hansen 1993 and 1998, and Pritchett 2002. For Livy’s approach to 
speeches in the AUC: Gries 1949, Walsh 1961: 219-44, Luce 1993, Forsythe 1999: 74-86. For speeches as 
they relate to Livy’s approach to exemplarity: Chaplin 2000. Livy’s reconstruction of the speech of a 
foreigner is not unusual: Adler 2011. 
45 Pausch 2011: 125-90 discusses the issue of multiple focalization at length and argues how the foreign 
perspective lends a sense of balance and impartiality to his account that ultimately contributes to Livy’s 
credibility as an even-handed historian. 
46 cf. Florus 1.22.6.19 = modii duo anulorum Carthaginem missi dignitasque equestris taxata mensural; 
Coelius F24 = Prisc. GL 2.198 = nullae mationi tot tantas tam continuas victorias tam brevi spatio datas 
arbitror quam vobis.  
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story—apart from these initial anonymous sources. He initially describes the alternate 
tale as a fama, thereby limiting its truth value. However, Livy then remarks on the 
potential veracity of his account by noting that it best approximates the truth (propior 
uero). Livy’s claim points to the fact that he can judge the apparent truth value of the 
various tales and that he does know the true (vero) account of Mago’s speech. However, 
he declines to include the truest version of the speech and instead substitutes something 
near (propior) the truth. The structure and effect of the episode thereby lends further 
weight to a less accurate version, which allows Mago’s speech and the display of the 
rings to convey a sense of Carthaginian success in Livy’s narrative that exceeds the 
reality behind the account. The overly large total of rings, which equate to Roman deaths, 
fit into the claim that Livy makes in the preface to the Third Decade that the side that 
would ultimately conquer would first come closer to ruin (propius periculum fuerint qui 
vicerunt, 21.1.2).  
Mago’s speech generally focuses on the overwhelming quantity of foes defeated 
by Hannibal. Livy notes the first explanation for the extent of the pile of rings at three or 
more measures, an account that is initially believable as its vast extent is grounded in and 
supported by the oration that precedes it. Furthermore, Mago continues by noting the link 
between the rings and the status of the Roman Equites. Livy asserts that Mago makes the 
comment in order to make the disaster appear greater (maioris cladis). The remarks made 
by both the internal and external narrators lend credibility to the larger value purported 
for the quantity of the rings. Mago’s and Livy’s comments surround and overwhelm the 
more accurate fama that claims the smaller measure for the number of rings. The content 
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of the speech, then, and comments made by both the internal and external narrators 
undermine the purported truth value of the fama. The structure of the episode, the 
comments made by both internal and external narrators, and the placement of the 
anonymous citation (quidam auctores) and the impersonal reference (fama) in the middle 
of the speech demonstrate how references and external and internal narrators question, 
emend, or cap the accounts of Livy’s predecessors. The overall effect of the narrative of 
Mago’s speech to the Carthaginian assembly is that the version of the events that is 
explicitly less likely—that of the three modii of rings—is the one whose consequences 
are meant to be felt as the narrative continues. Additionally, the Mago episode reveals 
how Livy’s use of an internal speaker lends narratorial weight to a version of events that 
the historian dismisses as unlikely. Livy, as external narrator, establishes his authority as 
a credible historian through source criticism while still allowing an implausible account 
to be revealed through a character’s speech. The interests and aims of the external and 
internal narrators are clearly separated in Livy’s report of Mago’s speech.  
 Shortly before Livy reports Mago’s speech in the Carthaginian assembly, he turns 
his focus to the situation in which the remaining consul, Varro, finds himself. In a 
meeting with delegates from Capua, Varro replies to their offer of assistance with an all 
too frank retort about the Romans’ current disastrous state. Near the end of his response, 
he explains how their enemies’ behavior and identity further exacerbates the Romans’ 
present circumstances:   
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Poenus hostis ne Africae quidem indigena47 ab ultimis terrarum oris, freto 
Oceani Herculisque columnis, expertem omnis iuris et condicionis et 
linguae prope humanae militem trahit. Hunc natura et moribus immitem 
ferumque insuper dux ipse efferauit, pontibus48 ac molibus ex humanorum 
corporum strue faciendis et, quod proloqui etiam piget, uesci corporibus 
humanis docendo. His infandis pastos epulis, quos contingere etiam 
nefas sit, uidere atque habere dominos et ex Africa et a Carthagine iura 
petere et Italiam Numidarum ac Maurorum pati prouinciam esse, cui non, 
genito modo in Italia, detestabile sit? (23.5.11-13) 
 
A Carthaginian enemy, not even indigenous to Africa, drags his force 
from the furthest shores of the earth, from the strait of Ocean and the 
pillars of Hercules. Nor is his army aware of any law or condition or 
even of speech remotely human. On top of that, their leader himself 
makes their nature savage and fierce and cruel in their customs by making 
bridges and structures built with a heap of human corpses and—a fact 
that even disgusts me to mention—by teaching them to feed on human 
bodies. Would it not be utterly detestable for one even just born in Italy to 
see those that have dined at these unspeakable banquets, which it is a 
crime just to touch, and to have them as masters and to obtain laws from 
Africa and Carthage and to  allow Italy to be a province of the Numidians 
and Mauritanians?  
 
Varro emphasizes the shock value of these rumors. He refrains from calling Hannibal by 
name in the passage, instead referring to him as Poenus hostis and dux ipse. He questions 
the origin of Hannibal’s army and dehumanizes them by noting their lack of the usual 
markers of human civilization: law, custom, and speech. The language employed in the 
Carthaginian army was of fascination also to Polybius, who remarks with amazement that 
                                               
47 indigena accepted by Dorey in his Teubner edition following various early MSS (PCRMDA). Walters 
and Conway in the OCT correct to indigenam following some later MSS, a lectio facilior based on the idea 
that it seems outrageous to assert that the Carthaginians are not African. However, the overall force of 
Varro’s speech aims at hyperbole and extremism, so a claim that comes off as initially surprising or strange 
fits well within the speech. Additionally, as Levene 2010: 221 points out, this description ties the 
Carthaginians back to their Phoenecian origins.  
48 While there is not a surviving reference in Polybius—or any of Livy’s predecessors—to the construction 
of bridges out of human bodies, the tale is briefly dramatized by Appian: ὁ δ᾽ ἔστι μὲν οὓς ἀπέδοτο τῶν 
αἰχμαλώτων, ἔστι δ᾽ οὓς ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς ἀνῄρει, καὶ τοῖς σώμασι τὸν ποταμὸν ἐγεφύρου καὶ ἐπέρα (Hann. 28), 
“But [Hannibal] sold some of the prisoners and executed others in anger, built a bridge with their bodies 
and crossed the river on it.” 
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Hannibal managed to keep his polyglot contingent together over so long a campaign 
(11.19).49 Polybius remarks that the Carthaginian forces “had neither law, custom, 
speech, nor any other thing naturally in common with each other” (11.19.4 οἷς οὐ νόμος, 
οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος, οὐχ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους). The 
tripartite series iuris et condicionis et linguae in Varro’s speech mobilizes the reference 
to Polybius’ text, who here lays out the three ideas in the same sequence: οὐ νόμος, οὐκ 
ἔθος, οὐ λόγος. Livy’s Varro, however, caps Polybius’ account by expanding and 
exacerbating the potentially troubling linguistic reality for the polyglot army by making 
these various groups not only unrecognizable to each other, but unrecognizable as 
humans (prope humanae).  
 Another reference to Polybius’ text later in the same speech comes in the mention 
of Hannibal’s rumored cannibalistic activity. Polybius includes in his narrative digression 
discussing Hannibal’s character (9.22-26) an account of advice that was given to the 
general by one of his friends that may reflect the origin of Varro’s claim of 
anthropophagy surrounding the Carthaginian general:  
καθ' ὃν γὰρ καιρὸν Ἀννίβας ἐξ Ἰβηρίας τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν ἐπενόει 
στέλλεσθαι μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, μεγίστης προφαινομένης δυσχρηστίας 
περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ τὴν ἑτοιμότητα τῶν ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, 
ἅτε καὶ κατὰ τὸ μῆκος ἀνήνυτον ἔχειν τι δοκούσης τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ 
πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα τῶν μεταξὺ κατοικούντων βαρβάρων, τότε 
δοκεῖ καὶ πλεονάκις ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐμπιπτούσης 
ἀπορίας εἷς τῶν φίλων Ἀννίβας ὁ Μονομάχος ἐπικαλούμενος 
ἀποφήνασθαι γνώμην διότι μία τις ὁδὸς αὑτῷ προφαίνεται. δι' ἧς ἐστιν εἰς 
Ἰταλίαν ἐλθεῖν ἐφικτόν. τοῦ δ' Ἀννίβου λέγειν κελεύσαντος, διδάξαι δεῖν 
                                               
49 cf., too, Livy’s frequent mention on the polyethnic army of the Carthaginians: 21.21.9, 22.43.2, 26.20.9, 
28.12.1-9, and 30.35.5-9. Levene 2010: 236-46 argues that Hannibal’s polyglot army is a key element to 
Livy’s construction of the lesson to be drawn from the Battle of Zama, which he ties to Livy’s unusual 
comment of advice to future Roman commanders (25.33.5-6).  
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ἔφη τὰς δυνάμεις ἀνθρωποφαγεῖν καὶ τούτῳ ποιῆσαι συνήθεις ..... Ἀννίβας 
δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τόλμημα καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐδὲν ἀντειπεῖν 
ἐδυνήθη, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν οὔθ' αὑτὸν οὔτε τοὺς φίλους 
ἐδύνατο πεῖσαι. τούτου δὲ τἀνδρὸς εἶναί φασιν ἔργα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν 
Ἰταλίαν εἰς Ἀννίβαν ἀναφερόμενα περὶ τῆς ὠμότητος, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ 
τῶν περιστάσεων. (9.24.4-8) 
 
At the time when Hannibal was laying out his plans to make the campaign 
against Italy with his forces, a very difficult situation was foreseen about 
the provisions and the readiness of the supplies for the soldiers, since the 
path ahead seemed to hold endless difficulty due both to its length and the 
size of their forces, and the fierceness of the barbarians that lived along the 
way. Then it seems that they were often at a loss in their meetings about 
this lot, as one of his friends, a Hannibal nicknamed “Monomachus” 
declares his opinion that just a single road appears before him, through 
which it is possible to make it to Italy. After Hannibal (the general) asked 
him to speak, he said that it is necessary for him to teach his troops to eat 
human flesh and to make them accustomed to do this. Hannibal was not at 
all able to speak against the boldness and practicality of this plan, but 
he was not able to persuade himself nor his friends to take on a notion of 
the act. They say that those things done throughout Italy and attributed to 
Hannibal as acts of savageness are the work of this man, but are also no 
less due to the circumstances.  
 
Polybius here notes that Hannibal cannot speak against the plan (τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐδὲν 
ἀντειπεῖν ἐδυνήθη). In Livy’s speech, Varro twice reiterates the unspeakable nature of the 
act (quod proloqui etiam piget; infandis pastos epulis). Further, in both of these texts the 
gladiator’s plan is to teach (διδάξαι, docendo) the troops to pursue this course of action. 
Although Hannibal in Polybius’ digression cannot quite bring himself to achieve the plan, 
neither does he condemn it. He notes instead that it is bold and practical (τὸ τόλμημα καὶ 
τὸ πρακτικὸν), qualities that he has previously pursued in his endeavors.50 Varro’s report 
                                               
50 For Hannibal’s daring endeavors in Polybius: e.g., 3.61.6, where Publius Scipio is taken aback by 
Hannibal’s swift and bold trek across the Alps and sudden appearance in the Po Valley or 3.92.3, where 
Fabius notes how the boldness of Hannibal’s maneuvers make it difficult to follow through on his delaying 
tactics. For Hannibal’s practical and rational calculations before action: e.g., 3.17.8, 3.17.11, 3.63.11, 
3.81.12, 3.89.4, 3.91.1, 3.92.2.  
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of Hannibal, however, describes these actions as fait accompli and starkly contrasts them 
to the expectations of an Italian, for whom it is a crime even to come in contact with 
banquets of such a sort (contingere etiam nefas). Livy’s internal narrator has thereby 
rewritten the Polybian claim that Hannibal merely entertained the idea of cannibalism.  
In each of the references to Polybius made in Varro’s speech, Livy has 
incorporated into the text of his internal narrator comments made by the Polybian 
external narrator. Beyond a simple assimilation of these narrative asides, Livy’s text caps 
(in the case of the note of the Carthaginian army’s language) or questions and emends (in 
the case of Hannibal’s rumored cannibalism) those statements made by Polybius as 
external narrator. Furthermore, the emendations made to Polybius’ report in Varro’s 
speech push the Carthaginians’ behavior to the extremes: they eat flesh that is 
untouchable, perform tasks that are indescribable, and break the very laws of human 
nature. Livy’s portrait of Varro focuses on his rash and ultimately destructive behavior.51 
Livy represents Varro as bold and reckless even in his role as an internal narrator, using 
and abusing the facets of the Polybian narrative to suit his need to disparage the conduct 
of his Carthaginian opponents. In subsuming these extradiegetic digressions from his 
predecessor into the metadiegetic plane of Varro’s speech, Livy takes control of the 
account provided by his source text, asserts his own authority over it, and uses these 
features to highlight his criticism of the behavior of a character in his text. 
 
                                               
51 Bernard 2000: 139-41 describes Livy’s portrait of Varro as an irrational and reckless general. Varro, too, 
is just the last in a series of commanders whose rash behaviors lead to the Roman defeats in Italy in the 
early stages of the war: Bernard 2000: 262-64 and Levene 2010: 170-72.   
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This analysis focused on two speeches that concern the Carthaginians from the 
aftermath of Hannibal’s victory at Cannae. Mago’s embassy to Carthage shows Livy 
examining various source texts for the composition of the speech and demonstrates that 
the internal narrator can create an interpretation of the fabula that the historian 
subsequently questions through his explicit description of his sources. Varro’s speech to 
the Capuans includes a short description drawn from Polybius’ character-sketch of 
Hannibal. Between them, the two passages show Livy actively consulting various 
sources—including Polybius—in the composition of his speeches. Comments made by 
both the external and internal narrators in the AUC emend or question the accounts of 
Livy’s source texts. Varro’s speech also indicates that the concerns and comments of the 
Polybian external narrator find their way into the voice of an internal speaker in Livy’s 
AUC. The incorporation of Polybius’ explicit narratorial asides forecasts the analysis in 
the following two chapters, which argue that Livy undertakes a similar process in the 
characterization of Hannibal as an internal narrator in the Third Decade.  
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Chapter Two 
A Polybian Hannibal in Livy’s Third Decade  
 
As the Carthaginian army approaches Italy during their campaign at the opening 
of the Second Punic War, the troops are bewildered when the Alps finally come into 
view. In a famous speech recorded by both Polybius and Livy in their narratives of the 
march, Hannibal exhorts the soldiers to relieve their trepidation in light of their previous 
efforts and campaigns these mountains have accommodated in the past.1 Livy’s version 
of the speech concludes with an attempt by Hannibal to counter the troops’ fears based on 
the difference between the reputation of the lofty mountain range and the reality faced by 
the army. Hannibal bases his assertion on the actual appearance of the Alps and the 
experiences that have led his army to this point: 
in conspectu Alpes habeant quarum alterum latus Italiae sit, in ipsis 
portis hostium fatigatos subsistere. quid Alpes aliud esse credentes quam 
montium altitudines? fingerent altiores Pyrenaei iugis: nullas profecto 
terras caelum contingere nec inexsuperabiles humano generi esse. Alpes 
quidem habitari, coli, gignere atque alere animantes; peruias paucis esse, 
esse et exercitibus. eos ipsos quos cernant legatos non pinnis sublime 
elatos Alpes transgressos. ne maiores quidem eorum indigenas sed 
aduenas Italiae cultores has ipsas Alpes ingentibus saepe agminibus cum 
liberis ac coniugibus migrantium modo tuto transmisisse. (21.30.5-8) 
 
They have the Alps in sight, with Italy on the other side of them, they 
stopped fatigued at the very gates of the enemy! What else do they 
believe the Alps are except heights of mountains? They might suppose 
that the Alps are higher than the ridges of the Pyrenees: surely, no lands 
touch the sky and are insurmountable to the human race. Indeed, the 
Alps are inhabited, cultivated, give birth to and nourish living beings, 
                                               
1 Polybius’ version of the speech (3.44) and Livy’s (21.30) will be further analyzed in the final section of 
the chapter below. For more on these passages and how they create expectations for Livy’s narrative: 
Pausch 2011: 149-56. For how these two speeches fit into the opening sequence of the Second Punic War: 
Händl-Sagawe 1995: 193-95.  
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allow passage to small forces and even to entire armies. The very legates 
whom they saw before their eyes did not pass over the Alps lifted from 
above on wings. He said that not even their ancestors were indigenous, 
but were the foreign inhabitants of Italy and had safely crossed these 
very Alps often with huge armies on the move, along with their children 
and wives. 
 
While a similar rationale is not found in Polybius’ version of the speech, scholars have 
noted that the evidence Hannibal uses in the argument in the AUC that the Alps are, in 
fact, passable is markedly similar to the explanation that Polybius gives in a well-known 
digression that attacks the outlandish claims of his predecessors (3.47.6-48.12).2 These 
scholars have demonstrated that the Polybian aside is likely the source for this portion of 
Livy’s speech or, as Levene has recently shown, can be viewed as both source and 
intertext.3 In this chapter I push further the boundaries of the allusive relationship 
between Polybius’ digression on the Alps and Hannibal’s speech in the AUC by studying 
the role that the general plays as an internal narrator in these two historiographic texts. I 
first establish the narratological identities of the characters of Hannibal within each of the 
historians’ texts and then reinterpret Hannibal’s speeches in the Livian narrative in light 
of his role as an internal narrator in Polybius’ Histories. 
  
                                               
2 For Livy’s echo of Polybius’ digression here, v. esp.: Girod 1982: 1206-8, Doblhofer 1983: 142-44, 
Händl-Sagawe 1995: 196-7, Feldherr 2009b, Levene 2010: 148-55 and 2014: 208. 
3 For the significance of Levene’s reading of the passage as both source and intertext, v. Levene 2010: 154-
55. For the idea that Livy can simultaneously use Polybius both as a source and create a wider allusive 
relationship with his predecessor, v. Stübler 1941: 158-62 and Levene 2006: 84-5.   
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Part 1: The Language of Opsis in Polybius’ Didactic Histories: 
 Polybius’ account of Hannibal’s speech at the Rhone is both shorter than Livy’s 
and makes up only a part of a larger meeting, at which the Gallic envoys who have 
arrived to make an agreement to aid the Carthaginians also speak. While Livy has these 
ambassadors only speak in private with Hannibal, Polybius’ version of the general’s 
speech picks up immediately after these ambassadors have reported the decisions made 
by their own assemblies:  
μετὰ δὲ τούτους εἰσελθὼν αὐτὸς πρῶτον μὲν τῶν προγεγενημένων 
πράξεων ἀνέμνησε τοὺς ὄχλους· ἐν αἷς ἔφη πολλοῖς αὐτοὺς καὶ 
παραβόλοις ἔργοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἐπικεχειρηκότας ἐν οὐδενὶ διεσφάλθαι, 
κατακολουθήσαντας τῇ 'κείνου γνώμῃ καὶ συμβουλίᾳ. τούτοις δ' ἑξῆς 
εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει, θεωροῦντας διότι τὸ μέγιστον ἤνυσται τῶν 
ἔργων, ἐπειδὴ τῆς τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως κεκρατήκασι τῆς τε τῶν 
συμμάχων εὐνοίας καὶ προθυμίας αὐτόπται γεγόνασι. διόπερ ᾤετο δεῖν 
περὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ὡς αὐτῷ μελόντων, πειθαρχοῦντας δὲ 
τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων 
ἔργων ἀξίους. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἐπισημαινομένου καὶ μεγάλην ὁρμὴν καὶ 
προθυμίαν ἐμφαίνοντος, ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων 
εὐξάμενος διαφῆκε, παραγγείλας θεραπεύειν σφᾶς καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι 
μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὡς εἰς τὴν αὔριον ἀναζυγῆς ἐσομένης. (3.44.10-13) 
 
He came up after them and first reminded the assembled troops of their 
former achievements, among which he said they had attempted many 
hazardous tasks and dangers and not failed in one of them, having 
followed his judgment and plans. Next, he wished that they would have 
courage, considering that they have accomplished the greatest part of 
their tasks, since they had mastered the crossing of the river and were 
eyewitnesses of the goodwill and eagerness of their allies. He asked 
them, therefore, to be at ease about the particulars, since those are his 
concern, but to obey his commands and be good men and worthy of their 
former works. After the assembly applauded and demonstrated the 
men’s great desire and eagerness, he praised them, prayed to the gods on 
behalf of them all, and dismissed them. He ordered them to make 
themselves ready and to prepare with haste, since they were making their 
departure the next day.  
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At the heart of the speech, Hannibal teaches his soldiers how to read their current 
situation to pursue the necessary course of action. His lesson encourages them to 
consider first their prior experience (τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων), a point further 
iterated by his repetitive mentions of the tasks they have accomplished (ἔργοις; τὸ 
μέγιστον ἤνυσται τῶν ἔργων; τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων). Hannibal then notes that they 
are eyewitnesses (αὐτόπται) of the support of the Gallic tribes whose ambassadors just 
spoke in the assembly. Hannibal uses a two-pronged approach centered on a practical 
consideration of the troops’ previous experiences and their own autopsy in the didactic 
speech to encourage his soldiers to dismiss their fears of continuing their campaign. 
These two elements, a pragmatic reliance on past events and the primacy of opsis, are 
also at the center of Polybius’ historiographic method. At first glance, Hannibal appears 
to follow a Polybian approach to didactic narrative. To push the point further and 
examine the extent to which the Carthaginian general employs rhetoric that mirrors that 
of the text’s external narrator, let us examine more fully how Polybius constructs the 
authority of his historiographic persona.  
The didactic quality of Polybius’ historical narrative is at the center of his thought 
and overall design, a fact scholars have often highlighted.4 Walbank’s influential work on 
Polybius has largely focused on the author’s intent that his Histories serve as a model for 
                                               
4 In addition to the work of Walbank and Eckstein discussed below, cf. Sacks’ 1981 survey of Polybius’ 
historiographic technique, which argues for a literal reading of Polybius’ methodological statements. 
Marincola’s 2001 seminal work on Greek historiography similarly argues (pp. 125-40) that the didactic 
qualities of Polybius’ account are at the heart of his historiographic method. 
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political activity.5 This becomes evident in the historian’s unique type of pragmatic 
history that developed from his personal political experience as a statesman of the 
Achaean league. Eckstein, however, has countered Walbank’s strictly politically-focused 
analysis by advocating a broader didactic aim for the text which includes ethical and 
moral concerns among the lessons that Polybius aimed to provide.6 While critics have 
analyzed the intrusive role that the historian himself plays as primary narrator in his 
explicit comments on historiographic didacticism, the use of Polybius’ secondary 
narrators as exemplars or teachers of pragmatic history remains largely unexplored.7 
Wiater’s recent work on Polybian speeches examines various speeches as functional 
elements with their narrative context.8 He argues that the speeches in Polybius provide an 
                                               
5 Walbank’s 1972 Sather lectures on Polybius address the issue at length; v. esp. pp. 32-97, the two 
chapters that layout Polybius’ overall method and unique place in the historiographic tradition following 
the method of Thucydides but on a larger, more universal scale. Walbank notes that Polybius’ focus on 
military and political matters is at the heart of his pragmatikē historia.  Similarly, Walbank 2002: 231-42 
argues that Polybius frequently contrasts the idea of his “useful” history with the pleasurable accounts of 
other historians, thereby marking his own narrative as explicitly more didactic than his fellow writers. 
Schepens 2010 shows the tension present in the narrative between Polybius’ model for practical experience 
as a necessary teacher for the political actor and his defense of Roman imperialism and the Greek resistance 
to it. Chaplin 2000: 23-25 discusses the practical nature of Polybius’ approach as a kind of exemplarity.  
6 Eckstein 1995: 26 claims that his “main purpose…is to reemphasize the moral dimension in Polybius's 
work—to rescue his moral seriousness,” a goal that has subsequently opened up avenues of research into 
the historian’s moralistic aims.  
7 Davidson 1991 on the Polybian “gaze” recognizes the multiple layers of the historiographic narrative, but 
fails to pursue the implications of those narratological levels as part of Polybius’ overall didactic purpose.  
Rood 2004: 147-64 on Polybius in deJong’s volume on narratology in Greek Literature focuses primarily 
on the intrusive role of the historian’s explicit comments on his method and purpose in writing as guiding 
the narratology of his account and in the construction of his persona as a “professional” historiographer. 
Thornton 2013 argues that various characters in Polybius’ narrative are particularly exemplary of Greek 
political action and thereby contextualize the didactic purpose of the Histories within the understanding of 
his audience.  
8 Wiater’s 2010 chapter is part of Pausch’s edited volume on speeches in the ancient historians. His 
analysis includes a section (pp. 80-83) on Hannibal’s speeches in the third book of the Histories that 
examines some of the same speeches as this chapter. Overall, he argues that Polybius’ speeches serve as a 
model for a new type of political education. While he, too, argues that Hannibal serves as an ideal student 
of history, this chapter focuses instead on demonstrating the conflation of identities of the Carthaginian 
general and Polybius as internal and external narrators. For scholars who have analyzed Polybius’ 
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alternative model of political education with a pragmatic approach to political and 
military action.  
Sight, autopsy, and spectacle play key roles in Polybius’ construction of his 
authority as a historian and in his discussion of the method and purpose of 
communicating historical knowledge. His reliance on his own visual investigations or on 
the accounts of eyewitnesses, when compared to his scrutiny of physical documents, 
reveals a clear model for the kind of historiographic inquiry that he intends to pursue. 
Polybius’ method privileges information gained directly through his own sight or that of 
his oral sources. Similarly, from the very beginning of the Histories, Polybius employs a 
language focused on the visualization of the examples in his narrative to demonstrate the 
power of opsis and his ability to control the gaze of his audience as the most efficacious 
ways for the reader to gain practical knowledge. Sight thereby becomes a key method of 
didacticism in the historian’s work. Just as Polybius shows himself to be one who 
acquires knowledge through opsis and subsequently communicates the information by 
directing the gaze of the reader, so too does he display Hannibal as an internal narrator 
and historian, capable of performing a parallel role.  
After the two preliminary books that serve as a backdrop for the central topic of 
the Histories, Polybius begins his main narrative with events from the 140th Olympiad. 
As he turns to address the Greek affairs of the period, he relates in a secondary proem the 
reason for starting his main historical account at this point (4.1-2). The prefatory remark 
                                               
theoretical approach to speech-writing, cf. Pédech 1964: 254-302, Walbank 1962, Schepens 1990, and 
Nicolai 1999, e.g..  
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provides a glimpse into Polybius’ historical method. On the one hand, he notes that he 
begins at precisely the moment in time where Aratus leaves off, while on the other the 
chronological framework provides him with access to direct knowledge of the events 
described:9 
δεύτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ καὶ τοὺς χρόνους οὕτως συντρέχειν τοὺς ἑξῆς καὶ τοὺς 
πίπτοντας ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν ὥστε τοὺς μὲν καθ' ἡμᾶς εἶναι, 
τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν· ἐξ οὗ συμβαίνει τοῖς μὲν αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς 
παραγεγονέναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἑωρακότων ἀκηκοέναι. (4.2.2) 
 
Secondly, [I pick up the narrative at this point] because this period of 
time and that subsequently included in my history coincides with my own 
era and that of my father, such that it happens that I myself was present 
for the events discussed or have heard about them from eyewitnesses.  
 
Polybius’ rationale demonstrates an ideal time frame from which he can begin the main 
narrative of his Histories. It also reveals that his historical methodology relies on his own 
personal experience (αὐτοὺς ἡμᾶς παραγεγονέναι) or the eyewitness (ἑωρακότων) 
testimony of those that were present for events discussed.10 In this way, Polybius depicts 
                                               
9 Polybius is one of many historians who cast themselves as continuators of their predecessors: Xenophon’s 
Hellenica takes up its narrative at the chronological point at which Thucydides’ quite abruptly ended. 
Ephorus may have followed suit in continuing Xenophon’s account. On the trend of continuation in 
Hellenistic historiography, v. Marincola 2001: 105-12. Polybius’ successors in Rome similarly build upon 
each other’s chronological frameworks as Tacitus begins the Annales where Livy’s AUC—which itself is 
partly derivative of Polybius’ work—left off.  
10 Livy’s preface to Book Six has several thematic parallels to Polybius’ secondary preface in Book Four of 
his Histories. Each of the historians marks a sharp contrast between the murkier events of the remote past 
and the more grounded events of more recent history. While Polybius prioritizes the accounts of 
eyewitnesses, Livy focuses on written sources—and laments the loss of written records in the Gallic sack of 
Rome—as the keys to fuller and more accurate history in his preface to Book Six: Quae ab condita urbe 
Roma ad captam eandem Romani sub regibus primum, consulibus deinde ac dictatoribus decemvirisque ac 
tribunis consularibus gessere, foris bella, domi seditiones, quinque libris exposui, res cum vetustate nimia 
obscuras, velut quae magno ex intervallo loci vix cernuntur, tum quod parvae et rarae per eadem tempora 
litterae fuere, una custodia fidelis memoriae rerum gestarum, et quod, etiam si quae in commentariis 
pontificum aliisque publicis privatisque erant monumentis, incensa urbe pleraeque interiere. clariora 
deinceps certioraque ab secunda origine velut ab stirpibus laetius feraciusque renatae urbis gesta domi 
militiaeque exponentur. (6.1.1-3).  
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an image of himself as an experienced pragmatikos and as a historian capable of 
ascertaining historical fact and fiction through the inquiry (ἀκηκοέναι) that he makes of 
others.11 As part of his attack on the writings of Timaeus in a surviving section from the 
twelfth book of his work (12.24-28), Polybius measures his predecessor by these same 
two standards in a well-known polemic.12 While he asserts that Timaeus’ account is full 
of sensationalism, inaccuracies, and other errors, the underlying faults that Polybius sees 
as the root causes for the errors in the former’s historical methodology is that he writes 
from a position of inexperience (τὸν μηδεμίαν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχοντα) and without evidence 
gained through sight (διὰ τὴν ἀορασίαν; 12.25g1-4). Just as Polybius builds his own 
authority through practical knowledge and visual investigation, he deconstructs the 
account of others through their failure to demonstrate a similar experiential awareness. 
Polybius thereby privileges the ability of autopsy to provide historians with the only 
means through which they can ascertain the truth about the events they recount.  
Similarly, Polybius demonstrates his own superiority as a knowledgeable 
historian through the insistence of his reliance on autopsy of physical artifacts and 
geography. As he notes with a high degree of numerical specificity the origins and 
quantity of troops that Hannibal exchanged between Spain and Africa to guard these 
                                               
11 Polybius’ claims in the passage are reminiscent of those of Thucydides, who notes his reliance on his 
own experience and the testimony of eyewitnesses in his methodological statement at the close of his 
“Archaeology” (v. 1.22.1-2, esp.). Herodotus, similarly, attributes his knowledge both to autopsy and oral 
inquiry in comments scattered throughout his Histories but especially prominent in his account of the 
Egyptians (v. esp. 2.2-3, 2.54-55, 2.143, e.g.)  
12 For analysis of Polybius’ remarks against Timaeus, see esp. Pédech 1961, Vercruysse 1990: 29-34, 
Schepens 1990: 51-2, and Walbank 1967 comm. ad loc. 
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lands during his invasion of Italy (3.33.5-16), Polybius preemptively attempts to quiet his 
potential critics: 
Οὐ χρὴ δὲ θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῆς ἀναγραφῆς…ἡμεῖς γὰρ εὑρόντες 
ἐπὶ Λακινίῳ τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἐν χαλκώματι κατατεταγμένην ὑπ' 
Ἀννίβου, καθ' οὓς καιροὺς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις ἀνεστρέφετο, 
πάντως ἐνομίσαμεν αὐτὴν περί γε τῶν τοιούτων ἀξιόπιστον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ 
κατακολουθεῖν εἱλόμεθα τῇ γραφῇ ταύτῃ. (3.33.17-18) 
 
It is not necessary to marvel at the accuracy of this description…for I 
found this written account drawn up in bronze by Hannibal at the 
Lacinian point, at the time when he was busying himself in places 
throughout Italy, and I consider that it is altogether trustworthy about 
such things. I consequently decided to follow this account. 
 
The historian here notes in order the actions of discovering the written account (ἡμεῖς... 
εὑρόντες), determining its veracity (ἀξιόπιστον), and subsequently deciding to adhere to 
its details.13 He embeds within his description a depiction of Hannibal writing the record 
himself, made more vivid by the inclusion of particulars about the material of the tablet 
and about how the Carthaginian took the time to document these facts while he was 
engaged in his campaigns in Italy. Polybius thus portrays his historical methodology as 
relying on his personal search for primary documents and estimation of their value while 
simultaneously describing himself as the direct recipient of Hannibal’s personal, 
handwritten accounts.14 Polybius thereby adds a distinct mark of primacy to his authority 
                                               
13 Guzzo 2007 attempts a reconstruction of the inscription.  
14 In an example that is somewhat parallel, Polybius remarks that Philinus is ignorant of the bronze tablets 
housed in the temple of Jupiter on the Capitoline (3.26). While Polybius took the effort to examine these 
physical documents for himself and thereby can speak authoritatively on these matters, he excuses Philinus 
for his ignorance and instead focuses his attack on the fact that Philinus says the exact opposite of the truth, 
even though there is no basis for such a claim (3.26.2-5).  
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on these matters through his emphasis on his personal experience and connection to these 
documents.  
 Polybius similarly argues that he gains authority through autopsy in a digression 
from his narrative of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps, during which he debates the 
weaknesses of other historians’ claims of fantastical tales regarding the account (3.47.6-
48.12). While Polybius lists several points of criticism, he notes that their explanations 
primarily make two mistakes: outright lies (ψευδολογεῖν) and the declaration of direct 
contradictions (μαχόμενα γράφειν αὑτοῖς; 3.47.6). Polybius’ final remark on these 
matters summarizes the basis of his claims: 
ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀποφαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων 
παρ' αὐτῶν ἱστορηκέναι τῶν παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ 
τόπους κατωπτευκέναι καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων αὐτοὶ κεχρῆσθαι πορείᾳ 
γνώσεως ἕνεκα καὶ θέας. (3.48.12) 
 
But I give a secure account of these events because I inquired about 
these matters from those that happened to be present at the time and 
because I examined the places myself and personally made the passage 
through the Alps in order to know and see it for myself.   
 
In the description of his historical method for investigating the crossing of the Alps, 
Polybius combines the various types of evidence available to him. First, he conducted 
historical inquiry (ἱστορηκέναι). In this particular case, he claims to have questioned 
those that were present for the actual crossing, thus relying on eyewitnesses to the 
historical events he sets out to describe.  Polybius then asserts that he performed a visual 
inspection (κατωπτευκέναι) of the pass itself to confirm its actual geographic and 
topographical qualities. These actions bolster his knowledge both of the land itself and 
the path taken by Hannibal’s army on their crossing. Further, the two-part process allows 
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Polybius to assert his superiority to the fantastical accounts of his historiographic 
predecessors. The explication of his methodological process also mirrors and 
prescriptively forecasts the procedure described in his secondary proem (4.1-2), discussed 
above. Thus, as the reader encounters Polybius’ explicit description of the ideal historical 
methodology at the beginning of the fourth book, it retroactively provides the appearance 
of authority for his preceding narrative. 
Beyond the role that opsis plays in lending clout to Polybius’ position as a 
knowledgeable historian, sight and spectacle have a key function within the larger 
didactic program of his work. In the proem that opens the two prefatory books of the 
Histories, he lays out the practical benefit that he envisions his audience gaining from his 
narrative and ties it to the visual language that describes his overall endeavor. Polybius 
first notes that his fellow writers often describe the benefits of the study of history:   
ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ τινὲς οὐδ' ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀρχῇ καὶ τέλει 
κέχρηνται τούτῳ, φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ 
γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, 
ἐναργεστάτην δὲ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης 
μεταβολὰς γενναίως ὑποφέρειν τὴν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων περιπετειῶν 
ὑπόμνησιν, δῆλον ὡς οὐδενὶ μὲν ἂν δόξαι καθήκειν περὶ τῶν καλῶς καὶ 
πολλοῖς εἰρημένων ταυτολογεῖν, ἥκιστα δ' ἡμῖν. (1.1.2-3) 
 
But since not just some [historians] to a lesser extent but really all use 
this as the beginning and end, so to speak, saying that the truest 
education and training for political affairs is the learning of history, 
and even that the recollection of the downfalls of others is the clearest 
and in fact the only way to teach one to be able to bear the changes of 
fortune nobly, it is clear that it seems proper for no one, and least of all 
for myself, to go on about things previously said well and by many.  
 
Polybius accentuates the point that historical narrative is meant to serve an instructive 
purpose: παιδείαν, γυμνασίαν, μάθησιν, and διδάσκαλον all mark the didacticism of 
 65 
 
knowledge of the past. The accumulation of synonyms makes the didactic quality of his 
narrative clear from the very start of the Histories and is further strengthened by his 
remark that the fact is universally accepted by his predecessors. Furthermore, Polybius 
includes two elements in his comment that clarify the aim and focus of his Histories. He 
envisions his narrative as instruction meant for the affairs of the state (πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς 
πράξεις) and he achieves his intended lesson by focusing on the vicissitudes of fortune 
(τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς) as evident in the experiences of others (τῶν ἀλλοτρίων 
περιπετειῶν).15 These two components, matters concerning the state and changes of 
fortune, serve as the basic building blocks for what Polybius deems to be his “pragmatic” 
version of history (τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας; 1.2.8)—a description of the past that 
primarily serves as instruction for those involved in political affairs.  
Polybius continues in his proem to describe the overall undertaking he aims to 
accomplish as a spectacle (θεώρημα) which is evident (ἐμφανές) through a comparison of 
his primary subject—the growth and supremacy of the Roman state—with the empires 
that preceded it (1.2.1-7). The two visually-oriented words bear a direct connection to 
didacticism in the Histories. Throughout Polybius’ work, the noun θεώρημα denotes a 
correlation to pragmatic instruction.16 The adjective ἐμφανές, on the other hand, 
                                               
15 The adjective πολιτικός denotes something broader than its English counterpart of “political.” As the 
Histories largely focuses on military affairs and statecraft, broadly speaking, Polybius probably has a 
similar range of meaning behind his use of the adjective; v. Walbank 1972: 32-65 on this matter.  
16 For its six instances in the text, see 1.2.1, 6.26.10, 9.14.5, 10.47.12, 12.25i.7, and 36.15.5. In his exkursus 
on the qualities of generalship (9.14), Polybius notes that θεώρημα is a part of instruction (μάθησις) that 
gives a general personal experience. Similarly, in his attack on Timaeus, Polybius notes (12.25i) that 
θεώρημα can represent personal suffering that allows one to know what is opportune in a given situation, 
knowledge that can only be gained through experiential trial.  
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combines the idea of appearance with what can be gained through knowledge of that 
outward form.17 After Polybius explicitly compares several of the empires to which the 
Romans have proved themselves superior, he goes on to state that his aim has a 
distinctive (ἴδιον) and marvelous (θαυμάσιον) quality. Polybius further notes that tyche 
has forced all matters toward one and the same end (πρὸς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν; 
1.4.1).18 The unique outcome, Polybius argues, requires the historian “to treat the 
administration of fortune through his history under one synoptic view for his audience” 
(1.4.2 διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τὸν χειρισμὸν τῆς 
τύχης). Of the six other uses of σύνοψις in the Histories, only one other refers to 
Polybius’ overall narrative design (14.1a.1) as the instance does here. The remaining five 
examples of the word describe an object or person “in plain sight” within a larger context 
that implies that knowledge can be gained through the recognition of the visible object.19  
Polybius notes the visual qualities (θεώρημα, ἐμφανές, θαυμάσιον, σύνοψιν) of his 
historical narrative throughout the proem to heighten the idea that the past is meant to 
become visible through his account. That is, that his text should evoke a clear image in 
the mind of the reader of the events that it sets out to describe if it is to accomplish its 
didactic aims.  
                                               
17 The adjective appears only four times: 1.2.1, 13.2.2, 21.32.7, and 31.28.5, but its meaning in these 
passages is consistent. V. esp. 13.2.2 and 31.28.5 for examples of the character of individuals as being 
“ἐμφανές” through their actions as recorded by Polybius.  
18 On the central role that tychē plays in Polybius’ Histories, Walbank 1957: 16-26. cf. Chapter 1, Part 1, 
above.  
19 2.69.5, 3.66.11, 6.27.1, 38.18.6.  
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As he discusses the disastrous outcome of Regulus’ campaigns in Africa (1.35.1-
7), Polybius claims that he relates the story for the rectifying edification of his readers 
(1.35.6 χάριν τῆς τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διορθώσεως). As the historian 
notes, there are two ways for people to change themselves for the better: either by 
experiencing their own misfortunes, which he calls more evident (ἐναργέστερον), or 
through those of others, which he notes are less harmful (1.35.7). As he continues, 
Polybius again turns to visual language to describe why one must therefore seek to learn 
from others’ downfalls, “since it is possible to see the better in it without harm” (1.35.8 
ἐπεὶ χωρὶς βλάβης ἔστιν συνιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον).20 Polybius similarly employed the 
adjective ἐναργής, used here to describe the experience of one’s own misfortunes, in the 
proem, as noted above, to refer to the fact that historians agree that the most manifest 
(ἐναργεστάτην) teacher within history is human misfortune. From the proem to the later 
explicit aside on the purpose of potentially painful exempla in didactic history, Polybius 
describes his historiographic method with language that centers on teaching through opsis 
and visualization within his narrative. Furthermore, he explicitly connects the visual 
qualities of his Histories to their pragmatic didacticism, creating a clear link between the 
spectacle contained within his account and its ability to demonstrate the proper action in a 
given situation.  
  
                                               
20 Polybius uses σύνοιδα and the uncompounded οἶδα seemingly interchangeably in the 163 instances of the 
two words. As expected in these terms formed from the perfect of ὁράω, they generally denote the present 
state of knowledge gained through the action of sight; v. LSJ under *εἴδω, p. 483.  
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Part 2: Opsis and Knowledge: Hannibal as a Student of History 
 While Polybius uses opsis to demonstrate his own authority as a didactic 
historian, he does not restrict such examples of visual language only to himself. At 
perhaps the most pivotal moment in the Histories, as he closes the geographically 
disparate narratives of books one through five to begin the symplokē, Polybius employs 
language marked by opsis in the reported speech of Agelaus at the assembly of the 
Achaeans, who are debating whether or not to come to terms with Philip.21 The speech, as 
related by Polybius through his customary combination of direct and indirect speech, 
bears direct implications for the historian’s subsequent narratological design as Agelaus 
suggests that the Greeks band together as do those that interlock (συμπλέκοντες) their 
hands before crossing a river (5.104.1).22 The imagery foregrounds the design of the 
symplokē that the Histories will follow from this point forward.23 To make his case 
further, Agelaus urges the Achaeans to take thought for (προϊδομένους) the forces 
currently waging war in the west and then examines the potential outcomes of the 
                                               
21 The symplokē, for Polybius, is a radical reorganization of his historiographic narrative after the fifth book 
of his Histories. In the first five books, the historian allowed each book (or pairs of books) to address a 
large geographic area over an extended period of time. From the conclusion of his digression on Rome that 
begins the sixth book forward, Polybius interweaves the narratives of each geographic area of the 
Mediterranean into a more concise account of a year or Olympiad. For the historian, this allows the 
connections between events occurring across the Mediterranean. Walbank 1975 discusses the importance of 
the symplokē to Polybius’ overall narrative as a means to intensify the links between Rome and the 
oikoumenē. Quinn 2013, conversely, notes how the overall ideology of the symplokē, as well as its 
narratological structures is largely Hellenocentric.  
22 Usher 2009 notes how Polybius frequently utilizes a combination of direct and indirect speech 
throughout the Histories. He demonstrates that except in exceptional cases, the orations related in the 
Histories begin with oratio obliqua to build up the rationale behind the speech and subsequently alter form 
to oratio recta as the speech moves on to its main point, which Usher terms, the “moment of fullest 
exhortation.”  
23 Champion 1997 argues against the historicity of Agelaus’ speech, on the grounds that it has been tailored 
to fit the introduction of the symplokē.  
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Hannibalic war (5.104.2-4). As Agelaus encourages the Achaeans to “catch sight of” the 
forces in the west, he thereby encourages them to trust his prediction of the outcome of 
these events. Agelaus then addresses Philip in his speech and similarly directs his gaze 
toward the west (πρὸς τὰς δύσεις βλέπειν; 5.104.5-7). While words derived from ὁράω 
generally indicate the knowledge gained through sight, the instances of βλέπω in 
Polybius’ Histories frequently denote the use of opsis to evoke an emotional or mental 
response.24 As Agelaus directs the gaze of the assembled Achaeans and Philip westward, 
therefore, he attempts to induce the sort of reaction of pathos and consequently employs 
the now-famous metaphor that the Romans and Carthaginians represent clouds appearing 
from that direction (τὰ προφαινόμενα νῦν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρας νέφη; 5.104.10). Polybius 
then immediately switches to oratio recta to relate the remainder of the speech, which 
notes the potential for disaster that hangs over their heads should they not band together 
(5.104.11). As Usher has argued, Polybius builds up the rationale and emotions employed 
by his speaking characters through oratio obliqua and then transitions to oratio recta to 
convey the key sentiment of the speech.25 The essential point that Agelaus tries to get 
across, then, is the thought that the Polybian narrator first relates in oratio recta.  
                                               
24 Forms of the verb βλέπω and its compounds occur over one hundred times throughout the Histories; cf., 
e.g., 3.16.4, in which the Romans “look toward” the successes of Macedon and are subsequently 
strengthened in their desire to strengthen their holdings in the east, or 3.64.10, in which Scipio tells his men 
before Ticinus to take heart because they can “catch sight of him” on the battlefield, or 3.107.8, in which 
the Romans “look toward” Aemilius with hope before Cannae, or, finally, 3.118.3, in which Rome’s allies 
in southern Italy “have an eye for” Carthage after Hannibal’s victory at Cannae.  
25 Usher 2009 similarly notes that these portions of the speeches are generally concerned with questions of 
justice or expediency—key themes within Polybius’ Histories. The portion reported through direct speech 
is frequently tied to Polybius’ overall characterization of the speaker. 
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The speech achieves the desired result as the assembly votes to make peace with 
Philip (5.105.1-2). Polybius highlights the role that opsis plays in Agelaus’ attempt to 
direct the gaze of both Philip and the assembly and his reliance on visual imagery. The 
visual emphasis in Agelaus’ speech demonstrates the ability of controlled sight to 
influence politically involved figures to make an informed decision based on what 
Agelaus presents as sound historical knowledge, here evident from the viewpoint of a 
secondary audience. Just as Polybius is on the verge of interweaving the overall design of 
his historical narrative, he similarly intertwines the language describing the role of 
didactic history and opsis as a historical tool by having Agelaus briefly take on the role of 
a historian within the narrative who controls the viewpoint of others to achieve a desired 
pragmatic end.  
Unlike Agelaus, who occupies the stage for a fleeting instance to deliver the 
speech that brings about peace between the Achaeans and Philip, Hannibal takes a much 
larger role within Polybius’ narrative across several books. As such, Hannibal’s ability to 
serve as an internal narrator and to play the role of historian can be tracked as it develops 
throughout the Histories. Polybius characterizes Hannibal as a model pragmatikos leader, 
capable of recognizing the proper action in a given situation through autopsy and 
subsequently controlling the opsis of others during the campaign or on the battlefield. 
Hannibal also creates visual displays of various kinds to control the opsis of and evoke 
particular responses from other characters within the narrative. As such, Hannibal shows 
himself to be the ideal student of history parallel to the model that Polybius proposes for 
his audience.  
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 In his preparations for and then throughout his campaign in Italy, Hannibal goes 
to great lengths to ensure that he gains knowledge through personal autopsy or through 
the direct reports of scouts (κατασκόποι) or local guides (καθηγεμόνες).26 As he is in the 
process of crossing the Alps, Hannibal sends inhabitants of the passes ahead as scouts 
into the difficult areas (3.48.11 εἴς τε τὰς μεταξὺ δυσχωρίας ὁδηγοῖς καὶ καθηγεμόσιν 
ἐγχωρίοις ἐχρῆτο). The scouts allow him to gain local knowledge and insight into areas 
that might lead to setbacks without risking his own safety. Hannibal thus comes to follow 
a method of practical decision-making that mirrors the historical methodology of 
Polybius discussed above.27 Each of them places a primacy on the ability of autopsy to 
convey the surest level of historical knowledge and only seeks out through the inquiry of 
others facts that cannot be ascertained directly—Hannibal actively dispatches the scouts 
to go where he cannot, while Polybius interviews those of the previous generation with 
direct knowledge of events before his own time. Hannibal both demonstrates that 
Polybius’ methodology is sound and serves as an exemplar for the external audience to 
model their own exploits after.  
 In addition to his ability to learn of the topography of the land through direct or 
secondary opsis, Hannibal also creates his own visual cues to aid actions and decision-
                                               
26 For Hannibal’s autopsy, v., e.g., 3.50, in which he himself catches sight of the ambush set up in his 
troops’ path while crossing the Alps. For κατασκόποι, v., e.g., 3.45.1 as Hannibal sends out Numidians as 
scouts around the Rhone or 3.100.1 in which the scouts return to report the location of Roman supplies that 
aids Hannibal in his maneuvers around Minucius. Polybius uses καθηγεμόνες to describe the inhabitants of 
a region that Hannibal sends as scouts to gain local knowledge of areas with which he is unfamiliar: v., e.g., 
3.42.6, 3.48.11, and 3.52.7. Conversely, the Roman Senate is frequently shown by Polybius to rely on 
rumor and report of the events occurring during the campaign and have to make counter maneuvers without 
the privilege of direct firsthand knowledge. The implications of the disparity between the methods of 
Roman and Hannibalic intelligence-gathering are the subject of a separate potential project. 
27 cf. Chapter 2, Part 1.  
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making. In order to facilitate his crossing of the Rhone in the face of Gallic opposition, 
Hannibal orders his men to traverse the river in two stages, thereby requiring lines of 
communication between the two parts of his forces (3.43). His solution is having the 
soldiers who have already crossed send smoke signals to mark their presence, a visible 
sign that he himself had previously arranged with his troops: 
Ἀννίβας δ' ἅμα τῷ συνιδεῖν ἐν τῷ πέραν ἐγγίζοντας ἤδη τοὺς παρ' αὑτοῦ 
στρατιώτας, σημηνάντων ἐκείνων τὴν παρουσίαν τῷ καπνῷ κατὰ τὸ 
συντεταγμένον, ἐμβαίνειν ἅπασιν ἅμα παρήγγελλε (3.43.6) 
 
At the same time that Hannibal saw that the soldiers had already crossed 
to the opposite bank ahead of him, with them making smoke signals to 
mark their presence as ordered, he gave the command for all to embark 
together.  
 
Here, Hannibal sees (συνιδεῖν) that the first portions of his army have crossed by means 
of smoke signals—a visible sign that he had prearranged (τὸ συντεταγμένον) with his 
troops. Polybius notes that he orders the remaining part of his forces to cross immediately 
(ἅμα) after he recognizes the smoke signals. On the one hand, Hannibal here follows the 
suggested Polybian behavior of pursuing a course of action based on what he sees before 
him. On the other, Hannibal anticipated a situation in which he would need to gain the 
knowledge of his troops’ crossing and he preemptively arranged for the means to 
recognize their arrival by ordering them in advance to mark their crossing with the smoke 
signals. Polybius thereby portrays Hannibal as actively avoiding a situation in which he 
would lack the knowledge necessary to proceed as planned.  
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Polybius further establishes Hannibal’s management of opsis by showing his 
capacity to control the sight available to others to his own advantage.28 For example, 
Hannibal misdirects the sight of his enemies—who become an internal audience for the 
gambit—by taking advantage of the unexpected appearance of fog before the battle of 
Trasimene to conceal the movement and position of his troops.29 As Polybius describes 
the encounter, Hannibal’s troops jump out of the fog at the sound of a predetermined 
signal which creates confusion on the part of Flaminius and his troops: 
οὔσης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ὀμιχλώδους διαφερόντως, Ἀννίβας ἅμα τῷ τὸ 
πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς πορείας εἰς τὸν αὐλῶνα προσδέξασθαι καὶ συνάπτειν 
πρὸς αὐτὸν ἤδη τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων πρωτοπορείαν ἀποδοὺς τὰ συνθήματα 
καὶ διαπεμψάμενος πρὸς τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἐνέδραις συνεπεχείρει πανταχόθεν 
ἅμα τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον, παραδόξου γενομένης 
αὐτοῖς τῆς ἐπιφανείας, ἔτι δὲ δυσσυνόπτου τῆς κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα 
περιστάσεως ὑπαρχούσης, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων κατὰ πολλοὺς τόπους ἐξ 
ὑπερδεξίου καταφερομένων καὶ προσπιπτόντων, οὐχ οἷον παραβοηθεῖν 
ἐδύναντο πρός τι τῶν δεομένων οἱ ταξίαρχοι καὶ χιλίαρχοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων, 
ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συννοῆσαι τὸ γινόμενον. ἅμα γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πρόσωπον, οἱ 
δ' ἀπ' οὐρᾶς, οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων αὐτοῖς προςέπιπτον. διὸ καὶ συνέβη 
τοὺς πλείστους ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ῆς πορείας σχήματι κατακοπῆναι, μὴ 
δυναμένους αὑτοῖς βοηθεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡσανεὶ προδεδομένους ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ 
προεστῶτος ἀκρισίας. ἔτι γὰρ διαβουλευόμενοι τί δεῖ πράττειν 
ἀπώλλυντο παραδόξως. (3.84.1-5) 
 
As it was an especially foggy day, as soon as the greater part of the 
marching column had entered into the valley and the vanguard of the 
enemy had already made contact with him, Hannibal gave the signal and 
sent word to those lying in ambush and they attacked the enemy from 
all sides at once. But, since the sudden appearance of the enemy was 
                                               
28 In addition to the example of the fog at Trasimene discussed below, another famous instance of Hannibal 
misdirecting the knowledge of others through his control of opsis is the anecdote that recounts his use of 
wigs and disguises around the camp to fool visitors and even those who knew him well (3.78). Polybius 
describes the ruse as a “Punic subterfuge” (3.78.1 Φοινικικῷ στρατηγήματι τοιούτῳ).  
29 Hannibal similarly creates a false understanding of the situation for Fabius when he uses the torches 
attached to oxen to misdirect the Romans’ efforts after they had trapped the Carthaginians in a narrow 
gorge (3.93-94). Hannibal shows his ability to evoke an expected response from the Roman general by 
generating a state of disinformation. 
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unexpected and since the condition of the atmosphere still hindered 
visibility and since the enemy was bearing down on them and attacking 
on all sides from the higher ground, those around Flaminius—the 
centurions and tribunes of the Romans—were not able to come to the 
aid of the those that were in need and they were not even able to 
comprehend what was going on. At the same time the enemy attacked 
them, some from the front, others from the rear, and still others from 
the flanks. Consequently it came about that the majority of them were 
cut down in the marching column itself, not being able to help each 
other, but instead betrayed by the bad judgment of their commander, for 
they were unexpectedly killed while they were still deliberating what 
it was necessary to do.   
 
The narrative creates an extreme contrast of both the battlefield organization and the 
resulting order or chaos experienced by each side. Hannibal draws up his men in an 
orderly fashion, even though they are spread out in ambuscades, and is able to signal 
them to attack all together (συνεπεχείρει; ἅμα) at every side (πανταχόθεν) of the enemy. 
The sudden and unexpected appearance (παραδόξου…ἐπιφανείας) of the Carthaginians 
renders Flaminius and his officers completely unable to comprehend what is happening 
(συννοῆσαι τὸ γινόμενον), leaving them at a loss as to how to proceed (διαβουλευόμενοι 
τί δεῖ πράττειν). Hannibal’s plan exploits Flaminius’ state of inadequate opsis 
(δυσσυνόπτου).  
Polybius begins the passage with Hannibal as the subject of the main verb of the 
sentence and the series of attributive participles that show him taking advantage of the 
atmospheric conditions, demonstrating Hannibal’s control over the situation as he sets up 
the action. After that, however, the historian maintains the focus of his narrative on the 
utter despondency of the Romans through the repetition of their inability to help one 
another (οὐχ οἷον παραβοηθεῖν ἐδύναντο... μὴ δυναμένους αὑτοῖς βοηθεῖν). Furthermore, 
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his external audience becomes unable to see the actions of the Carthaginian troops, much 
like the experience of Flaminius’ legions themselves. Hannibal’s men attack suddenly at 
various instances from above (ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου), in front (κατὰ πρόσωπον), behind (ἀπ' 
οὐρᾶς), and from the sides (ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων), maximizing the chaos that the tactic 
produces. Polybius recounts only the results of their actions, namely that the Romans are 
destroyed contrary to all expectations (ἀπώλλυντο παραδόξως), rather than describing the 
maneuvers that occur behind the veil of the fog.  
The narrative conflates the roles of Hannibal as general, capable of wreaking 
havoc on the Romans by taking advantage of the appearance of an unexpected mist, and 
that of Polybius, creating confusion on the part of his audience by suppressing in his 
narrative the movements of the Carthaginian forces behind that same haze, as each sets 
out to maximize the effects of the purportedly unexpected fog on the battlefield. 
Throughout the account of Hannibal’s campaign in Italy, Polybius crafts a portrait of the 
general as an ideal student of history that mirrors the historiographic approach that he 
himself takes in producing his narrative. As Hannibal privileges information gained 
through autopsy or via the direct testimony of eyewitness accounts he models that type of 
pragmatic decision-making that Polybius advocates in the comments he makes as 
external narrator.  
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Part 3: Learning from the Past: Hannibal the Historian 
 
Let us now return to the point which began the chapter: that Hannibal’s speech at 
the crossing of the Rhone (3.44) uses language that recalls Polybius’ historiographic 
didacticism. As Hannibal takes on the role of internal narrator in his battlefield speeches, 
he continues to model the types of pragmatic behavior that Polybius attributes to him. 
Hannibal uses Polybian language to exhort his troops to particular exploits and thereby 
plays the role of a historian at the metadiegetic level of the Histories.30 Hannibal’s first 
major engagement after the Carthaginian army crosses the Alps—the battle at the Ticinus 
River—shows the general taking on the persona in the speech and spectacle that he uses 
to exhort his troops to success in the battle. As Polybius narrates the preparations of each 
side, he describes how Hannibal creates a vivid spectacle out of some Gallic captives he 
had taken during his transalpine route:31  
τούτους δὲ κακῶς διετίθετο, παρασκευαζόμενος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· καὶ γὰρ 
δεσμοὺς εἶχον βαρεῖς καὶ τῷ λιμῷ συνέσχηντο, καὶ ταῖς πληγαῖς αὐτῶν 
τὰ σώματα διέφθαρτο. καθίσας οὖν τούτους εἰς τὸ μέσον προέθηκε 
πανοπλίας Γαλατικάς, οἵαις εἰώθασιν οἱ βασιλεῖς αὐτῶν, ὅταν 
μονομαχεῖν μέλλωσιν, κατακοσμεῖσθαι· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἵππους 
παρέστησε καὶ σάγους εἰσήνεγκε πολυτελεῖς. (3.62.4-6) 
 
He was mistreating them, while making preparations for the future: for 
they were holding heavy fetters, and they had been distressed by 
starvation, and their bodies were crippled by blows. After he sat them 
down in the middle, he set out Gallic panoplies, of the sort which their 
kings were accustomed to wear when they were about to fight in single 
                                               
30 On the multiple narratological levels within the Histories: Davidson 1991 and Rood 2004. For a brief 
general introduction to battlefield speeches in historiography: Erhardt 1995. cf., too, the discussion in 
Chapter 1, Parts 2 and 3, above.  
31 Walbank 1957: 397 deems the entire episode of the spectacle and the speech “apocryphal.” Seibert 1993: 
115-16 concludes that the savageness of this episode is made up and added to the tradition in order to make 
Hannibal appear more barbaric. Adler 2011: 65 notes how the spectacle does constitute a moral appeal, 
albeit on the basis of an “overwrought” argument on Hannibal’s part.  
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combat. In addition to these, he stood horses there and brought in lavish 
cloaks. 
 
Polybius highlights Hannibal’s attention to the visual details of the spectacle with his 
own emphasis on illustrative language. The descriptive adjectives βαρεῖς and πολυτελεῖς 
vivify the depiction of the chains and cloaks and bookend the account of the spectacle. 
The starvation and subsequent torture of the captives paints a dramatic portrait of the 
state of their bodies. The historian then notes the general’s placement of these prisoners 
in the middle of the scene, following which he employs several compound verbs to 
record each additional step in the creation of the vignette. The sequence of verbs allows 
the reader to visualize each element of the spectacle in its place in relation to the other 
components. First, the armor is laid out in front (προέθηκε) and Polybius as external 
narrator further specifies the panoply as the kind worn by Gallic kings for single 
combat—armor that is likely resplendent in its own right, though the details are left to the 
imagination of the reader. Then, the horses are brought in to stand alongside (παρέστησε) 
the other offerings, before the setting of the scene comes to a close with the introduction 
(εἰσήνεγκε) of the lavish garments. The spatial prefixes of the verbal sequence clarify the 
positions of each of the vignette’s elements and thereby add depth and visual perspective 
to the scene. The objectives of the efforts of these two men—the external historian and 
the internal character—are therefore aligned: as Polybius carefully narrates Hannibal’s 
creation of the vignette, he himself paints a vivid picture of the scene that can evoke the 
same response in the mind of his external audience that it did for Hannibal’s internal 
audience composed of the Carthaginian army.  
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In contrast to the elaborate entrance scene, the narrative of the duel itself is 
contained within a short genitive absolute (3.62.10 γενομένης δὲ τῆς μάχης). This limits 
the focus on the act itself and instead highlights the setup of the spectacle and the troops’ 
reaction to it.32 Before Polybius closes his account with Hannibal’s speech, he first notes 
the effects of the duel and explains the purpose behind the exhibition: 
ἦν δὲ παραπλησία καὶ περὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡ διάληψις· 
ἐκ παραθέσεως γὰρ θεωρουμένης τῆς τῶν ἀγομένων καὶ ζώντων 
ταλαιπωρίας, τούτους μὲν ἠλέουν, τὸν δὲ τεθνεῶτα πάντες ἐμακάριζον. 
Ἀννίβας δὲ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων τὴν προκειμένην διάθεσιν 
ἐνεργασάμενος ταῖς τῶν δυνάμεων ψυχαῖς, μετὰ ταῦτα προελθὼν αὐτὸς 
τούτου χάριν ἔφη παρεισάγειν τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, ἵν' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων 
συμπτωμάτων ἐναργῶς θεασάμενοι τὸ συμβαῖνον βέλτιον ὑπὲρ τῶν 
σφίσι παρόντων βουλεύωνται πραγμάτων. (3.62.11-63.1) 
 
For the majority of the Carthaginians, the sentiment was very similar: on 
comparison, after they saw the hardship of those being led away while 
still alive, they were pitying them, but all were considering the one that 
died as blessed. Through the aforementioned means, Hannibal created the 
intended effect in the minds of his soldiers and, after this, he stepped 
forward and said that he had brought out the prisoners for this purpose, so 
that they, having looked on the misfortunes of others clearly, would 
determine to bring about the better outcome for their own present 
circumstances. 
 
Both Polybius, as he closes his narrative of the spectacle of the prisoners, and Hannibal, 
as he opens his speech, note with participial forms derived from θεάομαι that the act of 
seeing the drama unfold produces the intended emotional response, to fight in the 
forthcoming campaign as if they have nothing to lose.33 Hannibal’s assertion that his 
                                               
32 This observation was brought to my attention by John Marincola in a public lecture, “Lacrimae Rerum: 
Emotions and the Ancient Historian,” given at UTAustin, 10 April 2015.  
33 Various forms of the verb and its derivative θεωρέω appear well over 400 times throughout the Histories, 
often with little difference in meaning except when the latter means to “consult an oracle.”  
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troops see “others’ misfortunes” (συμπτώματα ἀλλότρια) as a means of didacticism 
echoes a passage discussed above:34  
...τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ἰδίων συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων...τὸν δ' 
ἀεὶ θηρευτέον, ἐπεὶ χωρὶς βλάβης ἔστιν συνιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον. 
(1.35.7-8) 
 
[Of the two possibilities of learning] through one’s own misfortunes or 
those of others...the latter must always be sought, since it is possible to 
see the better in it without harm. 
 
The very model of historiographic instruction that Polybius purports to pursue himself 
resonates in Hannibal’s spectacle and speech. After the historian recounts the rest of the 
general’s oration—which focuses on how the sight of the captives should remind the 
troops not to surrender but to stand and fight—he leaves no doubt that the Carthaginian’s 
overall performance brings about the intended didactic effect.35 Polybius closes his 
account with the following summary: 
τῶν δὲ πολλῶν ἀποδεχομένων τό τε παράδειγμα καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ 
λαμβανόντων ὁρμὴν καὶ παράστασιν οἵαν ὁ παρακαλῶν ἐσπούδασε, τότε 
μὲν ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς διαφῆκε (3.63.14). 
 
Since the majority received both the spectacle and the speech favorably 
and caught the very enthusiasm and fire that the speaker was eager for, he 
then praised them and dismissed them.  
 
Polybius calls the show put on by Hannibal a παράδειγμα and throughout his narrative, 
he uses the term παράδειγμα to denote an example from which one can take a didactic 
                                               
34 For further discussion of this passage, cf. Chapter 2, Part 1, above.  
35 Adler 2011: 64-72 discusses the actual speech at greater length and also compares the speeches of 
Hannibal and Publius Scipio before the Ticinus. Adler notes, in particular, how both Hannibal’s speech and 
Publius Scipio’s are not “particularly strong or particularly feeble” (p. 72); neither appears to be clearly 
favored in Polybius’ construction of these speeches, but both speeches are fairly appropriate to the situation 
at hand.  
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lesson.36 Through the combination of the visible display and his words (λόγους) Hannibal 
leads his audience to recognize their current need for courageous action. In consequence 
of the speech and spectacle, the Carthaginian forces win a resounding victory over the 
Roman troops. The overall narrative of the Battle of the Ticinus River thereby shows 
Hannibal playing the role of historian as an internal narrator within the Histories that 
teaches pragmatic lessons to his internal audience through spectacle and speech in much 
the same way as Polybius intends his readers to learn through the visually evocative 
words of his text.  
The conflation of general and historian continues in Hannibal’s speech before the 
pivotal battle of Cannae, the nadir of fortune for the Romans in the Second Punic War, 
but a veritable zenith of success for Hannibal. The Battle of Cannae also takes on 
narratological significance for Polybius, who breaks his otherwise continuous narrative of 
the campaign at this point to turn to affairs in Greece for the subsequent two books of the 
Histories. When he finally returns his focus to Rome at the start of Book Six, Polybius 
first embarks on a long digression about the structure and nature of the Roman state and 
then resumes his historical narrative in a vastly different format: the symplokē, the 
interwoven account of affairs across the Mediterranean world.37 The drastic break in the 
narrative and the subsequent shift that occurs after the battle gives Cannae a privileged 
position as a key didactic moment for Polybius’ audience—a fact that he makes clear in 
                                               
36 There are fourteen instances of the simple noun: 1.20.15, 1.59.8, 3.21.2, 3.63.14, 4.23.8, 4.53.4, 5.9.7, 
5.98.6, 5.111.7, 7.11.3, 9.28.3, 10.47.6, 11.10.5, and 21.31.6.  Verbal forms also appear (2.60.7, 15.32.5, 
29.19.5, 35.2.10, 38.9.2, and 38.20.1) as do its compounded form παραδειγματισμός (6.38.4, 15.20.5, and 
30.8.8).  
37 cf. Chapter 2, Part 2, above.   
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the aside that ends the third book (3.118). Polybius notes that it is only through the 
peculiarity of their constitution that the Romans are able to overcome the crisis that 
occurred after Cannae.38 The narrative of the fate of Rome after the disaster at Cannae is 
held in suspense until after Polybius describes the Roman constitution in the sixth book 
of the Histories. In his aside here after Cannae, Polybius describes the Roman 
constitution and their ability to recover after the disaster as a lesson that is useful for the 
instruction of his politically-minded audience.39 
Just as he did before the Battle at the Ticinus River, Hannibal addresses his troops 
in preparation for the battle.40 Polybius fills this speech, too, with themes that relate to 
opsis and his own historiographic method:  
Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν θεωρῶν ὅτι καλεῖ τὰ πράγματα 
μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, εὐλαβούμενος δὲ μὴ 
διατέτραπται τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, κρίνας 
προσδεῖσθαι παρακλήσεως τὸν καιρὸν συνῆγε τοὺς πολλούς. 
ἁθροισθέντων δέ, περιβλέψαι κελεύσας πάντας εἰς τοὺς πέριξ τόπους, 
ἤρετο τί μεῖζον εὔξασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ τοὺς παρόντας ἐδύναντο 
καιρούς, δοθείσης αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας, τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ τῶν πολεμίων 
ἱπποκρατοῦντας ἐν τοιούτοις τόποις διακριθῆναι περὶ τῶν ὅλων. πάντων 
δὲ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἐπισημηναμένων διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν... (3.111.1-3) 
 
At the same time Hannibal, when he saw that the matters call him to 
fight and to engage the enemy, and since he was wary that the army 
might be troubled by the recent defeat, thought that the situation required 
an assembly and he gathered the troops. After they gathered, he urged 
                                               
38 3.118.8-9: ὁμολογουμένως γὰρ Ῥωμαίων ἡττηθέντων τότε καὶ παραχωρησάντων τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις 
ἀρετῆς, τῇ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἰδιότητι καὶ τῷ βουλεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνεκτήσαντο τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας 
δυναστείαν, νικήσαντες μετὰ ταῦτα Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἰκουμένης ἁπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς ἐγένοντο 
μετ' ὀλίγους χρόνους. 
39 3.118.11-12: τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς τῆς Ῥωμαίων πολιτείας ποιησόμεθα λόγον, νομίζοντες οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν 
τῆς ἱστορίας σύνταξιν οἰκείαν εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ἐξήγησιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολιτευμάτων 
διορθώσεις καὶ κατασκευὰς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσι καὶ πραγματικοῖς τῶν ἀνδρῶν.  
40 Adler 2011: 77-81 compares the orations of Paullus (3.108-9) and Hannibal (3.111) before the Battle of 
Cannae. Adler notes that Hannibal’s speech portrays the Carthaginians in strongly imperialistic terms (v. 
esp. 3.111.8-10). Erskine 1993 argues that this imperialistic bent is a Polybian invention.  
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them all to look around at the surrounding places and he asked them 
what greater thing would they be able to request from the gods in the 
present circumstances, were the opportunity offered to them, than to fight 
a decisive encounter in such surroundings seeing as they were far 
superior in cavalry compared to their enemy. Everything clearly 
confirmed what was said. 
 
In good Polybian fashion, Hannibal takes notice of (θεωρῶν) and analyzes the matters at 
hand (τὰ πράγματα) to recognize the need for battle. As he begins his speech, he 
encourages his troops to use their own autopsy to recognize the necessary course of 
action. Hannibal prepares his troops for his message by first directing their gaze 
(περιβλέψαι) toward a sight that is representative and illustrative of their current 
situation.41 The guidance of his audience’s opsis is an act of focalization. Just as Polybius 
as external narrator uses a focalizer’s perspective in his relation of the story to add an 
interpretation of the events of the fabula, Hannibal here forces a point of view onto his 
internal audience. This focalizes the Carthaginian army’s outlook for the campaign and 
shows them how they ought to interpret their current situation. Although he had to 
manipulate the appearance of the Gallic captives before the battle at the Ticinus River to 
provide the spectacle he required, the surrounding lands themselves (τοὺς πέριξ τόπους) 
demonstrate the strength of their position without the need to contrive a spectacle to 
provide a visual representation of their situation as he did at the Ticinus River. Hannibal 
orders his army to observe what is plainly evident (διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν); the lesson to be 
drawn from this is purportedly unmistakable. As Hannibal continues, he shifts his focus 
                                               
41 cf., too, the speech of Agelaus in Chapter 2, Part 2.  
 83 
 
from interpreting the events for his soldiers to demonstrating that they already have the 
tools required to read the situation themselves.  
After he explicitly lists the various advantages that the Carthaginian army has in 
these circumstances, the general continues his exposition of their superiority by noting 
the practical experience gained during the recent campaign.  
ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρως διέκεισθε τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μάχης, ἔδει τοῦτο 
ποιεῖν, καὶ μεθ' ὑποδειγμάτων ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολλοὺς διεθέμην λόγους· 
ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τρισὶ μάχαις τηλικαύταις ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου 
νενικήκατε Ῥωμαίους, ποῖος ἂν ἔτι λόγος ὑμῖν ἰσχυρότερον παραστήσαι 
θάρσος αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; (3.111.6-7) 
 
When you were inexperienced concerning battle against the Romans, it 
was necessary that I do this and I was reciting many speeches to you 
along with examples. But since you have by all accounts beaten the 
Romans successively in three large battles, what sort of speech would 
render your courage still stronger than your deeds themselves?  
 
In recollecting the exemplary spectacles (ὑποδείγματα) he had employed as part of his 
earlier orations, Hannibal acknowledges their role in making his previously 
inexperienced (ἀπείρως) troops learn to succeed against the Roman army. The word 
ὑπόδειγμα bears a special significance within Polybius’ narrative: in nearly all of the ten 
instances in which it occurs, Polybius employs it to denote his own use of an example 
within the Histories.42 Hannibal’s designation of his past spectacles as ὑποδείγματα 
therefore represents a direct conflation of the roles of Polybius as external narrator and 
Hannibal as internal speaker.  The displays of manipulated opsis used in earlier battlefield 
speeches, however, are no longer necessary as the practical experience the Carthaginians 
                                               
42 v., e.g., 6.54.6, 8.21.11, 9.16.5, 11.2.8, 12.25i.1, and 15.20.5.  
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have gained through their deeds (τῶν ἔργων) supersedes any requirement of spectacle. 
The rank and file of Hannibal’s army can now acquire understanding directly through 
autopsy as their general does—a parallel denoted in the opening of the speech as he 
encouraged them to look at the topography of the land just as he was. His role as internal 
narrator and quasi-historian has consequently accomplished its larger didactic aim: his 
troops, that is, his audience, are provided with some measure of success following the 
observation of ὑποδείγματα. These achievements endow the army with the practical 
experience that is, in Polybius’ estimation, the best teacher for the pragmatically inclined 
individual.  
In the final battlefield oration of Hannibal’s Italian campaign, the roles of the 
external and internal narrators converge to their greatest extent. In addition to the 
historian’s explicit commentary about the instructive purpose of historiography, Polybius 
has also woven into his larger narrative a depiction of the didactic progression of an 
internal audience—the Carthaginian army, as led by the secondary narrator and quasi-
historian Hannibal, through the same process he envisions for his readers. Just as 
Polybius followed Hannibal’s footsteps through the Alps, then, the student of Polybian 
history is meant to follow the path of the Carthaginian army in the development of his or 
her own historical knowledge and understanding. 
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Part 4: Livy’s Polybian Hannibal 
 After the narrative of the fall of Saguntum and the immediate Roman response, 
Livy notes Hannibal’s advance preparations for his Italian campaign. These measures 
include an exhortation to his troops before dismissing them to winter quarters for the 
chance to spend time with their families.43 Hannibal’s brief speech is his first in the Third 
Decade and consequently provides the earliest opportunity to examine Livy’s use of the 
Carthaginian general as an internal narrator.44 Livy reports Hannibal’s oration through 
direct speech: 
'credo ego uos'45 inquit, 'socii, et ipsos cernere pacatis omnibus 
Hispaniae populis aut finiendam nobis militiam exercitusque 
dimittendos esse aut in alias terras transferendum bellum; ita enim hae 
gentes non pacis solum sed etiam uictoriae bonis florebunt, si ex aliis 
gentibus praedam et gloriam quaeremus. itaque cum longinqua ab 
domo instet militia incertumque sit quando domos uestras et quae 
cuique ibi cara sunt uisuri sitis, si quis uestrum suos inuisere uolt, 
commeatum do. primo uere edico adsitis, ut dis bene iuuantibus bellum 
ingentis gloriae praedaeque futurum incipiamus.' (21.21.3-6) 
 
“Allies!” he says, “I believe that you yourselves also perceive that, since 
all the peoples of Spain have been subdued, we must either make an 
end to our campaign and dismiss our troops or we must carry on the war 
into other lands. Indeed, in this way these clans will flourish with the 
                                               
43 Levene 2010: 60 notes how these preparations fit into the larger anachronistic order of events that Livy 
draws in his narrative of the sack of Saguntum: keeping these events here heightens the sense that Hannibal 
is the real threat that needs to be dealt with and allows Livy to establish and develop the relationship 
between Hannibal and his troops, a theme that recurs throughout the narrative.  
44 There is no indication in the Periochae of Hannibal playing any role in the AUC before his appearance in 
Book 21. Additionally, given Livy’s careful and comprehensive set up of Hannibal’s childhood oath (21.1), 
his succession to command of the army (21.3), the character sketch (21.4), and his initial tasks as general 
(21.5), there is no reason to suppose that Hannibal appeared in the text prior to his grand entrance to the 
stage at the opening of the Third Decade. It is even less likely that he gave any speeches before the fall of 
Saguntum. On the monographic qualities of the Third Decade and its focus on the Hannibalic War, v. 
Levene 2010: passim, but v. esp. the Introduction, viii-x, and how his fifth chapter ties the various threads 
of the book together into a coherent explanation for some of the anomalies in Livy’s narrative.  
45 The phrase credo ego vos recalls the opening of Cicero’s pro S. Rosc. Amer., which begins with the same 
three words. Livy uses the opening again in a speech by Pinarius during the civil unrest in Syracuse 
(24.38.1).  
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benefits not only of peace but even of victory, if we procure booty and 
glory from other nations. And so, since a campaign far from home 
stands over us and it is uncertain when you will see your homes and 
those things which are dear to each of you, if any of you wishes to visit 
your family, I offer you a leave of absence. I declare that you are to be 
present at the beginning of spring, so that we can begin a war that will 
offer great glory and wealth, with the gods helping us well.”  
 
Hannibal’s speech touches on several themes: the status of the Iberian peninsula (pacatis 
omnibus Hispaniae populis), the need for and potential benefits to be derived from the 
forthcoming war, the great distance they will cover in their imminent campaign, and, 
finally, a prayer that they find divinely supported success in the endeavor.  
Polybius, conversely, makes no mention of the speech or of the furlough granted 
to the Carthaginian troops. Two of the prominent themes noted in Livy’s version of the 
speech, however, do appear at the conclusion of a lengthy geographical digression that 
Polybius makes at the onset of Hannibal’s campaign (3.36-38). After mentioning the 
Carthaginians’ control of the northern coast of Africa, Polybius notes that they also 
subdued all of the Iberian peninsula up to the Pyrenees (ἐκεκρατήκεισαν καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας 
ἁπάσης ἕως τῆς ῥαχίας, ὃ πέρας ἐστὶ πρὸς τῇ καθ' ἡμᾶς θαλάττῃ τῶν Πυρηναίων ὀρῶν; 
3.39.4). Polybius then provides a summary of the distances Hannibal and his army 
traversed in various stages throughout the campaign, with the distance from New 
Carthage to the Po Valley totaling, in his estimate, about nine thousand stades.46 The 
                                               
46 3.39.5-11: ἀπέχει δὲ τοῦ καθ' Ἡρακλείους στήλας στόματος οὗτος ὁ τόπος περὶ ὀκτακισχιλίους σταδίους. 
ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ Καινὴν πόιν ἀπὸ στηλῶν εἶναι συμβαίνει τρισχιλίους, ὅθεν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν ὁρμὴν Ἀννίβας τὴν εἰς 
Ἰταλίαν· [τὴν δὲ Καινὴν πόλιν ἔνιοι Νέαν Καρχηδόνα καλοῦσιν]· ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εἰσὶν ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Ἴβηρα 
ποταμὸν ἑξακόσιοι στάδιοι πρὸς δισχιλίοις, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου πάλιν εἰς Ἐμπόριον χίλιοι σὺν ἑξακοσίοις, (ἀπὸ 
δ'Ἐμπορίου πόλεως εἰς *** περὶ ἑξακοσίους), καὶ μὴν ἐντεῦθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ διάβασιν περὶ χιλίους 
ἑξακοσίους· [ταῦτα γὰρ νῦν βεβημάτισται καὶ σεσημείωται κατὰ σταδίους ὀκτὼ διὰ Ῥωμαίων ἐπιμελῶς·] 
ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς διαβάσεως τοῦ Ῥοδανοῦ πορευομένοις παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν ποταμὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς πηγὰς ἕως πρὸς τὴν 
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catalogue of marches highlights the span between the homes of Hannibal’s men and their 
eventual destination of Italy, as did the longinqua ab domo instet militia of Livy’s version 
of the speech. These two themes—the Carthaginian conquest of Spain and the distance 
their forthcoming campaign will take them from home—stand out both in Polybius’ 
geographical aside and in Hannibal’s speech in Livy’s AUC at the same point in each of 
the historians’ narratives. The parallel placement and thematic overlap mobilize the 
Polybian reference in Livy’s version of the general’s speech. As the speech is Hannibal’s 
first in the Third Decade, it serves a paradigmatic function for Livy’s use of Hannibal as 
an internal narrator.  
Finally, we return to Livy’s version of the speech at the Rhone, which—as noted 
above—contains references to Polybius’ digression on the passing of the Alps. Unlike the 
exhortation given after the fall of Saguntum, the speech at the Rhone has a direct 
Polybian parallel. A close comparison of these two versions of Hannibal’s speech reveals 
how Livy incorporates into his internal narrative text comments originally made as asides 
by the external narrator in Polybius. As Livy puts the words of Polybius into Hannibal’s 
mouth in these speeches, he conflates the identities of the two narrators—one internal, the 
other external—found in his source material. As I argued above, basic elements of the 
conflation exist in Polybius’ own text as well, as the Polybian Hannibal uses language 
                                               
ἀναβολὴν τῶν Ἄλπεων τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν χίλιοι τετρακόσιοι. λοιπαὶ δ' αἱ τῶν Ἄλπεων ὑπερβολαί, περὶ 
χιλίους διακοσίους· ἃς ὑπερβαλὼν ἔμελλεν ἥξειν εἰς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία τῆς Ἰταλίας. ὥστ' εἶναι τοὺς 
πάντας ἐκ Καινῆς πόλεως σταδίους περὶ ἐννακισχιλίους, οὓς ἔδει διελθεῖν αὐτόν. On the identity of the 
passage described from the Emporium to the Rhone as the Via Domitia of 118 and Polybius’ awareness of 
the road, v. Reynolds 1966: 118. On the actual distances covered during Hannibal’s campaign, Hoyos 
2006: 408-65; v. esp. 409 and his bibliography on the topic.  
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that mirrors that used by the author for his own historiographic comments. Livy, 
however, amplifies the conflation of identity between the Greek historian and his 
Carthaginian general to a greater extent. While Hannibal is a model of the Polybian 
method of didactic historiography in the Histories, he speaks with the voice of Polybius 
throughout Livy’s Third Decade.  
Before Hannibal begins his speech at the Rhone in the AUC, Livy first sets the 
stage for both the exhortation itself and for the allusive relationship he draws with 
Polybius’ text in the ensuing account. He notes the situation in the camp, the arrival of 
some Gallic envoys, the general disposition of the troops, and Hannibal’s reaction to 
these matters: 
Hannibalem, incertum utrum coeptum in Italiam intenderet iter an cum eo 
qui primus se obtulisset Romanus exercitus manus consereret, auertit a 
praesenti certamine Boiorum legatorum regulique Magali aduentus, qui se 
duces itinerum, socios periculi fore adfirmantes, integro bello nusquam 
ante libatis uiribus Italiam adgrediendam censent. multitudo timebat 
quidem hostem nondum oblitterata memoria superioris belli; sed magis 
iter immensum Alpesque, rem fama utique inexpertis horrendam, 
metuebat. itaque Hannibal, postquam ipsi sententia stetit pergere ire atque 
Italiam petere, aduocata contione uarie militum uersat animos castigando 
adhortandoque. (21.29.6-30.1) 
 
Hannibal, uncertain whether to continue on the journey he had begun or to 
engage in battle with this Roman army which was the first to present itself 
to him, is turned away from this present conflict by the arrival of the 
envoys of Boii and Chief Magalus. They asserted that they would be 
guides for the march and allies in this peril and advised him to invade 
Italy before engaging in battle anywhere or weakening his forces. The 
rank and file was certainly afraid of the enemy, since the memory of the 
previous war had not yet been erased, but even more were they fearing the 
immeasurable journey and the Alps, a task made dreadful by rumor, at 
least to the inexperienced. And so, Hannibal, after he stood firm in his 
decision to continue to march toward and attack Italy, called together an 
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assembly and stirred the spirits of the soldiers in various ways by 
chastising and encouraging them. 
 
Hannibal’s disposition moves from uncertainty to decisiveness at the arrival of some 
Gallic envoys, which provides him with an opportunity to improve the faltering state of 
the Carthaginian army. Though the Gauls pledge their alliance and service, they do so in 
private, before Hannibal gathers the army into the assembly. In Polybius’ version of the 
meeting, however, the Gallic diplomats speak at the gathering before the general himself 
steps forward to give his speech:  
αὐτὸς δὲ συναγαγὼν τὰς δυνάμεις εἰσήγαγε τοὺς βασιλίσκους τοὺς περὶ 
Μάγιλον – οὗτοι γὰρ ἧκον πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων – 
καὶ δι' ἑρμηνέως τὰ δεδογμένα παρ' αὐτῶν διεσάφει τοῖς ὄχλοις. ἦν δὲ 
τῶν λεγομένων ἰσχυρότατα πρὸς θάρσος τῶν πολλῶν πρῶτον μὲν ἡ τῆς 
παρουσίας ἐνάργεια τῶν ἐπισπωμένων καὶ κοινωνήσειν ἐπαγγελλομένων 
τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πολέμου, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας αὐτῶν 
ἀξιόπιστον, ὅτι καθηγήσονται διὰ τόπων τοιούτων δι' ὧν οὐδενὸς 
ἐπιδεόμενοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων συντόμως ἅμα καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας 
ποιήσονται τὴν εἰς Ἰταλίαν πορείαν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡ τῆς χώρας 
γενναιότης, εἰς ἣν ἀφίξονται, καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ 
προθυμία, μεθ' ὧν μέλλουσι ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγῶνας πρὸς τὰς τῶν 
Ῥωμαίων δυνάμεις. οἱ μὲν οὖν Κελτοὶ τοιαῦτα διαλεχθέντες ἀνεχώρησαν. 
(3.44.5-9) 
 
[Hannibal] called together his forces and introduced the chieftains and 
Magalus—for they came to him from the plains around the Po—and he 
explains through an interpreter the things decided in their assemblies. Of 
the things mentioned in the speech, the most effective for the 
encouragement of the troops were, first, the visible presence of those 
welcoming them and promising to take part in the war against the 
Romans; second, the trustworthiness of their offer that they would be 
led safely and quickly through lands of the sort through which they 
would make the campaign into Italy without the lack of any necessity; 
additionally, the richness of the country into which they were about to 
campaign, and its magnitude, and still further the eagerness of the men 
with whom they are about to make an attack against the Roman forces. 
Then the Celts withdrew after speaking such things. 
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The offers made by the envoys and the chief Magilus to serve as allies (socios…fore/ 
κοινωνήσειν…τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πολέμου) and to lead the Carthaginians to Italy (se 
duces itinerum/καθηγήσονται) appear in both texts. Livy records these proposals through 
indirect speech as though they are made directly to Hannibal, not in the wider assembly 
of the troops. Their words affect only the general himself. His doubt is removed and his 
resolve strengthened. Polybius, on the other hand, has the ambassadors speak to the 
assembled troops and he describes the offers that they make not through a record of their 
speech, but instead through extradiegetic comments about the effect that these promises 
had on Hannibal’s troops (πρὸς θάρσος τῶν πολλῶν). In other words, Polybius focalizes 
the Gallic envoys’ offers from the perspective of the Carthaginian army.  
Livy, however, removes the frame created by Polybius’ external narratorial 
remarks, and returns the words of Gallic ambassadors to the mouths of those who 
originally spoke them. As he does in Hannibal’s speech after the fall of Saguntum, Livy 
restores comments from the extradiegetic level of Polybius’ narrative to the metadiegetic 
text of one of his internal narrators. He simultaneously diminishes the influence that the 
Gallic ambassadors had in Polybius’ text over the entire Carthaginian army and limits 
their impact to the general himself. By removing the Gauls’ speech in the assembly, 
however, Livy heightens the focus on the role that Hannibal plays in the forthcoming 
gathering.  
 In general, Livy’s version of the speech given at the Rhone is longer and more 
detailed than Polybius’. As Hannibal opens his exhortation in the assembly, he includes 
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comments recalling the assembly after the fall of Saguntum.47 The first phase of 
Hannibal’s later speech notes his surprise at the army’s unexpected fear:  
mirari se quinam pectora semper impauida repens terror inuaserit. per tot 
annos uincentes eos stipendia facere neque ante Hispania excessisse 
quam omnes gentesque et terrae quas duo diuersa maria amplectantur 
Carthaginiensium essent. indignatos deinde quod quicumque Saguntum 
obsedissent uelut ob noxam sibi dedi postularet populus Romanus, 
Hiberum traiecisse ad delendum nomen Romanorum liberandumque 
orbem terrarum. tum nemini uisum id longum, cum ab occasu solis ad 
exortus intenderent iter: nunc, postquam multo maiorem partem 
itineris emensam cernant, Pyrenaeum saltum inter ferocissimas gentes 
superatum, Rhodanum, tantum amnem, tot milibus Gallorum 
prohibentibus, domita etiam ipsius fluminis ui traiectum, in conspectu 
Alpes habeant quarum alterum latus Italiae sit, in ipsis portis hostium 
fatigatos subsistere. (21.30.2-5) 
 
He said that he was amazed at the kind of sudden fear that invaded their 
always fearless hearts. They served and conquered for so many years and 
they did not depart from Spain before all tribes and all the lands which 
the two separate seas surround were under Carthaginian control. 
Second, that they had crossed the Ebro to destroy the name of the 
Romans and to free the whole world because they were indignant that the 
Roman people were demanding that anyone who had besieged Saguntum 
be handed over to them as if they were guilty. At that time it seemed long 
to no one, although they made their way from the far west to the 
extreme east. Now, after they could see that by far the greater part of 
their journey had been traversed, and that the pass through the Pyrenees 
had been overcome among the most ferocious clans, and that the 
Rhone—such a river!—had been crossed although so many thousands 
of Gauls were preventing them and after the force of even the river 
itself was overcome, and that they have the Alps in sight, with Italy on 
the other side of them, they stopped fatigued at the very gates of the 
enemy! 
 
Hannibal first recalls the army’s efforts to conquer Spain (Hispania…omnes gentesque et 
terrae… Carthaginiensium essent). In the speech he gives after the fall of Saguntum, he 
                                               
47 Pausch 2011: 149-56 also sets this speech within the larger narrative context and demonstrates how Livy 
focalizes his account of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps from various perspectives throughout his narrative 
to build suspense and entertainment for the readers of Livy’s text.  
 92 
 
also relates the troops’ deeds in Spain (pacatis omnibus Hispaniae populis; 21.21.3). As 
noted above, the mention of the conquest of Spain strongly parallels a note made in 
Polybius’ geographical digression (3.39.4), which is found at the same point in his 
narrative as the Livian speech. Similarly, Hannibal’s oration after Saguntum stresses the 
distance the army would travel on the campaign (longinqua ab domo instet militia; 
21.21.5). The comment evokes the substance of the catalogue of marches found in 
Polybius’ narratorial aside (3.39.5-11). At the assembly on the Rhone, too, Hannibal 
notes the distance and routes already travelled by his troops (ab occasu solis ad exortus 
intenderent iter). The list in Livy’s text includes the natural geographical boundaries 
mentioned specifically in Polybius’ digression (3.39.5-11): the Ebro (Hiberum), the 
Pyrenees (Pyrenaeum), the Rhone (Rhodanum), and the Alps (Alpes), strengthening the 
connections between Livy’s account and that of Polybius.48  
 Since the association between these two texts is grounded in the opening of 
Livy’s version, let us now examine Polybius’ account of Hannibal’s speech at the 
assembly on the Rhone in full:  
μετὰ δὲ τούτους εἰσελθὼν αὐτὸς πρῶτον μὲν τῶν προγεγενημένων 
πράξεων ἀνέμνησε τοὺς ὄχλους· ἐν αἷς ἔφη πολλοῖς αὐτοὺς καὶ 
παραβόλοις ἔργοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἐπικεχειρηκότας ἐν οὐδενὶ διεσφάλθαι, 
κατακολουθήσαντας τῇ 'κείνου γνώμῃ καὶ συμβουλίᾳ. τούτοις δ' ἑξῆς 
εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει, θεωροῦντας διότι τὸ μέγιστον ἤνυσται τῶν 
ἔργων, ἐπειδὴ τῆς τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως κεκρατήκασι τῆς τε τῶν 
συμμάχων εὐνοίας καὶ προθυμίας αὐτόπται γεγόνασι. διόπερ ᾤετο δεῖν 
περὶ μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ῥᾳθυμεῖν, ὡς αὐτῷ μελόντων, πειθαρχοῦντας δὲ 
τοῖς παραγγέλμασιν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων 
ἔργων ἀξίους. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἐπισημαινομένου καὶ μεγάλην ὁρμὴν καὶ 
προθυμίαν ἐμφαίνοντος, ἐπαινέσας αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων 
                                               
48 For the text of the passage, v. above.  
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εὐξάμενος διαφῆκε, παραγγείλας θεραπεύειν σφᾶς καὶ παρασκευάζεσθαι 
μετὰ σπουδῆς, ὡς εἰς τὴν αὔριον ἀναζυγῆς ἐσομένης. (3.44.10-13) 
 
He came up after them and first reminded the assembled troops of their 
former achievements, among which he said they had attempted many 
hazardous tasks and dangers and not failed in one of them, having 
followed his judgment and plans. Next, he wished that they would have 
courage, considering that they have accomplished the greatest part of 
their tasks, since they had mastered the crossing of the river and were 
eyewitnesses of the goodwill and eagerness of their allies. He asked 
them, therefore, to be at ease about the particulars, since those are his 
concern, but to obey his commands and be good men and worthy of their 
former works. After the assembly applauded and demonstrated the men’s 
great desire and eagerness, he praised them, prayed to the gods on behalf 
of them all, and dismissed them. He ordered them to make themselves 
ready and to prepare with haste, since they were making their departure 
the next day.  
 
To open the speech in Polybius’ Histories, Hannibal first calls to mind the troops’ prior 
actions (τῶν προγεγενημένων πράξεων), which would include, of course, the conquest of 
Spain. The added specificity of the conquest of the Iberian Peninsula, however, 
additionally strengthens the reference to Hannibal’s speech at Saguntum, with its own 
Polybian parallels, as noted above.  
 Livy’s version of the speech surpasses Polybius’ by incorporating mentions of the 
crossings of both rivers and with the evocative note of the Rhone’s greatness. As 
Hannibal continues in Polybius’ version, he encourages his men and then describes that 
they have already accomplished most of their tasks and crossed the river. Livy 
incorporates the act of encouragement in his description of the opening of the speech 
(adhortando; 21.30.1). Polybius’s paraklesis (εὐθαρσεῖς εἶναι παρεκάλει) becomes its 
Latin near equivalent with Livy’s adhortatio.  Livy also incorporates the idea that the 
army had already completed most of their journey, as maiorem partem itineris mirrors 
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Polybius’ τὸ μέγιστον…τῶν ἔργων. Livy also caps Polybius’ description of the crossing 
of a river (τῆς τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ διαβάσεως) by noting both the crossing of the Ebro 
(Hiberum traiecisse) and the Rhone (Rhodanum), the latter qualified by the descriptive 
phrase: tantum amnem.  
 Livy makes a meaningful change to the next section of Polybius’ speech, 
however. While the Polybian Hannibal next notes that the army are eyewitnesses 
(αὐτόπται) of the goodwill and support of their Gallic allies, the Livian general mentions 
the opposition that the Carthaginians have already faced from the tribes in the area: the 
ferocissimas gentes of the Pyrenees and the Gauls who hindered their crossing of the 
Rhone (milibus Gallorum prohibentibus). Since Magilus and the Boii had offered their 
assistance to Hannibal in private in Livy’s text and made no speech in the assembly, the 
Carthaginian rank and file in the AUC were not, in fact, eyewitnesses of the support as 
they are in the Greek historian’s account.49 By noting instead the hostile presence of the 
Gauls in Hannibal’s speech, Livy intensifies the challenges already faced by the 
Carthaginian army. The absence of a note of allied support also makes their forthcoming 
campaign seem more difficult. The Livian Hannibal gives the impression in his speech 
that his troops have tougher tasks both behind and ahead of them in the campaign, a 
change that effectively undermines the entire reason the Polybian Hannibal makes the 
speech. On the whole, Livy incorporates the entirety of Polybius’ account of Hannibal’s 
speech into just the opening of his version and in an act of intertextual one-upmanship, 
                                               
49 These envoys do make an appearance later in Livy’s version of the speech, however, on which, cf. the 
discussion of 21.30.6-11, below.  
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surpasses it in detail and content, while simultaneously undercutting the main purpose 
behind the speech in his predecessor.  
 After the end of Hannibal’s speech, Polybius continues his narrative up to the 
army’s arrival at the foot of the Alps and the beginning of their trek across the mountains 
(3.45-47). At this point, Polybius embarks on a well-known digression attacking the 
fantastical and unrealistic accounts of his predecessors (3.47.6-48.12).50 After he 
describes the unlikely scenarios posited by prior historians—including overly steep paths, 
a lack of information on the part of Hannibal, and the appearance of divine 
intervention—Polybius presents a rational defense of his more realistic account that 
Hannibal not only knew where he was going but that he traversed well-used paths: 
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐρημίας, ἔτι δ' ἐρυμνότητος καὶ δυσχωρίας τῶν 
τόπων ἔκδηλον ποιεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτῶν. οὐχ ἱστορήσαντες γὰρ ὅτι 
συμβαίνει τοὺς Κελτοὺς τοὺς παρὰ τὸν Ῥοδανὸν ποταμὸν οἰκοῦντας οὐχ 
ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς πρὸ τῆς Ἀννίβου παρουσίας, οὐδὲ μὴν πάλαι προςφάτως 
δέ, μεγάλοις στρατοπέδοις ὑπερβάντας τὰς Ἄλπεις παρατετάχθαι μὲν 
Ῥωμαίοις, συνηγωνίσθαι δὲ Κελτοῖς τοῖς τὰ περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδία 
κατοικοῦσι, καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἐν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων ἐδηλώσαμεν, πρὸς δὲ 
τούτοις οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι πλεῖστον ἀνθρώπων φῦλον κατ' αὐτὰς οἰκεῖν 
συμβαίνει τὰς Ἄλπεις, ἀλλ' ἀγνοοῦντες ἕκαστα τῶν εἰρημένων ἥρω τινά 
φασιν ἐπιφανέντα συνυποδεῖξαι τὰς ὁδοὺς αὐτοῖς. (3.48.5-7) 
 
Likewise, as for what is said about the isolation, it makes the falseness of 
their accounts of the difficulty and ruggedness of the passages still more 
conspicuous. For they have not learned through their inquiry that it so 
happens that the Celts that live along the Rhone have not once, but twice 
before Hannibal’s campaign, and not long ago but very recently, crossed 
over the Alps with great armies to fight against the Romans and come to 
the aid of the Celts that live along the Po valley, just as I described in an 
                                               
50 It is unclear which of his predecessors specifically Polybius is attacking here. Possibilities include 
Phylarchus, Chaereas, Sosylus, and Silenus, among others: Walbank Comm. ad loc: I: 381-82. The 
fantastical elements of Silenus are well known in their inclusion in Coelius Antipater’s monograph, on 
which, cf. Chapter 5, Part 1, below, and the fragment on Hannibal’s dream: Coelius F32 FRHist = Cic. de 
Div. 1.48.  
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earlier section.51 In addition to this, they do not know that a very large 
group of men happen to live between the Alps, but they are in the wrong 
about each of the things mentioned and say that some hero appears to 
show them the path. 
 
Polybius’ argument rests on the actual passability of the Alps, as demonstrated by the 
Transalpine Gauls who had already crossed the mountains on two occasions to fight 
against the Romans. The historian also mentions the Alpine tribes who live within the 
mountain range and from whom Hannibal and his troops will shortly face opposition 
(3.50-53).  
Polybius’ rational explanation of the viability of the Carthaginian army’s plans to 
cross the Alps is found in Hannibal’s speech in the AUC, where Livy continues the 
interplay with his Greek predecessor. The general picks up his expression of surprise that 
his troops are wary of the Alps with a rhetorical question before proceeding to a rational 
defense that mirrors Polybius’ digression:  
quid Alpes aliud esse credentes quam montium altitudines? fingerent 
altiores Pyrenaei iugis: nullas profecto terras caelum contingere nec 
inexsuperabiles humano generi esse. Alpes quidem habitari, coli, 
gignere atque alere animantes; peruias paucis esse, esse et exercitibus. 
eos ipsos quos cernant legatos non pinnis sublime elatos Alpes 
transgressos. ne maiores quidem eorum indigenas sed aduenas Italiae 
cultores has ipsas Alpes ingentibus saepe agminibus cum liberis ac 
coniugibus migrantium modo tuto transmisisse. militi quidem armato 
nihil secum praeter instrumenta belli portanti quid inuium aut 
inexsuperabile esse? Saguntum ut caperetur, quid per octo menses 
periculi, quid laboris exhaustum esse? Romam, caput orbis terrarum, 
petentibus quicquam adeo asperum atque arduum uideri quod inceptum 
moretur? cepisse quondam Gallos ea quae adiri posse Poenus desperet; 
proinde aut cederent animo atque uirtute genti per eos dies totiens ab se 
uictae aut itineris finem sperent campum interiacentem Tiberi ac 
moenibus Romanis. (21.30.6-11) 
                                               
51 Polybius describes the campaign in the preceding book of his Histories: 2.21-2.  
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What else do they believe the Alps are except heights of mountains? 
They might suppose that the Alps are higher than the ridges of the 
Pyrenees: surely, no lands touch the sky and are insurmountable to the 
human race. Indeed, the Alps are inhabited, cultivated, give birth to 
and nourish living beings, allow passage to small forces and even to 
entire armies. The very legates whom they saw before their eyes did 
not pass over the Alps lifted from above on wings. He said that not even 
their ancestors were indigenous, but were the foreign inhabitants of Italy 
and had safely crossed these very Alps often with huge armies on the 
move, along with their children and wives. Indeed, what is impassable 
or unsurmountable for an armed soldier carrying nothing with him except 
his implements of war? What danger and what labor had been expended 
for eight months in order to take Saguntum? As they are attacking Rome, 
the capital of the world, does anything seem so difficult and arduous to 
delay their undertaking? The Gauls once took those places which a 
Carthaginian is giving up hope of attacking! Then they should either 
yield to a people conquered by them in spirit and courage so often in 
those days or they should hope that the end of their journey is the field 
lying between the Tiber and the walls of Rome. 
 
Hannibal’s speech here in the AUC incorporates several elements of Polybius’ digressive 
attack on his historiographic predecessors: first, he notes that people inhabit the Alps 
(Alpes…habitari, coli). Second, he includes the various campaigns taken by the Gauls 
(ingentibus saepe agminibus), substituting saepe for Polybius’ οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς. 
Additionally, Livy’s Hannibal mentions that the Gallic tribes have crossed the Alps not 
just for military purposes, but also for permanent migration, taking along their wives and 
children (cum liberis ac coniugibus migrantium). Lastly, the presence of the Cisalpine 
envoys in sight of the army (ipsos quos cernant legatos) shows that the Alps can be 
crossed. The claim recalls part of Polybius’ version of the speech, discussed above, that 
the troops were eyewitnesses (αὐτόπται) of the support of their allies. Livy removes the 
mention of the assistance the legates are offering and moves his note of their physical 
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presence from the context of Hannibal’s adhortatio to the Polybian rationale about the 
passability of the Alps, strengthening the connections between his text and that of his 
Greek predecessor.  
 Just as he does in Hannibal’s first speech in the decade, Livy incorporates the 
allusions to Polybius’ digression into the close of Hannibal’s oration. As Livy integrates 
these comments and moves them from the extradiegetic text in Polybius into his story, he 
thereby subsumes Polybius’ voice into that of the internal narrator and actor Hannibal. 
This allows Livy to take authority over his Greek predecessor’s text by changing, 
correcting, or capping Polybius’ words. Additionally, the very passage that the Roman 
historian incorporates into Hannibal’s speech at the Rhone was, for Polybius, an 
expression of polemic against his own predecessors. As Livy asserts his control over 
Polybius’ text, he also stakes his own claim in the historiographic dispute. If his Greek 
counterpart towers over his own predecessors, Livy’s incorporation of Polybian language 
allows him to surpass these earlier authors as well.  
Despite Hannibal’s reassurances, the reality that the Carthaginian army 
encounters proves much more difficult than their general leads them to expect.52 After the 
column crosses to the Italian side of the Alps and Hannibal encourages his worn out 
troops (21.35), the advance scouts arrive at what they deem to be the end of the road (ad 
                                               
52 cf. Levene 2010: 148-55. In discussing the intertextual relationship between Livy and Polybius on the 
crossing, Levene notes (v. esp. p. 152) that the imagery Livy draws of their frightful crossing (21.32.7) also 
proves worse than the expectations the troops had upon hearing the fama of the Alps. cf. Doblhofer 
1983:142-44.  
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finem viae, 21.36.3). The impasse eventually causes a disruption in the progress of the 
column and prompts a response from the general: 
miranti Hannibali quae res moraretur agmen nuntiatur rupem inuiam 
esse. digressus deinde ipse ad locum uisendum. haud dubia res uisa 
quin per inuia circa nec trita antea, quamuis longo ambitu, 
circumduceret agmen. ea uero uia insuperabilis fuit (21.36.3-5) 
 
As Hannibal was wondering what was causing the march to be delayed, it 
was announced to him that the cliff was impassable. He himself then set 
off to examine the pass. It seemed that there was no doubt but that the 
column would be led around through impassable places never before 
trodden on, however long the detour. The path was truly insurmountable. 
 
Livy’s description of Hannibal’s action here includes an act of autopsy (ipse…visendum), 
noted with a direct calque of the Greek term. Just as Livy conflates the narratorial 
identities of Polybius and Hannibal in the speeches noted above, here the general acts in a 
manner that mirrors the historiographic persona that the Greek historian constructs for 
himself. Although Livy incorporates a note of Polybian autopsy into the passage, the 
repetition of remarks on the impassability of the route (inviam…invia… insuperabilis) 
echo Hannibal’s speech given before the start of the crossing. In the rationale transferred 
from Polybius’ text, Livy’s Hannibal describes the Alps as nec insuperabiles and pervias 
(21.30.7). The speech thereby contains a negation and a direct antonym of the adjectives 
that now describe the passageways when viewed through direct autopsy. The depiction 
calls to question the rationale employed by Polybius and incorporated into Hannibal’s 
speech by Livy. The Carthaginian army finds their passage just as impassable and 
impossible as they imagined. 
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When the Punic army reaches the insurmountable impasse, Livy instead notes that 
they have to cut a new, previously unpassed road into the mountain (21.37), thereby 
fulfilling the wildest expectations of Hannibal’s troops that they were venturing where no 
army had travelled before. 
inde ad rupem muniendam per quam unam uia esse poterat milites ducti, 
cum caedendum esset saxum, arboribus circa immanibus deiectis 
detruncatisque struem ingentem lignorum faciunt eamque, cum et uis 
uenti apta faciendo igni coorta esset, succendunt ardentiaque saxa infuso 
aceto putrefaciunt. ita torridam incendio rupem ferro pandunt 
molliuntque anfractibus modicis cliuos ut non iumenta solum sed 
elephanti etiam deduci possent. (21.37.2-3) 
 
Then soldiers were led out to open up the rocky cliff, the one place 
through which there was able to be a path. Since the rock had to be cut, 
they made a huge pile of wood after they toppled over and cut up the 
large trees nearby and they set this pile on fire when the force of the 
wind had arisen that was suitable for making a fire. They weakened the 
burning rocks by pouring vinegar onto them.53 In this fashion they 
opened up the rocky cliff, dried out by the fire, with iron implements and 
they made the sloping roads gentler with curving little paths so that not 
only the pack animals but even the elephants were able to be led across.   
 
Polybius, conversely, makes no mention of the fires and vinegar, but does relate a 
several-day-long effort to widen a previously existing path for the elephants to come 
down (3.54-55).54 Livy’s description of the crossing caps that of his Greek predecessor in 
that his Carthaginians cut rock to open up an entirely new path, whereas Polybius’ Punic 
                                               
53 Vitruvius provides a nearly contemporaneous description of this practice in his de Arch.: saxa silicea, 
quae neque ferrum neque ignis potest per se dissolvere, cum ab igni sunt percalefacta, aceto sparso 
dissiliunt et dissolvuntur (“limestone rocks, which neither iron nor fire are able to dissolve through their 
own efforts, burst open and are dissolved with the application of vinegar after the rocks have been heated 
up by fire”; 8.3.19).  
54 ἅμα δὲ τῷ παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τοιοῦτον τόπον, ὃν οὔτε τοῖς θηρίοις οὔτε τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις δυνατὸν ἦν 
παρελθεῖν διὰ τὴν στενότητα (“just as soon they arrived at such a place as was impossible to pass through 
for the elephants and for the pack animals, due to its narrowness; 3.54.7).  
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troops only expand a path for their animals. Livy’s account makes them the first to 
traverse this specific path, drawing upon a trope of “firstness”: ego primus. Becoming the 
first person in Rome to accomplish a particular feat granted cultural and political 
significance. The primus trope is well exhibited in Duilius’ naval victory, the first for 
Rome, which is commemorated through a monumental inscription reported by Appian 
(App. BCiv. 5.130) and surviving on a column setup as a memorial of the victory.55 
Duilius continued to have resonance in Livy’s own day, as Augustus likely renewed his 
triumphal monument and added one of his own of similar design. Additionally, Duilius is 
included, with accompanying elogium, among the Augustan monument of the summi 
viri.56 Despite the textual issues for the inscriptions and the elogium, the central feature of 
each of the narratives surrounding Duilius is his that he first accomplishes a naval victory 
and receives other unprecedented honors.57 Livy draws upon the cultural capital of 
primacy when he has Hannibal’s troops be the first to traverse newly opened pathways.  
The situation brings to fruition the worst fears experienced by the Carthaginian 
army before they crossed the Alps, directly contradicting the rationale first voiced by 
Polybius and then assimilated into Hannibal’s speech. The dread felt by the army prompts 
                                               
55 On Duilius’ original monument: Plin. NH 34.20, Sil. 6.663-69, and Quint. Inst. 1.7.12. Scholarly 
discussions: Sehlmeyer 1999: 117-19, Kondratieff 2004: 7-10 and Roller 2013. The surviving inscription of 
the Duilius column (CIL I2 25 = CIL 6.1300) is of uncertain date, since Augustus (then Octavian) 
reinvigorated the tradition of Duilius after his own victory at Naulochos. On the inscription: Bleckmann 
2002: 118-24.  
56 On Duilius as an exemplum followed and perpetuated by Augustus: Chaplin 2000: 184-87 and Roller 
2009. On the Duilius monument and its place within the larger Augustan landscape: Roller 2013.  
57 The Columna Duilia Inscription features a repetition of primus: [r]em navebos marid consol primos 
c[eset copiasque] / [c]lasesque navales primos ornavet pa[ravetque] (CIL 6.1300, ll. 5-6). The elogium is 
reconstructed by Chioffi as follows: pri[m]us d[e Poeneis n]a≥val[em trium]/[phum egit. (CIL 6.40952); 
cf. Kondratieff 2004: 11, n. 40. cf. Polyb. 1.22-23, Cic. de Sen. 44, Livy Peri. 17, Val. Max. 3.6.4, Tac. 
Ann. 2.49, Front. Strat. 2.3.24, in addition to those cited in the note above.  
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the Carthaginian general to call the assembly at which he gives the Polybian speech 
discussed above. Livy summarizes the Carthaginians’ fears of the Alps before their 
crossing:  
multitudo timebat quidem hostem nondum oblitterata memoria 
superioris belli; sed magis iter immensum Alpesque, rem fama utique 
inexpertis horrendam, metuebat. (21.29.7) 
 
The rank and file was certainly afraid of the enemy, since the memory of 
the previous war had not yet been erased, but even more were they 
fearing the immeasurable journey and the Alps, a task made dreadful by 
rumor, at least to the inexperienced.  
 
The phrase utique inexpertis makes three potential references to Livy’s incorporation of 
Polybius. First, it effectively foregrounds Hannibal’s forthcoming Polybian rationale that 
the very journey is not worth fearing as it had been successfully crossed multiple times 
by the local inhabitants and by waves of Gallic armies. The Gauls have the experience 
and are therefore unafraid. Second, the note also recalls Polybius’ assertion of his own 
journey through the Alps, which serves as part of his defense of his reliability on 
Hannibal’s crossing.58 Third, the phrase also heightens the accomplishment made by 
these soldiers during their actual crossing, as they travel on paths that are inexpertis to all, 
even to the local inhabitants. The army’s worst fears concerning the immense and 
horrendous task are fulfilled from the perspective of even the most knowledgeable Alpine 
                                               
58 3.48.12: ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀποφαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρ' αὐτῶν ἱστορηκέναι 
τῶν παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ τόπους κατωπτευκέναι καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων αὐτοὶ κεχρῆσθαι 
πορείᾳ γνώσεως ἕνεκα καὶ θέας. “But I give account of these matters securely because of the fact that I 
inquired about these matters from those that happened to be present at the time and because I examined the 
places myself and personally made the passage through the Alps in order to know and see it myself.” On 
the passage and its importance in Polybius’ assertion of autopsy and his historiographic authority, cf. 
Chapter 2, Parts 2 and 3, above.  
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tribes. Livy’s Hannibal encounters the startling and—given his logical defense of the 
likelihood of crossing—unexpected impasse only to overcome it. Although the overall 
situation that Livy describes of the actual impassability of the Alps calls to question 
Polybius’ rational defense of the Carthaginians’ crossing, as noted above, the creation of 
a completely new road in the face of such travails demonstrates that Livy’s account of the 
text surpasses that of his Greek predecessor. The intertextual one-upmanship also adds to 
Hannibal’s fama as a notable general who can overcome the seemingly unsurmountable 
crossing, a situation that even the pragmatic rationalist Polybius deemed impossible.  
 Hannibal’s next speech during his campaign into Italy—recorded by both 
Polybius and Livy—occurs in the middle of his crossing of the Alps, just before his men 
encounter the impassable routes that require them to cut new roads into the mountain 
paths. Hannibal takes advantage of a spectacular view of their eventual target area to 
encourage and inspire his troops to continue the pursuit of their goal. Polybius’ account 
of the speech is dominated by his description of the physical appearance of the landscape: 
ἐπειρᾶτο συναθροίσας παρακαλεῖν, μίαν ἔχων ἀφορμὴν εἰς τοῦτο τὴν 
τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν· οὕτως γὰρ ὑποπεπτώκει τοῖς προειρημένοις 
ὄρεσιν ὥστε συνθεωρουμένων ἀμφοῖν ἀκροπόλεως φαίνεσθαι διάθεσιν 
ἔχειν τὰς Ἄλπεις τῆς ὅλης Ἰταλίας. διόπερ ἐνδεικνύμενος αὐτοῖς τὰ περὶ 
τὸν Πάδον πεδία καὶ καθόλου τῆς εὐνοίας ὑπομιμνήσκων τῆς τῶν 
κατοικούντων αὐτὰ Γαλατῶν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς Ῥώμης αὐτῆς τόπον 
ὑποδεικνύων ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίησε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. (3.54.2-3) 
 
He tried to call together an assembly of the army, having a single cause 
for this meeting: the clear view of Italy. For, Italy lies under the 
aforementioned mountains in such a way that when both are viewed 
together the Alps have a general appearance to seem to be a citadel for 
all of Italy. He therefore shows to them all the plains around the Po and 
generally reminds them of the favorable disposition of the Gauls living 
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there. At the same time he also points out the situation of Rome itself 
and made the men take heart to some extent.  
 
Polybius first notes as external narrator the purpose for Hannibal’s exhortation: the 
striking and spectacular appearance of Italy (τὴν τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐνάργειαν). The claim to 
enargeia is further strengthened by the vividness of the narrator’s description that 
follows, which notes the physical layout of the countryside to the mountains and then 
employs a result clause to equate the Alps to be the bastion (ἀκροπόλεως) of all of Italy. 
Hannibal’s speech, related through a series of participial phrases (ἐνδεικνύμενος... 
ὑπομιμνήσκων… ὑποδεικνύων), begins only after the external narrator sets the stage with 
the vivid description of the mountains.  
 Livy too opens his account with a depiction of the physical appearance of the 
view but then quickly moves into Hannibal’s speech: 
praegressus signa Hannibal in promunturio quodam, unde longe ac late 
prospectus erat, consistere iussis militibus Italiam ostentat subiectosque 
Alpinis montibus Circumpadanos campos, moeniaque eos tum 
transcendere non Italiae modo sed etiam urbis Romanae; cetera plana, 
procliuia fore; uno aut summum altero proelio arcem et caput Italiae in 
manu ac potestate habituros. (21.35.8-9) 
 
Hannibal stepped out in front of the standards at a certain promontory, 
from which the view was far and wide, and ordered the soldiers to stop 
there. He points out to them Italy and the fields on the plains along the 
Po lying below the Alps. He says that they are now climbing the walls 
not just of Italy but even of the city of Rome. He says that the rest of the 
journey will be flat or downhill and that after one or two more battles 
they will take into their possession and under their power the citadel 
and capital of Italy.  
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Hannibal here encourages his troops to perform an act of autopsy on the lands into which 
they are about to campaign.59 He stops them on the point at which they have the most 
open view (longe ac late prospectus) of Italy.60 Several elements of the report bear 
striking parallels to Polybius’ version of the fabula. First, Hannibal describes the plains of 
Italy as lying under (subiectos) the Alps, a direct translation of Polybius’ ὑποπεπτώκει. 
Then he notes that the mountains they are in the process of crossing act as walls (moenia) 
for Italy and the city of Rome itself. The claim captures the sense of Polybius’ description 
of the Alps as the acropolis of Italy, another defensive structure meant to guard a city. 
Livy here corrects the Polybian depiction in his incorporation of these comments into 
Hannibal’s speech. The acropolis of a city generally lies at its interior, while its walls 
form its perimeter. As each historian describes the Alps, the sense is that these mountains 
represent the defensive boundary of Italy which the Carthaginians are in the midst of 
crossing. Livy’s moenia is then a more fitting choice of vehicle for the simile describing 
the Alps than Polybius’ ἀκρόπολις. To heighten the force of the correction further, Livy 
does incorporate a direct reference to the acropolis mentioned by his Greek predecessor. 
At the end of Hannibal’s speech, he describes Rome as the citadel and capital of Italy 
(arcem et caput Italiae), using arx, a direct calque of the Greek ἀκρόπολις.  
                                               
59 Pausch 2011: 151-52 also describes the focalization of this account from the perspective of the 
Carthaginian troops. cf. Feldherr 2009b: 317-18, fn. 9, who notes that the entire account of Hannibal’s 
crossing of the Alps is so centrally focalized from the perspective of the Carthaginians that “a Roman 
reader may be in danger of forgetting who he is.”  
60 Jaeger 2006: 402-3 and Levene 2010: 17 both describe how this view forecasts and is paralleled by 
Hannibal’s final look at Italy upon his departure: 30.20.7-9.  
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Additionally, Hannibal’s depiction of Rome as the caput of Italy recalls the claim 
he had just made in his speech at the Rhone that they are campaigning against the capital 
of the whole world (21.30.10 caput orbis terrarum). The reminiscence to his earlier 
oration further mobilizes the reference made back to Polybius’ text and strengthens the 
sense of the validity of the correction the Roman historian has Hannibal make here, in 
that it repeats a metaphor already employed by the Carthaginian general. Just as Livy 
does in the other speeches in the opening book of the Third Decade examined above, here 
he incorporates comments originally made by the external narrator in Polybius into the 
voice of Hannibal. Livy uses an internal narrator to mediate his interaction with his Greek 
predecessor and to provide points of clarification and emendation to the claims originally 
posited by Polybius.  
 
 These three speeches of Hannibal that I have analyzed are his first of the Third 
Decade and serve a paradigmatic function for the general’s strategic process and his 
interaction with his troops for the narrative that follows. Livy incorporates into each of 
these three orations language, comments, and rational arguments that originally appeared 
in Polybius’ Histories from the voice and perspective of the external narrator. 
Consequently, Hannibal speaks not just in a Polybian fashion in the Third Decade of the 
AUC, but by using the actual words of Polybius. As Livy alludes to and incorporates 
these comments, he also corrects and caps the claims and comments found in his Greek 
predecessor, either through his own word choice or in the events of the narrative that 
follow. While the Carthaginian general’s speeches record and give voice to the Polybian 
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historiographic tradition in Livy’s text, they also offer emendations and instances of 
intertextual one-upmanship. In effect, then, Livy’s Hannibal as internal narrator supplants 
Polybius and as he relates not only the content of these Histories but also the 
historiographic reasoning behind the process that created them.  
Moreover, the conflation of the identities of Hannibal and Polybius into the voice 
of a single internal narrator in the Third Decade provides a potential explanation for 
Livy’s lack of direct citation of Polybius’ text within the decade. Only after the decisive 
Battle of Zama and its aftermath does Livy mention the Greek historian’s name in his 
text: “Polybius, an author not at all to be rejected, recounts…” (Polybius, haudquaquam 
spernendus auctor, tradit…; 30.45.5).61 The otherwise complete absence of direct 
citations of Polybius’ Histories throughout the Third Decade, despite Livy’s now 
established use of Polybius as a source text, both highlights and avoids concealing the 
nuance of the conflation of the narratological identities of Polybius and Hannibal. In 
effect, Hannibal in Livy’s Third Decade functions like a Contean “modello-esemplare” in 
place of Polybius, much as Homer does for Vergil’s Aeneid.62 Direct citations to 
Polybius’ text are unnecessary as the intertextual references made within Hannibal’s 
speeches recall the text throughout the Third Decade. The allusive language of the 
                                               
61 For more on the citation, cf. Chapter 4, Part 4, below, and Luce 1977: 141, n. 3; Levene 2010: 161-62; 
Moore 2010: 148.  
62 The “modello-esemplare” comes to stand as a model for a particular author based on an accretion of a 
number of imitations, rather than through direct reference. Conte 1981, 1985: 121-22, 1986: 31. cf. Conte-
Barchiesi 1989: 93-96; and Hinds 1998: 41-44 (v. esp. n. 46). Conte notes that, for Vergil, Homer functions 
also as a “modello-codice,” that is, as a representative of the entire genre of epic poetry. The consistent 
Polybian bent of Hannibal in the Third Decade (and the fact that Polybius does not stand at the beginning 
of the historiographic tradition) suggests that the Polybian modello-esemplare in Hannibal does not extend 
to be a representative of the entire genre of historiography. As I will argue in the remaining chapters, Livy 
has other internal narrators to stand in as other modelli-esemplari.  
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Carthaginian general’s speeches maintains the intertextual connections between Livy’s 
and Polybius’ texts.  
As Hannibal speaks with a Polybian voice throughout the decade, his speeches 
themselves serve as citations of Polybius’ text and markers of the influence that his 
Histories played on the Third Decade of the AUC. Livy’s speeches fully conflate the 
roles of the external and internal narrators that had already functioned with mirrored 
methodologies in Polybius’ text, amplifying a previously existing phenomenon from the 
account of his Greek predecessor. However, the conflation also reveals Livy’s ability to 
assert his authority over the Polybian narrative. As the Roman historian subsumes 
Polybius’ extradiegetic comments into Hannibal’s speeches, he takes control of the 
explanation of these events and speeches through his own extra-narrative comments. Livy 
is thereby able to question, emend, or cap the Polybian version of the war and offer in its 
place his own interpretation, without resorting to the explicit polemic that Polybius 
employs in the digression on the crossing of the Alps that we took as a starting point for 
this chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
Scipio as a Methodological Narrator for Polybius and Livy 
 
As I argue in the previous chapter, Livy uses Hannibal as a mouthpiece for 
Polybian history in the Third Decade. It stands to reason, then, that other internal 
narrators are also able to speak from the point of view of a particular historian’s language 
and methodology. The larger-than-life figure that looms over the Third Decade on the 
Roman side and, as has been argued, is in many ways a foil for and parallel with 
Hannibal, is the young Publius Cornelius Scipio.1 As the young Scipio takes command of 
his father’s and uncle’s former troops in Spain, he evokes the memory of the past to 
change the fortunes of the Roman army in the region. In a rousing speech, he employs 
several examples from the recent past to rouse his troops to action. As Chaplin has 
argued, the young general uses some typical elements of exemplarity in his speech to 
demonstrate Roman virtus and to defend his explanation for the forthcoming events of 
the war.2 In the central portion of his speech, Scipio uses several wars, from both the 
recent and far past to encourage and exhort his men:  
vetera omitto, Porsennam Gallos Samnites: a Punicis bellis incipiam. 
quot classes, quot duces, quot exercitus priore bello amissi sunt? iam quid 
hoc bello memorem? omnibus aut ipse adfui cladibus aut quibus afui, 
maxime unus omnium eas sensi. Trebia Trasumennus Cannae quid aliud 
sunt quam monumenta occisorum exercituum consulumque Romanorum? 
adde defectionem Italiae, Siciliae maioris partis, Sardiniae; adde ultimum 
terrorem ac pauorem, castra Punica inter Anienem ac moenia Romana 
posita et uisum prope in portis uictorem Hannibalem. in hac ruina rerum 
                                               
1 Rossi 2004 on the parallel but opposite trajectories of Hannibal and Scipio in the Third Decade. Levene 
2010: ch. 1, esp. pp. 14-19, on Livy’s narrative organization that suggests the parallel action between 
Hannibal in Book 21 and Scipio in Book 30 and, more largely, H. in the first half of the decade and S. in 
the second.  
2 Chaplin 2000: 64-65.  
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stetit una integra atque immobilis uirtus populi Romani; haec omnia 
strata humi erexit ac sustulit. uos omnium primi, milites, post Cannensem 
cladem uadenti Hasdrubali ad Alpes Italiamque, qui si se cum fratre 
coniunxisset nullum iam nomen esset populi Romani, ductu auspicioque 
patris mei obstitistis; et hae secundae res illas aduersas sustinuerunt. 
(26.41.10-13) 
 
I pass over things of the far past: Porsenna, the Gauls, the Samnites. I will 
begin from the Punic Wars. How many fleets, how many leaders, how 
many armies were lost in the previous war? What, then, should I recall in 
this war? I myself was either present for all the disasters or, for those 
from which I was absent, I alone felt their effects most sharply. What else 
are Trebia, Trasimene, or Cannae than the monuments of slaughtered 
armies and Roman consuls? Add to that the defection of Italy, the greater 
part of Sicily, and Sardinia; add, too, the greatest fear and dread, a Punic 
camp positioned between the Anio and the walls of Rome and a 
conquering Hannibal seen almost at our gates. Only the excellence of the 
Roman people stood uninjured and immovable during this eventful 
disaster. This virtue lifted up and elevated all that had collapsed to the 
ground. You, soldiers, first of all, under the leadership and command of 
my father, opposed Hasdrubal as he advanced toward the Alps and Italy 
after the disaster at Cannae and, had he joined up with his brother, the 
name of the Roman people would no longer exist. These successes 
deferred those defeats.  
 
While the full speech is much longer and contains several other elements, the section at 
hand typifies the speech’s exemplary nature most explicitly. Scipio claims to avoid the 
use of old exempla, but then mentions briefly, in a clear instance of praeteritio, three 
exemplary stories recorded earlier in Livy’s AUC and that various internal narrators recall 
as exempla in their speeches.3 Chaplin notes that Scipio’s speech is the last time a Roman 
                                               
3 In addition to the speech discussed here, Porsenna is invoked as an exemplum at 6.40.17, 9.11.6, 10.16.7; 
the Gauls: 6.7.4, 6.28.9, 21.30.11, 21.43.13, 21.52.7, 22.59.8, 38.43.9; and the Samnites (specifically): 
8.4.9, though this is likely a reference to the Roman disaster at Caudium: 9.36.1, 9.38.4 and 15, 22.14.12, 
23.41.14, 23.42.7, 25.6.10, and 35.11.3; Chaplin 2000: 32-49 discusses the use of Caudium as exemplum in 
great detail as a major case study in her examination of Livy’s exemplary techniques. For these lists (and 
other exemplary figures and events), Chaplin 2000: 203-14.  
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attempts to use Cannae as an exemplum.4 His mention of the ability of the event to 
demonstrate the virtus of the Roman people reflects the proper interpretation of the 
defeat. The addition of the three common exempla from the distant past to the more 
recent exempla from the initial stages of the Hannibalic war puts a Livian interpretation 
of the later events at the forefront of the external audience’s mind. Scipio, in effect, 
speaks with a voice that models Livy’s approach as historian and external narrator, in 
much the same way that Hannibal recalls Polybius’ methods and techniques in the Third 
Decade. This chapter elaborates on the exemplary nature of Scipio’s speeches throughout 
the last half of the Third Decade and explores how the Livian voice of Scipio adds further 
interpretive and historiographic significance to the narrative of Scipio’s campaigns in 
Spain and the debate leading up to his invasion of Africa. As with Hannibal in the 
previous chapter, however, I will first return to Polybius’ Histories to examine the 
precedent for Scipio’s behavior and speeches before returning directly to Livy’s account.  
 
 
 
  
                                               
4 Chaplin 2000: 65.  
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Part 1: The Polybian Scipio in Spain  
 The Polybian version of Scipio’s speech quoted above is notably shorter and 
focuses on the current situation of the Roman army in Spain:  
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε συνηθροισμένων τῶν δυνάμεων παρεκάλει μὴ 
καταπεπλῆχθαι τὴν προγεγενημένην περιπέτειαν· οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς 
ἡττῆσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων οὐδέποτε, τῇ δὲ προδοσίᾳ τῇ 
Κελτιβήρων καὶ τῇ προπετείᾳ, διακλεισθέντων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπ' 
ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων. ὧν ἑκάτερα νῦν 
ἔφη περὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπάρχειν· χωρὶς γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολὺ 
διεσπασμένους στρατοπεδεύειν, τοῖς τε συμμάχοις ὑβριστικῶς 
χρωμένους ἅπαντας ἀπηλλοτριωκέναι καὶ πολεμίους αὑτοῖς 
παρεσκευακέναι. διὸ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἤδη διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς, τοὺς δὲ 
λοιπούς, ὡς ἂν τάχιστα θαρρήσωσι καὶ διαβάντας ἴδωσι τὸν ποταμόν, 
ἀσμένως ἥξειν, οὐχ οὕτως εὐνοοῦντας σφίσι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀμύνεσθαι 
σπουδάζοντας τὴν Καρχηδονίων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀσέλγειαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, 
στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνας ἅθρους 
διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐ θελήσειν, κατὰ μέρος δὲ κινδυνεύοντας 
εὐχειρώτους ὑπάρχειν. διὸ βλέποντας εἰς ταῦτα παρεκάλει περαιοῦσθαι 
τὸν ποταμὸν εὐθαρσῶς· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑξῆς ἀνεδέχετο μελήσειν αὑτῷ καὶ 
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγεμόσι. (10.6.1-6) 
 
Nevertheless, at that time, after the soldiers were gathered together, he 
exhorts them not to be astounded at their previous reversal. He said the 
Romans were never beaten in valor by the Carthaginians, but by the 
treachery and fickleness of the Celtiberians, since the generals were cut 
off from each other through their trust in the alliance with the 
aforementioned people. Each of these things now happens for the enemy, 
for they make their camps far apart from each other, they used their allies 
in a hubristic fashion, alienated them, and made enemies for themselves. 
On account of this, some have sent messages to the Romans already and 
the rest, as soon as they take heart and see the Romans crossing the 
river, they will gladly come, not as much being well disposed to the 
Romans but rather because they are eager to take vengeance because of 
the insolence of the Carthaginians toward them. But the greatest reason is 
that their leaders of the opposing groups are at odds with each other and 
will not be willing to fight together against the Romans, and they are easy 
to overcome if they attack group by group. He therefore bids his troops to 
examine these things and to cross the river boldly. Afterwards, he 
promises that the rest will be a matter of concern to him and the other 
generals.  
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Scipio in the Polybian version of the speech focuses on the matters at hand in Spain. 
There is no mention of the deeds, recent or long past, of the troops in Spain 
corresponding to what appears in Livy’s version. Scipio here first explains the recent 
defeats suffered by the Roman armies in Spain as the result of others’ treachery 
(προδοσίᾳ) and fickleness (προπετείᾳ). He asserts that the fault did not lie within these 
soldiers who now fall under his command, but in the unexpected betrayal of their allies. 
He turns the tables further by noting how the Celtiberians now find themselves in the 
same position that the Romans were under their previous commanders. Each of these 
elements appears in Livy’s version of the speech, though in a slightly different order.5 
Near the end of the speech in Polybius, Scipio encourages his troops to examine the 
situation for themselves (βλέποντας) to demonstrate these facts to them before they cross 
the river. The note of autopsy in the Polybian speech is replaced in the AUC with an 
emotional appeal that focuses on Scipio’s appearance as a reoccurrence of his father’s 
and uncle’s presence.6 This change will be discussed further below.  
                                               
5 26.41.20-22: quod mens sua sponte diuinat, idem subicit ratio haud fallax. uexati ab iis socii nostram 
fidem per legatos implorant. tres duces discordantes prope ut defecerint alii ab aliis, trifariam exercitum in 
diuersissimas regiones distraxere. eadem in illos ingruit fortuna quae nuper nos adflixit; nam et deseruntur 
ab sociis, ut prius ab Celtiberis nos, et diduxere exercitus quae patri patruoque meo causa exitii fuit; nec 
discordia intestina coire eos in unum sinet neque singuli nobis resistere poterunt. “What my mind foretells 
of its own accord, likewise a rational and non-deceptive examination also supports. Troubled by the 
Carthaginians, their allies beg for an agreement with us via their ambassadors, and their three generals, 
quarreling to the extent that each is just about to abandon the others, have led their armies in three different 
directions into completely different areas. The same misfortune that recently troubled us now falls onto the 
Carthaginians, for they are now also being deserted by their allies, just as we were by the Celtiberians 
before. And they have divided their armies, which was the cause of ruin for my father and uncle. Their 
infighting does not allow them to come together as one and they are unable to resist us each on their own.” 
6 26.41.22-25: uos modo, milites, fauete nomini Scipionum, suboli imperatorum uestrorum uelut accisis 
recrescenti stirpibus. agite, ueteres milites, nouum exercitum nouumque ducem traducite Hiberum, 
traducite in terras cum multis fortibus factis saepe a uobis peragratas. breui faciam ut, quemadmodum 
nunc noscitatis in me patris patruique similitudinem oris uoltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei 
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 Additionally, the Polybian Scipio suggests that the actions of his troops will 
encourage particular reactions from their Celtiberian opponents. Once the Romans cross 
the Ebro, the Celtiberians will respond to the sight of their crossing (διαβάντας ἴδωσι τὸν 
ποταμόν) by forsaking their ties with Carthage and coming to the side of the Romans. 
Scipio’s suggestion that his troops’ actions will provoke a response mirrors the way that 
Hannibal engineers others’ behavior by creating spectacles or directing their vision, as I 
argued in the previous chapter. In Livy’s version of the speech there is no indication that 
the Celtiberians will see and respond to the presence of the Roman troops. Upon quick 
inspection, therefore, Scipio in the Histories appears to use the visually charged language 
that Hannibal employs in his campaign in Italy, while Scipio in the AUC does not. The 
Polybian version of the speech characterizes Scipio in a manner parallel to his treatment 
of Hannibal in his Italian campaign. Both Hannibal and Scipio rely on visually-evocative 
language and the creation or manipulation of spectacles to provoke expected responses 
from various internal audiences. Polybius continues his characterization of Scipio as a 
character driven by Polybian methodology in the ensuing campaign as Scipio besieges 
and captures New Carthage and turns the tide in Spain against the Carthaginians.  
Scipio’s speech at the start of his Spanish campaign also serves as a conclusion to 
Polybius’ introduction to the general and his character. As Polybius resumes his narrative 
                                               
uirtutisque effigiem uobis reddam ut reuixisse aut renatum sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat. 
“You, then, soldiers, grant favor to the name of the Scipiones, the progeny of your commanders, as though 
I am growing from the stalk just cut. Come on, veteran soldiers, lead this new army and your new 
commander across the Ebro. Lead us into lands that have often been traversed by you with many brave 
deeds. Just as you now recognize in me a likeness of the face, appearance, and bodily features of my father 
and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I provide to you a copy of their character, loyalty, and courage in 
order that you each of you would say that Scipio the general lives again or has been born a second time.”  
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of the campaign after his report of the speech, he concludes his account with the 
following summary:  
ὃ δὴ καὶ πρῶτον ἄν τις λάβοι καὶ μέγιστον σημεῖον τῆς ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν ἄρτι 
ῥηθείσης διαλήψεως. ἔτος γὰρ ἕβδομον ἔχων πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι πρῶτον 
μὲν ἐπὶ πράξεις αὑτὸν ἔδωκε τελέως παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηλπισμένας διὰ 
<τὸ> μέγεθος τῶν προγεγονότων ἐλαττωμάτων, δεύτερον δοὺς αὑτὸν τὰ 
μὲν κοινὰ καὶ προφαινόμενα πᾶσι παρέλειπε, τὰ δὲ μήτε παρὰ τοῖς 
πολεμίοις <μήτε παρὰ τοῖς φιλοῖς προσδοκηθέντα>7, ταῦτ᾽ ἐπενόει καὶ 
προετίθετο πράττειν. ὧν οὐδὲν ἦν χωρὶς ἐκλογισμῶν τῶν ἀκριβεστάτων. 
(10.6.9-12) 
 
This, indeed, anyone would accept as the first and greatest indication of 
the opinion I just expressed above. For in the first place, though he was 
twenty-seven, he applied himself to tasks having been thought to be 
dangerous by most people because of the extent of the previous defeats; 
second, as he devoted himself to these things, he left behind the things 
common and obvious to everyone, and instead contrived and set out to do 
the things not expected by his enemies nor his friends. None of these 
things were done without his calculation of the slightest details. 
 
The assertion that Polybius refers back to here (τῆς…ῥηθείσης διαλήψεως) is his claim 
about Scipio at the opening of his character sketch that Scipio uses calculation and 
foresight in all his endeavors.8 Polybius sets the character of Scipio apart from the 
majority of Polybius’ subjects as he avoids what is anticipated (προφαινόμενα πᾶσι 
παρέλειπε) and instead follows a precise and exacting method of calculation 
(ἐκλογισμῶν). The word ἐκλογισμός appears only four times in the extant sections of the 
Histories and three of these instances come from Polybius’ narrative about Scipio’s 
                                               
7 I follow Reiske’s supplement for this lacuna.  
8 10.2.13: ὅτι δ᾽ ἕκαστα μετὰ λογισμοῦ καὶ προνοίας ἔπραττε, καὶ διότι πάντα κατὰ λόγον ἐξέβαινε τὰ τέλη 
τῶν πράξεων αὐτῷ, δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων. “That he accomplished everything with 
logical calculation and foresight and the fact that all the ends of his actions fell out for him exactly as he 
reasoned will be clear through the things I am about to relate.”  
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actions at the opening of his Spanish campaign.9 The term’s only other appearance in 
Polybius’ text comes at a similarly watershed and, ultimately, decisive moment for the 
Romans: when they resolve during the First Punic War to abandon their land-based 
strategy and adopt naval warfare to have a chance to defeat the Carthaginians.10 Through 
his use of the term ἐκλογισμός to describe Scipio’s overall approach to action, Polybius 
therefore subtly sets up the general’s campaign in Spain as the moment that turns the tide 
of the Hannibalic War in favor of Rome in the way that the embracing of naval 
techniques did in the First Punic War.11 
In order to examine how Polybius sets up the decidedly unique and ultimately 
paradigm-altering behavior of Scipio, let us turn back to the character sketch and a 
summary of the Scipio’s accomplishments that Polybius makes reference to in the 
passage just quoted (10.6.9-12) and which opens his account of Scipio’s exploits in 
Spain. The digression itself and Polybius’ remarks that open it suggest this moment is 
                                               
9 1.59.2, 10.6.12, 10.9.2, and 10.9.3. There are four instances of the denominative verb ἐκλογίζω, as well: 
3.33.8, 3.99.3, 4.12.2, and fr. 49. 
10 1.59.1-3: ὁμοίως δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι ψυχομαχοῦντες, καίπερ ἔτη σχεδὸν ἤδη πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν 
πραγμάτων ὁλοσχερῶς ἀφεστηκότες διά τε τὰς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι δι᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν 
δυνάμεων κρινεῖν τὸν πόλεμον, τότε συνορῶντες οὐ προχωροῦν αὑτοῖς τοὔργον κατὰ τοὺς ἐκλογισμοὺς 
καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν τόλμαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, ἔκριναν τὸ τρίτον ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς 
ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐλπίδων, ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης, εἰ καιρίως ἅψαιντο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, 
μόνως ἂν οὕτως πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. ὃ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. “Similarly, the Romans, 
fightinig to the last gasp, even though they had for nearly five years withdrawn from naval operations 
because of their misfortunes and because they believed that they would decide the war with their infantry 
forces, but then seeing that they were not having the success that matched their expectations and that this 
was mostly due to the boldness of the Carthaginian general, they decided for the third time to make an 
attempt at the hopes for naval forces. They were thinking that only through this plan, if they could achieve 
a timely attack, would they achieve an advantageous end to the war, an end they even achieved.” 
11 Polybius seems to prefer the uncompounded λογισμός or another compound, διαλογισμός or 
συλλογισμός, e.g., for Hannibal’s rational calculations, cf., e.g., 3.17.8, 3.17.11, 3.63.11, 3.81.12, 3.89.4, 
3.91.1, 3.92.2. Hannibal does, however, verbally perform the action of ἐκλογισμός at one point in the 
Histories (ἐκλογιζόμενος 3.33.8), when he plans to ensure the loyalty of the Spanish and African troops by 
exchanging their defensive positions before his campaign to Italy.  
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Scipio’s grand entrance to the stage in the Histories and that he did not make much of an 
appearance, if any, in the earlier, now lost sections.12 Beyond his introductory remarks, 
Polybius also includes within the character sketch the two best known episodes of 
Scipio’s life before his Iberian campaign: his heroic action at the Ticinus River to save 
his father’s life (10.3.3-7) and his election to the aedileship under extraordinary means 
(10.4.1-5.8). These two stories come into the digression as analepses, not in their 
expected chronological positions in the larger narrative. In particular, Polybius actively 
omits the case of the younger Scipio’s heroism at the Ticinus in his account of the battle, 
downplaying the consul’s wound altogether until after the encounter.13 The character 
sketch and the analepses that describe Scipio’s early life provide a similar introduction to 
Polybius’ narrative of the events in Spain that the digression on Hannibal’s oath and 
                                               
12 Polybius opens the digression as follows: Ὅτι μέλλοντες ἱστορεῖν τὰ πραχθέντα Ποπλίῳ κατὰ τὴν 
Ἰβηρίαν, συλλήβδην δὲ πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον ἐπιτελεσθείσας αὐτῷ πράξεις, ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθα τὸ 
προεπιστῆσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ φύσιν τἀνδρός, “Since I am about to relate the deeds of 
Publius in Spain and, in short, all the accomplishments he completed throughout his life, I find it necessary 
to set out to my audience the character and nature of that man” (10.2.1). The processes of selection that 
produced the fragments of the Histories after that survive after Book Six, which focus on leadership figures 
and Polybius’ Scipionic ties, also suggests that it is unlikely that any earlier episodes concerning Publius 
Scipio that were in the original text and are now lost. On the manuscript tradition of Polybius and the 
collection and ordering of the fragments after Book 6, Moore 1965 and the introductions to Vols. ii and iii 
of Walbank’s commentary (1967 and 1979).  
13 During his main narrative of the Battle at the Ticinus River, Polybius makes no mention of Scipio’s 
possible actions, instead merely noting that some of the cavalry closed around the Publius Scipio near the 
end of the battle (τινὲς δὲ περὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα συστραφέντες, 3.65.11), without clarifying the danger the 
Consul faced or any wound he received. Polybius also twice mentions in his narrative of the aftermath of 
the battle a wound suffered by Publius Scipio (αὑτὸν ἐθεράπευε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τραυματίας, 3.66.9; αὐτὸς 
ὑγιασθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος, 3.70.5). Livy highlights the possibility that Scipio saved his father’s life at the 
Ticinus by including it in his main narrative of the battle (auxitque pauorem consulis uolnus periculumque 
intercursu tum primum pubescentis filii propulsatum, 21.46.7) and by noting Coelius’ version that Publius 
Scipio was instead saved by a Ligurian slave, which Livy claims to be less likely (seruati consulis decus 
Coelius ad seruum natione Ligurem delegat; malim equidem de filio uerum esse, quod et plures tradidere 
auctores et fama obtinuit, 21.46.10). On the possible significance of the foreshadowing of Scipio’s eventual 
defeat of Hannibal at this point in the narrative of Livy’s twenty-first book, Levene 2010: 14-19, esp., and 
Rossi 2004.  
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childhood did for his account of the invasion of Italy in Book Three.14 For both Hannibal 
and Scipio, then, Polybius inserts into his narrative of the openings of their major 
campaigns analepses to their youth that establish the fundamental components of their 
characters and provide his readers with a frame of reference with which to judge their 
subsequent actions.  
 After some preliminary remarks about the general qualities of Scipio’s character, 
Polybius relates Scipio’s bold action that saved his father’s life at the Ticinus River as the 
first major event that he includes in the digression. He sets the story up to add to the 
purported agreement of Scipio’s beneficence and generosity (εὐεργετικὸς καὶ 
μεγαλόψυχος; 10.3.1) that he is “keen in wit, discreet, and fixed in thought on his 
intended purpose” (ἀγχίνους καὶ νήπτης καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὸ προτεθὲν ἐντεταμένος; 
10.3.1). The framing comment suggests that the audience interpret the Ticinus story 
through a lens focusing on Scipio’s cunning and decision-making rather than on his 
courageous action. Polybius also frames the tale through the account of Gaius Laelius, 
who was the general’s close friend from childhood and accompanied him to Spain. Since 
Polybius notes the personal connection between the two Romans, he provides Laelius’ 
narrative with the quality of eyewitness-authority that he so often advocates.15 Polybius 
                                               
14 On which, cf. Chapter 1, Part 1, above.  
15 Polybius describes their personal relationship as follows: ὧν εἷς ἦν Γάιος Λαίλιος, ἀπὸ νέου μετεσχηκὼς 
αὐτῷ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ λόγου μέχρι τελευτῆς, ὁ ταύτην περὶ αὐτοῦ τὴν δόξαν ἡμῖν ἐνεργασάμενος διὰ τὸ 
δοκεῖν εἰκότα λέγειν καὶ σύμφωνα τοῖς ὑπ' ἐκείνου πεπραγμένοις (10.3.2), “One of these was Gaius 
Laelius, who partook in [Scipio’s] every deed and word from youth up to his death, and he made the same 
impression about Scipio on me, due to the fact that his account seems probable and fitting with deeds done 
by Scipio.” That Polybius notes that Laelius produces the same impression on him that Scipio did on 
Laelius only strengthens the purported air of authority. On Gaius Laelius, RE Laelius 400-404.  
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notes Laelius’ direct knowledge of these events and makes himself the recipient of that 
information thereby following his preferred method of consulting direct eyewitnesses 
when autopsy is impossible.16 As a result of this personal connectin, Polybius describes 
Laelius’ account as probable (εἰκότα) and fitting with Scipio’s other deeds (σύμφωνα τοῖς 
ὑπ' ἐκείνου πεπραγμένοις; 10.3.2), even though he made no mention of the tale in his full 
narrative of the Battle at the Ticinus River (3.65.1-11).  
After his claim concerning Laelius’ reliability, Polybius includes his account of 
Scipio’s action at the Ticinus River:  
ἔφη γὰρ πρώτην γεγονέναι Ποπλίου πρᾶξιν ἐπίσημον, καθ' ὃν καιρὸν ὁ 
πατὴρ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἱππομαχίαν συνεστήσατο πρὸς Ἀννίβαν περὶ τὸν Πάδον 
καλούμενον ποταμόν. τότε γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἑπτακαιδέκατον ἔτος ἔχων καὶ 
πρῶτον εἰς ὕπαιθρον ἐξεληλυθώς, συστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς 
διαφερόντων ἱππέων οὐλαμὸν ἀσφαλείας χάριν, συνθεασάμενος ἐν τῷ 
κινδύνῳ τὸν πατέρα περιειλημμένον ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων μετὰ δυεῖν ἢ τριῶν 
ἱππέων καὶ τετρωμένον ἐπισφαλῶς, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἐπεβάλετο παρακαλεῖν 
τοὺς μεθ' αὑτοῦ βοηθῆσαι τῷ πατρί, τῶν δ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν κατορρωδούντων 
διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν περιεστώτων πολεμίων, αὐτὸς εἰσελάσαι παραβόλως 
δοκεῖ καὶ τολμηρῶς εἰς τοὺς περικεχυμένους. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἀναγκασθέντων ἐμβαλεῖν οἱ μὲν πολέμιοι καταπλαγέντες 
διέστησαν (10.3.3-6) 
 
For [Laelius] says that Publius’ first notable deed was when his father 
engaged in the cavalry battle with Hannibal around the Po River. At that 
time, so it seems, he was seventeen years old and made his first trip into 
the field, his father put him in charge of a unit of excellent cavalry for the 
sake of his safety. But he caught sight of his father in danger, surrounded 
by the enemy along with two or three cavalry and gravely wounded. At 
first, he tried to call his men to go help his father, but since they were 
afraid for some time because of the number of enemies surrounding him, 
so he decided to dive in himself against the massed enemies recklessly and 
daringly. After this, the rest were forced to rush in and the enemy, being 
struck with fear, scattered. 
 
                                               
16 On this method, 3.48.12 and Chapter 2, Parts 1 and 2, above.  
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Polybius first notes Scipio’s age and inexperience, a status that prompted his father to 
surround him with a group of experienced cavalry for his son’s protection. The account 
then immediately picks up in the middle of the battle with the young Roman catching 
sight (συνθεασάμενος) of his father in peril in the midst of the enemy. As Scipio 
recognizes the need for action, he attempts first to exhort (παρακαλεῖν) the cavalry before 
ultimately rushing into the fray himself. His action forces (ἀναγκασθέντων) his troops to 
respond in kind.  
Since Polybius sets up the account to demonstrate Scipio’s cunning, the bold 
move reflects the young man’s ability to decide upon the proper course of action for a 
given situation, not just his reckless but effective courage. When he is unable by his 
verbal harangue to compel his men to act, Scipio forces them to respond to his actions 
instead, exhibiting the power of deeds over words. He accomplished the feat by creating a 
situation that allows his troops to see him in danger. Scipio puts into military action a 
method Polybius advocates for his own historiographic approach, that an audience learns 
effectively by viewing the misfortunes of others.17 Scipio’s objective is to save his father 
from the peril he currently faces, a feat he cannot accomplish alone. Had Scipio wanted 
to demonstrate his bravery in combat or if he thought his own presence in the battle alone 
would rescue his father, he would have immediately taken action. He instead first 
attempts, and fails, to convince the cavalrymen to attack the enemy. The younger Scipio 
overcomes the hesitation of the troops tasked with his protection by utilizing a Polybian 
                                               
17 For Polybius’ remarks on his didactic process, 1.35.7-8 and 3.63.1. These passages are discussed in 
Chapter 2, Part 1, above.   
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didactic technique that forces these men to pursue the correct course of action after seeing 
him in danger. Polybius’ account of Scipio’s feats at the Ticinus River does not 
emphasize his bravery but instead his ability to use opsis to his advantage. He examines 
the situation at hand and solves the problem by guiding the sight of his men to force their 
action in a way that mirrors the historiographic process of Polybius.  
 The next episode Polybius includes in the character sketch of Scipio is his 
successful election to the aedileship. Polybius records this story as a representation of 
Scipio’s ability to accomplish his deeds through calculation and foresight (τῶν δι' 
ἀγχίνοιαν ἐκ λογισμοῦ <καὶ> προνοίας ἐπιτελουμένων; 10.5.8), as he makes clear in his 
summarizing remarks that conclude the character sketch (10.5.8-10). Polybius reflects 
Scipio’s logical approach from the beginning of the account by noting the step-by-step 
analysis that led to his feat:  
συνεγγιζούσης δὲ τῆς καταστάσεως, λογιζόμενος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πλήθους 
φορᾶς οὐκ εὐμαρῶς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐφιξόμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς, τὴν δὲ πρὸς 
αὑτὸν εὔνοιαν τοῦ δήμου θεωρῶν μεγάλην ὑπάρχουσαν, καὶ μόνως 
οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνων κἀκεῖνον καθίξεσθαι τῆς προθέσεως, εἰ 
συμφρονήσαντες ἅμα ποιήσαιντο τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἦλθεν ἐπί τινα τοιαύτην 
ἔννοιαν. θεωρῶν γὰρ τὴν μητέρα περιπορευομένην τοὺς νεὼς καὶ 
θύουσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ τἀδελφοῦ…ἔφη πρὸς αὐτὴν ὄνειρον 
τεθεωρηκέναι δὶς ἤδη τὸν αὐτόν. (10.4.3-5) 
 
With the election drawing near, as Scipio determined from the favor of 
the people that his brother would not easily attain office but saw that he 
possesses a great deal of the goodwill of the people for his own part, and 
as he came to the decision that his brother would only achieve his aim if 
they made the attempt together in the spirit of cooperation, he came to a 
plan along these lines: He saw his mother going around to the temples 
and making sacrifices to the gods on behalf of his brother…he told her 
that he had already twice seen the same dream.  
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Scipio here reasons both the need for action and the plan he will follow based on his 
visual inspection of the events, like he did above, when he saves his father. Polybius 
twice mentions the action of sight with the participle θεωρῶν and quotes Scipio as 
describing the appearance of his supposed dream with a perfect infinitive (τεθεωρηκέναι) 
of the same verb. As I argued in the previous chapter, Polybius constructs and conveys 
his own authority through autopsy and by relating the results of that visual inspection to 
his audience. Here, Polybius’ depiction of Scipio models a parallel process: he first 
visually examines the situation and then describes what he has seen to his mother, though 
here his vision is the dream he claims to have had.18  
 Polybius’ narrative of the ensuing election also demonstrates Scipio’s attention to 
the visual appearance presented to others. Much as Hannibal creates a spectacle out of the 
duel of the Gallic captives in before the Battle at the Ticinus River, Scipio here fashions 
his appearance before the public to ensure that the sight provokes the electorate to vote 
for him and his brother.19 After noting Pomponia’s response to Scipio’s report of his 
dreams, Polybius describes Scipio’s surprising entrance to the candidacy for the 
aedileship as follows:  
ἠξίου τήβενναν αὑτῷ λαμπρὰν εὐθέως ἑτοιμάσαι: τοῦτο γὰρ ἔθος ἐστὶ 
τοῖς τὰς ἀρχὰς μεταπορευομένοις. καὶ τῇ μὲν οὐδ᾽ ἐν νῷ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἦν, ὁ 
δὲ λαβὼν πρῶτον λαμπρὰν ἐσθῆτα κοιμωμένης ἔτι τῆς μητρὸς παρῆν εἰς 
τὴν ἀγοράν. τοῦ δὲ πλήθους καὶ διὰ τὸ παράδοξον καὶ διὰ τὴν 
προϋπάρχουσαν εὔνοιαν ἐκπληκτικῶς αὐτὸν ἀποδεξαμένου, καὶ μετὰ 
ταῦτα προελθόντος εἰς τὸν ἀποδεδειγμένον τόπον καὶ στάντος παρὰ τὸν 
ἀδελφόν, οὐ μόνον τῷ Ποπλίῳ περιέθεσαν οἱ πολλοὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
                                               
18 While the likely feigned dream suggests a sense of falseness that does not seem to correspond with 
Polybius’ larger claims toward truth-telling, it also mirrors the deceptive manipulated appearances that the 
historian praises Hannibal for being able to create, cf. 3.78.  
19 On the spectacle before Ticinus, cf. Chapter 2, Part 3, above.  
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τἀδελφῷ δι᾽ ἐκεῖνον, καὶ παρῆσαν ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν ἀμφότεροι γεγονότες 
ἀγορανόμοι. (10.4.8-10.5.3) 
 
He was asking her to prepare a white toga for him immediately: for this 
is the custom for those who are standing for political offices. What she 
said earlier was no longer in her mind and, as soon as he received the 
white toga and while his mother was still sleeping, he arrived at the 
forum. The people received him enthusiastically, due to its unexpected 
nature and because of their previous goodwill toward him, and when he 
came to the appointed place later and stood next to his brother, not only 
did the public bestow the office upon Publius, but even on his brother for 
his sake, and then both appeared at their house having been elected 
aediles.  
 
In his narrative, Polybius emphasizes the visual qualities of the event. He twice describes 
the white hue of the toga (τήβενναν…λαμπρὰν, λαμπρὰν ἐσθῆτα). Polybius retains the 
color descriptor between the two repetitions while varying the noun, which suggests that 
he is not using the phrase in its technical sense of the toga candida, but rather in 
highlighting the visually striking appearance of the whitened toga. As Scipio arrives in 
the forum, the crowd reacts positively, in part because of the goodwill (εὔνοιαν) they had 
shown him in the past. As noted above, Scipio bases his decision to press for the office 
after recognizing the goodwill (εὔνοιαν) the people had for him. In repeating the phrase 
again in his narrative of the election, Polybius signals that Scipio’s estimation of the 
people’s favor was correct. Further, their roles are intertwined as the reasoning that 
motivates Scipio as a character to pursue the aedileship, the people’s εὔνοια, corresponds 
to the rationale that Polybius as external narrator credits for the people’s response.  
 Polybius then concludes his digression on Scipio’s character by explaining the 
purpose behind his excursus: 
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ταῦτα μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω μοι χάριν τῶν ἀκουόντων, ἵνα μὴ 
συγκαταφερόμενοι ψευδῶς τῇ καθωμιλημένῃ δόξῃ περὶ αὐτοῦ 
παραπέμπωσι τὰ σεμνότατα καὶ κάλλιστα τἀνδρός, λέγω δὲ τὴν 
ἐπιδεξιότητα καὶ φιλοπονίαν. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦτο συμφανὲς ἐπ᾽ 
αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων. (10.5.9-10) 
 
These things were therefore recounted by me for the sake of my 
audience, in order that they do not dismiss the most notable and finest 
qualities of the man being falsely brought down by the commonly 
accepted opinion. I am talking about his cleverness and his 
industriousness. This will be even clearer in his deeds.  
 
Polybius describes how the forthcoming narrative of Scipio’s subsequent actions should 
be read: in the context of how clever and hard-working he was. Immediately following 
this remark, Polybius records the Scipionic speech (10.6.2-6) discussed above. The 
speech relates how Scipio encourages his troops to use their own opsis (βλέποντας, 
10.6.6) to recognize the need for action and to follow his direction. Further, he notes how 
the Romans’ actions will evoke a particular response from the Celtiberians when they see 
(ἴδωσι, 10.6.4) the army crossing the river. As an internal narrator, Scipio models the 
Polybian method of autopsy and the management of others’ sight, just as Hannibal does 
in his speeches in his campaign in Italy. Scipio also gains the knowledge of the situation 
in Spain and his estimation of the type of action required come through Polybian methods 
of inquiry.  
Throughout the subsequent episodes, Polybius repeatedly describes Scipio’s 
investigation into the state of affairs: πυνθανόμενος (10.7.1, 10.7.4, 10.8.1), ἀκούων 
(10.7.3, 10.8.2), and ἐξητάκει (10.8.1). Furthermore, he notes on two occasions that 
Scipio makes these inquiries of those that have visual and experiential knowledge of the 
places and events: ἐξητάκει…τῶν εἰδότων (10.8.1), διὰ δέ τινων ἁλιέων τῶν 
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ἐνειργασμένων τοῖς τόποις ἐξητάκει (10.8.7). An investigation based on oral inquiry from 
those with personal knowledge mirrors Polybius’ method of historical inquiry as he 
describes it in his account of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps (3.48.12).20 After Polybius 
notes Scipio’s careful inquiry into the state of affairs in Spain and the layout of New 
Carthage, he narrates in detail the city’s design and orientation to his audience (10.10.1-
10.11.4). Polybius thereby provides for the external audience the knowledge that Scipio 
has just gained and that the historian himself learns through autopsy (10.11.4).21 
Similarly, just as Polybius makes a polemic against the fantastical accounts of his 
predecessors during his narrative of Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps (3.47.6-48.12), he 
makes a similar attack against other historians’ explanations for Scipio’s success.22 
                                               
20 ἡμεῖς δὲ περὶ τούτων εὐθαρσῶς ἀποφαινόμεθα διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν πράξεων παρ' αὐτῶν ἱστορηκέναι τῶν 
παρατετευχότων τοῖς καιροῖς, τοὺς δὲ τόπους κατωπτευκέναι καὶ τῇ διὰ τῶν Ἄλπεων αὐτοὶ κεχρῆσθαι 
πορείᾳ γνώσεως ἕνεκα καὶ θέας. (3.48.12) “But I give a secure account of these events because I inquired 
about these matters from those that happened to be present at the time and because I examined the places 
myself and personally made the passage through the Alps in order to know and see it for myself.” Polybius’ 
assertion of autopsy here, when combined with other known elements of his political career, has 
encouraged a debate that this passage is part of a later insertion to the text: Walbank 1957: 382, e.g.; 
Pédech 1964: 528, however, ties this passage to the timing of Polybius’ questioning of eye-witnesses, 
which must have occurred earlier. cf., Chapter 2, Part 2, above.  
21 ὁ δὲ περίβολος τῆς πόλεως οὐ πλεῖον εἴκοσι σταδίων ὑπῆρχε τὸ πρότερον – καίτοι γ' οὐκ ἀγνοῶ διότι 
πολλοῖς εἴρηται τετταράκοντα· τὸ δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος. οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκοῆς ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' αὐτόπται γεγονότες μετ' 
ἐπιστάσεως ἀποφαινόμεθα – νῦν δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι συνῄρηται. (10.11.4) “The circuit around the city was 
of old not more than twenty stades. Indeed, I am aware of the fact that it is stated by many to be forty, but 
this is false, for I do not give an account based on hearsay, but being an eyewitness from careful 
observation. And it is contracted still further now.” On the potential problems that lie behind Polybius’ 
geographic accounts in this narrative and their relation to his assertion of autopsy, cf. Walbank 1967: 204-5 
and Gauthier 1968: 93-4.  
22 Τούτοις δὲ τοῖς ἐκλογισμοῖς ὁμολογοῦντες οἱ συγγραφεῖς, ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος ἔλθωσι τῆς πράξεως, οὐκ 
οἶδ' ὅπως οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν τούτου πρόνοιαν, εἰς δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τὴν τύχην ἀναφέρουσι τὸ 
γεγονὸς κατόρθωμα, καὶ ταῦτα χωρὶς τῶν εἰκότων καὶ τῆς τῶν συμβεβιωκότων μαρτυρίας, καὶ διὰ τῆς 
ἐπιστολῆς τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ποπλίου σαφῶς ἐκτεθεικότος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς ἐκλογισμοῖς 
χρησάμενος, οἷς ἡμεῖς ἀνώτερον ἐξελογισάμεθα, καθόλου τε τοῖς ἐν Ἰβηρίᾳ πράγμασιν ἐπιβάλοιτο καὶ 
κατὰ μέρος τῇ τῆς Καρχηδόνος πολιορκίᾳ. (10.9.2-3) “Authors are in agreement about the calculations, but 
whenever they come to the conclusion of his plan, I do not know how they do not attribute the success that 
happened to the man and to his foresight, but instead to the gods and to chance. They claim this despite the 
probability and the testimony of those that lived with him, and the letter of Publius himself sent to Philip 
that clearly explains that he used the very calculations which I recorded here as he conducted affairs in 
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Polybius launches a defense of his historiographic method as he demonstrates a character 
and internal narrator performing actions that follow his prescribed approach. The 
narrative around the siege of New Carthage allows Polybius to both model and defend his 
methodology through Scipio’s actions.  
Finally, Polybius concludes his narrative of the set up for the siege at New 
Carthage with a report of Scipio’s speech before the encounter:  
πλὴν ὅ γε Πόπλιος, συνάψαντος καὶ τοῦ στόλου πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρόν, 
ἐπεβάλετο συναθροίσας τὰ πλήθη παρακαλεῖν, οὐχ ἑτέροις τισὶ χρώμενος 
ἀπολογισμοῖς, ἀλλ' οἷς ἐτύγχανε πεπεικὼς αὑτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἡμεῖς τὸν κατὰ 
μέρος ἄρτι πεποιήμεθα λόγον. (10.11.5) 
 
Publius, however, after the fleet had also arrived at the appropriate time, 
decided to call together the troops and address them, using no other 
arguments except those which happened to have been persuasive to 
himself, the reasons which I just recounted in detail.  
 
Polybius notes that Scipio communicates to his troops the same rationales used to 
determine their proposed course of action and that these are the points that he has just 
conveyed as external narrator. The knowledge that Polybius and Scipio have gained 
through the inquiry of eyewitnesses and through their own autopsy is made known to 
both of their audiences, external and internal, in the same narrative act. As Polybius 
describes the layout of New Carthage and the state of affairs in Spain, he conflates his 
role as external narrator with his account of Scipio’s actions. Each of them pursues the 
same methodology to gain knowledge of the city and recounts their logical calculations 
of the necessary course of action with the same words.  
                                               
Spain generally and in particular in the siege of New Carthage.” The authors to whom Polybius refers here 
likely include Silenus: FGrH 175; cf. Livy 26.49.3. On the passage at 3.47.6-48.12, Chapter 2, Part 2, 
above. On Scipio’s letter to Philip, Walbank 1940: 210-11.  
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 In the middle of his description of the siege at New Carthage, Polybius paints a 
picture of Scipio as an active participant in the engagement, fulfilling the tasks necessary 
to ensure the success of the endeavor. Scipio takes measures to ensure his safety, 
however, tasking three men with large shields to cover his movements from enemy 
missiles (10.13.2). Scipio takes advantage of the visual possibilities provided by the 
safety of his concealment, as Polybius describes the results of the enterprise: 
διὸ παρὰ τὰ πλάγια καὶ τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους τόπους ἐπιπαριὼν μεγάλα 
συνεβάλλετο πρὸς τὴν χρείαν· ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἑώρα τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δ' 
αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος ἐνειργάζετο προθυμίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις. 
ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε μηδὲν ἐλλιπὲς γίνεσθαι τῶν πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλ' 
ὁπότε τιν' αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ὁ καιρὸς ὑποδείξειε, πᾶν ἐκ χειρὸς 
ἀεὶ συνηργεῖτο πρὸς τὸ δέον. (10.13.3-5) 
 
Because of this, as he passes along the flanks of his lines and the higher 
ground, he contributed a great deal to the action: at the same time, he saw 
what was happening and also was seen by all and brought about an 
eagerness on the part of those engaging in the fighting. The result was 
that nothing necessary for the battle was left out, but whenever the right 
moment indicated to him something for what lay before him, everything 
was always at hand for what was needed.  
 
Scipio’s action demonstrates his recognition of the power that opsis has, as it allows him 
to recognize and subsequently to encourage his men to the behaviors necessary to the 
situation. His position under the cover of the shields allows him to reach higher ground, 
which, in turn, enables him to see (ἑώρα) for himself what is occurring, and to inspire his 
troops as they see him (ὁρώμενος) in their midst. His visible presence creates the 
eagerness (προθυμίαν) necessary to spur his men to fight in a successful manner. Scipio 
values opsis both as a means of gaining sure knowledge and as a way to evoke an 
expected response through a constructed or managed appearance. Polybius’ comment on 
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Scipio’s appearance and presence on the battlefield makes the battles’ success dependent 
upon (ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε) the general’s sight and visibility among the troops.  
Polybius’ account of Scipio’s invasion of Spain provides a contained narrative 
episode that demonstrates Scipio’s qualities, approaches to practical decision making, and 
means of communicating information to his troops. Polybius weaves into his accounts of 
Scipio’s early life and throughout his narrative of the campaign in Spain elements of 
opsis and pragmatic decision making that mirror his own historiographic process, just as 
he does with Hannibal in the third book of the Histories. Scipio, too, recognizes the value 
of opsis and manages others’ sight to his advantage, and he forces the Celtiberians and 
his troops to pursue expected courses of action based on his visible presence or actions. 
Scipio, like Hannibal, models Polybian methods of analyzing and conveying the situation 
to his army. In his speeches to his troops in Spain he uses language that mirrors Polybius’ 
own construction of knowledge and authority based on autopsy and practical reasoning.  
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Part 2: Putting Exempla to Work: Scipio in Spain 
 Scipio’s speech to his father’s and uncle’s former troops as he arrives in Spain, as 
noted above, appears in both Polybius’ and Livy’s texts. The main elements of the 
Polybian speech are found in the closing of Livy’s version. A direct comparison of the 
two versions best demonstrates what Livy’s Scipio takes or leaves from Polybius’ Scipio. 
First, let us consider the entire report of the speech in Polybius, which highlights the 
reversal of the situation in Spain and Scipio’s expectation of success:   
Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε συνηθροισμένων τῶν δυνάμεων παρεκάλει μὴ 
καταπεπλῆχθαι τὴν προγεγενημένην περιπέτειαν· οὐ γὰρ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς 
ἡττῆσθαι Ῥωμαίους ὑπὸ Καρχηδονίων οὐδέποτε, τῇ δὲ προδοσίᾳ τῇ 
Κελτιβήρων καὶ τῇ προπετείᾳ, διακλεισθέντων τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπ' 
ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ πιστεῦσαι τῇ συμμαχίᾳ τῶν εἰρημένων. ὧν ἑκάτερα νῦν 
ἔφη περὶ τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπάρχειν· χωρὶς γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολὺ 
διεσπασμένους στρατοπεδεύειν, τοῖς τε συμμάχοις ὑβριστικῶς 
χρωμένους ἅπαντας ἀπηλλοτριωκέναι καὶ πολεμίους αὑτοῖς 
παρεσκευακέναι. διὸ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἤδη διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς, τοὺς 
δὲ λοιπούς, ὡς ἂν τάχιστα θαρρήσωσι καὶ διαβάντας ἴδωσι τὸν ποταμόν, 
ἀσμένως ἥξειν, οὐχ οὕτως εὐνοοῦντας σφίσι, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀμύνεσθαι 
σπουδάζοντας τὴν Καρχηδονίων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀσέλγειαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, 
στασιάζοντας πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡγεμόνας ἅθρους 
διαμάχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὐ θελήσειν, κατὰ μέρος δὲ κινδυνεύοντας 
εὐχειρώτους ὑπάρχειν. διὸ βλέποντας εἰς ταῦτα παρεκάλει περαιοῦσθαι 
τὸν ποταμὸν εὐθαρσῶς· περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑξῆς ἀνεδέχετο μελήσειν αὑτῷ καὶ 
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἡγεμόσι. (10.6.1-6) 
 
Nevertheless, at that time, after the soldiers were gathered together, he 
exhorts them not to be astounded at their previous reversal. He said the 
Romans were not ever beaten in valor by the Carthaginians, but by the 
treachery and fickleness of the Celtiberians, since the generals were cut 
off from each other through their trust in the alliance with the 
aforementioned people. Each of these things now happens for the enemy, 
for they make their camps far apart from each other, they used their 
allies in a hubristic fashion, alienated them, and made enemies for 
themselves. On account of this, some have sent messages to the 
Romans already and the rest, as soon as they take heart and see the 
Romans crossing the river, they will gladly come, not as much being well 
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disposed to the Romans but rather because they are eager to take 
vengeance because of the insolence of the Carthaginians toward them. 
But the greatest reason is that their leaders of the opposing groups are at 
odds with each other and will not be willing to fight together against the 
Romans, and they are easy to overcome if they attack group by group. He 
therefore bids his troops to examine these things and to cross the river 
boldly. Afterwards, he promises that the rest will be a matter of concern 
to him and the other generals. 
 
The parallels to the Polybian version of the speech are present in just the closing of 
Livy’s account:  
quod mens sua sponte diuinat, idem subicit ratio haud fallax. uexati ab iis 
socii nostram fidem per legatos implorant. tres duces discordantes prope 
ut defecerint alii ab aliis, trifariam exercitum in diuersissimas regiones 
distraxere. eadem in illos ingruit fortuna quae nuper nos adflixit; nam et 
deseruntur ab sociis, ut prius ab Celtiberis nos, et diduxere exercitus 
quae patri patruoque meo causa exitii fuit; nec discordia intestina coire 
eos in unum sinet neque singuli nobis resistere poterunt. uos modo, 
milites, fauete nomini Scipionum, suboli imperatorum uestrorum uelut 
accisis recrescenti stirpibus. agite, ueteres milites, nouum exercitum 
nouumque ducem traducite Hiberum, traducite in terras cum multis 
fortibus factis saepe a uobis peragratas. breui faciam ut, quemadmodum 
nunc noscitatis in me patris patruique similitudinem oris uoltusque et 
lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei uirtutisque effigiem uobis reddam ut 
reuixisse aut renatum sibi quisque Scipionem imperatorem dicat. 
(26.41.20-25) 
 
What my mind foretells of its own accord, likewise a rational and non-
deceptive examination also supports. Troubled by the Carthaginians, their 
allies beg for an agreement with us via their ambassadors, and their three 
generals, quarreling to the extent that each is just about to abandon the 
others, have led their armies in three different directions into completely 
different areas. The same misfortune that recently troubled us now falls 
onto the Carthaginians, for they are now also being deserted by their 
allies, just as we were by the Celtiberians before. And they have divided 
their armies, which was the cause of ruin for my father and uncle. Their 
infighting does not allow them to come together as one and they are 
unable to resist us each on their own. You, then, soldiers, grant favor to 
the name of the Scipiones, the progeny of your commanders, as though I 
am growing from the stalk just cut. Come on, veteran soldiers, lead this 
new army and your new commander across the Ebro. Lead us into lands 
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that have often been traversed by you with many brave deeds. Just as you 
now recognize in me a likeness of the face, appearance, and bodily 
features of my father and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I provide to 
you a copy of their character, loyalty, and courage in order that you each 
of you would say that Scipio the general lives again or has been born a 
second time.  
 
Both of these accounts stress the importance of the current situation in Spain and how the 
tables have turned on the Carthaginians, who now face the same situation that the 
Romans did when the previous Scipiones were in command there. In Livy’s version, 
Scipio notes that an honest reckoning of the situation leads to a sure recognition of the 
state of affairs, echoing Polybius’ assertion that Scipio uses λογισμός throughout the 
narrative of the siege of New Carthage. In each version of the speech, Scipio notes that 
the Carthaginians have split into discordant camps (χωρὶς γὰρ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων πολὺ 
διεσπασμένους στρατοπεδεύειν; diduxere exercitus) and that their support from their 
allies is waning (τοῖς τε συμμάχοις ὑβριστικῶς χρωμένους ἅπαντας ἀπηλλοτριωκέναι; 
defecerint alii ab aliis). In both versions, too, Scipio mentions that the Celtiberians send 
to him for assistance or alliance (διὸ καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἤδη διαπέμπεσθαι πρὸς σφᾶς; socii 
nostram fidem per legatos implorant).  
 Despite these parallels to Polybius’ account of the speech, Livy’s version lacks 
the focus on opsis that the Polybian Scipio asserts (ἴδωσι, βλέποντας), through which he 
both encourages his men to see the situation themselves and claims that their appearance 
will provoke a response from the Celtiberians. In the portions that are directly open to 
comparison, then, Livy appears to have removed or at least limited the role of opsis that 
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features heavily in Polybius’ version of the speech, consequently removing the most 
Polybian characteristic that Scipio embodies in Polybius’ version of the speech.  
 Instead, Livy fills the speech with exemplary language. Exemplarity is a well-
known feature of Livian historiography and has been a key facet of recent scholarship.23 
In this section, I build largely on the work of Chaplin, who has argued the young general 
uses some typical elements of exemplarity in his speech to demonstrate Roman virtus and 
to defend his explanation for the forthcoming events of the war.24 Scipio claims to avoid 
the use of the old exempla, but then fills his speech with multiple examples drawn from 
Livy’s second pentad:25  
vetera omitto, Porsennam Gallos Samnites: a Punicis bellis incipiam. 
quot classes, quot duces, quot exercitus priore bello amissi sunt? iam quid 
hoc bello memorem? omnibus aut ipse adfui cladibus aut quibus afui, 
maxime unus omnium eas sensi. Trebia Trasumennus Cannae quid aliud 
sunt quam monumenta occisorum exercituum consulumque Romanorum? 
adde defectionem Italiae, Siciliae maioris partis, Sardiniae; adde ultimum 
terrorem ac pauorem, castra Punica inter Anienem ac moenia Romana 
posita et uisum prope in portis uictorem Hannibalem. in hac ruina rerum 
stetit una integra atque immobilis uirtus populi Romani; haec omnia 
strata humi erexit ac sustulit. uos omnium primi, milites, post Cannensem 
cladem uadenti Hasdrubali ad Alpes Italiamque, qui si se cum fratre 
coniunxisset nullum iam nomen esset populi Romani, ductu auspicioque 
patris mei obstitistis; et hae secundae res illas aduersas sustinuerunt. 
(26.41.10-13) 
 
I pass over things of the far past: Porsenna, the Gauls, the Samnites. I will 
begin from the Punic Wars. How many fleets, how many leaders, how 
many armies were lost in the previous war? What, then, should I recall in 
                                               
23 For example, Feldherr 1998, Chaplin 2000, 2014, Roller 2004, 2009, 2011.  
24 Chaplin 2000: 64-65.  
25 For the references to Porsenna, the Gauls, and Caudium, cf. the opening to this chapter, above. Feldherr 
1998: 54, n. 12, notes that this speech is one of many instances in which a commander uses the past valor 
of the Romans’ ancestors in a battlefield exhortation. His second chapter (pp. 51-81) deals broadly with 
how Livy blends the spectacles expected as part of Roman civic life with the historiographic tradition of 
generals’ speeches.  
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this war? I myself was either present for all the disasters or, for those 
from which I was absent, I alone felt their effects most sharply. What else 
are Trebia, Trasimene, or Cannae than the monuments of slaughtered 
armies and Roman consuls? Add to that the defection of Italy, the greater 
part of Sicily, and Sardinia; add, too, the greatest fear and dread, a Punic 
camp positioned between the Anio and the walls of Rome and a 
conquering Hannibal seen almost at our gates. Only the excellence of the 
Roman people stood uninjured and immovable during this eventful 
disaster. This virtue lifted up and elevated all that had collapsed to the 
ground. You, soldiers, first of all, under the leadership and command of 
my father, opposed Hasdrubal as he advanced toward the Alps and Italy 
after the disaster at Cannae and, had he joined up with his brother, the 
name of the Roman people would no longer exist. These successes 
deferred those defeats.  
 
Scipio’s speech follows the tenets of Roller’s exemplary loop.26 Roller’s loop describes 
exemplary discourse as containing the following elements: an action of ethical 
consequence for the Roman community, an audience to observe and judge the action, 
commemoration of the deed and its consequence through a monument, and the 
encouragement for imitation.27 Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae serve as the acts to be 
remembered, and the Roman failures there convey the social value to be demonstrated: 
these are negative exempla that Scipio hopes to encourage his men to avoid repeating.28 
Scipio himself makes up the primary audience as he claims to be present for some of the 
battles.29 The speech, given to a secondary audience made up of the soldiers in Spain, 
                                               
26 Roller 2004: 4-6.  
27 cf., too, Roller 2009 and 2011, which expand further his take on exemplarity in Roman historiography. 
Roller 2009 uses the case of Duilius to compare the historicist and exemplary modes of Roman historical 
writing and how these relate to larger trends in Roman culture. Roller 2011 examines the moral 
complexities evident in the Fabius exemplum to determine how the conflicts of value and judgement in the 
tale of Fabius make him a useful exemplary actor for later debate.  
28 Pausch 2011: 100: As Scipio narrates these more recent events he provides a detailed summary and 
analysis of these engagements from the Roman perspectives. cf. Burck 1962: 125-27.  
29 Feldherr 1998: 71-72 notes that Scipio’s “unique personal experience of all Rome's disasters give a 
particular authority to Scipio's narrative and, by extension, to the historian's” (p. 72).  
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memorializes these events, as does Scipio’s claim to have felt the effects of these 
defeats.30 Additionally, the deictic demonstrative hae, which emphatically points to their 
current circumstances, and Scipio’s description of the situation at hand displays the 
results of the past events and serves as further monuments of the actions at issue here: the 
physical conditions in which the army finds themselves memorializes their past 
successes.  
Additionally, Scipio extends the memorialization beyond the battles in Italy to 
include further his troops’ past valor in Spain slightly later in his speech:31 
quid igitur minus conueniat, milites, quam cum aliae super alias clades 
cumularentur ac di prope ipsi cum Hannibale starent, uos hic cum 
parentibus meis--aequentur enim etiam honore nominis--sustinuisse 
labantem fortunam populi Romani, nunc eosdem quia illic omnia 
secunda laetaque sunt animis deficere? (26.41.17) 
 
What, then, soldiers, is less suitable than that you along with my 
parents—for they are made equal even by the honor of the name—
supported the collapsing fortune of the Roman people here when 
defeats were being heaped on other defeats and the gods themselves 
were practically standing with Hannibal, but now you same men fail in 
courage because everything is favorable and prosperous over there?  
 
                                               
30 Scipio’s mentions of the grief he felt at the deaths of his father and uncle in such a short period of time is 
much like the exhibition of scars as monuments in other speeches; cf. Roller 2004: 5 and Hölkeskamp 
1996: 302-8 for examples of types of monumenta contained within the concept of “monumental memory.”  
31 Scipio opens the speech, too, by recalling these events: nemo ante me nouus imperator militibus suis 
priusquam opera eorum usus esset gratias agere iure ac merito potuit: me uobis priusquam prouinciam aut 
castra uiderem obligauit fortuna, primum quod ea pietate erga patrem patruumque meum uiuos 
mortuosque fuistis, deinde quod amissam tanta clade prouinciae possessionem integram et populo Romano 
et successori mihi uirtute uestra obtinuistis (26.41.3-5), “No new general before me has been able to give 
his soldiers thanks so rightly and deservedly before he had made use of their works. But fortune obligated 
me to do so to you before I ever saw my province or my camp: first, because of the piety you had toward 
my father and uncle, both in life and after they died; second, because you kept intact by your courage and 
for the Roman people and for me, their successor, the possession of a province thought lost after such a 
defeat.” On “fortune” in Livy, Kajanto 1957 and Levene 1993: 30-33.  
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Scipio’s speech uses language that metaphorically hints at the construction of a physical 
monument: cumularentur, starent, sustinuisse. While Hannibal’s successes are piled up 
(cumularentur), the Scipiones in Spain and their troops prop up (sustinuisse) Rome’s 
fortune, which is said to be collapsing (labantem). Scipio contrasts physical space 
(hic…illic) and time (cum…nunc) to highlight the discord between the fortunes of the 
army before and at present. The deictic adverbs hic and illic provide points of reference 
for the physical venues in which the soldiers have exhibited their courage (animis), which 
is the primary ethical value the deeds commemorated through the speech are meant to 
embody.  
Lastly, Roller’s exemplary loop ends with a need for imitation. So, too, does 
Scipio’s speech:  
uos modo, milites, fauete nomini Scipionum, suboli imperatorum 
uestrorum uelut accisis recrescenti stirpibus. agite, ueteres milites, 
nouum exercitum nouumque ducem traducite Hiberum, traducite in 
terras cum multis fortibus factis saepe a uobis peragratas. breui faciam 
ut, quemadmodum nunc noscitatis in me patris patruique similitudinem 
oris uoltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei uirtutisque effigiem 
uobis reddam ut reuixisse aut renatum sibi quisque Scipionem 
imperatorem dicat. (26.41.22-25) 
 
You, then, soldiers, grant favor to the name of the Scipiones, the 
progeny of your commanders, as though I am growing from the stalk just 
cut. Come on, veteran soldiers, lead this new army and your new 
commander across the Ebro. Lead us into lands that have often been 
traversed by you with many brave deeds. Just as you now recognize in 
me a likeness of the face, appearance, and bodily features of my father 
and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I provide to you a copy of their 
character, loyalty, and courage in order that you each of you would say 
that Scipio the general lives again or has been born a second time. 
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Scipio closes the exemplary loop with a call for imitatio: he encourages the troops in 
Spain to repeat their brave deeds. A series of imperatives (favete, agite, traducite, 
traducite) enjoins the veteran soldiers to commence the action. Scipio notes that their 
campaign targets lands often tread by the veterans (saepe a uobis peragratas) and places 
already home to their brave deeds (fortibus factis). Scipio claims that his presence 
represents a rebirth (suboli, reuixisse aut renatum) of Scipionic good fortune and that his 
bearing comprises a physical re-manifestation (similitudinem, effigiem) of his uncle’s and 
father’s persons.32 When Scipio conflates his identity with that of his father, he also 
effectively merges the identities of these soldiers as both primary and secondary 
audiences: they witnessed their own valorous action in the past and now hear Scipio’s 
call for imitatio of these affairs in the events to come. Just as the soldiers see the elder 
Scipio in the younger, they ought to find a renewal and rebirth of their past courage in 
their forthcoming deeds.  
Lastly, at the very opening of the speech, in his initial summary of the events in 
Spain that led to his arrival, Scipio claims that “Fortune put me in your debt before I ever 
saw the province or your camp” (me uobis priusquam prouinciam aut castra uiderem 
obligauit fortuna; 26.41.4). In highlighting the exemplary nature of these troops’ past 
deeds in Spain throughout his speech, Livy has Scipio here note that the exemplary 
lesson exists prior to his visual inspection (viderem) of the land or the state of the army. 
                                               
32 Compare, too, how Hannibal is said to resemble his father: Livy 21.4.2: Hamilcarem iuuenem red- 
ditum sibi ueteres milites credere, “The veteran soldiers believed that a young Hamilcar had returned to 
them.” Levene 2010: 173-177 discusses this phenomenon as it relates to characterization in Livy’s text (cf. 
esp. 177 n. 33). Physical appearance as a means of establishing character within Roman culture: Quint. 
5.10.23-7.  
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The tag that opens the speech thereby prioritizes the Livian methodology of exemplarity 
over the Polybian emphasis on autopsy and the logical examination of affairs.  
 In the aftermath of the siege of New Carthage, Livy describes a speech given by 
Scipio that has no Polybian parallel.33 The speech commemorates the capture of the city 
and the resulting consequences for the status of their campaign in Spain. After opening 
the speech by giving thanks to the gods, Scipio moves on to demonstrate the exemplary 
qualities his troops should gain from commemorating their victory: 
militum deinde uirtutem conlaudauit quod eos non eruptio hostium, non 
altitudo moenium, non inexplorata stagni uada, non castellum in alto 
tumulo situm, non munitissima arx deterruisset quo minus transcenderent 
omnia perrumperentque. itaque quamquam omnibus omnia deberet, 
praecipuum muralis coronae decus eius esse qui primus murum 
adscendisset; profiteretur qui se dignum eo duceret dono. (26.48.4-5) 
 
He then praised the courage of the soldiers because neither the sally of 
the enemy, nor the height of the walls, nor the unconquerable fords of the 
swamp, nor the fortification situated on the high hill, nor the most heavily 
defended citadel deterred them from ascending or breaking through 
everything. Although he would owe everything to all of them, the 
particular honor of the mural crown belonged to the one who had first 
ascended the wall and he said that he who believed that he was worthy of 
the honor should declare it.  
 
Livy’s narrative of Scipio’s speech, like the exhortation that he offers upon his arrival in 
Spain, follows the tenets of Roller’s exemplary loop. The soldiers themselves are an 
audience to the valorous act and Scipio’s speech in commemoration of it. Additionally, 
Livy’s narrative of the battle includes a mention of Scipio taking up a position on the hill 
in order to become a “witness and spectator of the courage and cowardice of each” (testis 
                                               
33 Polybius immediately moves from the final capture of the city (10.15.11) to his description of the looting 
of the city and Scipio’s treatment of the captives and distribution of the wealth gained in the sack (10.16-
20).  
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spectatorque uirtutis atque ignauiae cuique; 26.44.8).34 Scipio himself thereby becomes 
the original audience of the soldiers’ deeds, while the troops are the audience for the act 
of commemoration. The soldiers’ courage (militum…virtutem) is, of course, the 
exemplary behavior to be recalled through the exemplary loop. Two elements of Scipio’s 
speech serve as the commemorative monuments: the physical spaces that Scipio 
describes as overcome by his forces and the mural crown awarded to the first soldier to 
mount the wall. There is an implicit call for imitation as Scipio hints at future conflicts 
earlier in the speech when he describes the current financial standings of the two sides.35  
More significantly to Scipio’s exemplary speech, however, is the dispute arising 
over the awarding of the mural crown. As two men, a marine and a legionnaire, each 
profess to deserve the honor, a conflict ensues between the army and the navy over who 
should receive the crown (26.48.6-13). As the debate worsens, Scipio takes action 
because of the potential for a negative exemplum to be derived from this conflict: “this 
matter is guided by no less detestable an example, inasmuch as an honor for courage is 
sought by deceit and lies” (nihilo minus detestabili exemplo rem agi, quippe ubi fraude 
ac periurio decus petatur virtutis; 26.48.11). To avoid the continuing trouble, Scipio 
awards both men with the mural crown in a second assembly speech, ending the conflict 
                                               
34 When compared to Polybius’ account of the same portion of the battle, Scipio’s position has a different 
point of emphasis: ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἑώρα τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δ' αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος ἐνειργάζετο 
προθυμίαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις (10.13.4), “At the same time, he saw what was happening and also was seen 
by all and brought about an eagerness on the part of those engaging in the fighting.” For Polybius, it is 
Scipio’s presence that encourages the bravery of the Roman troops, while Livy’s Scipio is a witness of their 
courageous action.  
35 neque hostibus quicquam relinqueretur et sibi ac suis omnia superessent (26.48.3), “There was nothing 
left for the enemy and everything remained for him and his men.”  
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and preserving the status of the mural crown as a marker of courage and avoiding its 
potential to provide continuing contention between the army and navy (26.48.13-14). The 
speech Scipio gives to the troops in the immediate aftermath of the capture of New 
Carthage is marked by Livian exemplary language. 
 In the opening of his campaign in Spain, Livy’s Scipio uses exemplarity in his 
speeches as an internal narrator and in making decisions and pursuing various courses of 
action. In many instances in the Livian speeches, Scipio draws on exemplary language 
where the Polybian Scipio would employ opsis and autopsy. Upon comparison, then, 
each historian’s version of Scipio uses a methodological approach to decision making and 
behavior that mirrors the author’s own historiographic approach.  
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Part 3: Master of Reading Exempla: Scipio’s Exemplary Debate 
In addition to Scipio’s use of Livy’s model of exemplary language in his 
speeches, Scipio shows an ability to read exempla properly when others attempt to cite 
them against him. In the second half of the Third Decade, especially, Scipio establishes a 
preeminent position in his use of exempla.36 In a debate with Fabius, who attempts to cite 
an exemplum against him, Scipio shows that his reading is the more persuasive 
interpretation of the exemplary event. Thus, Scipio not only uses exempla in his speeches, 
but Livy even shows him using exemplary language more convincingly than his 
counterparts. Among Livy’s internal narrators, Scipio best approximates Livy’s own 
historiographic method.  
After Scipio successfully completes his campaigns in Spain, he returns to Rome 
with a plan to pursue the war deeper into Carthaginian territory by invading Africa 
directly. Scipio’s proposal for the invasion prompts a debate in the senate in which he is 
opposed by Fabius.37 In his lengthy attack on Scipio’s plan, Fabius attempts to use 
exempla to demonstrate the potential problems with the proposal to invade Spain.38 After 
                                               
36 Chaplin 2000: 61-65 and 70-72 argues that Scipio’s reading of the exemplary nature of Cannae is 
persuasive and provides the lessons needing to be taken from the disaster. Consequently, Scipio is the last 
Roman to cite Cannae as an exemplum, closing the book for the reading of this episode. cf., too, pp. 92-97, 
where Chaplin compares the exemplary language of Fabius and Scipio in their debate and which I also 
discuss below.  
37 Levene 2010: 111-18 discusses further allusive practices at work for Livy behind this debate, including 
those made to Greek authors and figures, especially the possibility that Diodorus’ version of Nicias’ speech 
contains elements more alike to Livy’s Fabius than Thucydides (cf. esp. 114, n. 71 for a discussion of how 
this identification would fit with Diodorus’ potential sources for the passage). For a description of the 
Thucydidean parallels (to Nicias and Alcibiades) in this passage, Rodgers 1986. Walsh 1961: 105-6 also 
presents some Nician parallels to Livy’s depiction of Fabius in the debate.  
38 Chaplin 2000: 92-97 discusses the nature and range of exempla employed by both Fabius and Scipio. 
Chaplin breaks Fabius’ speech into five main sections, with the following exempla spread across four of 
these sections: C. Lutatius at the end of the First Punic War, Fulvius at Capua during Hannibal’s march on 
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criticizing Scipio for caring too much about his reputation and the role that public opinion 
plays in his endeavors, Fabius summarizes his own success in stopping Hannibal in Italy 
and then describes other disasters in which a foreign expedition led to defeat (28.40-42). 
Fabius then describes what he feels is the most relevant exemplum for Scipio’s proposed 
invasion of Africa: the failed campaign of M. Atilius Regulus in Africa during the First 
Punic War: 
externa et nimis antiqua repeto. Africa eadem ista et M. Atilius, insigne 
utriusque fortunae exemplum, nobis documento sint. ne tibi, P. Corneli, 
cum ex alto Africam conspexeris, ludus et iocus fuisse Hispaniae tuae 
uidebuntur…cetera—neque ea eleuo—nullo tamen modo Africo bello 
comparanda, ubi non portus ullus classi nostrae apertus, non ager pacatus, 
non ciuitas socia, non rex amicus, non consistendi usquam locus, non 
procedendi; quacumque circumspexeris hostilia omnia atque infesta. 
(28.42.1-2 and 6-7) 
 
I am going on about foreign and sufficiently old campaigns. Let us instead 
use as a lesson that same Africa and Marcus Atilius, a remarkable example 
of each type of fortune. Indeed, Publius Cornelius, when you first catch 
sight of Africa from the sea, your affairs in Spain will seem to have been a 
game and a joke…For the rest—and I do not disparage these things—it is 
nevertheless not to be compared with an African war in any way, where 
there is no port open to our fleet, no pacified land, no allied state, no 
friendly king, no place for making a base camp, no place for marching out. 
All the things that you will see are hostile and dangerous.  
 
Fabius cites the Regulus campaign as an exemplum worth considering in the context of 
this debate and claims that it demonstrates that Scipio will find difficulty immediately 
upon his arrival in Africa.39 While Fabius does allude to Regulus’ success and failure 
                                               
Rome, the Scipiones in Spain, the Athenians at Syracuse, Regulus in Africa, the Celtiberian allies in Spain, 
Claudius and Livius at the Metaurus.  
39 O’Gorman 2011: 275-76 notes how Fabius moves from pairs of exempla that work smoothly to the 
“internally ambiguous” example of Regulus. O’Gorman briefly summarizes how Scipio turns the Regulus 
exemplum against Fabius, on which, v. below.  
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(utriusque fortunae) in his introduction of the exemplum, he misses the point that Regulus 
was successful enough in the initial stages of his campaign that he besieged Carthage and 
that his opponents were willing to listen to peace terms and consider capitulating to the 
Romans.40  
The epitomizer for Livy’s eighteenth book notes that a key element of the 
Regulus exemplum is that it exhibits each type of fortune, good and bad (magnum 
utriusque casus exemplum in Regulo; Perioch. xviii). Fabius’ utriusque fortunae in the 
summary may recall Livy’s original explanation (utriusque casus) of the Regulus affair in 
Book 18.41 If Fabius intratextually recalls Livy’s original narrative of the Regulus affair 
in his speech, he attempts to draw upon the interpretation offered in Book 18. Fabius, 
however, misreads and misrepresents the Regulus exemplum by tying it to the potential 
opposition that Scipio would allegedly face immediately upon his arrival in Africa. In his 
                                               
40 For a narrative of Regulus’ campaign, Polyb. Hist. 1.29-35. For an epitome of Livy’s account, cf. 
Periochae xvii and xviii. The Periochae suggest that Livy places the onset of Regulus’ campaign as the end 
point of Book 17 (Atilius Regulus cos. victis navali proelio Poenis in Africam traiecit, Perioch. xvii.15-16) 
and then concludes with the disastrous end to the campaign at the opening of Book 18 (Atilius Regulus in 
Africa serpentem portentosae magnitudinis cum magna clade militum occidit, et cum aliquot proeliis bene 
adversus Carthaginienses pugnasset, successorque ei a senatu prospere bellum gerenti non mitteretur, id 
ipsum per litteras ad senatum scriptas questus est, in quibus inter causas petendi successoris <erat>, quod 
agellus eius a mercennariis desertus esset; Perioch. xviii.1-8). The epitomizer also notes that the Regulus 
campaign serves as an exemplum of adverse fortune: quaerente deinde fortuna, ut magnum utriusque casus 
exemplum in Regulo proderetur, arcessito a Carthaginiensibus Xanthippo, Lacedaemoniorum duce, victus 
proelio et captus est (Perioch. xviii.8-11), “Then, with fortune seeking to produce an extreme exemplum of 
each type of outcome in the case of Regulus, he was conquered in battle and captured by Xanthippus, a 
Spartan general, summoned by the Carthaginians.” 
41 On the potential accuracy of the Periochae, Bessone 2015 in chapter one above. While Begbie 1967, 
Bingham 1978, and Jal 1984 create different lists of discrepancies between the surviving books and the 
corresponding Periochae, they generally point to more harmony than alteration. Chaplin 2010b points to 
the focus on speeches in Perioch. 48 and 49, perhaps suggesting a focus more on events that demonstrate 
the power of the word. Additionally, there is a focus in the Periochae on notable individuals, Bessone 
2015: 434-5. All of this points to the idea that the exemplarity of a notable individual like Regulus is the 
sort of thing that the Periochae are likely to preserve and the epitomizer’s utriusque casus is more likely to 
be derived from Livy’s genuine text than not. On other sources for the Periochae and possible 
intermediaries: Begbie 1967, Bingham, 1978, Hellegouarc’h 1994, and Hose 1994.   
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subsequent response, Scipio seizes upon the discrepancy in Fabius’ argument and 
attempts to discredit Fabius’ reading of the episode and to support his own proposition 
for invading Africa.  
When Scipio does arrive in Africa (29.28), he is met with a sight and response 
that is far from what Fabius claims he would encounter.42 Instead of finding closed ports 
and hostile enemies, Scipio finds a seemingly empty land as the Carthaginians abandon 
the coastal fields and cities upon the Roman approach.43 Contrary to what Fabius 
described in the debate, above, Livy claims that all the fear occurs on the part of the 
Carthaginians, not the Romans, who instead establish a camp at ease. Within this context, 
too, Livy makes reference to Regulus’ prior campaign and, consequently, to the debate 
between Fabius and Scipio that had very recently discussed Regulus at length.44 Livy’s 
elaboration on the Carthaginian fears notes that they expect that they have no commander 
who is an equal to Scipio.45 Even in the ensuing episodes, the Romans find success in 
                                               
42 Note, too, that Livy’s narrative of the crossing (29.27) is largely uneventful. There is only a brief delay 
due to some fog. Livy even uses this opportunity to remark on the improbable account of Coelius (F37 
FRHist = Livy 29.27.13-15), who records how the Romans had to brave near-shipwreck only to land in 
Africa in great chaos and without their weapons.  
43 29.28.1-3: expositis copiis Romani castra in proximis tumulis metantur. iam non in maritimos modo 
agros conspectu primum classis dein tumultu egredientium in terram pauor terrorque peruenerat, sed in 
ipsas urbes…ut relinqui subito Africam diceres; “After the troops had disembarked, the Romans measured 
out their camp in the nearest little hills. Already, such dread and fright had come into the coastal fields, at 
first because of the sight of the fleets and then because of the clamor made by the disembarking soldiers—
and not just there but also in the cities themselves…such that you might say that Africa was suddenly left 
abandoned.” 
44 29.28.5: nam post M. Atilium Regulum et L. Manlium consules, annis prope quinquaginta, nullum 
Romanum exercitum uiderant praeter praedatorias classes; “For it was nearly fifty nears since M. Atilius 
Regulus and L. Manlius were consuls and they had not seen a single Roman army apart from some 
marauding ships.”  
45 29.28.7: eo maior tum fuga pauorque in urbe fuit. et hercule neque exercitus domi ualidus neque dux 
quem opponerent erat. “Therefore, the city at that time experienced a rather large evacuation and dread. 
And, by god, there was not a strong enough army at home who could meet [the Romans].” 
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their initial encounters in Africa (e.g. 29.29 and 29.34). The easy nature of the African 
landing in Livy’s narrative supports the interpretation of the Regulus exemplum that 
Scipio advances in his debate with Fabius. As a result, the narratorial identities and 
approaches of Livy and Scipio run parallel to one another as one describes events that 
follow from the other’s analysis of Regulus’ exemplary actions.  
 In his response to Fabius in the debate, moreover, Scipio directly addresses his 
opponent’s failure to read the Regulus episode correctly: 
Negat aditum esse in Africam, negat ullos patere portus. M. Atilium 
captum in Africa commemorat, tamquam M. Atilius primo accessu ad 
Africam offenderit, neque recordatur illi ipsi tam infelici imperatori 
patuisse tamen portus Africae, et res egregie primo anno gessisse et 
quantum ad Carthaginienses duces attinet inuictum ad ultimum 
permansisse. nihil igitur me isto exemplo terrueris. si hoc bello non 
priore, si nuper et non annis ante quadraginta ista ita clades accepta 
foret, qui ego minus in Africam Regulo capto quam Scipionibus occisis in 
Hispaniam traicerem? (28.43.17-18) 
 
[Fabius] says that there is no approach to Africa, that there are no ports 
open to us. He recalls that Marcus Atilius was captured in Africa, as 
though Atilius met trouble upon his first approach to Africa. Nor does he 
recall that the ports of Africa were open to that man himself, unlucky 
though he was, and that he managed affairs successfully in the first year 
and, as far as the Carthaginian leaders were concerned, he remained 
unbeaten until the end. You will not, therefore, frighten me at all with 
that example. If that disaster had happened in this war, not in the previous 
one, or if it had happened recently and not forty years ago, how would I 
less likely cross over to Africa with Regulus captured than to Spain with 
the Scipios killed?  
 
In summarizing Regulus’ initial successes, Scipio directly responds to the reading of the 
exemplum offered to him by Fabius in several ways: First, Scipio points out that Regulus 
initially had ports at his disposal upon his arrival, thereby contradicting the claim made 
by Fabius that the idea that no ports are currently open to Scipio has a bearing on the 
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correlation between the Regulus campaign and the proposed invasion of Scipio. Second, 
Scipio reminds Fabius and the Senate that Regulus was unbeaten by Carthaginian 
opponents, which calls to mind that a Spartan mercenary, Xanthippus, was responsible 
for Regulus’ defeat.46 Third, despite Fabius’ claims that he turns away from old (antiqua) 
matters when he brings up the Regulus affair, Scipio points out that the prior campaign in 
Africa corresponds to a previous war, now decades in the past (non annis ante 
quadraginta).47 Lastly, in response to Fabius’ description of Scipio’s Spanish campaign 
as child’s play (ludus et iocus), Scipio instead notes that his efforts in Spain better follow 
an exemplum with more immediacy and personal impact—the deaths of his father and 
uncle—than Regulus’ now dated campaign.  
Taken as a whole, the differences pointed out by Scipio suggest that the Regulus 
affair has no bearing on his current proposed invasion of Africa and instead corresponds 
best to the situation in Spain when he arrived there after the deaths of his father and 
uncle. In doing this Scipio suggests a new reading of the Regulus exemplum. 
Additionally, as Scipio has previously had success in the Spanish theater,48 he shows that 
                                               
46 A fact highlighted by Scipio in the next line of his speech: “Nor would I grant that it is more fortunate for 
Carthage that the Spartan Xanthippus was born than that I was born for my country” (nec felicius 
Xanthippum Lacedaemonium Carthagini quam me patriae meae sinerem natum esse; 28.43.19).  According 
to the Periocha describing book 18, Livy notes this too: “He was conquered in battle and captured by 
Xanthippus, a Spartan general, summoned by the Carthaginians” (arcessito a Carthaginiensibus Xanthippo, 
Lacedaemoniorum duce, victus proelio et captus est; Perioch, xviii.9-11).  
47 Chaplin 2000: 121-31 on the differences in old and new exempla in the speeches of Fabius and Scipio, 
respectively, in this debate as it relates to their ages and a larger trend in the AUC that younger speakers use 
more recent exempla and generally have more forward-looking readings of the past.   
48 In fact, Scipio has just recently in the narrative reported his success to the Senate (28.38.2-3): et senatu 
extra urbem dato in aede Bellonae quas res in Hispania gessisset disseruit, quotiens signis conlatis 
dimicasset, quot oppida ex hostibus ui cepisset, quas gentes in dicionem populi Romani redegisset; 
aduersus quattuor se imperatores, quattuor uictores exercitus in Hispaniam isse; neminem 
Carthaginiensem in iis terris reliquisse. “And with the Senate convened outside the city in the temple of 
Bellona, he described what he had accomplished in Spain, how often he had fought in open battle, how 
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he can already respond the new take on this precedent of Regulus, which prompts his 
claim that Fabius cannot scare him with this exemplum (nihil igitur me isto exemplo 
terrueris). In effect, Scipio hints that Fabius uses the Regulus campaign at the wrong 
debate, where instead he should have brought this up before Scipio’s invasion of Spain.  
In the narrative surrounding the impetus for his Spanish Campaign (26.18), 
however, there was no mention of the Regulus affair. In fact, there was no opposition at 
all to the idea of sending another commander to Spain; the debate only arose about who 
should be sent (26.18.2-4).49 After Scipio appears suddenly at a high vantage point during 
the election for the proconsulship in Spain, he wins a unanimous election, though, with 
Livy’s comment on the lack of opposition (nemo audeat in Hispaniam imperium 
acciperet; 26.18.6), this should serve as no surprise.50 The people’s fears that arise after 
this election instead highlight the idea that the history of Scipio’s family should have 
played a role in determining their choice:  
ceterum post rem actam ut iam resederat impetus animorum ardorque, 
silentium subito ortum et tacita cogitatio quidnam egissent; nonne fauor 
plus ualuisset quam ratio. aetatis maxime paenitebat; quidam fortunam 
                                               
many towns he had captured from the enemy by force, what peoples he had brought back under the 
authority of the Roman people; he said that he had advanced to Spain against four generals, against four 
victorious armies and that he had left no Carthaginian behind in those lands.” 
49 26.18.2-4: et Romae senatui populoque post receptam Capuam non Italiae iam maior quam Hispaniae 
cura erat. et exercitum augeri et imperatorem mitti placebat; nec tam quem mitterent satis constabat quam 
illud, ubi duo summi imperatores intra dies triginta cecidissent, qui in locum duorum succederet 
extraordinaria cura deligendum esse. cum alii alium nominarent, postremum eo decursum est ut proconsuli 
creando in Hispaniam comitia haberentur. “And at Rome, after Capua was recovered there was not a care 
for Italy on the part of the Senate and people as much as there was for Spain. They decided that it would be 
best for the army to be augmented and a commander to be sent out. There was less agreement about whom 
they should send than there was that this ought to happen, when two high commanders had fallen within 
thirty days of each other, it ought to be chosen with extraordinary care who would take the place of two 
commanders. After a few nominated someone or another, it was at last decided that a comitia be held for 
creating a proconsulship for Spain.”  
50 Levene 2010: 314 on Scipio’s youth, inexperience, and self-promotion, and Livy’s interpretation of the 
election.  
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etiam domus horrebant nomenque ex funestis duabus familiis in eas 
prouincias ubi inter sepulcra patris patruique res gerendae essent 
proficiscentis. (26.18.10-11) 
 
But, after the election, as their burst of high spirits and fervor had at 
once receded, a sudden silence arose and there was an unspoken 
reflection on what they had done. Had their goodwill been stronger 
than reason? His age was the most vexing. Some were even afraid of 
the fortune of his family and his name as he was proceeding from two 
grief-ridden families into those very provinces where he would be 
conducting campaigns among the tombs of his father and uncle. 
 
The people’s fears arise before his Spanish campaign due to his family’s history in the 
region. His father’s and uncle’s defeat and deaths serve as a negative exemplum of which 
the people fear a repeat. Livy highlights the exemplary nature of this fear by describing 
the entire account of the election through the focalization of the Roman populus as an 
audience reacting to the events in Spain. The tombs of Scipio’s family (sepulcra patris 
patruique) serve as a physical monument commemorating the Roman defeats in Spain. 
As the people fear Scipio’s campaign marching among the sepulchers, they envision the 
soldiers on the new Spanish campaign becoming an audience to the monuments and 
thereby being encouraged to imitate the defeats of past Roman armies. Scipio’s reaction 
to the people’s fear, however, breaks the exemplary loop and its potential disastrous 
effects on his campaign. He responds directly by calling a contio and turns their concern 
on its head by addressing his age and command.51 Scipio’s speech at this meeting renews 
                                               
51 26.19.1-2: Quam ubi ab re tanto impetu acta sollicitudinem curamque hominum animaduertit, aduocata 
contione ita de aetate sua imperioque mandato et bello quod gerundum esset magno elatoque animo 
disseruit, ut ardorem eum qui resederat excitaret rursus nouaretque et impleret homines certioris spei 
quam quantam fides promissi humani aut ratio ex fiducia rerum subicere solet. “When [Scipio] noticed the 
anxiety and care the people had from such a rash act, he called together a contio and spoke about his age 
and the command entrusted to him and the great war which had to be fought. He lifted the spirits such that 
he reawakened again and renewed the eagerness which had resided and he filled men with a more certain 
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the vigor felt by the populus upon his first appearance and demonstrates that ratio can be 
overcome by ardor and hope (26.19.2), a direct answer to the people’s concern mentioned 
above (nonne fauor plus ualuisset quam ratio; 26.18.10). Scipio’s subsequent success in 
Spain and his exemplary speeches while there demonstrate how he has broken the 
exemplary loop and overcome the negative exemplum of his father’s and uncle’s defeat. 
When Scipio recalls the exemplary power of his family’s troubles in Spain during his 
debate with Fabius about the invasion of Africa, he creates a hierarchy of exemplary 
foreign invasions: Regulus had an easier time in Africa than Scipio’s father and uncle did 
in Spain; Scipio, conversely, pursued his own Spanish campaign in more difficult 
circumstances than his relatives. Consequently, Scipio undermines Fabius’ most direct 
negative exempla to suggest that the proposed invasion of Africa is the correct course of 
action for himself, specifically, to take.  
To return to the remaining portions of the debate against Fabius before the 
invasion of Africa, however, Scipio suggests other exempla the Senate should consider in 
making their decision. He first responds to Fabius’ mention of the Athenian invasion of 
Sicily during the Peloponnesian War by recalling his own Greek example:  
at etiam Athenienses audiendi sunt temere in Siciliam omisso domi bello 
transgressi. cur ergo, quoniam Graecas fabulas enarrare uacat, non 
Agathoclem potius, Syracusanum regem, cum diu Sicilia Punico bello 
ureretur, transgressum in hanc eandem Africam auertisse eo bellum 
unde uenerat refers? (28.43.20-21) 
 
And [he discusses] even how the Athenians dared to rashly cross to Sicily 
with the war neglected at home. Why, then, since there is time to 
                                               
hope than what the faith in the promise of a man or rational consideration or confidence in the matters at 
hand is accustomed to adduce.”   
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describe Greek stories, do you not instead recall Agathocles, the King of 
Syracuse, when Sicily was long burning with a Carthaginian war, that he 
crossed to this same Africa and turned back the war to the place 
whence it had come?  
 
While Scipio does little to directly address the exemplum of the Sicilian Expedition, in his 
loose quotation of Fabius’ recollection, Scipio makes a key change to Fabius’ language: 
Where Fabius claimed that the expedition left the war “abandoned at home” (bello domi 
relicto; 28.41.17), Scipio slightly heightens the claim with the war “neglected” or 
“ceased” at home (omisso domi bello). Scipio thereby hints that the real problem with the 
Sicilian Expedition was that there was no one left to defend Athens after the fleet left.52 
Later in his speech, Scipio reminds the Senate that regardless of the outcome of this 
debate, his colleague P. Licinius Crassus has to remain with an army in Italy due to his 
position as Pontifex Maximus.53 Therefore, no matter what happens with Scipio’s 
proposed African invasion, the war will never be completely stopped or neglected at 
home.  
                                               
52 There are, of course, other differences between the Sicilian Expedition and Scipio’s proposed invasion, 
most notably the fact that Sicily was not the seat of power of Athens’ primary opponent, Sparta, but rather 
an attempt to expand the Athenian empire’s footprint in the Western Mediterranean by lashing out at a 
powerful state of Doric descent.   
53 28.44.10-11: ne quid interim dum traicio, dum expono exercitum in Africa, dum castra ad Carthaginem 
promoueo, res publica hic detrimenti capiat, quod tu, Q. Fabi, cum uictor tota uolitaret Italia Hannibal 
potuisti praestare, hoc uide ne contumeliosum sit concusso iam et paene fracto Hannibale negare posse P. 
Licinium consulem, uirum fortissimum, praestare, qui ne a sacris absit pontifex maximus ideo in sortem 
tam longinquae prouinciae non uenit. “As for whether or not the state take any harm here while I am 
crossing over, while I disembark my army in Africa, and move my camp toward Carthage, that at which 
you, Quintus Fabius, were able to excel when Hannibal as victor was flying around all of Italy, see to it that 
it is not insulting to deny that the consul Publius Licinius, a very courageous man and one who did not 
come to the allotment of a province so far away lest he as pontifex maximus be absent from his religious 
duties, is able to overpower Hannibal, shaken for so long and now almost broken.”  
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 In place of the Athenian Sicilian Expedition, Scipio instead recalls Agathocles, 
the Syracusan King who undertook his own invasion of Africa in 310-307 BCE when 
faced with a Carthaginian war on his own soil.54 Scipio creates several strong indications 
that the Agathocles exemplum is more apposite to his proposed invasion than the Sicilian 
Expedition: First, Agathocles was at war with Carthage (Punico bello), just like Rome at 
Scipio’s present. Second, Agathocles invaded Africa, just as Scipio proposes 
(transgressum in hanc eandem Africam), so the geographical parallel heightens the 
applicability of the exemplum. Additionally, by invading Africa during a war with 
Carthage, Agathocles was able to achieve Scipio’s own goal: to return the war to its 
source (auertisse eo bellum unde uenerat). Lastly, Agathocles’ home of Sicily would be 
the province allotted to Scipio in order to achieve his intended invasion. Scipio therefore 
proposes to imitate Agathocles’ exemplum in a very precise fashion.  
 As a final model to bring up in response to Fabius, Scipio describes how 
Hannibal’s invasion of Italy is an exemplum that the Romans—and specifically Scipio 
himself—should seek to emulate.55 In a similar way as he did by reframing the Regulus 
exemplum with its applicability to a more recent situation, Scipio calls on the immediacy 
of a recent exemplary act to trump others that are dated and, by consequence, less 
relevant: 
                                               
54 Diodorus Siculus’ Univ. Hist. (xix and xxi) describes the rise and death of Agathocles. cf., too, the brief 
note on his character in Polyb. 9.23.2. Like Regulus, however, Agathocles found initial success in his 
campaign before ultimately meeting his end in Africa. Importantly, however, Agathocles achieved his goal 
of taking the war out of his homeland and returning the theater of operations to Africa.  
55 The parallelism between Scipio and Hannibal is felt strongly in this passage, as it will be in their meeting 
before Zama. cf. Rossi 2004 on the parallelism between these two figures in their career trajectories in the 
Third Decade.  
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'Sed quid, ultro metum inferre hosti et ab se remoto periculo alium in 
discrimen adducere quale sit, ueteribus externisque exemplis admonere 
opus est? maius praesentiusue ullum exemplum esse quam Hannibal 
potest? (28.44.1-2) 
 
“But why, then, is there need to call to mind old and foreign examples, to 
show how great it is to bring fear to a distant enemy and, by removing the 
danger from oneself, to put another at risk? Can there be any better or 
more present exemplum than Hannibal?  
 
Scipio’s reference to Hannibal as an exemplum to emulate cuts to the heart of his 
response to Fabius’ opposition of his proposed invasion. Hannibal is a more immediate 
(praesentius) and better (maius) example that best fits with the key purposes behind his 
planned expedition: to take the war to the enemy. Immediacy and relevance represent the 
core of Scipio’s rejection of Fabius’ exempla throughout the speech. He replaces the 
Regulus example first with his father’s and uncle’s campaign in Spain and second with 
his own, each subsequent exchange being more recent and a better fit than what Fabius 
originally proposes. Similarly, in his rejection of Fabius’ proposal of Athens’ failed 
Sicilian Expedition, Scipio counters with the more recent and more apposite campaign of 
Agathocles in Africa.  
 Near the conclusion of his speech, Scipio turns the final analysis of the Hannibal 
exemplum into a call for action based upon the past deeds of both the Romans and their 
enemy that demonstrates the benefits that could be derived from his suggestion, even if 
he ultimately fails in his invasion of Africa:  
si hercules nihilo maturius hoc quo ego censeo modo perficeretur bellum, 
tamen ad dignitatem populi Romani famamque apud reges gentesque 
externas pertinebat, non ad defendendam modo Italiam sed ad inferenda 
etiam Africae arma uideri nobis animum esse, nec hoc credi uolgarique 
quod Hannibal ausus sit neminem ducem Romanum audere, et priore 
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Punico bello tum cum de Sicilia certaretur totiens Africam ab nostris 
exercitibusque et classibus oppugnatam, nunc cum de Italia certetur 
Africam pacatam esse. requiescat aliquando uexata tam diu Italia: uratur 
euasteturque in uicem Africa. castra Romana potius Carthaginis portis 
immineant quam nos iterum uallum hostium ex moenibus nostris 
uideamus. Africa sit reliqui belli sedes; illuc terror fugaque, populatio 
agrorum, defectio sociorum, ceterae belli clades, quae in nos per 
quattuordecim annos ingruerunt, uertantur. (28.44.12-15) 
 
If, by god, this war is brought to an end in a fashion not at all more timely 
than by what I just recommended, nevertheless it would be fitting with the 
dignity of the Roman people and their standing among kings and 
foreign peoples to be seen that we have the courage not just to defend 
Italy, but even to take the war to Africa. We, too, do not want to have it 
believed or spread abroad that no Roman commander would dare to do 
what Hannibal dared and that Africa was rather often attacked by our 
armies and fleet in the First Punic War, which was fought over Sicily; 
instead, Africa is now left in peace when we are now fighting over Italy. 
Let Italy, troubled for so long, finally be at rest. Let Africa be burned and 
be devastated for her turn. Let a Roman camp threaten the walls of 
Carthage rather than that we see again an enemy siege work from our 
walls. Let Africa be the seat of the war that remains. Let the terror and 
flight, let the plundering of the fields, the defection of allies, and the 
other devastations of war, which have assailed against us for fourteen 
years, be turned to there.  
 
In his peroration here, Scipio frames his analysis of the action to be taken from the 
Hannibal exemplum and the war in Italy with the tenets of the Livian exemplary loop. He 
notes the dignity, reputation, and courage of the Roman people as the characteristics to be 
illustrated (dignitatem populi Romani famamque… nobis animum esse).56 Multiple levels 
of audiences are noted: the reputation of Rome is seen through the eyes of foreigners 
                                               
56 Additionally, just before this passage, Scipio had described the strength of Rome as the Roman soldier: 
uiribus nostris milite Romano stetimus, 28.44.5. Rome’s power as derived from her soldiery is another 
characteristic that Scipio draws upon as an exemplary quality to be emulated. As he claims in his 
surrounding comments (28.44.4-7), Scipio contrasts the fortune that Carthage will endure when facing his 
invasion with what the Romans have faced during Hannibal’s invasion of Italy. He claims that the two 
sides will suffer different fates because of the disparate treatment each takes with its allies.   
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(apud reges gentesque externas), and, in order for the comparison to be made that Scipio 
fears, an audience must be aware of their past actions in the First Punic War. 
Additionally, the Romans themselves have been the spectators of the devastation of Italy 
through Hannibal’s assault on their homeland (iterum uallum hostium ex moenibus 
nostris uideamus). In the closing lines to his explanation, Scipio lays out both the 
memorialization of the exemplary deeds and the call for imitatio. He asks that the various 
types of destruction wrought on Italy over the last fourteen years be turned against Africa 
now. The images of the ruin of Italy (terror fugaque, populatio agrorum, defectio 
sociorum, ceterae belli clades) call to mind Hannibal’s actions and the Romans’ inability 
to expel him from their homeland. Hannibal’s devastating campaign in Italy becomes 
both a positive and negative exemplum for the Romans in Scipio’s reading. They ought to 
emulate the bold move to take the war to their enemy’s homeland and, in so doing, follow 
the exemplary deeds of their forefathers in the First Punic War and avoid the problems 
that have arisen from their earlier lack of action. As Scipio closes his speech with an 
exhortation to action that is based upon previous exemplary deeds, he employs the Livian 
historiographic methodology of exemplarity in his role as an internal narrator.  
 After the debate with Fabius, Scipio struggles to receive permission from the 
Senate to undertake his campaign in Africa, though Livy claims that this is due to the 
senators’ fear of his use of the popular assembly to circumvent the Senate’s decision if 
his debate failed (28.45).57 After some exchanges between the two sides, Scipio is 
                                               
57 28.45.1: minus aequis animis auditus est Scipio quia uolgatum erat si apud senatum non obtinuisset ut 
prouincia Africa sibi decerneretur, ad populum extemplo laturum. “Scipio was heard with less friendly 
dispositions because it had been spread around that he would immediately take it before the people if he did 
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confirmed in the allotment of Sicily as his province and permission to invade Africa, “if 
he thought it best for the state” (permissumque ut in Africam, si id e re publica esse 
censeret, traiceret; 28.45.8). The turn of phrase in the Senate’s decree recalls Scipio’s 
recent claim that “he would do whatever was best for the state” (cum Scipio respondisset 
se quod e re publica esset facturum; 28.45.3). The repetition of “e re publica esse” 
suggests that Scipio’s reading of the exempla in support of his invasion of Africa 
corresponds to the lesson Livy feels should be taken from the debate.58 An internal 
audience has come to the same conclusion as the speaker. Scipio has brought about on the 
part of the Senate a realization of the need for the invasion of Africa by taking up a 
Livian interpretation of the exempla seen in Regulus’ African campaign and the efforts of 
all three Scipiones in Spain (as well as several other examples from the remote and recent 
past). Through the debate about the proposed invasion of Africa, therefore, the identities 
and purposes of Livy, qua external narrator, and Scipio, in his role as internal narrator, 
converge.  
After he makes preparations to undertake his invasion of Africa, Scipio offers the 
following prayer before setting out: 
'diui diuaeque' inquit 'qui maria terrasque colitis, uos precor quaesoque uti 
quae in meo imperio gesta sunt geruntur postque gerentur, ea mihi 
populo plebique Romanae sociis nominique Latino qui populi Romani 
                                               
not obtain from the Senate that Africa would be decreed his province.” Importantly, Livy does not suggest 
that Scipio’s words or speech were less persuasive or effective, but merely that the Senate was less 
disposed to grant Scipio’s request because they were aware of his possible circumvention; contra Chaplin 
2000: 96, who suggests that the Senate’s negative reaction (as an internal audience to the speeches), 
supports an interpretation that Livy claims that Fabius won the debate. Compare, too, however Livy’s 
initial comments about the Senate’s reaction to Fabius’ speech: 28.43.1.  
58 Chaplin 2000: 96: “Only the repetition of Scipio’s language in the senatorial decision shows that he has 
won.” Rather than read Livy’s comments at 28.43.1 as suggesting the appearance that Fabius won the 
debate, the Senate’s reaction immediately after Fabius’ speech sets up their hesitation to Scipio’s proposal.  
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quique meam sectam imperium auspiciumque terra mari amnibusque 
sequuntur bene uerruncent, eaque uos omnia bene iuuetis, bonis auctibus 
auxitis; saluos incolumesque uictis perduellibus uictores spoliis decoratos 
praeda onustos triumphantesque mecum domos reduces sistatis; 
inimicorum hostiumque ulciscendorum copiam faxitis; quaeque populus 
Carthaginiensis in ciuitatem nostram facere molitus est, ea ut mihi 
populoque Romano in ciuitatem Carthaginiensium exempla edendi 
facultatem detis.' (29.27.1-4) 
 
“Gods and Goddesses,” he says, “you who rule the lands and seas, I beg 
and beseech you that whatever things have been done, are being done, 
and will be done afterwards under my command will turn out well for 
me, for the people and plebs of Rome, for our allies, and for the Latin 
name, those who follow the path, command, and authority of me and the 
Roman people on land, on sea, and on the shores. I ask that you favor all 
these things and foster them with good fruits, that you allow the victors to 
be brought back home with me safe and sound, with our enemies 
conquered, and adorned with spolia, burdened by loot, and celebrating a 
triumph. That you make an abundance of enemies to be avenged and that 
whatever the Carthaginian people have strived to do against our state, I 
ask that you give to me and to the Roman people the opportunity of 
making exempla of the Carthaginian state.” 
 
Scipio’s prayer is an expected practice for a general as part of the profectio before setting 
out on a campaign.59 Though the prayer for the most part, and as expected, focuses on the 
future assistance of the gods, as evidenced in the mixture of future imperatives (auxitis, 
faxitis) and substantive clauses of purpose (uti…uerruncent…iuuetis… sistatis…detis), 
Scipio also mentions his deeds of the past and present with the phrase: gesta sunt 
geruntur postque gerentur. Scipio here blends together past, present, and future in the 
way that exemplarity functions more broadly in Livy’s AUC. The full exemplary loop 
                                               
59 cf. Hannibal’s vows recounted by Livy: 21.21.9, on which Levene 1993: 45; or the departure of P. 
Licinius Crassus in 171 to campaign against the Macedonian King Perseus (42.49.1-8). Livy comments 
extensively here on Crassus’ departure and the Romans’ thoughts about the importance of this practice and 
its relation to the outcome of the battle. On prayers and offerings before setting out on military campaigns, 
Koeppel 1969. On the profectio and the Romans’ reaction to it, Kajanto 1957: 78-79 and Feldherr 1999: 
51-52.  
 156 
 
comprises a past deed, a present (for the narrative) commemoration of the deed, and a 
call for future behavior or lessons to be gained from the act of commemoration.60 Scipio 
then closes the prayer with an explicit request that the gods grant him the opportunity to 
perform exemplary deeds (exempla edendi) through his campaign. Scipio’s invasion of 
Africa is allowed to proceed because he demonstrates his ability to read exempla properly 
in his debate with Fabius and then begins with a prayer that both mirrors and requests the 
production of exemplary acts. Livy’s account of the prayer and the debate before the 
campaign suggests that the ensuing narrative should be read in light of its use of 
exemplarity. If Scipio continues reading exempla correctly and demonstrates his 
knowledge through sustained use of exemplary language, he will find the success he 
requests of the gods.  
 
In the second half of the Third Decade, Scipio takes center stage as an internal 
narrator who both exhibits Livy’s model of exemplary narrative and also demonstrates 
the ability to read exempla correctly when compared to other characters. A comparison of 
Polybius’ and Livy’s versions of Scipio’s speech upon his arrival in Spain reveals that 
Livy removes the elements of autopsy and manipulating opsis that were present in 
Polybius’ version and replaces these with a thorough treatment of exemplary language, 
replete with several notable Livian exempla. Livy limits the elements of Polybian 
historiographic methodology that I argue is present in the speech in Polybius’ Histories 
                                               
60 v. Part 2 of this chapter, above on Roller 2004.  
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and instead inserts language and themes that mirror his own historiographic approach. In 
other speeches throughout the decade, Scipio continues to show his command of Livian 
exemplarity by reading exempla properly when others attempt to turn them against him. 
After successfully debating with Fabius the merits of his proposed campaign to Africa, 
Scipio offers a prayer upon his departure that uses Roller’s exemplary loop while also 
asking the gods that his troops are able to perform exemplary deeds. In comparing the 
two accounts of Scipio examined in the first two sections of this chapter, Scipio stands in 
Polybius’ Histories as an analogue of Polybian methodology, Scipio in the AUC 
represents and serves as a mouthpiece of the Livian historiographic method of 
exemplarity.  
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Chapter Four 
A Battle of Narratorial and Authorial Self-Reference at Zama 
 
Part 1: Opsis and Exemplarity Compared 
In the previous two chapters, I examined how Polybius and Livy use Hannibal 
and Scipio as mouthpieces for various historiographic methods in their narratives. 
Polybius uses both generals during their initial invasions of enemy lands as internal 
narrators that demonstrate his own approach that relies on opsis, spectacle, and pragmatic 
reasoning. Livy integrates the Polybian elements into his portrayal of Hannibal, while he 
explicitly avoids doing so with his take on Scipio’s speeches. Instead, Scipio 
demonstrates a proficiency in the Livian historiographic model of exemplarity during his 
campaign and his preparation for his invasion of Africa. For Livy, the figures of Hannibal 
and Scipio serve as Contean modelli-esemplari of Polybius’ and his own texts and 
representatives of their historiographic methods.1 
At the heart of the differences between Livy’s presentations of Hannibal and 
Scipio is the distinction between the Polybian opsis that Hannibal uses and the 
exemplarity evident in the Livian portrayal of Scipio. Both opsis and exemplarity involve 
sight and audience on various levels, and Feldherr has shown the central role played by 
the visual qualities of Livy’s narrative and his approach to exemplary monumentality.2 
Still, opsis and exemplarity diverge in several ways despite the overlap between them in 
                                               
1 For the term and a description of Conte’s modelli, cf. Chapter 2, Part 4, above.  
2 On the interconnected concepts of vision, spectacle, exempla, and monumenta for Livy: Feldherr 1999: 1-
50.  
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their reliance on some sort of visual act. Opsis functions on many levels of Polybius’ text. 
It is the central feature of his pragmatic approach to historiography. As I argued in 
Chapter Two, above, Polybius uses opsis and autopsy to gauge the accuracy of the events 
he records; he has his characters use opsis and autopsy in their actions within the 
narrative; and he uses opsis as a key feature in the speeches given by his internal 
narrators. Polybian speeches engage their internal audiences by modeling opsis as a 
heuristic tool that gives the external audience a pragmatic lesson to take from Polybius’ 
narrative. This last use of Polybian opsis is of interest to the student of Livy’s AUC. 
Although opsis operates widely within Polybius’ historiographic methodology, 
exemplarity serves a narrower, though still vital role for Livy’s AUC. Livy does not use 
exemplarity to gauge the truth behind the events he narrates or the veracity of his source 
texts, as Polybius does with opsis. Instead, exemplarity operates as a heuristic tool 
exploited by both the external and internal narrators to provide a meaningful 
interpretation of the events that Livy records. While opsis is, for Polybius, an apparatus 
for pragmatic didacticism, exemplarity for Livy is a device that is a foundation of his 
moralistic didacticism, as he describes in his general preface.3 The discussion below 
focuses on the parallel roles of Polybian opsis and Livian exemplarity as heuristic tools 
                                               
3 Livy praef. 10: Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli 
documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde 
foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod vites. “This is the especially advantageous and fruitful quality in 
studying history: that you look upon evidence of every kind of exemplum, as though they are set out on a 
famous monument. From this it is on you and on your state to pick out what you ought to imitate, and, from 
that, what is shameful in both the attempt and in the outcome and ought to be avoided.”  
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for internal and external audiences to determine how to behave: practically for Polybius’ 
audiences and morally for Livy’s.  
Another difference between these two historiographic tools is the capability or 
even need to interpret the events explored by each. Polybian opsis is clear-cut and not 
open to interpretation. The unequivocal nature of opsis provides Polybius the opportunity 
to assert his authority over his predecessors based on his autopsy of the passes across the 
Alps (3.48.12).4 In Polybius’ Histories Hannibal, too, relies on autopsy whenever 
possible, as he does when catching sight of an ambushing force during his own crossing 
of the Alps (3.50). In passages where the opsis of a character fails to provide a clear-cut 
representation of the events before them, one of two possibilities occurs: Either the 
character’s sight is diminished in some fashion, as happens in the fog at the Battle of 
Lake Trasimene that causes Flaminius and his troops to fail to see the Carthaginians 
before being ambushed (3.84.1-5),5 or another character has purposefully constructed a 
false appearance to guide their intended audience to a mistaken understanding of the 
events, as happens when Hannibal uses the torch-bearing oxen to fool the Romans (3.93-
94) or masks and wigs to fool would-be assassins (3.78).6 Livy follows suit and has his 
Hannibal use opsis to determine the cause of a holdup in his marching column (21.36.3-
5). The result of the sight he encounters is described as haud dubia (21.36.4), a 
                                               
4 cf., too, his attack of Timaeus for his lack of visual inspection (12.25g.1-4) or his claim to have found an 
inscription of Hannibal (3.33.17-18). For discussion of these passages, Chapter 2, above.  
5 On which, Chapter 2, Part 3, above. 
6 Polybius refers to Hannibal’s trick with the wigs as an example of “Punic subterfuge” (3.78.1 Φοινικικῷ 
στρατηγήματι τοιούτῳ), perhaps suggesting that this behavior—and consequently the larger ability to 
confound others’ opsis—is limited to Carthaginian actors or even Hannibal himself, though this is his only 
use of said term.  
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designation that matches Polybius’ take on the authority granted by opsis. Additionally, 
as opsis for Polybius provides a straightforward account of what is occurring, it can lead 
its recipient unequivocally to a particular course of action. Hannibal in the Histories 
demonstrates the clear-cut nature of opsis in his battlefield exhortation at Cannae 
(3.111.1-3). Polybius’ Scipio, too, does so in his claim that the sight of the Roman troops 
in Spain will provoke an easily predictable response from the native Spanish tribes 
(10.6.4).  
Livian exemplarity, on the other hand, is built upon discourse and based upon 
contextual interpretation. Acts of various types become meaningful exempla through the 
interpretive process that underlies the presentation and discussion of the deeds. This 
becomes evident in Livy’s recurring use of various exempla. Cannae, for instance, is 
recalled by Tiberius Sempronius following the death of Postumius as an exemplum to 
demonstrate Roman resilience (23.25), by Fabius Maximus in the elections of 214 to 
show the need for choosing an experienced leader (24.7.10-9.5), by Scipio in Spain, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, to show how the tables have now turned against 
Carthage (26.41), by Hannibal on multiple occasions as a means of encouraging his 
newly acquired Italian allies (23.43) and his troops (23.45 and 27.12.11-12).7 In each of 
these instances the exemplary lesson to be drawn from the Battle of Cannae is determined 
based on the discourse that ensues as the speaker expounds on the qualities of the battle 
that he deems apropos to that situation. Significantly, the internal narrators that use the 
                                               
7 On Cannae as an exemplum, Chaplin 2000: 53-72. Chaplin notes, in total, ten instances of the use of 
Cannae as an exemplum: 23.18.7, 23.25.3, 23.43.4, 23.45.8, 24.8.20, 25.10.8, 25.22.1-3, 26.12.14, 
26.41.11, 27.12.11 (Appendix, p. 205).  
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exemplary power of Cannae are each able to draw their own conclusions about the lesson 
to be drawn from the battle. Livy, as external narrator, weighs in as appropriate by 
suggesting the reactions of various internal audiences (such as the Senate: 23.25.6-11; the 
Centuriate assembly: 24.9.4-6; the Carthaginian army: 23.46.1-2 and 27.12.13-14; and 
Scipio’s troops in Spain: 26.42.1). The interpretive act formed by the internal narrator’s 
description and the audience’s reaction is integral to the construction of the exemplum.8 
The central importance of the interpretation by an internal narrator and the 
internal audience makes Livian exemplarity context-dependent. Each exemplum can take 
on various lessons in different contexts. The possible interpretations of the Battle of 
Cannae just mentioned, for example, demonstrate how the context of the recollection of a 
particular exemplary act changes depending on the context in which it is recalled.9 So, 
too, does the Regulus exemplum, as noted by Scipio and Fabius in their debate over the 
former’s proposed invasion of Africa, as discussed in the previous chapter.10 After Fabius 
attempts to argue that the failure of Regulus in Africa demonstrates the folly of Scipio’s 
                                               
8 See also Roller 2004, 2009, 2011. Roller 2009 uses the case of Duilius to compare the historicist and 
exemplary modes of Roman historical writing and how these relate to larger trends in Roman culture. 2009: 
216-17 stresses the discursive nature of exemplarity. Roller 2011 examines the moral complexities evident 
in the Fabius exemplum to determine how the conflicts of value and judgement in the tale of Fabius make 
him a useful exemplary actor for later debate. Roller shows how the discourse surrounding Fabius’ actions 
demonstrate a shift in the meaning as they change over time.  Chaplin 2000: 50-72 also establishes the role 
that the internal speakers within Livy’s text construct meaning for the internal and external audience. On 
speakers and exemplary spectacles in general in Livy, Feldherr 1998.  
9 Langlands 2011 argues that this phenomenon is integral for the larger use of exemplarity in Roman 
culture, as exhibited in the works of Valerius Maximus and Cicero (de Off.). Ethical decisions described by 
Valerius and Cicero demonstrate that behaviors are to be judged depending on the circumstances in which 
they are performed: what is right for one person in a given situation may be different for someone else, 
even in a similar situation. cf., too, Langlands 2008, where she explores the discursive practices at work in 
Valerius’ treatment of the theme of severitas.  
10 For the full account of the meeting and the speeches of Fabius and Scipio: Livy 28.40-45. For my brief 
analysis, cf. Chap. 3, Part 3, above. cf., too, Chaplin 2000: 92-97, which discusses the wider range of 
exempla used by each speaker.  
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planned campaign, Scipio replies that his own operations in Spain, which were ultimately 
successful, are a better analogue for Regulus’ disastrous invasion of Africa (28.43.17-18). 
Scipio’s retort demonstrates that contextual clues larger and more significant than parallel 
situations must be read in any attempt to apply an exemplary deed to future behavior: 
“How would I less likely cross over to Africa with Regulus captured than to Spain with 
the Scipios killed?” (qui ego minus in Africam Regulo capto quam Scipionibus occisis in 
Hispaniam traicerem?; 28.43.18).11 Scipio instead proposes that his own campaign in 
Spain is a more applicable parallel for Regulus’ invasion of Africa, although his victory 
there ultimately trumps the exemplary power of Regulus’ defeat as an impediment to a 
proposed attack.12 Scipio’s reading of the exemplary lesson found in the Regulus episode 
demonstrates how the applicability of exempla and the meaning to be derived from them 
are interpreted by the speaker to suit the context in which they are displayed.  
Another key distinction between opsis and exemplarity is the perspective from 
which each operates: opsis is performed by an audience (the viewer) while exemplarity is 
defined and explored by a speaker to an audience. Polybius claims that only by travelling 
along Hannibal’s path through the Alps himself can he gain a sure understanding of the 
march (3.48.12). His need for autopsy underscores the importance of the viewer-based 
perspective required for Polybian opsis to be accurate: he could not rely on others’ 
accounts of the campaign and, as he tells it, his act of autopsy is what gives him greater 
                                               
11 Scipio’s retort is the culmination of a larger demonstration of Fabius’ misapplication of Regulus to the 
current situation: 28.43.17-18. Scipio notes that some of the specific elements described by Fabius are not 
accurate (such as his claims of Regulus’ lack of initial success, or the defeat at the hands of the 
Carthaginians) or less applicable than more recent events.  
12 On which, Chapter 3, Part 3, above. 
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authority over his predecessors. For Polybius’ characters, too, opsis is performed from 
their perspective. Hannibal, for instance, uses opsis to give himself an advantage over his 
enemy as he crosses the Rhone (3.43) or when his troops encounter a difficult path along 
their crossing of the Alps (3.51.6). Even when Hannibal as an internal narrator prepares a 
spectacle for his troops to provide the proper lesson for them to learn before a battle, as 
he does before the Battle at the Ticinus River (3.62.11-63.1), Polybius focalizes the 
description of the scene from reaction of the audience.13 Although the speech associated 
with the duel provides Hannibal the opportunity to explain the purpose behind the 
spectacle that he sets up, Polybius highlights that the troops learned the lesson upon 
seeing the combat themselves. Hannibal’s words only reiterate the same message. In 
Scipio’s initial engagements in Spain, Polybius notes how carefully the general ensures 
that his position on the field allows him to see what is occurring and to be seen by his 
troops (ἅμα μὲν γὰρ ἑώρα τὸ γινόμενον, ἅμα δ' αὐτὸς ὑπὸ πάντων ὁρώμενος; 10.13.3-5), 
who are encouraged by the sight of their general.14  
Livy, too, includes the focus on the audience-based perspective in his 
incorporation of Polybian opsis. Livy’s Hannibal performs autopsy (ipse…visendum) on a 
pass in the Alps before determining how his army should pass through (21.36.3-5) and, 
nearer the end of their crossing, Hannibal encourages his troops to perform a visual 
                                               
13 On this passage, Chapter 2, Part 3, above. 
14 On which, Chapter 3, Part 1, above. Though Scipio’s placement on the field is, in part, a way of 
achieving an expected or planned behavior from his troops, the perspective of the opsis is focused on the 
soldiers: they gather the intelligence through their own sight and determine the course required without the 
need for an interpretive exemplary debate.  
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inspection themselves of the lands in which they are about to campaign (21.35.8-9).15 
Hannibal’s speech here only reinforces the point that the view from the promontory 
yields on its own; the opsis performed by the Carthaginian army gives them the lesson 
that they need to incorporate to find success in their forthcoming campaign.  
Livian exemplarity, conversely, is built primarily from the speaker’s perspective. 
While an audience is necessary to receive the lesson and ensure the survival of the 
exemplary acts, the moral to be drawn from the deeds only gains significance when 
expounded upon by a narrator.16 Fabius and Scipio’s debate over the proposed invasion 
of Spain (28.40-44), for example, shows how the exempla of Regulus and Agathocles in 
Africa or the Athenians in Sicily take on different lessons when explained by each 
speaker. The Senate’s various reactions to these points (28.43.1 and 28.45.1) demonstrate 
how the speaker’s interpretation of the exemplary acts helps determine the meaning an 
internal audience should draw from them.17 Similarly, when Scipio addresses the 
remnants of his father’s and uncle’s army in Spain, he explains to them how their past 
valor suggests a way for their campaign to move forward (26.41). His call for action 
relies on the Carthaginians and Spaniards seeing and knowing how the Romans intend to 
advance by exhibiting their presence to the Carthaginian and Spanish forces to encourage 
them to splinter.18 Lucius Marcius, however, who steps up in the immediate aftermath of 
                                               
15 On these passages, Chapter 2, Part 4, above. Hannibal’s encouragement of autopsy from the perspective 
of his troops is key to the overall focalization of the crossing of the Alps from the Carthaginian point of 
view: Feldherr 2009b: 317-18, esp. n. 9, and Pausch 2011: 151-52.  
16 In laying out his “Exemplary Loop,” Roller 2004 notes the necessity of both the primary and secondary 
audiences to the construction of exemplarity.  
17 On these remarks, Chapter 3, Part 3, above and Chaplin 2000: 96.  
18 On this passage, Chapter 3, Part 2, above and Chaplin 2000: 64-65.  
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the Scipios’ deaths to take command of their fractured forces, recalls the same deeds to 
suggest that the army should be wary of the Carthaginian forces regrouping (25.39). 
There is considerable overlap between these two situations: the internal audience is 
largely the same (though Scipio’s new forces have augmented those that had survived in 
Spain), the situations are parallel (largely being trapped by three Carthaginian and allied 
armies), and the deeds recalled (the feats of the elder Scipios’ armies in Spain) are 
similarly repeated. Unlike Polybian opsis, which is clear upon its receipt, identical 
exemplary acts gain distinct interpretations when recounted from the perspectives of 
different speakers even to the same audience in similar situations.  
The shift in perspective between Polybian opsis and Livian exemplarity is even 
subtly hinted at in the parallel descriptions that Hannibal and Scipio each resemble their 
father.19 Hannibal, the representation of Polybian opsis in Livy’s text, is said by his 
troops to resemble his father Hamilcar: “The veteran soldiers believed that a young 
Hamilcar had returned to them.” (Hamilcarem iuuenem redditum sibi ueteres milites 
credere; 21.4.2). The correlation is made from the perspective of the troops: they notice 
and draw meaning from the parallel appearance of their new commander. Scipio, 
however, notes the similarity between his appearance and his father’s in his speech in 
Spain: 
breui faciam ut, quemadmodum nunc noscitatis in me patris patruique 
similitudinem oris uoltusque et lineamenta corporis, ita ingenii fidei 
uirtutisque effigiem uobis reddam ut reuixisse aut renatum sibi quisque 
Scipionem imperatorem dicat. (26.41.24-25) 
                                               
19 Levene 2010: 173-77 notes how these descriptions fit into larger patterns of characterization in Livy’s 
text.  
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Just as you now recognize in me a likeness of the face, appearance, and 
bodily features of my father and uncle, I will shortly make it so that I 
provide to you a copy of their character, loyalty, and courage in order 
that each of you would say that Scipio the general lives again or has been 
born a second time. 
 
For Scipio, the exhibitor of Livian exemplarity, the description of the parallel and the 
exploration of its significance originates from the perspective of the speaker of the 
exemplum. The second person forms (noscitatis, vobis) and the call for action 
demonstrate how exemplarity is still delivered to and for an audience, but it is the internal 
narrator who explains these parallels in Scipio’s case.  
This chapter pushes on the limits of Polybian opsis and Livian exemplarity by 
exploring how each author incorporates notes of their respective historiographic method 
into their accounts of the Battle of Zama. As Hannibal and Scipio meet on the battlefield 
in the conclusive action of the war, Livy and Polybius each use the opportunity to 
demonstrate the value and efficacy of their own historiographic approaches. Livy 
includes a notice of the battlefield exhortations given by Hannibal and Scipio that alludes 
to the generals’ prior campaigns and the meeting they had to discuss options for peace 
before the battle:  
Poenus sedecim annorum in terra Italia res gestas, tot duces Romanos, 
tot exercitus occidione occisos et sua cuique decora ubi ad insignem 
alicuius pugnae memoria militem uenerat referebat: Scipio Hispanias et 
recentia in Africa proelia et confessionem hostium quod neque non 
petere pacem propter metum neque manere in ea prae insita animis 
perfidia potuissent. ad hoc conloquium Hannibalis in secreto habitum ac 
liberum fingenti qua uolt flectit. ominatur, quibus quondam auspiciis 
patres eorum ad Aegates pugnauerint insulas, ea illis exeuntibus in 
aciem portendisse deos. adesse finem belli ac laboris; in manibus esse 
praedam Carthaginis, reditum domum in patriam ad parentes liberos 
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coniuges penatesque deos. celsus haec corpore uoltuque ita laeto ut 
uicisse iam crederes dicebat. (30.32.6-11) 
 
Hannibal was recalling the things they accomplished for sixteen years 
in Italy, that they had killed so many Roman leaders in the slaughter, and 
so many armies, and, when he had come to a soldier distinguished for a 
memorable action in some battle, he recalled to each man his glories. 
Scipio was recalling the Spanish provinces, the recent battles in Africa, 
and the confession of their enemy that they were not able to avoid asking 
for peace due to their fear, but they were not able to keep the peace 
because of the innate treachery of their character. Given that his meeting 
with Hannibal was held in secret and therefore free for suiting it to his 
needs, he spins it in whatever way he wants. He makes a prediction 
that, as the Carthaginians are heading out to battle, the gods have given 
them the portents that their fathers had once had for the auspices as they 
fought at the Aegates Isles. He also predicts that they had come to the 
end of the war and their labor, that the spoils of Carthage were in their 
hands, their return home to their country, their parents, children, 
wives, and household gods was at hand. He was speaking these things 
with his head held high and with his face so joyous that you would have 
thought that he had already conquered.  
 
As Livy narrates the battlefield exhortations of Hannibal and Scipio, each of them return 
to themes that were established in prior speeches of these two generals and the debate 
leading up to Scipio’s departure for Africa. Each starts his speech with a recollection of 
their past successes (res gestas; recentia…proelia) to encourage their men to pursue 
similar behavior. Hannibal makes a point to refer to his troops’ former victories and 
accomplishments throughout Livy’s and Polybius’ narratives: at the foot of the Alps 
(21.30.2-5; cf. Polyb. 3.44.10-13), before the Ticinus (21.44.1-2; cf. Polyb. 3.63), at 
Cannae (Polyb. 3.111.6-7).20 Scipio similarly refers to the veterans’ experience upon his 
                                               
20 Livy makes no mention of Hannibal’s exhortation before the Battle of Cannae. Polybius’ account of the 
speech centers around the idea that paradeigmata and words of encouragement are no longer necessary 
given the troops’ personal experience: on which, Chapter 2, Part 3, above. Perhaps Livy buys into the claim 
Hannibal advances in Polybius’ version of the speech.  
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arrival in Spain (26.41.17; cf. Polyb. 10.6.1-6) and relates his troops’ successes in Spain 
as part of his debate against Fabius (28.43.17-18).21  
As Hannibal and Scipio repeat their typical recitation of their armies’ past deeds 
before the Battle of Zama, they each attempt a different take on the exemplary 
recollection of prior acts of valor. Hannibal singles out individuals and recalls their deeds 
(sua…decora) to them individually (cuique). The term decora, which can refer to both 
the physical decorative honors and the deeds through which the soldiers earned them, 
effectively bridges the gap between the action itself and the physical commemoration of 
those acts. However, Hannibal falls short of making the link between these deeds and a 
collective call to action for his troops and instead recalls the valorous soldiers one by one. 
Additionally, Hannibal only recalls his troops’ deeds in Italy, with a retrospective focus 
only on those past events. Hannibal does not make an explicit exhortation to future 
behavior and thereby fails to bridge the gap between the past action and the potential 
repetition of that action.  
Scipio, however, makes the move to collectivize the response of the troops to his 
speech. As part of the prediction (ominatur) that he proposes, Scipio claims the plunder 
of Carthage is in their grasp (in manibus) and that the victory will enable them to return 
home.22 To accompany his expectation of their homecoming, Scipio points them to 
consider things that they share in common: their families (parentes, liberos, coniuges), 
                                               
21 Note, too, Scipio’s report to the Senate of his success in Spain just prior to his debate with Fabius over 
the proposed invasion of Spain: 28.38.2-3.  
22 Levene 2010: 291 notes that Scipio’s somewhat prophetic claim in this speech is part of “a more general 
sense of moral endorsement on the divine level,” which is ultimately tied to Scipio’s response to Hannibal 
in their meeting, on which, Chapter 4, Part 3, below. 
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gods (Penates…deos), and their mutual country (patriam). The shared experience of his 
troops encourages a collective response. Scipio also recalls the deeds of the previous 
generation at the Aegates Isles—the decisive conflict of the First Punic War. The mention 
of the final battle of the previous war—when coupled with the reference to the Penates, 
family, and household, which may call to mind for the soldiers the domestic cult, 
including the imagines of their ancestors—monumentalizes for the troops their ancestors’ 
exemplary deeds.23  Scipio thereby blends together the exemplary nature of the actions of 
Romans past, present (with his mention of the troops’ recent skirmishes in Africa), and 
future (by predicting the successful end to their campaign and their victorious return 
home). In comparison to Hannibal’s exhortation that is narrower in scope, less 
prospective, and more limited in its use of collective encouragement, Scipio’s battlefield 
speech exhibits a far more effective instance of the exemplary loop.  
Additionally, Livy notes how Scipio recognizes the opportunity to manipulate his 
secret meeting with Hannibal in whatever way he wishes (qua volt), highlighting Scipio’s  
ability to apply a particular exemplary reading to the event.24 As noted above, Livian 
exemplarity requires an interpretation by a speaker (often an internal narrator) to an 
audience, unlike Polybian opsis which is performed by the audience and provides a clear-
cut explanation of events. Livy’s aside that Scipio can fit (fingenti) the event to his 
purposes strengthens the sense that the general is performing an exemplary speech to his 
                                               
23 On the imagines and their important religious, familial, social, and political functions: Flower 1996; v. 
esp. pp. 209-11 on the domestic cult and the role of the Penates and imagines in that practice.  
24 On Scipio’s manipulation of the meeting and its relation to Livy’s own manipulated version of the 
speeches: Moore 2010: 162.  
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troops in order to encourage them to achieve success in the battle like they have in Spain 
and, more recently, since landing in Africa, and like their ancestors did in the previous 
war with Carthage.  
In this chapter I examine the lengths to which Livy pushes his incorporation of 
Polybian opsis in his portrayal of Hannibal and Scipio’s mastery of exemplarity to add 
further interpretive significance to the Battle of Zama and the conclusion to the Third 
Decade. As in the previous chapter, however, I will first return to Polybius’ Histories to 
examine the precedent for the narrative surrounding the battle of Zama and the speeches 
shared between the two generals before returning directly to Livy’s account.  
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Part 2: The Polybian Battle of Zama  
 The figure of Scipio pursues a methodology of investigation and communication 
in Polybius’ narrative of his affairs in Spain that mirrors the function of Polybius as an 
external narrator, as I argue in the previous chapter. So too, did Hannibal in his campaign 
in Italy, as I argue in Chapter Two. As the methodologies employed by the generals 
usually indicate their success in their endeavors, Polybius has the chance to explicate the 
soundness of his methodology more fully as he describes an encounter between the two 
Polybian generals, namely the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio and the ensuing 
engagement at Zama. In the narrative that Polybius creates surrounding the Battle of 
Zama, the generals on each side of the conflict demonstrate their abilities to manipulate 
opsis to their advantage. In his actions prior to the battle, Scipio Africanus shares many 
of the elements of Polybian historiographic language that Hannibal employed in his 
campaign in Italy. Scipio controls the opsis of the Carthaginian envoys that visit his camp 
and gives a battlefield exhortation that recalls that of Hannibal before Cannae and which 
brings about similar success. As Scipio and Hannibal each take the opportunity to speak 
to their troops before the battle, they use language that parallels the historiographic 
comments of Polybius, as I argued in Chapters Two and Three, above.25 In this particular 
instance, however, the speeches made on each side create a range of effects and outcomes 
on the internal audiences that the external audience can use to compare the rhetorical 
techniques described.  
                                               
25 Rumpf 2006 analyzes the lengths to which these orations serve narratorial purposes within Polybius’ and 
Livy’s accounts of the battle, which I address further, below. 
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 A lengthy and seemingly complete narrative of the Battle of Zama survives 
among the remaining fragments of the fifteenth book of Polybius’ Histories.26 After the 
initial skirmishes that result in the complete abandonment of the temporary armistice, 
Scipio and Hannibal move their armies in response to one another.27 Hannibal prepares 
for the coming battle by attempting to determine the layout and disposition of the Roman 
army:  
κἀκεῖθεν ἐξέπεμψε τρεῖς κατασκόπους, βουλόμενος ἐπιγνῶναι ποῦ 
στρατοπεδεύουσι καὶ πῶς χειρίζει τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς ὁ τῶν 
Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός. (15.5.4) 
 
And from there, [Hannibal] sent out three scouts, wanting to find out 
where they were camping and how the Roman general was conducting the 
affairs in the camp.  
 
As he did in the narrative of the Italian campaign discussed above, Hannibal sends out 
scouts (κατασκόπους) to view what he himself cannot. The participle βουλόμενος, with 
its object infinitive ἐπιγνῶναι and the subsequent indirect questions, marks Hannibal as 
the ultimate recipient of the knowledge gained through the reconnaissance. Though the 
scouts will perform the visual act, Hannibal directs their exploits and therefore controls 
the information gathered by them.  
                                               
26 On the manuscript tradition of Polybius: Moore 1965 and the introduction to Walbank’s 1967 
Commentary. On the fragments for Book 15: Foulon 1995.  
27 The section of Polybius’ narrative that describes the creation of the armistice does not survive, but 15.1.2 
notes that the Carthaginians’ actions violate a sworn truce: παραβεβηκέναι τοὺς ὅρκους καὶ τὰς συνθήκας 
τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. Scipio also mentions the terms of the treaty in his personal meeting with Hannibal 
before the battle (15.8.7-8). For Livy’s account of the truce: 30.16. cf. Diod. 27.12. The historicity of the 
treaty is suspect: Mantel 1991: 125-28, Hoyos 2003: 167-70; contra Gerhold 2002: 111-40. Levene 2010: 
326-31 discusses the relationship between the violation of this treaty and the larger issue of moral causation 
in Livy.  
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 Though Hannibal attempts to gain the knowledge necessary to determine the 
course of action he would pursue against the Roman army, the scouts are discovered and 
led to the camp of their enemy. Polybius marks Scipio’s reaction to the capture of these 
scouts as something outside the norm of military operations:  
Πόπλιος δ', ἐπαναχθέντων ὡς αὐτὸν τῶν κατασκόπων, τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχε 
τοῦ κολάζειν τοὺς ἑαλωκότας, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς 
τοὐναντίον συστήσας αὐτοῖς χιλίαρχον ἐπέταξε πάντα καθαρίως ὑποδεῖξαι 
τὰ κατὰ τὴν παρεμβολήν. (15.5.5) 
 
But Publius, after the scouts were brought before him, held off from 
punishing the captured men, as is their usual custom, so much so that he 
contrived the opposite and placed the tribune in charge of them to point 
out clearly everything around the camp.  
  
While the Romans’ custom in these situations dictates that the captured scouts should be 
punished, Scipio instead gives orders to ensure that they fulfill their assigned task. The 
near repetition of the phrase “τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς” from above, here in the singular 
“τὰ κατὰ τὴν παρεμβολήν,” creates a connection between Hannibal’s original orders and 
Scipio’s demand that the scouts be shown the elements of the encampment. Since the 
scouts were captured, their mission was completed only through the agency of Roman 
general, who commanded that they be shown the camp. In effect, Scipio has taken control 
of the opsis of these scouts and, consequently, the information gained through their 
exploits.  
 Scipio’s control over the knowledge of the Roman encampment is strengthened as 
he continues to manage the action that follows the grand tour of the camp. He ensures 
that the scouts received the information they set out to learn: 
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γενομένου δὲ τούτου προσεπύθετο τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰ πάντα φιλοτίμως 
αὐτοῖς ὑποδέδειχεν ὁ συσταθείς· τῶν δὲ φησάντων, δοὺς ἐφόδια καὶ 
παραπομπὴν ἐξαπέστειλε προστάξας ἐπιμελῶς Ἀννίβᾳ διασαφεῖν περὶ 
τῶν ἀπηντημένων αὐτοῖς. (15.5.6-7) 
 
After this was done, [Scipio] inquired of the men whether the one 
appointed to them pointed out everything with care. After they agreed, 
he gave them supplies and an escort and sent them off, having ordered 
them to explain to Hannibal carefully what happened to them.  
 
Scipio’s management of the information that the scouts have gathered through autopsy 
reaches its maximum extent in the passage. His inquiry (προσεπύθετο) verifies that they 
gained the desired knowledge and he forces their assent to the fact (τῶν δὲ φησάντων) 
that they did. He then orders them (προστάξας) to pass the knowledge on to Hannibal and 
to do so with care (ἐπιμελῶς). Scipio even supplies them with the provisions and escort 
necessary to ensure their safety on their return.28  
 Scipio’s ploy succeeds and more. Hannibal is so overcome by admiration for 
Scipio that he requests a meeting with his Roman counterpart.29 Scipio agrees to the 
request and responds that he will to arrange a time and place to meet at a later time: “he 
said that he would send to him indicating the time and place when he would meet with 
him” (ἔφη δὲ πέμψειν πρὸς αὐτὸν διασαφῶν, ἐπειδὰν μέλλῃ συμπορεύεσθαι, τὸν τόπον 
καὶ τὸν καιρόν; 15.5.10). Through his response Scipio maintains the control he has over 
                                               
28 De Sanctis 1968: 2.594 notes that this passage is likely to be fabricated, due to its similarity to an account 
by Herodotus of Xerxes’ treatment of some Greek scouts (Hdt. 7.146.7) or the tale of Laevinus’ treatment 
of Pyrrhus’ scouts (Dion. Hal. 19.11, e.g.). Walbank 1967: 450, however, notes that this story may, in fact, 
be true if Scipio himself is aware of such stories and models his behavior off of them.  
29 15.5.8: ὧν παραγενηθέντων θαυμάσας ὁ Ἀννίβας τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν τἀνδρὸς οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως 
εἰς ὁρμὴν ἔπεσε τοῦ βούλεσθαι συνελθεῖν εἰς λόγους τῷ Ποπλίῳ. “After [the messengers] returned, 
Hannibal was amazed at the generosity and daring of the man and somehow came to the impulse of 
wanting to come to a meeting with Scipio.” 
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the information that was established earlier in his interactions with the scouts. 
Additionally, immediately after Scipio sends his response to Hannibal’s request, two 
events occur that neutralize any possible advantage that the scouts’ report may have 
granted to the Carthaginian general. First, the arrival of Masinissa adds ten thousand 
troops to the Roman force;30 second, Scipio breaks camp and moves to a favorable and 
well-watered location near Naragara.31 Hannibal may not have been familiar, as 
Polybius’ audience is, with the concept that the Roman army always constructs its camp 
according to the same layout.32 His initial plan to reconnoiter the layout and management 
of the camp (πῶς χειρίζει τὰ κατὰ τὰς παρεμβολὰς; 15.5.4) suggests a lack of knowledge 
or at least a vague awareness of the encampment on his part.33 His unfamiliarity with the 
Roman camp and the sudden addition of Masinissa’s ten thousand troops negate any 
potential benefit derived from the knowledge provided to Hannibal through the scouts as 
facilitated by Scipio. While Hannibal attempts to rely on opsis as he has done in the past, 
                                               
30 15.5.12: τῇ δ' ἐπαύριον ἧκε Μασαννάσας, ἔχων πεζοὺς μὲν εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ περὶ 
τετρακισχιλίους.  
31 15.5.14: ἀνέζευξε, καὶ παραγενηθεὶς πρὸς πόλιν Ναράγαρα κατεστρατοπέδευσε, πρός τε τἄλλα τόπον 
εὐφυῆ καταλαβόμενος καὶ τὴν ὑδρείαν ἐντὸς βέλους ποιησάμενος. The actual site is uncertain, as is the 
manuscript tradition here. For a full discussion of the potential sites: Walbank 1967: 446-49. In the text 
given here, I follow the well-accepted reading of Schweighaeuser of Ναράγαρα for MS Μάργαρον: 
Walbank 1967: 451.  
32 Polybius discusses the consistency of the construction of the Roman military camp (6.26.10-12 and 6.27-
34) as part of his larger description of Roman customs in the sixth book of the Histories. The extended 
ethnographic digression serves as the introduction to the symplokē and an explanation of the success that 
Rome finds in the rest of Polybius’ work.  
33 Similarly, Nero’s and Livius’ ability to fool Hasdrubal about the arrival of the second consular army at 
the Battle of the Metaurus River may also suggest a larger unawareness of Roman camp practices on the 
part of the Carthaginians (Livy 27.46-7). Though the fragments of Polybius’ eleventh book do not contain 
the precursor actions to the Battle of the Metaurus, the phrase that opens his description of the battle 
suggests the conclusion of these details: Ἀσδρούβᾳ δὲ τούτων μὲν ἤρεσκεν οὐδέν (11.1.2). The issues that 
caused concern for Hasdrubal likely included the unexpected appearance of a second consular army.  
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Scipio manipulates the situation, takes command of Hannibal’s ability to gain knowledge, 
and neutralizes the value of the visual information that the Carthaginians acquire.  
 When the two generals do meet, Hannibal speaks first. His remarks (15.6.6-7.9) 
read the past and present situations faced by the two states with a focus on the fickleness 
of fortune and he warns Scipio not to be excessively proud but instead to consent to 
Hannibal’s proposed terms for peace.34 Scipio’s response (15.8), however, offers his own 
reading of the current circumstances taking into account more recent events than what 
Hannibal had mentioned.35 In his reply, Scipio reproaches Hannibal for misreading the 
situation: “It is clear that the matters have undertaken a drastic change. Indeed, the 
greatest concern is what end we have reached.” (δῆλον ὡς μεγάλην εἴληφε τὰ πράγματα 
παραλλαγήν. τὸ δὲ δὴ μέγιστον ἤλθομεν ἐπὶ τί πέρας; 15.8.5-6). Scipio’s remarks make it 
clear that Hannibal has proposed terms for peace that are no longer valid given the 
current circumstances. While the Carthaginians’ proposition may have found traction 
before both armies crossed to Africa, as Scipio explains, the events that have transpired 
since their arrival have made an equitable peace impossible.36 The conversation shared 
between these two generals demonstrates that Scipio has used a superior ability to 
perceive the suitable course of action in the situation at hand.  
                                               
34 Adler 2011: 72-76 discusses the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio before Zama at length and 
stresses how Hannibal’s focus on fortune in this exchange fits in with Polybius’ larger historiographic 
methods.  
35 Champion 2004: 150 notes how Scipio’s reading of the situation and the Carthaginian’s responsibility as 
the aggressors in this war fits in with the larger narrative of Books One through Five.  
36 15.8.4: ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πρὸ τοῦ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους διαβαίνειν εἰς Λιβύην αὐτὸς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἐκχωρήσας 
προύτεινας τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας, οὐκ ἂν οἴομαί σε διαψευσθῆναι τῆς ἐλπίδος. “But if you yourself had 
departed from Italy and offered these terms before the Romans crossed to Africa, I do not think that you 
would have had false hope.” On this argument: Walbank 1967: 452.  
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 As Polybius continues his narrative, he notes that the meeting ends in a state that 
leaves no chance for reconciliation (ἀσύμβατον ποιησάμενοι τὴν κοινολογίαν; 15.9.1). 
Consequently, he makes a brief aside to remark on the significance of the outcome of the 
engagement (15.9.2-6) and then moves to his description of the battle.37 Polybius 
describes in detail the position and arrangement of the Roman lines, noting how Scipio 
creates unusually large gaps in the line to allow the enemy’s elephants to pass through.38 
After the troops have been arranged, Scipio addresses his men using themes and language 
that recall Hannibal’s speeches before the Battles at the Ticinus River and at Cannae.39 
To begin, Scipio’s oration takes the opportunity to remind his troops of their previous 
experiences: “for he thought it good for them to be brave men, worthy of themselves and 
their country, by recalling their past travails” (ἠξίου γὰρ μνημονεύοντας τῶν 
προγεγονότων ἀγώνων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γίνεσθαι, σφῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἀξίους; 
15.10.2). Before the engagement at Cannae, Hannibal similarly reminds his men to focus 
on their recent battles to gain courage:  
ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τρισὶ μάχαις τηλικαύταις ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου 
νενικήκατε Ῥωμαίους, ποῖος ἂν ἔτι λόγος ὑμῖν ἰσχυρότερον παραστήσαι 
θάρσος αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; (3.111.6-7) 
                                               
37 cf. Livy 30.32.1-3. Levene 2010: 11-12 notes how the suggestion of the potential outcome of this 
engagement shows how Livy points to later stages of Roman history in his narrative.  
38 15.9.7: πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς ἁστάτους καὶ τὰς τούτων σημαίας ἐν διαστήμασιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς 
πρίγκιπας, τιθεὶς τὰς σπείρας οὐ κατὰ τὸ τῶν πρώτων σημαιῶν διάστημα, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῖς 
Ῥωμαίοις, ἀλλὰ καταλλήλους ἐν ἀποστάσει διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐλεφάντων. “First he 
placed the hastati-their standards placed at intervals, after them the principes, placed not in the gaps behind 
the standards of the front line as is the custom for the Romans, but behind them at a distance because of the 
large number of their opponents’ elephants.” On Hannibal’s use of elephants at Zama—and in his earlier 
campaigns: Charles and Rhodan 2007.  
39 Adler 2011: 78-79 also connects Hannibal’s speech before Zama with those before Cannae and the 
Ticinus, noting that there is a discontinuity between claims that Hannibal makes in his Italian campaign and 
those he later makes at Zama. Adler provides a thoughtful explanation for the effects this disconnect may 
have had on Polybius’ ancient audience.  
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Since you have by all accounts beaten the Romans successively in three 
large battles, what sort of speech would render your courage still stronger 
than your deeds themselves? 
 
Both Scipio and Hannibal call their men to rely on their own knowledge and experience. 
Hannibal, as discussed in Chapter Two above, explains to his men that these past battles 
negate the need for a lengthy speech or didactic spectacles (ὑποδείγματα).40 Scipio, too, 
avoids the use of contrived scenes in the rest of his oration and instead relies on the 
ability of his troops to adequately use opsis to read the situation.   
Beyond the call for recollection of past military engagements found in the 
battlefield speeches of Hannibal at Cannae and Scipio at Zama, each of the generals notes 
the significance of the imminent battle for their current campaign. For each army, the 
battle they are about to face in enemy territory may grant them complete dominion over 
their opponents’ lands. At Cannae, Hannibal makes the point at the conclusion of his 
battlefield exhortation:  
οὗ κρατήσαντες κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε παραχρῆμα πάσης Ἰταλίας, 
ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῶν νῦν πόνων, γενόμενοι συμπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς 
Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας, ἡγεμόνες ἅμα καὶ δεσπόται πάντων γενήσεσθε 
διὰ ταύτης τῆς μάχης. (3.111.9) 
 
Having conquered here, you will straightaway be masters of all of 
Italy, and be freed from your present toils, coming into possession of all 
the prosperity of the Romans; at the same time you will become the 
leaders and masters of everything through this battle.    
 
                                               
40 For further discussion of this passage, Chapter 2, Part 3, above.  
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Scipio, however, includes near the beginning of his speech at Zama the thought that a 
victory provides control over their opponents’ lands, using language that is parallel to 
and, for Polybius’ external audience at least, reminiscent of Hannibal’s oration at Cannae: 
ἠξίου… καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ὅτι κρατήσαντες μὲν τῶν ἐχθρῶν 
οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ πραγμάτων ἔσονται κύριοι βεβαίως, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
τῆς ἄλλης οἰκουμένης τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ δυναστείαν ἀδήριτον αὑτοῖς 
τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι περιποιήσουσιν· (15.10.2) 
 
He also thought it good for them to take before their eyes that after their 
victory over their enemies not only will they certainly be masters of 
affairs in Libya, but that they will also acquire for themselves and their 
country possession of the leadership and uncontested dominion of the 
whole inhabited world.  
 
Direct verbal and semantic parallels resound in these two passages: Scipio’s κρατήσαντες 
μὲν…ἔσονται κύριοι recalls Hannibal’s κρατήσαντες κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε. While the 
Carthaginians at Cannae are on the verge of domination of all of Italy (πάσης Ἰταλίας) 
and all the fortune of the Romans (συμπάσης…τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας), the Romans 
at Zama have within their grasp dominion over the affairs in Libya (τῶν ἐν Λιβύῃ 
πραγμάτων). While Hannibal’s men are trying to become leaders and masters of all 
(ἡγεμόνες ἅμα καὶ δεσπόται πάντων), the Romans can possess the abstractions leadership 
and dominion (τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ δυναστείαν). Scipio’s remarks demonstrate a sense of 
one-upmanship over Hannibal’s in two ways: first, the potential (and achieved) dominion 
of Rome will be uncontested (ἀδήριτον)—a point never raised by Hannibal; second, 
Roman rule will stand over the whole oikoumenē (τῆς ἄλλης οἰκουμένης), a catchphrase 
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for Polybius that incorporates the entire scope of his Histories.41 Furthermore, Polybius 
had just described in an aside the potential outcome of the engagement in similar terms:42 
οὐ γὰρ τῆς Λιβύης αὐτῆς οὐδὲ τῆς Εὐρώπης ἔμελλον κυριεύειν οἱ τῇ 
μάχῃ κρατήσαντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὅσα νῦν 
πέπτωκεν ὑπὸ τὴν ἱστορίαν. (15.9.5) 
 
For, those who would conquer in this battle would not be masters just of 
Libya, nor of Europe, but even of all the parts of the inhabited world, the 
very thing that has now happened in the course of history.  
 
As an internal narrator, Scipio’s estimation of the situation, as described to his troops, 
mirrors that of the external narrator. Just as Hannibal had in his campaign in Italy, Scipio 
serves a role in his exhortation before Zama that functionally and semantically parallels 
that of Polybius.  
 Additionally, Scipio’s speech at Zama incorporates themes that Hannibal had 
previously employed in the narrative in his battlefield exhortation at the Ticinus River. 
After considering the consequences of victory or death, Scipio briefly considers the fate 
of those who flee from battle:  
ἀσφάλειαν γὰρ τοῖς φυγοῦσιν οὐδεὶς ἱκανὸς περιποιῆσαι τόπος τῶν ἐν τῇ 
Λιβύῃ· πεσοῦσι δ' ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων χεῖρας οὐκ ἄδηλα [εἶναι] τὰ 
συμβησόμενα τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις· (15.10.4) 
 
For no place of those in Libya is sufficient to provide safety for those that 
flee: but it is not unclear what will happen for those that fall into the hands 
of the Carthaginians, if they consider it correctly.   
 
                                               
41 cf., e.g., his many mentions of the term in his methodological passages: 1.1.5, 1.3.3, 1.4.1, 2.37.4-5, 
3.1.4, 3.3.9, 3.37.1, 3.58-59, and 4.2.4, among others.  
42 Levene 2010: 11, n. 19, notes that Livy takes up this sentiment in his version of Hannibal’s and Scipio’s 
speeches. 
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Before the Battle at the Ticinus River, Hannibal’s estimation of his army’s present 
circumstances contains a plea much like Scipio’s at Zama:43  
οὐδένα γὰρ οὕτως ἀλόγιστον οὐδὲ νωθρὸν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν, ὃς 
μνημονεύων μὲν τοῦ μήκους τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς διηνυσμένης ἐκ τῶν πατρίδων, 
μνημονεύων δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν μεταξὺ πολεμίων, εἰδὼς δὲ τὰ μεγέθη 
τῶν ποταμῶν ὧν διεπέρασεν, ἐλπίσαι ποτ' ἂν ὅτι φεύγων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν 
ἀφίξεται. (3.63.7) 
 
For there is not any one of them who is so irrational or dimwitted, who 
would ever hope that he would reach home by flight, after he calls to mind 
the length of the road traversed from their country and the number of 
enemies in between, and knowing the size of the rivers which he crossed.  
 
In each of these battlefield speeches, then, the general warns his troops that there is no 
escape should they flee from the battle. Both speakers, too, note that the fact can be 
recognized through good sense, as Scipio suggests they ought to reason it out properly 
(τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις), while Hannibal observes that none of them is so unreasonable 
(οὐδένα γὰρ οὕτως ἀλόγιστον) as to miss his point.  
Consequently, the battle becomes a matter of victory or death, as each general 
notes to his troops. Scipio ends his speech by contrasting these two extremes: “therefore 
he thought it best for them, considering that there are two possibilities, either to conquer 
or die, to advance forward to meet the enemy” (διόπερ ἠξίου δύο προθεμένους, ταῦτα δ' 
ἐστὶν ἢ νικᾶν ἢ θνήσκειν, ὁμόσε χωρεῖν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους; 15.10.6). At the Ticinus, 
Hannibal uses the spectacle of the Gallic captives (3.62) to illustrate the same fact.44 In 
order to be sure that the recognition is not lost on his troops, Hannibal also provides the 
                                               
43 On this speech and Hannibal’s less-than-convincing use of this rationale, Adler 2011: 64-69.  
44 For a discussion of this passage: Chapter 2, Part 3, above. For a comparison of these two passages in 
Polybius: Adler 2011: 61-76.  
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potential explanation of the demonstration for them: “he was thinking it necessary for all 
of them to go to battle to conquer in the best case, but if that should not be possible, then 
to die” (ᾤετο δεῖν…πάντας ἰέναι πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας, μάλιστα μὲν νικήσοντας, ἂν δὲ μὴ 
τοῦτ' ᾖ δυνατόν, ἀποθανουμένους; 3.63.9). In each of these scenarios—the Romans at 
Zama and the Carthaginians at the Ticinus—the present circumstances have left them 
only two possible outcomes, victory (νικᾶν; νικήσοντας) or death (θνήσκειν; 
ἀποθανουμένους). Scipio’s battlefield speech before Zama combines elements and 
themes employed by Hannibal before two of his own successes, at the Battle of the 
Ticinus River and at Cannae. In the exhortation, Scipio lays out before his troops the 
potential outcomes that they will personally suffer should the battle turn against them. 
Just as Hannibal’s speeches spur the Carthaginians to victory in Italy, Scipio encourages 
the success of his men in the decisive engagement.  
After Polybius concludes his narrative of the preliminary arrangement and 
encouragement of the Roman forces, he addresses the same matters for the Carthaginian 
army, noting their layout for the battle in detail (15.11).45 The battlefield speeches 
delivered on the Carthaginian side of the engagement, however, allow for a contrast of 
approaches with those delivered to the Romans. First, Hannibal orders the individual 
commanders of the mercenary forces to each address their own forces separately.46 He 
                                               
45 On the position of Hannibal’s various troops at the start of the battle and Livy’s rearrangement of 
Polybius’ description: Walsh 1961: 157-58, Walbank 1967: 458, and de Sanctis 1968: 636.  
46 15.11.4: παρήγγειλε δὲ τοὺς ἰδίους στρατιώτας ἕκαστον παρακαλεῖν, ἀναφέροντας τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης 
ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰς μεθ' αὑτοῦ παραγεγενημένας δυνάμεις (15.11.4), “He ordered each of them to address 
their own soldiers, calling to mind the hope of victory that rests on him and the forces that he brought back 
with him.” Hannibal’s strategy represents the last of a string of attempts to communicate with the 
polyethnic forces that make up his mercenary troops: v., e.g. 11.19.3-5. Levene 2010: 239-44 ties the 
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also instructs his fellow Carthaginian commanders to point out to their men the probable 
suffering of others:  
τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἡγουμένους τὰ συμβησόμενα περὶ 
τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι καὶ τιθέναι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν, ἐὰν ἄλλως 
πως ἐκβῇ τὰ τῆς μάχης. (15.11.5) 
 
As for the Carthaginians, he ordered their leaders to count out and to place 
before their eyes the consequences for their children and wives if the 
matters of the battle should turn out any other way.  
 
Although Scipio, as noted above, reminds his troops of the potential consequences that 
will befall them personally, Hannibal orders the Carthaginian leaders to place the focus 
for their troops on the possible suffering of their relatives. While Polybius, in a passage 
described above, notes that learning from the misfortunes of others is preferable because 
these are “without harm” (χωρὶς βλάβης: 1.35.8), he also describes the experience of 
learning through one’s own hardships as “more evident” (ἐναργέστερον: 1.35.7).47 
Hannibal, then, chooses to follow the course laid out by Polybius as preferable as a 
means of historiographic didacticism, while Scipio opts for the more apparent, direct, 
and, evidently, more effective approach.  
 Hannibal reserves his battlefield exhortation at Zama only for his seasoned 
veterans, those that had campaigned with him for the previous seventeen years, 
encouraging them to recall their past success against the Romans.48 He notes, 
                                               
multiethnic composition of Hannibal’s army noted here (and in Livy 30.35.5-9) to a larger admonitory 
lesson for Livy’s audience. 
47 For a discussion of these passages: Chapter 2, Part 1, above.  
48 15.11.6: Ἀννίβας δὲ τοὺς μεθ' αὑτοῦ παραγεγονότας ἐπιπορευόμενος ἠξίου καὶ παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων 
μνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἑπτακαιδεκαέτους συνηθείας, μνησθῆναι δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν 
προγεγονότων αὐτοῖς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἀγώνων· 
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specifically, the battles at the Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae as examples that they 
should recall (15.11.8). In addition to his focus on their past experience, Hannibal also: 
“bids his men to cast their eyes at their opponents and to examine their ranks” 
(ἀναβλέπειν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευε <καὶ> τὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων κατοπτεύειν τάξιν; 15.11.10). In 
this way, he uses his usual visually charged language (ἀναβλέπειν, κατοπτεύειν) to turn 
the focus of his troops to the present makeup of the Roman army.  
Hannibal suggests that the total number of opponents that they presently face is 
much less than those that they had in past battles.49 While his numerical accounting holds 
true at the beginning of the battle, the outcome of the engagement shows a miscalculation 
on his part. After the initial skirmishes commenced and the Carthaginian elephants had 
been subdued by the gaps arranged in the lines by Scipio (15.12.1-4; for the plan, cf. 
15.9.7), the mercenaries engage with the Roman forces. As the mercenaries are 
overwhelmed, they turn back toward the Carthaginian lines and begin to kill them.50 The 
retreat and betrayal by the mercenary forces show the failure of Hannibal’s serialized 
approach to the battlefield speeches before Zama. The mercenaries collapse onto the 
main Carthaginian line, who fight vigorously at first but are ultimately overwhelmed by 
the combination of their former comrades and the Roman forces (15.13.5-8). Thus, the 
bulk of the Carthaginian forces only retreat when they oppose the combination of their 
own fleeing mercenaries and the Roman army. As the main Carthaginian line eventually 
                                               
49 15.11.10: οὐ γὰρ οἷον ἐλάττους, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πολλοστὸν μέρος εἶναι τῶν τότε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀγωνισαμένων. 
For estimates of the number of combatants in each engagement: Walbank 1967: 449-50 and 456-58.  
50 15.13.4: πέρας ἐνέκλιναν οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ δόξαντες ἐγκαταλείπεσθαι προφανῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων, 
ἐπιπεσόντες κατὰ τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας ἔκτεινον τούτους.  
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flees, they turn against even Hannibal’s seasoned veterans, who wisely force them away 
(15.13.9). Though Hannibal suggests before the battle that the number of combatants on 
each side would be in the Carthaginians’ favor, the totals are tipped in the favor of the 
Romans as the succession of desertions by the mercenaries and then their fellow 
Carthaginians turns against Hannibal’s body of men, who eventually fall after a vigorous 
defense (15.14). Thus, Hannibal’s insistence that his veteran troops rely on an autopsy of 
their opponents’ lines before the battle fails after their allies turn against them.  
Polybius concludes his narrative of the battle of Zama with a lengthy digression 
exculpating Hannibal from blame for the defeat (15.15-16).51 Polybius claims that the 
Carthaginian general did all that he could to prepare and was even aware of the role that 
Fortune plays in determining the outcome of events. Instead, Polybius suggests that a 
proverb (παροιμίαν) best summarizes the cause of Hannibal’s defeat: “A brave man 
comes upon one still stronger than him” (ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν; 
15.16.6).52 The stronger man obviously refers to Scipio, but the implication of Polybius’ 
use of the proverb is most apparent when the roles of Hannibal and Scipio as internal 
narrators in their campaigns at Zama are compared. At every turn, Scipio demonstrates 
his ability to outwit and outmaneuver his Carthaginian counterpart. Just as Hannibal as an 
                                               
51 While Hannibal survives the battle by fleeing to Hadramentum, Polybius’ encomiastic account describing 
the truth behind the Carthaginian general’s defeat has many of the markers of the death notices in the 
Histories, on which: Pomeroy 1986.   
52 On the possible sources of this line, Walbank 1967: 464; cf. Suidas s.v. ἐπιβολή; possibilities include 
Theognis, Simonides, or some unknown Hellenistic poet. ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν is Homeric: Il. 11.471, 11.665, 
16.627, 16.837, 23.546; Od. 8.582, 15.557. Levene 2010: 286-87 discusses this appraisal and Livy’s 
incorporation of it (30.35.5-9) in light of the importance of fortune stressed in the run-up to the battle. On 
Livy’s comment and the possible identification of Polybius as one of the authors with military knowledge 
that Livy mentions: de Sanctis 1968: 636.  
 187 
 
internal narrator had earlier played a role that was parallel to Polybius’ guise as external 
narrator, Scipio reads the situation before Zama and responds in a Polybian fashion as 
well, a fact made evident in his treatment of the Carthaginian scouts and in the speech he 
delivers before the battle. Scipio is able to condense into his actions and exhortation 
surrounding a single, decisive battle the tropes and techniques employed by Hannibal 
throughout his campaign in Italy.  
In the narrative surrounding the Battle of Zama, Polybius continues to portray his 
leading generals, Hannibal and Scipio, as internal narrators that serve roles parallel with 
his own. In their exchange before the battle, however, Scipio demonstrates his superiority 
to his Carthaginian counterpart by managing and manipulating Hannibal’s scouts and the 
information that they gain for the situation. Scipio’s bold move, however, impresses 
Hannibal and encourages him to seek a meeting with the Roman general. Over the course 
of their exchange Scipio shows a superior ability to use opsis in reading the 
circumstances that the armies face. In the battlefield exhortations employed by each 
general, Polybius demonstrates a contrast in styles. Scipio uses themes and language that 
recall issues addressed by Hannibal in his speeches at the Ticinus and Cannae. Hannibal, 
meanwhile, allows his subordinate officers to address each group of the army 
individually and only addresses his veteran troops himself. While his words encourage 
these men to valiant action, the outcome of the encounter demonstrates that his larger 
reading of the situation was inferior to his counterpart’s, just as he did in his meeting with 
Scipio, when the tide of the battle ultimately turns against him. Polybius’ narrative of the 
events surrounding the Battle of Zama and the actions and speeches of the leading 
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generals on each side therefore shows the danger of failing to recognize the 
circumstances faced in a given situation. Hannibal ultimately has opsis turn against him 
as Polybius allows Scipio to see the world through his eyes in the narrative surrounding 
Zama.  
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Part 3: Decisive Encounter: Hannibal, Scipio, and their Historians at Livy’s Zama  
 
 Livy’s narrative of the Battle of Zama comprises the pivotal episode of the final 
book of the Third Decade.53 Livy includes many of the same episodes in the lead-in to the 
Battle, including the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio. The similarities between 
Livy’s and Polybius’ narrative of the preliminary actions and the meeting between the 
general are enough that even the fiercest sceptics regarding Livy’s use of Polybius in the 
Third Decade admit that Polybius was likely a source for Livy in composing this 
episode.54 More recently, scholars who have examined the two narratives of the Battle of 
Zama have started from the premise that Livy was likely using Polybius as a source for 
his account.55 A comparison between the speeches in each author shows, among other 
                                               
53 On the structure of Livy’s individual books in the Third Decade: Levene 2010: 25-33. While Luce 1977: 
33-38 notes that many Livian books have a tripartite structure, Levene notes that Book 30 has closer to a 
bipartite structure, finding two halves in the defeat of Syphax (and the subsequent attempt at a truce) and 
the Battle of Zama and its aftermath (p. 26); cf. Burck 1962: 102-3.   
54 Nissen 1863: 83-85; Walsh 1961: 124-32; Treptow 1964: 209; de Sanctis 1968: 168-73; Burck 1971: 26-
27; Luce 1977: 178-80. Briscoe 1993: 39 explores the impact of “Nissen’s Law” on the question of Livy’s 
use of Polybius in the Third Decade. More specifically, several scholars point to the likelihood of Livy’s 
pre-Zama speeches as derived from Polybius: Hoffmann 1942: 99; Cavallin 1947: 27; Treptow 1964: 209.; 
Edlund 1967. The most vocal holdout to this idea is Tränkle 1977: 193-241 (on Zama specifically: 238-41) 
who argues vehemently that Livy does not begin to use Polybius until the Fourth Decade. The strong 
similarities to Polybius’ narrative in Livy’s account of Zama Tränkle posits are due to a common source, 
due to his belief that the additions could not be Livy’s own, so an intermediate author must have introduced 
those elements. Levene 2010: 128-35 summarizes the main issues with Tränkle’s argument.  
55 e.g.: Rumpf 2006, Adler 2011, and Billot 2014.  Rumpf 2006 compares Polybius and Livy on the 
meeting at Zama to describe how the focus and structure of speeches differ between the two in an effort to 
uncover differences between the modes of thought in each author’s attempt at historiographic speechifying. 
Broadly speaking, Rumpf concludes that Polybius’ speeches are more agonal, aim at determining the best 
line of argument, and provide a clearer determination of the winner, while Livy’s are often more practical 
and reflect changing attitudes over time (a fact Rumpf links back to the nature of the Roman constitution). 
Adler 2011: 98-107 notes how closely Livy follows Polybius in this exchange and argues that, among other 
things, Scipio’s need to spin Hannibal’s speech as he reports it to his soldiers (30.32.8) suggests that Livy 
“implicitly concedes the power of Hannibal’s appeal” (p. 106).  Billot 2014 argues that Polybius, Livy, and 
Silius each pattern their narratives of the Battle of Zama to fit into their larger claims about the significance 
of the Second Punic War. While Polybius notes that the battle is a contest for total hegemony of the 
Mediterranean—in line with his comments at the start of his Histories, Silius instead claims that the battle 
serves as a cultural turning point, paving the way for the coming principate. Billot notes that Livy claims 
that the battle is the most memorable ever fought, alluding to and linking Zama back to his superlative 
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things, that Hannibal relies on fortune more so than does Scipio.56 Hannibal’s emphasis 
on fortune corresponds to Polybius’ frequent remarks on tychē. The correlation between 
Livy’s Hannibal and Polybius extends further and is an extension of the function that 
Hannibal fulfills as a modello-esemplare to Polybius in his role as an internal narrator. 
For Livy’s narrative of the Battle of Zama this allows him to show his own 
historiographic method in direct competition with Polybius’ as Scipio and Hannibal on 
and off of the battlefield.  
In the run-up to the battle, however, Livy describes the prevailing moods at Rome 
and Carthage, as each city suffers anxiety and fear from their expectations for the 
impending conflict. This description has no direct Polybian parallel, so it is possible that 
it is a Livian addition.57  Livy’s account of the dispositions on each side shows a contrast 
between Livian exemplarity and Polybian opsis:  
sed cum Hannibale, prope nato in praetorio patris fortissimi ducis, alito 
atque educato inter arma, puero quondam milite, uixdum iuuene 
imperatore, qui senex uincendo factus Hispanias Gallias Italiam ab 
Alpibus ad fretum monumentis ingentium rerum complesset. ducere 
exercitum aequalem stipendiis suis, duratum omnium rerum patientia quas 
uix fides fiat homines passos, perfusum miliens cruore Romano, 
                                               
claim in the preface to the Third Decade: bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint 
(21.1.1). 
56 For brief remarks on Polybius’ account of their meeting, Chapter 4, Part 2, above. Levene 2010: 286-87 
discusses the role of fortune in Hannibal’s and Scipio’s speeches in Livy and how these compare to 
Polybius’ versions. One result of this comparison is that Hannibal appears to appeal to fortune—in perhaps 
a Polybian fashion—more so than does Scipio.  
57 Unless, of course, it was added by an intermediary source, such as Coelius. However, no notice of such 
an account in another author survives. Polybius does briefly note how each side feels about their 
relationship to the cause of the war: 15.3.2: οἵ τε γὰρ Ῥωμαῖοι δοκοῦντες παρεσπονδῆσθαι φιλοτίμως 
διέκειντο πρὸς τὸ περιγενέσθαι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἵ τε Καρχηδόνιοι συνειδότες σφίσι τὰ πεπραγμένα 
πρὸς πᾶν ἑτοίμως εἶχον πρὸς τὸ μὴ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ὑποχείριοι γενηθῆναι. “For the Romans, thinking that there 
had been a breach of faith, were eagerly fixed on prevailing over the Carthaginians. And the Carthaginians, 
recognizing what they had done, were willingly holding on for anything not to become subjects of their 
enemies.”  
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exuuias non militum tantum sed etiam imperatorum portantem. multos 
occursuros Scipioni in acie qui praetores, qui imperatores, qui consules 
Romanos sua manu occidissent, muralibus uallaribusque insignes 
coronis, peruagatos capta castra captas urbes Romanas. non esse hodie tot 
fasces magistratibus populi Romani quot captos ex caede imperatorum 
prae se ferre posset Hannibal. (30.28.4-7) 
 
But [the Roman people were thinking that the fight would be] with 
Hannibal, who was very nearly born in the camp of his father, a very 
courageous commander, nourished and educated among arms. As a boy he 
was formerly a soldier, a commander when scarcely a young man, and 
who now, as an old man, had filled up Spain, Gaul, and Italy from the 
Alps to the strait with monuments of his distinguished deeds, 
accomplished with his victories. He led an army equal to him in military 
experience, and made strong by their endurance of all matters which there 
would hardly be belief that men suffered, drenched with Roman blood 
on a thousand occasions, carrying with them the spoils not just of soldiers 
but even of generals. They thought that many men would encounter Scipio 
in the battle line who had already killed praetors, generals, and Roman 
consuls with their own hands; men awarded mural crowns and vallar 
crowns; men that had wandered around captured camps and captured 
Roman cities. They thought that the magistrates of the Roman people 
would not have today as many fasces as those which Hannibal was able to 
carry before him, having taken them after the slaughter of generals.  
 
Livy’s description of the Roman people’s outlook on the war mirrors in several ways the 
exemplary process so often exhibited in the AUC. First, they are concerned about actions 
of consequence to the Roman people: Hannibal’s numerous victories at their expense. 
Second, there are multiple audiences of these deeds: the Roman armies who fought and 
lost to Hannibal and the Carthaginian troops, whom we follow from Hannibal’s earliest 
days to the present. The Roman people themselves serve as a secondary audience of these 
deeds as they are rehearsing them in their concerns about the impending battle. Third, the 
fears of the Roman people here are most marked in Livy’s description by the 
memorialization of Hannibal’s deeds: Hannibal leaves monuments (monumentis 
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ingentium rerum) in his wake as he progresses along his campaign; his army is stained by 
Roman blood (perfusum…cruore Romano) and carries spoils (exuuias) taken from the 
defeated Romans;58 some of his soldiers have won the mural and vallar crowns 
(muralibus uallaribusque insignes coronis), rewards that are themselves offered in an 
overt act of exemplarity to encourage other soldiers to behave in a similar fashion; the 
Romans fear that Hannibal’s captured fasces, which are displayed in front of him as 
monuments of his victory, will outnumber their own fasces, the markers of the authority 
of the Republic.  
All of these monuments serve as physical reminders of Hannibal’s exemplary 
deeds. Lastly, there are multiple ways in which the exemplary deeds here are encourage 
future repetition or are already fulfilled as such: Hannibal is seen to inherit his military 
prowess in his father’s camp as he is brought up there;59 he repeats his victories across 
Italy (and earlier on his way to Italy), suggesting the ability to imitate his success on 
future occasions. Even the trepidation felt by the Roman people is a result of their 
anticipation that Hannibal’s exemplary acts are able to be repeated.  Livy’s description of 
their fears before Zama shows the Roman people thinking in terms of exemplarity when 
they analyze a situation and process information. They are reading the monuments left 
                                               
58 In fact, these very spoils might include those with which Hannibal’s army armed themselves during their 
campaign leading up to Cannae, a fact that led Livy to remark that one could hardly tell the Romans and 
Carthaginians apart they were armed so similarly: 22.46.4: Afros Romanam [magna ex parte] crederes 
aciem; ita armati erant armis et ad Trebiam ceterum magna ex parte ad Trasumennum captis. “You would 
have believed that the Africans were a Roman battle line, they were armed in such a fashion with weapons 
captured, for the most part, at the Trebia and Trasimene.” cf. Polybius 3.114.1-4.  
59 This reference is just one of many that link the narrative of Zama back to the opening of the Third 
Decade. For a discussion of some other ways that Livy uses parallels to Book 21 as a closural device: 
Levene 2010: 16-17, Jaeger 2006: 202-03, Walsh 1973: 207, Wille 1973: 52, Burck 1962: 50.  
 193 
 
behind by the Carthaginian advance through Italy and becoming fearful of further 
examples of those sorts of deeds.  
 Conversely, Livy’s description of the anxiety of the Carthaginian people before 
Zama shows them thinking in terms of Polybian opsis:  
haud dispar habitus animorum Carthaginiensibus erat quos modo petisse 
pacem, intuentes Hannibalem ac rerum gestarum eius magnitudinem, 
paenitebat, modo cum respicerent bis sese acie uictos, Syphacem captum, 
pulsos se Hispania, pulsos Italia, atque ea omnia unius uirtute et consilio 
Scipionis facta, uelut fatalem eum ducem in exitium suum natum 
horrebant. (30.28.10-11) 
 
The mental disposition was not at all different for the Carthaginians. As 
they look at Hannibal and the greatness of his accomplishments, at one 
moment it was distressing them that they had sought peace, at another, 
when they were looking back at the fact that they were twice beaten in 
battle, and that Syphax was captured, that they were driven from Spain 
and from Italy, and that all these things were accomplished by the courage 
and plan of one man—Scipio—they were terrified that he was a leader 
born for the purpose of their destruction, just as was fated. 
 
While Livy first notes that similar sentiments are felt on the Carthaginian side of the 
conflict, his description of the observations that led them there has a different force from 
that of the Roman people above. They see (intuentes) Hannibal before them and look 
back on (respicerent) their recent losses and setbacks. As was noted above as part of 
opsis, the interpretation of the events comes directly from these visual actions and is 
focalized through the audience. Rather than reading monuments as do their Roman 
counterparts, the Carthaginians examine the events and figures directly in front of them. 
Polybian opsis leads to a sure reading of the expected action to follow. Here, the 
Carthaginians’ expectation that Scipio is fated (fatalem) to bring on their destruction 
supports the inevitability of their interpretation coming to fruition.  
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Livy’s contrast of the hopes and fears of the two sides of the conflict demonstrates 
how each group analyzes events as they unfold. The Romans think in terms of Livian 
exemplarity, considering the monuments of exemplary deeds left behind and the 
precedents of behavior that should be drawn from the lessons given by the memorials. 
The Carthaginians, on the other hand, embody Polybian opsis: they examine the acts 
immediately apparent before their very eyes. Livy’s contrast between these two methods 
immediately before the start of the battle calls to mind for his audience both opsis and 
exemplarity and suggests that the subsequent narrative might best be read in terms that 
contrast the two approaches to historical thought.  
After the notices of the disposition of the Romans and Carthaginians, Livy 
describes the meeting between Hannibal and Scipio (30.29-31). Like Polybius (15.5.4-
10), Livy narrates how Scipio receives and enables the scouts sent out by Hannibal to 
reconnoiter the Roman camp (30.29). In Polybius’ account, Masinissa arrives after the 
scouts have reported back to Hannibal (15.5.12-13). As argued above, the arrival of 
Masinissa subsequent to the scouts’ efforts effectively negates the benefit gained from the 
scouted information.60 Livy, however, has Masinissa arrive on the day the scouts are in 
Scipio’s camp (30.29.4) and Livy explicitly notes that this information was passed on to 
Hannibal.61 While the Polybian Scipio takes control over and ultimately exploits the opsis 
of his counterpart, Livy’s Scipio has no such advantage. The Livian Hannibal proceeds 
                                               
60 Chapter 4, Part 2, above.  
61 30.29.4: nam et Masinissam cum sex milibus peditum quattuor equitum uenisse eo ipso forte die 
adferebant. “For they also reported that Masinissa had arrived with six thousand infantry and four thousand 
cavalry by chance on that very same day.”  
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with accurate knowledge about the size of Scipio’s troops. Rather than advancing with a 
false sense of confidence, as does the Polybian Hannibal, Livy’s Hannibal knows the 
complete truth, which gives his method of Polybian opsis its full ability to grant him the 
knowledge of how best to proceed.  
After the scouts return to Hannibal with the news of the happenings in the Roman 
camp, Hannibal requests a meeting with Scipio, as he does in Polybius’ text. The explicit 
impetus for Hannibal’s invitation, however, is markedly different between the two 
accounts. Polybius attributes the request to Hannibal’s admiration of Scipio’s generosity 
and boldness: 
ὧν παραγενηθέντων θαυμάσας ὁ Ἀννίβας τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν 
τἀνδρὸς οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἰς ὁρμὴν ἔπεσε τοῦ βούλεσθαι συνελθεῖν εἰς 
λόγους τῷ Ποπλίῳ. (15.5.8) 
 
After [the messengers] returned, Hannibal was amazed at the generosity 
and daring of the man and somehow came to the impulse of wanting to 
come to a meeting with Scipio. 
 
For Livy, however, this meeting stems from Hannibal’s impression that he could achieve 
a more favorable chance at peace if he met with Scipio:  
itaque quamquam et ipse causa belli erat et aduentu suo turbauerat et 
pactas indutias et spem foederum, tamen si integer quam si uictus peteret 
pacem aequiora impetrari posse ratus, nuntium ad Scipionem misit ut 
conloquendi secum potestatem faceret. (30.29.5) 
 
And so, although he himself was the cause of the war and had disturbed 
both the agreed upon truce and the hope for treaties with his arrival, he 
nevertheless thought that he could achieve more favorable terms if he 
sought peace with his troops intact than after he is beaten. So, he sent a 
messenger to Scipio to make an opportunity for meeting with him.  
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These two summaries of Hannibal’s rationale in requesting the meeting with Scipio 
suggest a different focus for each of the two historians in their subsequent accounts of the 
meeting between the generals. For Polybius, Hannibal’s motivation for the meeting 
revolves around two of Scipio’s positive traits (τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ τόλμαν). As a 
consequence, the meeting stems from Hannibal’s desire to investigate Scipio’s character 
more fully and suggests that the entire episode can be interpreted through a reading that 
focuses on Scipio’s positive behavior. Hannibal’s comment also encourages the episode 
to be treated as a comparison between Scipio and Hannibal. According to Livy, on the 
other hand, Hannibal’s desire to obtain more favorable peace terms (aequiora impetrari) 
motivates his request. Livy’s audience is thereby encouraged to focus on Hannibal’s 
arguments in favor of making an agreement for peace. As I argued above, Polybius’ 
version of the meeting and the ensuing battle stresses the differences between Hannibal’s 
and Scipio’s approaches to Polybian opsis. How, then, does Livy’s account of the 
meeting between the two generals follow through on the suggestion that coming to peace 
terms is at the heart of this episode?  
As they begin their meeting, Hannibal speaks first. He opens his speech by 
summarizing the situation for Scipio and himself (30.30.3-11). Hannibal then describes 
his earlier campaigns and suggests to Scipio how their situations are reversed, with Scipio 
being at the point of his story arc that Hannibal was after Trasimene and Cannae.62 As 
                                               
62 quod ego fui ad Trasumennum, ad Cannas, id tu hodie es. uixdum militari aetate imperio accepto omnia 
audacissime incipientem nusquam fefellit fortuna. patris et patrui persecutus mortem ex calamitate uestrae 
domus decus insigne uirtutis pietatisque eximiae cepisti; amissas Hispanias reciperasti quattuor inde 
Punicis exercitibus pulsis; consul creatus, cum ceteris ad tutandam Italiam parum animi esset, 
transgressus in Africam (30.30.12-14). “What I was at Trasimene and at Cannae, that is what you are 
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part of his summary, Hannibal encourages Scipio to recall a moment of autopsy: “You 
have seen the standards and arms of the enemy” (signa armaque hostium uidistis; 
30.30.8). Livy’s Hannibal, therefore, recalls the Polybian historiographic method, just as 
he has in other instances in which he serves as an internal narrator, as I argue above. He 
then points to his own appearance and presence as a lesson for Scipio that he should be 
mindful of fortune’s grasp on life:  
ut omnium obliuiscaris aliorum, satis ego documenti in omnes casus sum 
quem modo castris inter Anienem atque urbem uestram positis signa 
inferentem ac iam prope scandentem moenia Romana uideris, hic 
cernas duobus fratribus, fortissimis uiris, clarissimis imperatoribus 
orbatum ante moenia prope obsessae patriae quibus terrui uestram 
urbem ea pro mea deprecantem. (30.30.16-17) 
 
You should forget everything else, I am enough proof of all types of 
misfortunes. I just had my camp set up between the Anio and your city 
and you saw me advancing my armies and just now nearly scaling the 
walls of Rome, but here you see me deprived of two brothers, very brave 
men and very celebrated commanders, and you see me before the walls of 
my city—which is practically besieged—begging to ward off from it 
those things with which I terrorized your city.   
 
Hannibal requests that Scipio use Polybian opsis as he considers his words. At the center 
of his appeal, Hannibal reiterates Scipio’s visual ability with two sight verbs, surrounding 
a deictic adverb to concretize and direct his view (videris, hic cernas). The proximity of 
                                               
today. When you were scarcely at the age of military service you accepted command. At no point did 
fortune deceive you as you were attempting all your endeavors. After you took vengeance for the deaths of 
your father and uncle and from the calamity of your house you gained a notable reputation for courage and 
exceptional devotion to duty. You recovered the lost Spanish provinces and drove four Carthaginian armies 
from there. After you were made consul, when there was too little spirit for protecting Italy among 
everyone else, you crossed to Africa.” On this passage and the parallels between Hannibal and Scipio’s 
careers to this point, Rossi 2004 and Levene 2010: 234-5. Note that for “uixdum militari aetate…fefellit 
fortuna” it is unclear who the subject of this description is. Levene accordingly translates: “I/you received 
command…” and notes that this increases the parallelism between Hannibal’s and Scipio’s careers: Levene 
2010: 234, n. 194.  
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the two verbs highlights the emphasis placed here on Scipio’s opsis. Hannibal points to 
his own visible presence here in Africa, as a man now bereaved and scrambling to defend 
his homeland after so much success in enemy territory.63 He also notes the state of 
Carthage, as a city practically under siege. Livy’s Hannibal marks his exhortation with 
parallels to continue his suggestion to Scipio that the two are on similar paths: urbem 
vestram is repeated, in a chiastic word order, near the beginning and the end of 
Hannibal’s comparison. In each instance Hannibal references the walls of their respective 
cities, with an associated participle and prope—again, in a chiastic formation: prope 
scandentem moenia Romana…moenia prope obsessae patriae. The chiastic patterns 
emphasize how Scipio’s and Hannibal’s roles are reversed as their fortunes reverse. 
Livy’s Hannibal notes the loss of his brothers, just as he has just reminded Scipio of the 
loss of his father and uncle in Spain above (30.30.12-14). By highlighting their parallel 
situations, Livy’s Hannibal hopes to invoke a response from Scipio that will render peace 
possible. He does so by encouraging Scipio to undertake Polybian opsis and to plan for 
the same reversals of fortune that he suffered.  
Hannibal then attempts to convince Scipio that there is still an opportunity to 
make peace before committing to battle. He calls to mind the Romans’ last invasion of 
Africa, the disastrous campaign of M. Atilius Regulus in the First Punic War:64 
                                               
63 The Polybian Hannibal makes a similar attempt in his appeal to Scipio (15.7.2-4).  
64 For Regulus’ campaign, cf. Polybius 1.29-35 and Livy Periochae xvii and xviii. The Periochae suggest 
that Livy places the onset of Regulus’ campaign as the end point of Book 17 (Atilius Regulus cos. victis 
navali proelio Poenis in Africam traiecit, Perioch. xvii.15-16) and then concludes with the disastrous end 
to the campaign at the opening of Book 18 (Atilius Regulus in Africa serpentem portentosae magnitudinis 
cum magna clade militum occidit, et cum aliquot proeliis bene adversus Carthaginienses pugnasset, 
successorque ei a senatu prospere bellum gerenti non mitteretur, id ipsum per litteras ad senatum scriptas 
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omnia in pace iungenda tuae potestatis sunt, P. Corneli: tunc ea habenda 
fortuna erit quam di dederint. inter pauca felicitatis uirtutisque exempla 
M. Atilius quondam in hac eadem terra fuisset, si uictor pacem 
petentibus dedisset patribus nostris; sed non statuendo felicitati modum 
nec cohibendo efferentem se fortunam quanto altius elatus erat, eo foedius 
corruit. est quidem eius qui dat, non qui petit, condiciones dicere pacis; 
sed forsitan non indigni simus qui nobismet ipsi multam inrogemus. 
(30.30.22-24) 
 
Everything is in your power, Publius Cornelius, in making a peace 
agreement: otherwise, your fortune will be to have that which the gods 
will give you. Among the few examples of good fortune and courage in 
this same land would have formerly been Marcus Atilius if he, while he 
was victorious, had given peace to our fathers when they asked for it. 
But by not setting up a limit to his success and by not restraining the good 
fortune that was carrying him along, however much higher he was lifted 
up, that much more disgracefully he fell. Indeed, it is on the part of the one 
who offers peace, not the one who asks for it, to dictate the terms of peace. 
But perhaps we would not be unworthy to propose a punishment on 
ourselves.  
 
Hannibal invokes the exemplary power of Regulus in an effort to convince Scipio that he 
should consider making peace with Carthage. According to Polybius’ account of the First 
Punic War, Regulus offered peace terms to Carthage, but the proposal was overly harsh 
due to Regulus’ expectation of continued success (1.31.4-8). The Punic envoys reject the 
terms of the agreement and, ultimately, after Xanthippus’ intervention, turn the tables on 
the Romans and defeat and capture Regulus (1.32-35). Hannibal recalls the scenario but 
claims that Scipio ought to consider allowing Carthage to propose terms, contrary to the 
expectation that it should be Rome—as the side potentially offering peace—that sets the 
                                               
questus est, in quibus inter causas petendi successoris <erat>, quod agellus eius a mercennariis desertus 
esset; Perioch. xviii.1-8). The epitomizer also notes that the Regulus campaign serves as an exemplum of 
adverse fortune: quaerente deinde fortuna, ut magnum utriusque casus exemplum in Regulo proderetur, 
arcessito a Carthaginiensibus Xanthippo, Lacedaemoniorum duce, victus proelio et captus est (Perioch. 
xviii.8-11).  
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conditions of the treaty. Hannibal notes here, too, that the Carthaginians were the ones 
seeking peace in Regulus’ time as well (pacem petentibus… patribus nostris). By 
connecting his narrative of the Regulus exemplum to his own shift in the side expected to 
propose terms, Hannibal fails to take into account both sides of the Regulus exemplum 
and consequently misses out on the part of Regulus’ exemplary lesson most apposite to 
their current debate.  
Hannibal also manipulates other facets of Regulus’ exemplary nature. Though the 
situation warrants Regulus as a negative exemplum, in that Scipio should not follow the 
precedent Regulus set, Hannibal mentions the possibility that Regulus would have been 
(fuisset) an exemplum of good fortune and courage (felicitatis uirtutisque exempla) had he 
come to terms with Carthage when they first offered. The counterfactual condition 
implies that Regulus never, in fact, reached exemplary status for felicitas and virtus. The 
epitomizer who compiled the Periocha for Book 18, however, regards Regulus as an 
65exemplum of both good and bad fortune:  
quaerente deinde fortuna, ut magnum utriusque casus exemplum in Regulo 
proderetur, arcessito a Carthaginiensibus Xanthippo, Lacedaemoniorum 
duce, victus proelio et captus est (Perioch. xviii.8-11) 
 
Then, with fortune seeking to produce an extreme exemplum of each type 
of outcome in the case of Regulus, he was conquered in battle and 
captured by Xanthippus, a Spartan general, summoned by the 
Carthaginians.  
                                               
65 Overall, Regulus’ story and his nature as an exemplum extends beyond his campaign in Africa. He is 
perhaps better known for the exemplary power of his willingness to keep an oath to return to Carthage to 
his torture and death after a visit to the Senate to extend an offer of prisoner exchange from the 
Carthaginians: e.g. Cic. de Off. 3.99-115 and Orat. in Pis. 43, and Hor. Odes 3.5. The debates between 
Hannibal and Scipio, here, and Fabius and Scipio, above, surround only Regulus’ actions during his 
campaign in Africa. cf., too, Valerius Maximus’ treatment of Regulus as an exemplum under three different 
headings: de Religione (1.1.14), de Paupertate (4.4.6), and de Crudelitate (9.2.4).  
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While Hannibal does assert that Regulus suffered from a change in fortune, he does not 
suggest that Regulus represents an exemplum of both types of fortune. Though the loss of 
Book 18 makes it impossible to examine exactly how Livy characterized the exemplary 
nature of Regulus and his campaign in Africa, the periocha suggests that Hannibal has 
misread the exemplary qualities of the Regulus narrative and is, in fact, misconstruing in 
his speech to Scipio the lessons to take from the exemplum. As I described in the previous 
chapter, above, Scipio had already in the narrative dismissed the Regulus exemplum in 
his debate with Fabius.66 Hannibal’s failure to use Regulus for Livy’s intended exemplary 
lessons places him in the same category as Fabius before him: each attempts to draw 
upon the Regulus affair in an exchange with Scipio and each misreads and misconstrues 
the situation in the endeavor.  
Scipio, on the other hand, replies to Hannibal both by showing his awareness of 
the circumstances surrounding the First Punic War and by redefining the aspects of that 
war to which Hannibal should pay attention. After some initial comments about 
Hannibal’s arrival and the Punic perfidy exhibited in the Carthaginians’ recent actions to 
break the truce (30.31.1-4), Scipio explains to Hannibal why he expects to find success in 
the conclusion of their current war:  
neque patres nostri priores de Sicilia neque nos de Hispania fecimus 
bellum; et tunc Mamertinorum sociorum periculum et nunc Sagunti 
excidium nobis pia ac iusta induerunt arma. uos lacessisse et tu ipse fateris 
                                               
66 Chapter 3, Part 3, above. There I argue that Scipio rejects Fabius’ reading of the Regulus exemplum 
based on its inaccurate portrayal of Regulus’ defeat and its inappropriateness to the current situation. Scipio 
instead proposes that the precedents established by Regulus’ campaign in Africa were best counteracted by 
his own campaign in Spain and that Hannibal’s invasion of Italy is the best exemplum for him to follow in 
his proposed invasion of the Carthaginian homeland.   
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et di testes sunt qui et illius belli exitum secundum ius fasque dederunt 
et huius dant et dabunt. (30.31.4-5) 
 
Our fathers before us did not bring about the war for Sicily, nor did we 
bring about the war for Spain. In that earlier instance it was the danger of 
the Mamertine allies and for this one it was the destruction of Saguntum 
that brought on us a pious and just cause for arms. The fact that you 
provoked this war you yourself admit and the gods are witnesses of this, 
the gods who both provided a just and proper favorable outcome for 
that war and are currently providing one and will, in the end, provide one 
for this war, too.  
 
Scipio responds to Hannibal’s attempt to invoke the Regulus affair as a lesson by 
reframing the aspects of the First Punic War that should be considered in their current 
debate. As an internal narrator, Scipio had already in his debate with Fabius (28.40-44) 
argued why the Regulus exemplum has no bearing on his own invasion in Africa, so there 
is no need to address the issues with Hannibal’s mention of the Regulus exemplum 
directly. Instead, Scipio points out how Carthaginian aggression influenced the outbreaks 
of both Punic Wars. As part of this defense, Scipio claims that the gods themselves bring 
divine retribution back on Carthage for their unjust acts at the start of these wars.67 In his 
description, Scipio makes an appeal to the exemplarity of these deeds: The victorious 
campaigns of the Romans in the first war (illius belli exitum secundum ius fasque) are the 
actions worth repeating. The gods are the audience of the deeds (di testes sunt). Spain and 
Sicily, currently possessions of the Romans due to their successes in these wars (as noted 
                                               
67 The direct attribution of the Carthaginians’ defeat coming from divine vengeance is made by Livy in a 
few places, but always—as it is here—in the mouth of an internal narrator: 21.10 (Hanno), 21.40.11 
(Publius Scipio), 26.8.5 (Fabius), 28.44.7 (Scipio Africanus), and 30.42.21 (Hasdrubal Haedus): Levene 
2010: 345. On the unpredictability of fortuna in dictating gods’ interaction with men’s affairs: Davies 
2004: 121-23; cf. Levene 1993: 75. On moral causation more broadly in Livy’s Third Decade: Levene 
2010: 339-53.  
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by Scipio just above as in their power for a long time already: ea quae iam pridem in 
nostra potestate sunt; 30.31.2), serve as monuments in commemoration of these 
exemplary deeds. Lastly, the repetition of the action is represented in Scipio’s claim that 
he and his troops will prevail in the current war due to their past success. Scipio rejects 
Hannibal’s use of the Regulus exemplum by using exemplary language itself and, in so 
doing, he suggests that the completion of the events he proposes will be realized and 
achieve the fulfillment of an exemplary loop.  
 In another section of his speech, Hannibal contrasts his own situation with 
Scipio’s. Hannibal proposes that Scipio has, until now, experienced continuous good 
fortune (perpetuam felicitatem; 30.30.11). He then furthers the notion by citing a 
proverbial statement about the limits of a man who knows only good luck: “The one 
whom fortune has never deceived does not easily reflect on the uncertainties of events” 
(non temere incerta casuum reputat quem fortuna nunquam decepit; 30.30.11). After 
Scipio responds to Hannibal’s reading of the Regulus episode, he contradicts Hannibal’s 
claim that he has no experience with misfortune:  
Quod ad me attinet, et humanae infirmitatis memini et uim fortunae 
reputo et omnia quaecumque agimus subiecta esse mille casibus scio; 
ceterum quemadmodum superbe et uiolenter me faterer facere si 
priusquam in Africam traiecissem te tua uoluntate cedentem Italia et 
imposito in naues exercitu ipsum uenientem ad pacem petendam 
aspernarer, sic nunc cum prope manu conserta restitantem ac 
tergiuersantem in Africam attraxerim nulla sum tibi uerecundia obstrictus. 
proinde si quid ad ea in quae tum pax conuentura uidebatur, quasi multa 
nauium cum commeatu per indutias expugnatarum legatorumque 
uiolatorum, adicitur, est quod referam ad consilium: sin illa quoque grauia 
uidentur, bellum parate quoniam pacem pati non potuistis. (30.31.6-9) 
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As far as it pertains to me, I am mindful of the infirmity of mankind and 
I reflect on the power of fortune and I know that everything we 
accomplish is subject to a thousand misfortunes. But, just as I would 
confess that I would act arrogantly and impetuously if I would have 
rejected you coming to ask for peace yourself and leaving Italy of your 
own volition and with your troops embarked on your ships before I 
crossed over to Africa, but now, since I have dragged you back to Africa 
as you were resisting and refusing to the point that we nearly came to 
blows, I am bound by no sense of shame toward you. Therefore, if 
anything is added to the terms on which peace seemed about to be agreed 
at that time, like a fine for the transport ships seized during the armistice 
and the injury done to the legates, then there is something which I can take 
back to the council. But if these things seem too burdensome, prepare for 
war since you cannot abide by peace.  
 
Scipio uses additional verbal parallels to counter Hannibal’s allegation: he marks his 
response to Hannibal by repeating the phrase that Hannibal uses to open the comparison 
between their situations (quod ad me attinet; 30.30.10 and 30.31.6).  By connecting their 
two speeches with recurring language, Scipio strengthens his direct contradiction of 
Hannibal’s claim that he is unfamiliar with misfortune. He also “reflects on” (reputo) the 
power of fortune, which Hannibal asserts is difficult (non temere...reputat; 30.30.11) 
without knowledge of misfortune. Among the personal hardships that Hannibal mentions 
for his part is the loss of his brothers (30.30.16-17). Scipio, similarly, had lost his father 
and uncle in this war, as both he (26.41 and 28.43.18) and Hannibal admit (30.30.13). 
Hannibal even refers to the deaths of the elder Scipios as a “catastrophe” (calamitate; 
30.30.13). By making reference to and contradicting Hannibal’s claim that Scipio is 
unaware of misfortune, Scipio undermines the rest of Hannibal’s argument that their 
situations (here at Zama and after Cannae, respectively) are parallel. Scipio has now 
already suffered the hardships that Hannibal endures and learns from after his string of 
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victories leading up to Cannae. If Hannibal’s assertion that Scipio should better consider 
the possibility of misfortune in his decision is not sound, then the premise that underlies 
his suggestion for making peace too becomes unpersuasive. As Scipio continues, he 
describes the situation necessary to lead to the kind of peace terms Hannibal suggests. A 
contrafactual condition (faterer... si…aspernarer) confirms that Hannibal has not met the 
circumstances that would lead Scipio to agree to his proposed conditions of peace.  
Overall, Scipio shows in his meeting with Hannibal an ability to mobilize past 
actions and experiences to his gain in an explanation of future events. He rejects and 
counteracts Hannibal’s attempts to invoke the Regulus episode as a means of pushing for 
an agreement of peace. While Hannibal invokes aspects of Polybian opsis in his reference 
to the visual qualities that suggests a potential course of action, Scipio instead interprets a 
string of past events that demonstrate the power of misfortune (Regulus, Hannibal, and 
himself) and exhibits an approach that reflects Livy’s own exemplary model of 
historiography. Scipio closes his speech with an exhortation for future behavior (bellum 
parate) noting that Hannibal cannot tolerate peace (pacem pati non potuistis). Hannibal’s 
own aggression, as confirmed by both men in their speeches (30.30.3 and 30.31.4-5), 
becomes the exemplary behavior upon which Scipio bases his call to action. Scipio 
consequently uses exemplary language to make Hannibal himself the exemplum which 
disproves his own claims. Scipio therefore uses exemplarity to outdo Hannibal’s 
argument and to advance his own reading of the situation instead.  
As the two commanders leave their meeting, each goes to his camp and advises 
their soldiers to prepare for battle. Livy conflates the two exhortations into a single 
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report, recording the words these generals spoke to their troops on the eve of the decisive 
battle:  
In castra ut est uentum, pronuntiant ambo arma expedirent milites 
animosque ad supremum certamen, non in unum diem sed in perpetuum, 
si felicitas adesset, uictores. Roma an Carthago iura gentibus daret ante 
crastinam noctem scituros; neque enim Africam aut Italiam sed orbem 
terrarum uictoriae praemium fore; par periculum praemio quibus 
aduersa pugnae fortuna fuisset. nam neque Romanis effugium ullum 
patebat in aliena ignotaque terra, et Carthagini, supremo auxilio effuso, 
adesse uidebatur praesens excidium. (30.32.1-3) 
 
As they went into their camps, both announced that the soldiers should 
prepare their arms and their courage for the decisive struggle, to be the 
victors not just for a single day, but for all time, if fortune were present 
for them. They said that they would know before the following night 
whether Rome or Carthage would make laws for the world, for the 
reward for victory would not be Africa or Italy but the whole earth. 
They said that there was a danger equal to the prize for those whom the 
fortune of battle turned against. For there was no place of refuge for the 
Romans in a foreign and unknown land and, for Carthage, since the final 
defense was already sent out, destruction seems to be at hand.  
 
The impersonal passive in the ut temporal clause (ut est ventum) and the subject of the 
main clause, ambo, collectivize the two speeches into one. Livy’s report gives the 
impression that the two generals speak verbatim exhortations synchronously in their own 
encampments. The conflation of their speeches implies that they each took away from 
their meeting the same interpretation of the events and debates they shared. The fact that 
they left their conference having the same opinion of how matters stood suggests that one 
of the generals convinced the other of their reading of the events: so, which of them came 
off the victor in their debate?  
First, the ostensibly mutual speech after the meeting makes no reference to any 
chance at peace, instead telling the soldiers to ready their arms (arma expedirent). 
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Scipio’s final suggestion to Hannibal was to “prepare for war, since you cannot abide by 
peace” (bellum parate quoniam pacem pati non potuistis; 30.31.9). Second, the speech 
offered by both generals also describes the presence (or absence) of both good and bad 
fortune (si felicitas adesset…aduersa…fortuna fuisset). While both generals discuss the 
nature of fortune in their meeting, Hannibal attempts to encourage Scipio to expect his 
fortune to change given the recent success he has had: “The greatest fortune is that which 
must be trusted the least” (maximae cuique fortunae minime credendum est; 30.30.18). In 
his reference to Regulus, too, Hannibal suggests that Scipio should soon expect to find 
bad fortune in his campaign. Scipio, instead, informs Hannibal that he is already aware of 
the vicissitudes of fortune in his reply (30.31.6, quoted above). Since the ostensibly 
mutual speech includes possibilities of both the positive and negative outcomes, Scipio’s 
rejection of Hannibal’s claim to expect a reversal of fortune has found traction in the 
minds of the two generals.  
Additionally, the mutual speech by the two commanders describes the fate of the 
“whole world” (orbem terrarum) as being at stake. The equivalent term for Polybius, 
οἰκουμένη, also appears in his text before the battle. As an external narrator, Polybius 
claims that the inhabited world is at stake at Zama (15.9.2-5).68 So, too, does Scipio as 
internal narrator in a speech to his troops (15.10.2). As argued above, Polybius, qua 
external narrator, and Scipio, qua internal narrator, have their roles converge by offering 
an interpretation of the situation that is lexically and semantically parallel before the 
                                               
68 Levene 2010: 11 also notes that Livy takes up the general sentiments of Polybius on the stakes for which 
they fight at Zama.  
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battle. In fact, the joint speech by Hannibal and Scipio after their meeting in Livy has 
several thematic parallels to Scipio’s battlefield exhortation in Polybius (15.10): the 
potential rewards for victory, the lack of an escape route for the Romans, the possibility 
of both good and bad fortunes, and a claim of the equivalency of the two potential 
outcomes.69  
As he does in instances that I analyzed in Chapters Two and Three above, Livy 
mediates the Polybian text through the guise of his internal narrators. He thereby 
encourages an interpretation of the events that looks back on Polybius’ text. Just as 
Scipio demonstrates the correct reading of the events in Polybius’ text by copying the 
interpretation of the external narrator, Livy’s integration of this same reading in the 
mutual speech shared by Hannibal and Scipio shows that Hannibal comes over to 
Scipio’s explanation of the circumstances in Livy’s text. By showing that Scipio has 
“won” the debate in this manner, Livy demonstrates that Scipio’s rejection of Hannibal’s 
attempted use of the Regulus exemplum is, indeed, correct. Scipio is a proficient 
interpreter of exempla in his role as internal narrator, successfully reinterpreting the 
Regulus exemplum (among others) on two different occasions: here at Zama and in his 
debate with Fabius in Book Twenty-Eight. Additionally, Scipio rejects Hannibal’s 
explanation of the meaning of his physical appearance and, in so doing, rejects an 
interpretation based on Polybian opsis.  
                                               
69 The claim of equivalency for success and failure: Polyb. 15.10.5: πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴημεν ἀγεννέστατοι καὶ 
συλλήβδην ἀφρονέστατοι πάντων, εἰ παρέντες τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑλοίμεθα τὰ μέγιστα τῶν κακῶν 
διὰ φιλοζωίαν; “How would we not be totally base and, in short, totally foolish—more so than anyone—if 
we passed up the greatest of goods and chose the greatest of evils because of our love of life.” Livy 
30.32.2: par periculum praemio; “the danger is equal to the prize.”  
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As Livy presents the meeting between Scipio and Hannibal before Zama, the 
debate revolves around a contrast between the power of a visual spectacle—Hannibal’s 
demonstration of the visible clues of his person and the land around Carthage—and 
exemplarity—the Regulus exemplum and its reflection of the power of both good and bad 
fortune. As the two generals leave the meeting and take the same lessons back to their 
troops—lessons that are drawn from Scipio’s reading of the situation—Livy demonstrates 
which practical methodology is more effective. Scipio, whose efforts and speeches 
throughout the second half of the Third Decade demonstrate his ability to read exempla 
effectively and convey the appropriate lessons from the exempla to his internal audience, 
comes off the better of Hannibal, whose efforts remain mired in attempts at Polybian 
rationales based on autopsy. The meeting of these two generals allows Livy to contrast 
the historiographic methodologies of himself—through Scipio’s exemplary readings—
and his predecessor Polybius—through Hannibal’s reliance on autopsy and visual 
spectacle. As the forces of Hannibal and Scipio then clash in the Battle of Zama, they 
effectively stand as analogues of the Polybian and Livian methods of historiography, 
respectively.  
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Part 4: Looking Forward and Back: The End of Third Decade 
After the battle concludes, Livy continues his narrative by describing episodes 
that both bring the Hannibalic War to a close and also prefigure events to come in his 
later books:70 the pillaging of the Carthaginian camp and a subsequent engagement with 
Syphax’s cavalry (30.36), Hannibal’s flight to Antiochus (30.38), the agreement of terms 
of peace (30.37-38, 40, 43-44), the assignment of provincial commands for the coming 
year (30.40), and a meeting between the Senate and Philip’s ambassadors from Macedon 
(30.42), an exchange that effectively forecasts the soon-to-follow Second Macedonian 
War.71 Finally, Livy brings the book and decade to a formal close with a description of 
Scipio’s triumph (30.45).72 As part of the account of the triumph, Livy notes that Syphax, 
the defeated king of the Masaesulii who should have been led in chains as part of the 
triumph, died shortly after arriving in Italy (30.45.4-5). Livy uses this report as the 
opportunity to include the only direct reference to Polybius that he makes in the Third 
Decade: a note that Polybius claims that Syphax lived to be led along in the triumph: 
“Polybius—an author not at all to be rejected—records that this king was led in the 
triumph” (hunc regem in triumpho ductum Polybius, haudquaquam spernendus auctor, 
tradit; 30.45.5).73 The reference to Polybius comes in the midst of an example of explicit 
                                               
70 On these episodes as both a closure for the decade and also a connection to what follows in the rest of the 
AUC, Levene 2010: 10-13. 
71 In particular, the Senate informs the Macedonian ambassadors: “Your king is seeking war and if he 
continues on that path he will find it very soon” (bellum quaerere regem et si pergat propediem 
inuenturum; 30.42.7).  
72 On the triumph as the closure of the war and Livy’s Third Decade: Levene 2010: 10-12. cf., too, his note 
on “closure” (p. 10, n. 14). On the triumph as a closural elements in literary works more broadly: Westall 
2014.  
73 Polybius’ report of the triumph, with Syphax present as Livy claims: 16.23. cf., too, Chapter 2, Part 4, 
above. On the citation: Moore 2010: 148 notes how this fits with Livy’s larger pattern of source criticism 
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source criticism, comparing the account of his predecessor, which, in this instance, 
contains information Livy concludes is wrong. Despite his misgivings about Polybius’ 
mistake about Syphax, Livy offers clear, albeit litotic, praise of his predecessor.74 The 
reputation of Polybius’ method as an author (auctor) is of particular importance to Livy 
here, not just the factual basis of this particular piece of information.  
Immediately after this reference to Polybius, Livy concludes the Third Decade 
with a prospective look at the impact that Scipio has on future generations of Roman 
commanders:75  
Africani cognomen militaris prius fauor an popularis aura 
celebrauerit an, sicuti Felicis Sullae Magnique Pompeii patrum 
memoria, coeptum ab adsentatione familiari sit parum compertum 
habeo; primus certe hic imperator nomine uictae ab se gentis est 
nobilitatus; exemplo deinde huius nequaquam uictoria pares 
insignes imaginum titulos claraque cognomina familiarum fecerunt. 
(30.45.6-7) 
 
I have too little knowledge to say whether his popularity with the 
army or the popular favor first honored him with the cognomen 
“Africanus” or if it began from friendly flattery, just like “Felix” for 
Sulla and “Magnus” for Pompey did in the memory of our fathers. 
Certainly, however, he is the first general to be celebrated with the 
name of a nation that he had conquered. In his exemplum, then, did 
men not at all equal in victory gain famous titles for their imagines 
and renowned names for their families.  
 
                                               
and how it casts further negative light on Livy’s Roman sources. Levene 2010: 161-62 notes how this 
sudden citation reveals what might have been suspected by an attentive reader earlier in the narrative, 
namely that Polybius was a major source for Livy’s account of the Hannibalic War. Levene’s argument is 
in response to Tränkle’s position that Livy only turns to Livy at the start of Book 31: Tränkle 1977: 193-
241.  
74 The only other example of Livy’s praise for his sources also concerns Polybius: 33.10.10; cf. Moore 
2010: 148 and Luce 1977: 141, n. 3.  
75 On Livy’s use of prospective and retrospective narrative comments in his triumphal notices: Pausch 
2011: 98. 
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In the closing lines of the Third Decade, Livy notes that Scipio becomes an exemplum 
himself in taking the cognomen “Africanus,” as later Roman generals, too, take the 
names of cities they conquer as honorific cognomina. While Livy often records 
exemplary characteristics exemplified by Roman triumphs, his mention of the Scipionic 
exemplum is a rare moment where he as external narrator editorializes on the exemplary 
behavior of a character.76 Livy’s description of Scipio’s precedent includes nearly the full 
complement of the exemplary loop: First, the valorous behavior to be celebrated is the 
conquering of an enemy people (uictae ab se gentis). Second, the requirement for an 
internal audience to the action or its commemoration is met by the army, who witnessed 
and participated in the victory, and the Roman people, who celebrated Scipio’s triumph: 
Livy notes both the army and the Roman people as possible sources for the cognomen 
(militaris…fauor an popularis aura). Third, the physical commemoration of the act is 
demonstrated both by the actual triumph that Livy has just described and, more 
permanently, in the portrait busts and attached titles that these future Roman generals 
engender (insignes imaginum titulos). Finally, although Livy, as the narrator of this 
exemplum, does not make an explicit call for imitation, he clearly describes that such an 
appeal has already been fulfilled by future Romans (note the perfect tense fecerunt, 
suggesting a completed action). Consequently, Scipio’s adoption of the cognomen and 
Livy’s description of the same fulfill the exemplary loop and establish a model behavior 
for future Roman generals to attempt to follow, although, as Livy claims, the ones who 
                                               
76 On these two points, cf. Chaplin 2000: p. 50 nn. 1-2 and pp. 140-42. On Scipio’s triumph and its impact 
on Rome and later triumphs: Pittenger 2008: 165-67 and 188-89.  
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have done so do not meet the bar set by Scipio for the magnitude of his victory over 
Hannibal.  
On the grounds that Scipio stands as an analogue for Livy’s own historiographic 
method, as argued above, his exemplary status here leverages Livy’s reputation as a 
historian in several ways: Retrospectively, the citation to Polybius made just above—
notable for being the only direct reference to Polybius in the decade—allows Livy to 
suggest his own superiority to his Greek counterpart. On the one hand, Livy’s other 
source contradicts Polybius about the detail of Syphax’s presence in the triumph, so Livy 
can claim a direct advantage in the one and only detail he directly attributes to Polybius 
in the Third Decade. But that is a detail of little consequence and mitigated by the fact 
that, despite dying before the triumph itself, Syphax’s death did receive public attention 
with a state funeral given for him.77 On the other hand, Livy also notes that, despite the 
purported factual blunder regarding Syphax, Polybius is not an author that should be 
dismissed (haudquaquam spernendus).  Given that Hannibal functions as a modello-
esemplare for Polybius throughout the Third Decade, Scipio’s celebration of a triumph 
over Hannibal is analogically equivalent to Livy celebrating a victory over Polybius. 
Additionally, Syphax’s absence from the triumph allows more focus to be placed on 
Scipio’s victory over Hannibal. Livy’s abrupt—and perhaps unexpected—reference to 
Polybius in such a pivotal moment in his narrative only strengthens the connections 
between Hannibal and Polybius in the mind of Livy’s audience. Prospectively, Scipio’s 
                                               
77 30.45.4: conspecta tamen mors eius fuit quia publico funere est elatus; “His death was, however, made 
public because he was buried with a public funeral.”  
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status as modello-esemplare for Livy’s historiographic method allows Livy to suggest 
that future historians may not achieve a feat on par with him. Although Scipio here sets 
an exemplum that others attempt to follow, no one matches up to him in their 
accomplishment (nequaquam uictoria pares). Livy’s successors too may attempt to 
follow in his footsteps but they too will find themselves unequal in their endeavors.  
  
The Battle of Zama for both Polybius and Livy becomes an opportunity for them 
to demonstrate the value and utility of their respective historiographic methods. Polybius 
has Hannibal and Scipio both display opsis in their actions before and during the battle. 
Additionally, each of the generals represents one of the two types of pragmatic 
didacticism that he suggests are useful for encouraging the proper political and military 
action: learning through seeing others’ misfortunes or experiencing them for oneself. In 
the battlefield exhortations to their armies, Hannibal encourages his men to consider the 
potential harm that others would receive should they fail, while Scipio asks his men to 
consider the consequences for themselves in defeat. Ultimately, Scipio’s victory in the 
ensuing battle represents a demonstration of the effectiveness of his approach over 
Hannibal’s. His narrative of the Battle of Zama therefore allows Polybius to represent the 
two sides to his pragmatic approach to historiographic writing and to demonstrate which 
of those methods his audience should aim to undertake in their own military and political 
endeavors.  
Livy, too, reflects in his narrative of the Battle of Zama the utility of his approach 
to historiographic writing. Over the course of his account of the war leading up to the 
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conclusive battle, Livy uses the figures of Hannibal and Scipio in their roles as internal 
narrators as the modelli-esemplari for Polybius’ and Livy’s historiographic approaches, 
respectively. Hannibal frequently employs opsis and incorporates Polybian language into 
his speeches. Scipio instead uses exemplarity in his role as internal narrator. As Hannibal 
and Scipio meet before the battle and on the battlefield at Zama, then, their competition 
allows Livy to reflect on the value of his historiographic methodology vis-à-vis Polybius’ 
through the roles of their analogues, Scipio and Hannibal, respectively. As Livy uses self-
reference and intertextuality to create a polemical relationship with one of his 
predecessors and source texts, he also participates in larger Augustan literary practices, in 
which contemporary poets especially are well known to use similar techniques to put 
their works on par with or in a position superior to their predecessors and models. Livy, 
then, uses Hannibal and Scipio as internal narrators in the Third Decade to narrativize his 
place in the development of Greco-Roman historiography and to demonstrate how his 
work and his method is superior to that of one of his predecessors, the “not-to-be-
despised” Polybius.   
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Chapter Five 
Fragments of the Roman Historiographic Tradition in Livy’s Third 
Decade 
 
In the previous chapters I analyzed how Livy uses internal narrators in the AUC to 
integrate and interact with the text of Polybius, one of his source texts. In particular I 
examined how comments made by the external narrator of Polybius’ Histories were 
moved into the voices of internal narrators in Livy’s text. The integration of his sources 
creates a complex intertextual relationship that stresses Livy’s distinction from his 
predecessors and asserts Livy’s authority over them, as I argued occurred in the decisive 
exchange between Hannibal and Scipio who serve as modelli-esemplari of Polybius and 
Livy, respectively, in their roles as internal narrators in the AUC. Polybius is, of course, 
just one of a handful of known sources Livy used in composing his Third Decade. 
Unfortunately, a majority of Livy’s source texts survive only in fragmentary forms.1 A 
similar type of analysis of integration and analogous narratorial identity across wide 
sections of Livy’s and his sources’ texts is not possible with these fragmentary 
predecessors. In the extant fragments, it is often difficult to determine what, if any, 
portions are derived from comments made by external or internal narrators. In general, 
when working with prose fragments the problem of distinguishing between narratorial 
levels is compounded and it even becomes difficult to conclude whether the words 
provided by the cover texts are citations, paraphrases, or some combination of the two.2 
                                               
1 Levene 2010: 126ff. on the fragmentary sources that Livy uses in the Third Decade. 
2 Brunt 1980 lays out some of the pitfalls of working with citations, epitomes, and other notices of now lost 
works in cover texts and the potential for inaccuracy. To demonstrate his point, Brunt compares notices of 
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For example, the text quoted, ostensibly verbatim, for the opening of Cato’s Origines 
(F1a, F1b FRHist) appears in a different word order in each of two cover texts.3 While a 
slight variation in word order is a small issue, a problem arising from two attestations of a 
line likely as famous as the opening of a work demonstrates the potential for inaccuracy 
likely to be exacerbated for longer quotations,4 less significant portions of the work, or 
when no point of comparison from a parallel attestation can be had.5  
This chapter analyzes the fragments of these lost works and argues that Livy 
incorporates facets of the fragmentary texts into acts of internal narration, just as he does 
with Hannibal’s speeches, which contain elements from the narrative text of Polybius. 
The fragmentary nature of Livy’s major sources makes a sustained comparative 
framework—of the type I argued was present with Hannibal as the modello-esemplare for 
Polybius—impossible. I therefore focus primarily on Livy’s two most-cited sources in the 
Third Decade, Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias, to create a similar but narrowed 
version of that framework.6 Additionally, the editorial decisions that lie behind the 
ordering of the fragments often revolve around a chronological placement by comparison 
                                               
extant texts to the corresponding surviving sections (Plutarch on Polybius, e.g.) to show how often the 
reports can be misleading. Cf., too, Cornell 2014, vol. I: 15-16 on how this results in difficult editorial 
decisions for editions of fragments. For a similar demonstration of the limits of relying on citations to 
poetic fragments, Dover 2000.  
3 F1a FRHist = Serg. GL 4.502: si ques sunt homines; F1b FRHist = Pomp. GL 5.208: si ques homines sunt, 
and also continues the citation of the line.  
4 Even opening lines, however, are also not immune to textual issues: the first line of Livy’s general preface 
is notably misquoted in the manuscript tradition, but preserved in Quintilian (9.4.74). On this, Moles 1993: 
141 and n. 3. Luce 1965:234-37 believes the emendation is Livy’s own; contra Moles 1993: 162-63, n. 3.  
5 Consider, for example, Fabius F4a and b FRHist = DH 1.75.4-84.1 and Plut. Rom. 3-4, 6-8, in which 
Dionysius and Plutarch each cite an extended narrative of Romulus’ childhood, with several parallel 
sections, each interspersed with additional material that can only be extracted upon comparison.  
6 Levene 2010: 126 lists the citations for Coelius and Antias, totaling eleven and eight citations, 
respectively. 
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with a full surviving narrative, such as Livy’s Third Decade.7 The result is that a scholar 
who asserts that a surviving historical narrative incorporates or intertextually makes 
reference to a fragment drawn from another cover text, makes an argument bordering on 
circularity from the onset. To avoid such potential circularity, I will consider fragments 
that have non-Livian cover texts and that can be ordered or contextualized without 
reliance on Livy’s narrative.8  
To begin, I return to a speech I first explored in Chapter One to examine how 
Livy combines a speech and source criticism into a shared narrative act.9 After 
Hannibal’s victory at Cannae, he sends his brother Mago to report to Carthage the status 
of his campaign. As Livy describes the embassy (23.11-13), after Mago narrates the 
success that Hannibal has had in Italy, he then provides the following display in the 
middle of the speech: 
ad fidem deinde tam laetarum rerum effundi in uestibulo curiae 
iussit anulos aureos, qui tantus aceruus fuit ut metientibus 
dimidium supra tres modios explesse sint quidam auctores: fama 
tenuit quae propior uero est, haud plus fuisse modio. adiecit 
deinde uerbis, quo maioris cladis indicium esset, neminem nisi 
equitem, atque eorum ipsorum primores, id gerere insigne. summa 
fuit orationis, quo propius spem belli perficiendi sit, eo magis omni 
ope iuuandum Hannibalem esse (23.12.1-3) 
 
To add to the confidence of such successful endeavors, he ordered 
the golden rings to be poured out in the entrance of the Senate 
                                               
7 The chronological ordering of fragmentary editions based on a known narrative is a tradition that goes 
back to the earliest editions of Reliquiae: e.g. Peter [1870] 1914 and 1906 and Roth 1852. On the ordering 
of fragmentary editions and the issues that arise with chronological ordering, Cornell 2014, vol. I: 16-19.  
8 In separating the Livian and non-Livian fragments of these authors for my analysis, I follow the 
methodology of Elliot 2013, whose recent work on Ennius’ Annales distinguished between fragments 
drawn from or associated with Vergil’s Aeneid and those from other cover texts. This allows me to 
minimize the potential for circularity in arguing that Livy incorporates these narratives by first establishing 
what trends are present in the non-Livian fragments. 
9 cf. Part 3 in Chapter 1, above. 
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chamber. This made such a heaping pile that some authors claim 
that they filled more than three and a half measures when counted. 
A report which is nearer to the truth holds that it was not more 
than a single measure. He then added these words, in order that the 
significance of the disaster be more clear, that no one outside the 
equestrian order—and even then just the chief among them—wears 
this as a token of honor. The gist of the speech was that by as much 
as they were closer to the hope of finishing the war, there was that 
much more need of providing help to Hannibal. 
 
The anonymous citation (quidam auctores) at the heart of the speech highlights other 
accounts of the speech and its associated scene and brings these variant traditions to the 
awareness of the external audience. The vast total for the rings claimed by these 
anonymous sources ties into the preceding oration, which focuses on the overwhelming 
quantity of foes defeated by Hannibal (23.11.7-12). While the total of three modii seems 
supported by the speech at first glance, Livy then makes reference to another surviving 
version of the story. Although he describes the alternate tale as a fama, he notes that it 
comes closest to the truth (propior uero). After Livy’s brief aside, Mago finishes his 
speech with further emphasis of Hannibal’s successes so far. Comments made by both the 
external and internal narrators—Livy and Mago—and the content of the speech itself 
surround and undermine the purported truth value of the fama claiming the smaller 
measure for the number of rings. The overall effect of the narrative surrounding Mago’s 
speech to the Carthaginian assembly is that the version of the display that is regarded as 
less likely by the historian is the one whose consequences are meant to be felt as the 
narrative continues. 
 Livy’s use of citation and source criticism blends seamlessly with an act of 
internal narration. The text of an internal narrator and an inaccurate variant tradition 
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holds more power over the effect of the narrative than the historical truth analyzed by the 
external narratorial voice of the historian. This chapter explores how Livy uses acts of 
internal narration as a means of giving voice to the larger historiographic tradition of his 
predecessors. I argue that we gain additional insight into the now fragmentary works of 
Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias by considering how Livy integrates elements of 
their accounts into acts of internal narration. Livy either includes their words in the 
speech act directly or incorporates aspects of their works through the focalization of 
internal audiences.  
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Part 1: The Texts of Coelius and Antias 
A few words about the texts of Coelius and Antias and the details of them that can 
be gleaned from the surviving fragments will ground the discussion that follows. Coelius 
Antipater broke from his predecessors in the tradition of historical writing in Rome and 
composed a monograph on a single topic: the Second Punic War.10 This monograph has 
survived in sixty-two certain fragments, eleven of which are cited by Livy, and likely 
comprised seven books.11 Several features found in the fragments provide some details of 
the general characteristics of his narrative. First, Coelius is said to have made use of the 
text of Silenus as a source (F8 FRHist).12 The connection to Silenus has been noted as an 
explanation for the origin of the fantastical elements of Coelius’ narrative (e.g., F32, F36, 
and F52 FRHist).13 Second, the surviving fragments indicate that Coelius made frequent 
use of speeches in his text.14 Coelius is, as Peter argues, the first Roman historian for 
                                               
10 On how Coelius fits into the larger historiographic tradition at Rome, Badian 1966: 15-17 and 32-33; 
Chassignet 1999: 2.xli-xlix, 50-70, and 134-50; Kierdorf 2003: 35-38; and Cornell 2014: 1.257-63. The 
definitive standalone treatment of Coelius remains Herrmann 1979.  
11 There are, in addition to the sixty-two definite fragments, six of doubtful origins: Cornell 2014: 2.420-23. 
Fragments are cited from each of seven books, the last of which deal with the years 203-201, thus likely 
confirming that the work was divided into only seven books: Cornell 2014: 1.258-60.  
12 F8 FRHist = Cic. de Div. 1.49 = Silenus F2 FGrHist: hoc item in Sileni, quem Coelius sequitur, Graeca 
historia est (is autem diligentissime res Hannibalis persecutes est), “This, likewise, is in the Greek History 
of Silenus, whom Coelius follows. Silenus very carefully related the deeds of Hannibal.” Nepos Hann. 13.3 
also notes how Silenus was a close comrade of Hannibal’s and careful chronicler of his actions. Other 
likely sources for Coelius include Fabius Pictor and Polybius: Cornell 2014: 1.261. Peter 1914: ccxxxi 
argues against Polybius being a source for Coelius on the dubious assertion that a serious source like 
Polybius would have been out of place for an author of an account as sensationalized as Coelius’.  
13 F32 FRHist = Cic. de Div. 1.48; F36 FRHist = Livy 29.25.3-4; F52 FRHist = Pliny NH 31.21 each deal 
with fantastical elements such as divine dreams, unusual omens and portents, or other adynata. Notably, 
however, the religious and sensationalized aspects of these fragments are not out of place compared to the 
texts of Herodotus and, to a lesser extent, Livy.  
14 F 3, 4, 5, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 40, 44, 45, 55, and 59 FRHist all certainly or likely are derived from 
speeches in Coelius’ text. The identification of these fragments as oratorical comes from the presence of 
second person forms, the testimony of the cover text, or content that suggests a speech act. Servius records 
a citation that seems to be derived from a speech in oratio obliqua (F59 FRHist = Serv. Aen. 4.390-91).  
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whom we have evidence that he followed the Greek convention of using invented 
speeches in his narrative, but this could be an accident of the survival of Coelius’ 
predecessors.15 The sheer volume of the surviving fragments of Coelius of an oratorical 
nature suggest that the speeches were a notable enough part of his monograph to warrant 
later authors to comment on and record elements drawn from Coelius’ speeches. Third, 
the Carthaginian point of view that features heavily in Silenus’ text provides Coelius with 
a source that allows him to frame his narrative from the Punic perspective. For instance, 
Coelius includes among his speeches one delivered by a Carthaginian general after the 
Battle of Cannae (F22 FRHist).16 Coelius also shows Carthaginian characters acting 
positively. For instance, he describes Hannibal’s pious reaction to a dream in which Juno 
appeared to him by returning and improving a statue of the goddess (F32 FRHist).17  
Livy directly incorporates the Carthaginian point of view from Coelius’ histories 
through variant citation, as he does with the story of Publius Scipio’s rescue at the Battle 
of the Ticinus (21.46.7-10). The direct narrative portion of Livy’s account of the Ticinus 
gives the future Africanus the honor of saving his father (21.46.8). Coelius, instead, 
claims that the elder Scipio is saved at Ticinus by a Ligurian slave (F12 FRHist).18 
                                               
15 Peter 1914: ccxviii asserts that Coelius is the first to have made use of invented speeches. Cornell 2014: 
1.262 provides strong evidence that other earlier Roman historians included invented speeches as well. The 
issue at stake here is only the use of invented speeches: Cato, for one, certainly included at least his own 
speeches in his Origines: e.g., his speech for the Rhodians: F 87-93 FRHist. = Gell. 6.3 passim. This speech 
also circulated in an independent text (Gell. 6.3.7). On the speech: Astin 1978: 137-39 and 2773-82; 
Calboli 2003.  
16 F22 FRHist = Gell. 10.24.6-7, on which, cf. Part 2, below.  
17 F32 FRHist = Cic de Div. 1.48.  
18 F12 FRHist = Livy 21.46.7-10: [10] servati consulis decus Coelius ad servum natione Ligurem delegat; 
malim equidem de filio verum esse, quod et plures tradidere auctores et fama obtinuit. “Coelius assigns the 
glory of saving the Consul to a slave that is Ligurian by birth; Indeed, I prefer the version about the son to 
be true, because very many authors hand this down and popular rumor has maintained the same.”  
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Coelius’ version removes the bravery exhibited by Scipio in his youth and consequently 
diminishes the positive angle that Scipio is said to have later used to his advantage (e.g. 
Polyb. 10.3). The enduring power of the story of the son saving his father is demonstrated 
in Livy’s comment in support of it (fama obtinuit; 21.46.10) and by the fact that all 
subsequent accounts, except for Macrobius, bestow the glory on Scipio Africanus.19 As 
Livy notes, even before him most authors (plures tradidere auctores; 21.46.10) had 
included the version that Publius Scipio is saved by his son. Coelius therefore represents 
a break from the Roman historical tradition of the events at the Ticinus. His discontinuity 
from his native predecessors may, in fact, stem from his use of Silenus.  
Valerius Antias, on the other hand, wrote an annalistic history, from the 
foundation of the city to perhaps the death of Sulla in 78 BCE.20 Of the 68 fragments of 
Antias, 35 are cited by Livy, including eight from the Third Decade.21 A large number of 
the Livian fragments attack Antias’ penchant for exaggerating and inflating numbers in 
his text (e.g. T1-4, F23, 28, 36, 43, 45, 48, 54, and 62).22 Despite his distrust of Antias’ 
                                               
19 Val. Max. 5.4.2, Sen Benef. 3.33, Sil. It. 4.456-79, Flor. 2.6.10, Oros. 4.14.6, and Zon. 8.23.9. Macrobius 
(Sat. 1.11.26) is the only version subsequent to Livy that follows Coelius’ attribution of the rescue to a 
slave. Polybius, too, tells how Scipio saved his father in the introduction to the man’s character (10.3). 
Polybius does not, however, place this account in his narrative of the battle itself, which bears no mention 
of the danger faced by Publius Scipio (3.46). Polybius further grounds the story in an aura of truth by 
attributing it to the account of Laelius, a close personal friend of Scipio Africanus. On Polybius’ use of 
Laelius here: Walbank 1967: 2.198-99. Livy’s note of the tradition (fama obtinuit) recalls the phrase used 
in his analysis of the various measures of rings poured out in Mago’s speech (fama tenuit; 23.12.1-3), 
which also receives further support from the external narrator that it is more accurate (propior vero).  
20 On the structure, range, and dating of Antias’ work: Chassignet 2004: lxiii-lxxv, Forsythe 2002, Cornell 
2014: 1.294-98. On annalistic historiography in general, Walter 2003.  
21 In addition to the 68 fragments, Cornell gives eleven testimonia and three doubtful fragments. In addition 
to the 35 fragments cited by Livy, two additional fragments (F 65 and 66) that are ultimately derived from 
Livy.  
22 T1 = Livy 26.49.3: adeo nullus mentiendi modus est, “There is truly no limit to his lying”; T4 = Livy 
38.23.8: Valerius Antias, qui magis immodicus in numero augendo esse solet, “Valerius Antias, who is 
accustomed to being very unrestrained in augmenting his numeric data.”  
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numerical reports, Livy made wide use of Antias and likely owes to him the larger 
organizing principles for his narrative.23 Rich has argued that the structure of Antias’ 
work provided Livy with the shape of the annalistic framework as well as the material 
covering the Middle Republic.24 Citations to Antias describing domestic material are 
often found in Livy’s annalistic notices (e.g. F24, F44, and F59 FRHist). Antian 
fragments from non-Livian cover texts, too, contain material like the accounts in the 
annalistic notices, such as portents (and their expiation), the appointment of offices, or 
the origins of games or religious practices (e.g. F14 and F64 FRHist). Antias’ interest in 
the ominous and strange and Livy’s frequent criticism of his numerical data have 
contributed to the scholarly consensus that Antias made widespread use of plausible 
invention in composing his text.25 His use of invention led to a drastic expansion of 
material, which resulted in Antias’ text having a larger scope than his predecessors and a 
particular focus on expanding the narrative on more recent history.26  
As Livy integrates the texts of Coelius and Antias into his own narrative of the 
past, the general characteristics of their works play a role in the elements that Livy adds 
to the AUC. Just as he did with his incorporation of Polybian language and themes, Livy 
uses acts of internal narration to draw intertextual relationships with his predecessors. As 
                                               
23 Cornell 2014: 1.299-304 summarizes the scholarly opinions of how and to what effect Livy made use of 
Antias.  
24 Rich [1997] 2009: esp. 133-40.  
25 Badian 1966: 21, Wiseman 1979: 22, and Cornell 2014: 1.300.  
26 Cornell 2014: 1.297-98 summarizes the arguments for and against Antias’ drastic change of pace and 
compares it to that of other historians.  
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I argue in the examples below, Narrators and focalizers preserve elements of Coelius’ and 
Antias’ texts in Livy’s narrative.  
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Part 2: Speaking in Fragments   
At times, Livy directly integrates the texts of his predecessors into the voices of 
his internal narrators. I argue in Chapter Two that Hannibal’s speeches in his opening 
campaign of the war draw upon and incorporate Polybian language into the AUC. In a 
well-known example, a portion of Hannibal’s speech given before he crosses the Alps 
(21.30.5-8) directly echoes a digression from Polybius’ Histories (3.47.6-48.12).27 Livy 
includes elements that correspond to the fragments of Coelius and Antias in a similar 
fashion.  
In a section of the Noctes Atticae discussing various archaic and elegant 
expressions of time that are no longer in use, Gellius transmits fragments of Coelius and 
Cato in which each use the term diequinti, as opposed to the two-word phrase die quinto 
common in Gellius’ day (Gell. 10.24). The two fragments are drawn from the narrative 
discussing Carthaginians’ reaction to the Battle of Cannae. In Coelius’ monograph, one 
of Hannibal’s advisors claims that the cavalry alone will be sufficient for him to take 
Rome:  
Suppetit etiam Coelianum illud ex libro historiarum secundo: 'Si 
uis mihi equitatum dare et ipse cum cetero exercitu me sequi, 
diequinti Romae in Capitolium curabo tibi cena sit cocta.' 
(Coelius F22 FRHist = Gell. 10.24.6) 
 
There is also that example from Coelius in the second book of his 
histories: “If you are willing to give me the cavalry and, for your 
part, to follow behind me with the rest of the army, I will make 
sure that dinner is cooked for you in Rome on the Capitol on 
the fifth day from now.”  
                                               
27 For Livy’s echo of Polybius’ digression, cf. Chapter 2, Part 4, above, and Girod 1982: 1206-8, Doblhofer 
1983: 142-44, Händl-Sagawe 1995: 196-7, Feldherr 2009b, Levene 2010: 148-55 and 2014: 208.  
 227 
 
 
Gellius’ report of the fragment notes that Cato’s Origines is Coelius’ source for the 
speech and also cites Cato’s version of the commander’s words: 
Et historiam autem et uerbum hoc sumpsit Coelius ex origine <IV> M. 
Catonis, in qua ita scriptum est: 'Igitur dictatorem Carthaginiensium 
magister equitum monuit: “Mitte mecum Romam equitatum; diequinti 
in Capitolio tibi cena cocta erit.” (Cato F78 FRHist = Gell. 10.24.7) 
 
Coelius took both the story and this word (diequinti) from <fourth book28 
of> the Origines of M. Cato, in which it was written: ‘Therefore, the 
master of horse warned the Carthaginian dictator: “Send the cavalry 
with me and on the fifth day from now dinner will be cooked for you 
on the Capitoline.”’ 
 
Beyond Gellius’ testimony and the verbal echo of diequinti, Coelius also nearly copies a 
conditional version of the promise that the commander makes to Hannibal: (curabo) tibi 
cena sit cocta replaces Cato’s simple future tibi cena cocta erit. In each of these reports 
the unnamed commander puts forward a suggestion that the cavalry pursue this course of 
action (mitte…equitatum; equitatum dare). Coelius’ version, however, has the 
Carthaginian officer both show more deference to Hannibal in asking for command (si 
uis…) and assert more responsibility for the action that follows (curabo).  
 Livy too notes the commander’s offer in his narrative of the immediate aftermath 
of Cannae. He first describes the suggestions offered by the other Carthaginian officers, 
who believe that Hannibal should rest for a day to recuperate after his significant victory 
                                               
28 The attribution of the fragment to Book Four, as well as Hertz’s emendation to include the numeral in the 
fragment, comes from another citation found in Gellius (Cato F79 FRHist = Gell. 2.19.9) that provides the 
follow up to this exchange and names Book Four as the source for this account. On the emendation and the 
narrative structure for Book Four, Cornell 2014: 1. 1.199-205 and 3.126-27.  
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(22.51.1).29 Livy then records a speech as being given by Maharbal, the praefectus 
equitum. Livy here names his officer, in contrast to the anonymous officer of at least one 
of his predecessors. The fragment of Coelius contains only the direct quote of the speech 
and, as such, there is no indication in the surviving text of the identity of the speaker. 
While Cato’s Origines famously described military and political officers only by their 
titles, not their names, Coelius names commanders and statesmen when the information is 
available to him, so Coelius may or may not have introduced the speech with the name of 
the officer making the offer.30 As Livy names Maharbal, then, he demonstrates additional 
knowledge about these events that his predecessors possibly lacked or, at least in the case 
of Cato, decided not to share.  
Livy’s report of the speech demonstrates how he integrates elements from both of 
his predecessors’ accounts:  
Maharbal praefectus equitum, minime cessandum ratus, 'immo ut 
quid hac pugna sit actum scias, die quinto' inquit, 'uictor in 
Capitolio epulaberis. sequere; cum equite, ut prius uenisse quam 
uenturum sciant, praecedam.' (Livy 22.51.2) 
 
Maharbal, the master of the horse, believed that there should be 
the least delay and said: “On the contrary, in order for you to know 
what was accomplished in this battle, you will dine on the Capitol 
as the conqueror on the fifth day. Follow me! I will proceed with 
                                               
29 The episode of Hannibal’s plan immediately after Cannae is of great interest to the Romans, who often 
used it as one of the counterfactual questions at the heart of a favorite suasoria: “What would happen if 
Hannibal marched on Rome?” Lazenby 1996 and Fronda 2010: 288-300 discuss how this debate fits into 
the larger traditions that develop around the Second Punic War. Hoyos 2000 discusses the historicity of the 
episode, concluding that it more likely occurred after Trasimene than after Cannae.  
30 Cornell 2014: 1.215-16 and Cato T1 FRHist = Nep. Cato 3.1-4. Cato F115 FRHist = T20 = Pliny Nat. 
Hist. 8.11 notes the absence of names in Cato’s text and lists the name of Surus, one of Hannibal’s 
elephants, as an exception (Cornell 2014: 3.143-44); cf. Ennius F540 Sk, perhaps on the elephant 
mentioned here. Cato F76 FRHist provides an extended narrative with several commanders listed by title 
only as an example in support of these testimonia.   
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the cavalry so that they will know that we have arrived before 
they know that we are coming.”  
 
The imperative in Cato (mitte) is recalled through Livy’s sequere, as is the direct verbal 
parallel in Capitolio, which Livy retains despite Coelius’ in Captiolium. Livy does, 
however, recall Coelius’ sequi in his own imperative sequere. Maharbal is named as the 
master of horse by Livy, in contrast to his need to ask for permission to depart with the 
cavalry (si vis mihi equitatum dare) in Coelius. The designation of his position also 
recalls the title listed in Cato’s fragment: magister equitum. In comparison to Coelius’ 
version of the speech, where a conditional statement shows the officer asking for 
command, Livy’s narrative also shows that request fulfilled in that he is now listed as the 
praefectus equitum. Additionally, rather than asking for permission as he does in Cato 
and Coelius, Livy’s Maharbal declares with a vivid future that he will advance with the 
cavalry (cum equite…praecedam), which mirrors the self-assuredness of Coelius’ officer 
who asserted his role (curabo) in achieving these efforts. Livy mediates between the 
accounts of his two predecessors in Maharbal’s offer, which is made through the voice of 
an internal narrator and combines elements from both Cato’s and Coelius’ texts into one 
speech act.  
 In the aftermath of the fall of New Carthage, Scipio holds various meetings with 
groups of Spanish captives (Livy 26.49-50; cf. Polyb. 10.18-19). Among these prisoners 
is a woman of outstanding beauty. According to a citation in Gellius, Valerius Antias 
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engages in a well-known debate about Scipio’s morality by describing the general’s use 
of a Spanish captive for his sexual pleasure.31  
credo…Valerium Antiatem aduersus ceteros omnis scriptores de 
Scipionis moribus sensisse et eam puellam captiuam non redditam 
patri scripsisse contra quam nos supra diximus, sed retentam a 
Scipione atque in deliciis amoribusque ab eo usurpatam. (F29 
FRHist = Gell. 7.8.6) 
 
I believe that Valerius Antias took a view on Scipio’s character in 
opposition to all the other authors and wrote that he did not return 
the captive girl to her father, contrary to what we said above, but 
instead that she was retained by Scipio and that she was used by 
him for sexual dalliances.  
 
While Livy makes no explicit mention of the variant tradition, Scipio’s speech to the 
woman’s fiancé in the AUC makes a subtle reference to the tradition of Scipio’s interest 
in her:32  
'iuuenis' inquit 'iuuenem appello, quo minor sit inter nos huius 
sermonis uerecundia. ego cum sponsa tua capta a militibus nostris 
ad me ducta esset audiremque tibi eam cordi esse, et forma faceret 
fidem…’ (26.50.4-5) 
 
“As a young man,” Scipio says, “I address a fellow young man, 
in order that there may be less modesty between us. When your 
fiancée had been captured by our soldiers and led to me, I heard 
that she was very dear to you, and her beauty makes that 
believable…”  
 
                                               
31 On the larger tradition of Scipio’s morality, cf. Polyb. 10.19.3, where Scipio’s troops bring the captive 
girl before him because they know of his love for women (φιλογύνην ὄντα τὸν Πόπλιον). Chaplin 2010 
discusses how this tradition fits into Livy’s larger picture of Scipio. Kowalewski 2002: 211-18 and 219-39 
on how Livy incorporates Allucius and Sophonisba, respectively, into this episode. de Romilly 1988 notes 
how this episode in one example of a larger tradition of how a beautiful captive girl falls into the hands of 
her enemy. Tretheway 2002: 110-13 compares the versions of this episode in Polybius and Livy.  
32 Chaplin 2010 discusses the episode at length. Chaplin is correct that Livy makes no explicit mention of 
the Antian version (p. 62) and removes the reference to Scipio’s love of women entirely. While Chaplin’s 
larger point about the political acumen that Scipio demonstrates in Livy’s version of the episode is well 
made, I hope by showing how Livy does subtly reference this tradition that this further marks out Scipio’s 
restraint and recognition of political expediency.  
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Scipio draws a parallel between his identity and status and that of his addressee by noting 
his youth, like the young fiancé he is addressing (iuvenis…iuvenem). As Gellius notes, 
Scipio’s youth is a part of the larger tradition of his infidelity.33 Livy’s Scipio tries to 
remove any lingering sense of modesty from their interactions as he tells the young man 
to avoid letting verecundia interfere with their conversation.34 Scipio then notes the girl’s 
beauty (forma) as the legitimating factor for the fiancé’s affection for her. Scipio’s 
remark on her physical charms and the explicit removal of modesty highlight the 
possibility that the Antian tradition of infidelity lies behind Scipio’s speech.  
In his narrative of the aftermath of the fall of Carthago Nova, Livy twice notes 
Antias as a source for various numerical details and the personnel involved in the capture 
of the city (F28 FRHist = Livy 26.49.1-6). The citations to Antias in the section 
immediately preceding the narrative of the captive girl both demonstrate that he was 
aware of Antias’ description of Scipio’s indiscretion and call Antias’ text to mind for 
Livy’s audience, helping to mobilize the subtle references made to Scipio’s indiscretion 
in the subsequent exchange with her fiancé. Livy thereby incorporates references to 
Antias’ tradition within the speech of an internal narrator and focalizes the desire and its 
subsequent refusal from Scipio’s perspective. Knowledge of the Antian account of 
Scipio’s alleged impropriety enhances the interpretation that following a sense of civic 
                                               
33 Gell. 7.8.5; Scipionem istum, uerone an falso incertum, fama tamen, cum esset adulescens, haud sincera 
fuisse: “Scipio, when he was a young man—and it is uncertain whether or not it is true—did not have an 
untarnished reputation.”  
34 Kaster 1980 on the concept of verecundia. As the youth of the two figures in this discussion is of marked 
interest to Scipio, v., esp., pp. 242-43 of Kaster’s article on the interplay of youthfulness and the 
development of verecundia.  
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duty is appropriate in this context, as it creates more of an expectation that Scipio would 
have fulfilled his desires had his duty not interfered.35  
In addition to the narrative act itself, Livy incorporates elements from his source 
texts as he focalizes events from the perspectives of the internal audience. Among 
Cicero’s discussion of the other omens that occurred to mark the disaster for the Romans 
at Lake Trasimene, he notes that Coelius includes an account of a widespread earthquake 
across much of the Mediterranean world: 
magnum illud etiam, quod addidit Coelius, eo tempore ipso, cum 
hoc calamitosum proelium fieret, tantos terrae motus in 
Liguribus, Gallia compluribusque insulis totaque in Italia factos 
esse, ut multa oppida conruerint, multis locis labes factae sint 
terraeque desederint fluminaque in contrarias partes fluxerint 
atque in amnes mare influxerit. (Coelius F14b FRHist = Cic. de 
Div. 1.78) 
 
There is also this remarkable fact Coelius adds that, at the very 
time when this disastrous battle was occurring, there were such 
great earthquakes in Liguria, Gaul, very many islands, and 
throughout all of Italy that many towns fell to ruin, in many places 
there was destruction, and land eroded away, and streams flowed 
in the opposite direction, and the sea flowed into the rivers.  
 
As Coelius describes it, the earthquake turns the Roman world on its head. Cicero claims 
that Coelius adds (addidit) the detail about the earthquake, perhaps suggesting that the 
detail is found only in Coelius’ monograph.36 Livy discusses other prodigies in his 
narrative that leads up to the battle, but makes no mention of the earthquake in his initial 
                                               
35 My analysis here bolsters the interpretive payoff advanced by Chaplin 2010: 62-64, even though we 
disagree on the presence or absence of the Antian tradition in Livy’s text.  
36 contra Cornell comm. ad loc., which claims that addidit Coelius simply means that Coelius includes both 
what precedes and what follows the phrase.  
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account of the omens (22.1.8-20 and 22.3.11-13). Only later in the midst of the chaos of 
the battle does Livy refer to the earthquake:37 
tantusque fuit ardor animorum, adeo intentus pugnae animus, ut 
eum motum terrae qui multarum urbium Italiae magnas partes 
prostrauit auertitque cursu rapidos amnes, mare fluminibus 
inuexit, montes lapsu ingenti proruit, nemo pugnantium senserit. 
(22.5.8) 
 
Such was the fervor of their courage, their attention so fixed on the 
battle, that the earthquake which destroyed great parts of many 
cities in Italy and diverted in course swift streams, carried the 
sea up the rivers, overturned mountains with a huge landslide, not 
one of the combatants noticed it.  
 
Overall, the parallels between the two passages are clear. Each notes the toppling of 
cities, the unusual movement of water, and landslides. Livy, however, exchanges the 
verbal actions attributed to amnes and flumina when compared to the description of the 
watery motions found in the Coelius fragment.38  
Each account also includes a result clause to describe what follows the 
earthquake. The result effected in each case, however, is markedly different. Coelius 
records that the earthquake was so great that it caused a vast level of destruction. Livy 
instead focalizes the earthquake from the soldiers’ perspective by claiming that their 
fervor for battle was so great that not a single combatant notices an earthquake that 
shakes the entire Mediterranean world. While it is possible that Cicero removed the 
framing focalization of the soldiers’ perspective from his description of Coelius’ text, two 
                                               
37 On Livy’s rewriting of Coelius in his account of the other omens at Trasimene: Levene 2010 133-35. 
Levene argues that Livy reorders and reworks the narrative of these portents “to focus the events into a 
single dramatic moment” (135).  
38 Coelius: fluminaque in contrarias partes fluxerint atque in amnes mare influxerit; Livy: auertitque 
cursu rapidos amnes, mare fluminibus inuexit.  
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things suggest that the change is Livy’s.39 First, the remaining portions of the fragment 
described by Cicero have acts of internal narration and notes of focalization from an 
audience’s perspective. Second and more tellingly, Livy’s narrative of the battle is 
marked by descriptions of confusion and failed perception on the part of the Roman 
soldiers as they fail to hear the orders of their commander, are unable to see their 
standards through the fog, find their weapons and armor to prepare for the fight, and even 
to recognize to which side to turn to find friend or foe (22.5).40  
The soldiers are not the only internal audience that takes no notice of the 
earthquake. Livy fairly consistently notes the measures taken by the Senate to expiate 
dangerous portents reported throughout Roman territory.41 Earthquakes are among the 
prodigies that the Senate needs to redress—in fact, Livy reports (34.55.4) that in 193 
BCE overly frequent earthquakes shut down the Senate, which had to limit the reports of 
seismic activity to resume business.42 He makes no subsequent mention, however, of the 
earthquake that occurred during Trasimene or of any attempt by the Senate to ameliorate 
its effects.43 Since Livy has neither the combatants nor the Senate recognize what was for 
Coelius a great (magnum) sign of a calamitous battle (calamitosum proelium), he 
undermines Coelius’ entire narrative of the omens. Livy’s focalization of the earthquake 
                                               
39 For the potential that Cicero removes the note when paraphrasing Coelius, Levene 2010: 269, n. 20.  
40 On the potential confusion and its effect in Livy’s narrative, Levene 2010: 268-70.  
41 On prodigy lists and the Senate’s efforts to expiate divine omens in the narrative of Livy’s Third Decade, 
Levene 1993: 38-77 and Satterfield 2012. On the procedural aspects of these prodigy lists for the Annalistic 
Tradition, Rawson 1971, Frier 1979: 270-4, and Levene 1993: 35-36.  
42 cf. Cic. Har. Resp. 28.62. Satterfield 2012: 74 and 78-80 discusses this report and how it relates to Livy’s 
technique of reporting prodigy lists.  
43 As noted above, the prodigy list for the corresponding year (22.1.8-20) and the Senate’s expiations for 
those omens does not include the earthquake.  
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through the soldiers’ perspective allows him to highlight their lack of response. An 
internal focalizer thus provides Livy an opportunity to question his predecessor’s account 
without citing his text. Coelius’ notice of the omen, like the earthquake itself in the AUC, 
should be dismissed and ignored.  
Similarly, Livy has an internal focalizer draw attention to a problem with Valerius 
Antias’ text. After the deaths of the Scipio brothers in Spain, a Roman Knight, Lucius 
Marcius, steps in to rally the fractured troops and turn around Roman fortunes there (Livy 
25.37-39). Pliny the Elder records an excerpt from Valerius Antias that notes a flame 
rising from Marcius: 
L. Marcio in Hispania interemptis Scipionibus contionanti et 
milites ad ultionem exhortanti arsisse simili modo Valerius 
Antias narrat. (F27b FRHist = Pliny NH 2.241) 
 
Valerius Antias narrates that in a similar fashion a fire arose on 
Lucius Marcius in Spain after the Scipios were killed while he was 
giving a speech and encouraging the troops to vengeance.  
 
The cover text, the corresponding section of Pliny’s Natural History, describes instances 
of spontaneous combustion that led to the ignition of actual fires. Antias, too, gives no 
reason to suspect anything less than an actual fire (arsisse) has arisen on Marcius. Pliny’s 
claim that the flames on Marcius appear in a similar way (simili modo) connects the 
Marcian portent to two other fiery omens: Lake Trasimene burning across its entire 
surface and Servius Tullius having a flame shoot from his head while he was asleep as an 
infant.44 
                                               
44 Pliny NH 2.241: Trasimenum lacum arsisse totum; Servio Tullio dormienti in pueritia ex capite flammam 
emicuisse, “Lake Trasimene as a whole burned. A flame shot out from the head of Servius Tullius while he 
was sleeping as a child.” On the Servian portent: Livy 1.39 and Val. Max. 1.6.2.  
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As Livy summarizes his account of the valor of Marcius in turning around the 
affairs in Spain, he includes a description of the phenomenon that alludes to Antias’ 
account: 
apud omnes magnum nomen Marcii ducis est; et uerae gloriae eius 
etiam miracula addunt flammam ei contionanti fusam e capite 
sine ipsius sensu cum magno pauore circumstantium militum 
(Livy 25.39.16 = Antias F27a FRHist) 
 
Among all [the sources] the name of the leader Marcius is of great 
importance and they even add miracles on top of his true glory, 
claiming that a flame poured out of his head while he was 
speaking, without his knowledge but eliciting great fear on the 
part of the soldiers standing around him.  
 
Livy makes a direct citation to Antias just above this passage (25.39.14 Valerius 
Antias…tradit), which further mobilizes the reference beyond the general context, 
narrative situation, and basic details shared between the two accounts. Additionally, the 
participial action describing Marcius, contionanti, is repeated in both texts, further 
marking the Livian report as likely derived from Antias.  
Livy focalizes the account from the perspective of the internal audience: he 
explicitly notes that Marcius, the speaker, was completely unaware of the fire (sine ipsius 
sensu) and remarks on the effect that the appearance of the flame has on the soldiers (cum 
magno pavore…militum). Since Livy focalizes the fiery omen from the perspective of the 
internal audience, he highlights the potential effects that the flame has on the soldiers. 
Although Livy claims that the account is the opinio communis of his sources, he 
questions its veracity by separating the marvel (miracula) from Marcius’ true (verae) 
glory. While Livy does not avoid including variant traditions that he claims are 
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inaccurate, his focalization of the Antian flame through the soldiers’ perspective hints 
that the internal audience may provide further explanation for his mention of this variant 
tradition.  
 In Livy’s preceding narrative, Marcius gives two speeches that could provide the 
setting for the fiery portent. The second of these speeches (25.38.2-22) comprises a 
lengthy set speech related through oratio recta and receives a fuller treatment in Livy’s 
narrative. Livy’s introduction to the speech even recalls the phrasing of Valerius Antias, 
with the gerundive phrase adhortandos…milites and contione recalling the participles 
contionanti and exhortanti from the fragment from Antias.45 The soldiers’ reaction to the 
speech, however, is far from the terror that Livy notes Marcius’ fiery appearance 
inspired. Instead, the soldiers are overjoyed (laeti) and pleased (placebat) by the speech 
(25.38.23). Although Marcius’ second speech is introduced with language that recalls 
Antias’ report of the fiery omen, the reaction of the internal audience makes this speech 
unlikely for the appearance of the flames.  
Marcius’ first speech (25.37.10), however, a battlefield exhortation, better 
indicates a setting appropriate for the fiery omen. News reaches the Romans that 
Hasdrubal is approaching to attack the struggling camp and the soldiers are struck with 
grief over their current misfortunes: 
neque sedari lamentatio poterat…ipso mulcente et increpante 
Marcio…ne inultos imperatores suos iacere sinerent (Livy 
25.37.10) 
 
                                               
45 25.38.1: adloquendos adhortandosque sibi milites ratus, contione aduocata ita disseruit; cf. Antias F 
27b FRHist = Pliny NH 2.241: contionanti et milites ad ultionem exhortanti.  
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The weeping was not able to be assuaged…even though Marcius 
himself was soothing them and rebuking them…not to allow their 
commanders to lie there unavenged.  
 
In his battlefield speech, Marcius calls for the soldiers to avoid leaving their former 
leaders unavenged (inultos imperatores), recalling the phrase ad ultionem from the 
Antian fragment. The soldiers’ reaction to the speech, however, makes the connection to 
the reference to Antias more explicit:  
inde uerso repente in iram luctu discurrunt ad arma ac uelut 
accensi rabie discurrunt ad portas et in hostem neglegenter atque 
incomposite uenientem incurrunt. extemplo improuisa res 
pauorem incutit Poenis (25.37.11-12).  
 
Then, with their grief suddenly turned to anger, they run to their 
arms and, as though they were inflamed by rage, they run to the 
gates and attack the enemy who is approaching recklessly and 
without order. Immediately this unexpected event strikes fear upon 
the Carthaginians.  
 
The combination of fire and dread (pavor) that Livy includes in his report of the fiery 
omen here appears through the reactions of two internal audiences: the Roman troops and 
their Carthaginian opponents. Marcius’ soldiers have become inflamed (accensi) by his 
speech and they pass the dread (pavorem) to their opponents. As discussed above, Livy 
focalizes his account of the flames appearing during Marcius’ speech from the 
perspective of the troops, calling to his external audience’s attention the reaction of 
Marcius’ internal audience. The speech that provokes the fiery and dreadful response in 
Livy’s narrative is the battlefield speech, not the formal contio held later where Antias 
and the others claim the marvelous flames appeared (contionanti). Livy integrates the 
soldier’s reactions to his account of Marcius’ fiery appearance into his narrative of the 
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earlier speech and thereby questions the context for the omen claimed by Antias. 
Miracula such as these belong to battlefield speeches, not the formal contio.  
 
The methodological patterns evident in Livy’s integration of these fragmentary 
authors as source texts into acts of internal narration allow him to question and supersede 
his predecessors. Furthermore, his incorporation of his predecessors through internal 
speech acts suggests two larger points: First, for our interpretation of the AUC, this 
integration suggests that Livy’s internal narrators speak with the voices of the Roman 
historiographic tradition. Second, the pattern that emerges from Livy’s interaction 
through speech acts with the fragments examined here suggests a model for further 
studies of the AUC and its relation to fragmentary texts.  
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 I have analyzed how Livy’s internal narrators mediate between his and his 
predecessors’ texts. In Chapter One I survey the theoretical frameworks that I use 
throughout the project to show how Livy uses narrators as part of his intertextual 
approach to writing history. Chapters Two through Four explore the relationship between 
opsis, exemplarity, and the authority of the historiographic methods of Livy and Polybius 
as they appear in the voices of the internal narrators Hannibal and Scipio. In Chapter Two 
I argue that for Livy’s Hannibal the sustained practice of integrating comments made by 
the Polybian external narrator into Hannibal’s speeches allows the Carthaginian general 
to speak with a Polybian voice throughout the Third Decade. In so doing, Livy 
incorporates a conflation of character that was already present in Polybius’ text and 
increases it to a greater degree. While Hannibal in the Histories uses language modelled 
on Polybius’ methods of opsis and autopsy, Livy’s Hannibal actually speaks with 
Polybius’ own words. Without direct references made to Polybius, Hannibal’s referential 
speeches in the AUC create an intertextual relationship that identifies Hannibal as a 
modello-esemplare to Polybius’ Histories. In Chapter Three I turn to the character of 
Scipio in both Polybius and Livy. For Polybius, Scipio continues the trend of speaking 
with a focus on Polybian language and methodology. In Livy’s Third Decade, however, 
Scipio uses language in his speeches that mirrors Livy’s own historiographic techniques. 
In his role as an internal narrator Scipio becomes an analogue for Livy’s methodology. 
Scipio uses exemplarity to guide the actions of his internal audience and presents a more 
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compelling interpretation of the Regulus exemplum in his debate with Fabius about the 
proposed invasion of Africa.  
In Chapter Four I combine the analyses from the previous two chapters to argue 
how Livy creates a payoff from these parallel narratorial identities that allows the two 
internal narrators to stage a competition on behalf of the authors whose approaches each 
represents. As Hannibal and Scipio face off at Zama, their speeches and interactions set 
the stage for a battle of authorial reference as they stand as analogues for the 
methodologies of Polybius and Livy, respectively. As Scipio triumphs over Hannibal in 
the battle, the Roman victory there represents a victory for Livy’s exemplary method of 
historiography over Polybius’ own reliance on pragmatic decision-making based on opsis 
and autopsy. By establishing a competitive relationship with one of his predecessors 
through sustained intertextual reference, Livy takes part in larger literary traditions 
common in the Augustan age.  
In Chapter Five I briefly survey how additional internal narrators, too, display 
elements drawn from some of Livy’s other predecessors. In particular, acts of internal 
narration integrate aspects of the texts of Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias. 
Although the fragmentary remains of these authors makes it impossible to establish a 
sustained intertextual relationship between a predecessor text and a single internal 
narrator—as became clear with Polybius and Hannibal—the consistency of Livy’s 
integration of his sources into acts of internal narration suggests a more complicated 
interaction with his source material than just mining their texts for historical data. This 
type of engagement with his predecessors is also obviously a far cry from the image of 
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Livy as a slavish copyist imagined by the Quellenforscher. The integration of source texts 
into acts of internal narration shows Livy giving a voice to the Greco-Roman 
historiographic tradition throughout the Third Decade.  
To conclude, I would like to suggest a few possible avenues that this research 
opens for future studies. While Livy has been shown to have undertaken different 
methodological processes at various points in the construction of his narrative and his use 
of sources,1 this type of internal narrator-based integration of his source texts is not 
limited to the Third Decade. For example, in the Fourth Decade, a notice of the dramatic 
performances at the Ludi Megalenses in 194 BCE (34.54.3-8) has provoked the interest 
of scholars for Livy’s apparent mishandling of the discrepancy over the timing and origin 
of the innovations introduced at these games.2  
The discrepancy revolves around the correct identification of the games at which 
the first dramatic festivals were performed, the first time the Senators were given separate 
seating from the rest of the audience, and on whose authority or suggestion that 
separation was made.3 In his first reference to the partitioning of the seating, Livy notes 
                                               
1 Luce 1977 demonstrates this throughout, but esp.: 185-229. Levene 2010: 131-35 demonstrates a small 
number of examples in which Livy’s methods are markedly different between the Third and Fourth 
Decades as part of his response to Tränkle 1977, whose work centers on the assumption that Livy’s 
methods—pertaining to his use of Polybius as source material—did not alter drastically between sections of 
the AUC.  
2 Other notices related to the innovations: 34.44.5 and 36.36.4. cf. Val. Max. 2.4.3 and 4.5.1, Cicero’s Pro 
Cornelio (= F27 Crawford) and Har. Resp. 24, Ascon. Corn. 55St, and Val. F41 and 44 FRHist. Scholarly 
discussions of the full range of issues behind these notices includes: Klotz 1964: 45-46, 78, and 84, 
Ungern-Sternberg 1975, Briscoe 1981: 118, 134, and 274-76, Bernstein 1988: 193-95, and Fleck 1993: 
209-13. On the fragments specifically and Livy’s handling of them: Chassignet 2004: 3.230-1 and Cornell 
2014: 3.348-50. On Livy’s supposed misrepresentation of Antias at 36.36.4: Tränkle 1977: 67 n. 46, 
Briscoe 1981: 276, and Cornell 2014: 3.350, among the other works just noted.  
3 The first celebration of the Megalesia was in 204 BCE when the statue of Magna Mater arrived in Rome 
(Livy 29.14.14), but the dedication of the temple in her honor occurred in 191, at which point Livy notes 
that Antias claims the first Ludi Megalenses were held (36.36.4).  
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that the censors receive the appreciation of the Senate for making the proposal of the 
separation to take place at the Ludi Romani of that year (194 BCE).4 Valerius, too, seems 
to have given the credit to the Censors (F 41 FRHist).5 The cover text for the Valerian 
fragment is Asconius’ commentary on Cicero’s Pro Cornelio. Cicero twice notes Scipio 
as the originator of the idea.6 In his speech on the Responses of Haruspices, Cicero 
claims Scipio gave the concession for separating the Senate from the people at the Ludi 
Megalenses.7  
Livy gives a second notice to the separation of seating as he records the Ludi 
Megalenses of 194 BCE (34.54.3-8). Livy’s notice, however, makes it clear that the 
partitioning was still done at the Ludi Romani, not the Megalesia:  
Megalesia ludos scaenicos A. Atilius Serranus L. Scribonius Libo aediles 
curules primi fecerunt. horum aedilium ludos Romanos primum senatus a 
populo secretus spectauit praebuitque sermones, sicut omnis nouitas solet, 
aliis tandem quod multo ante debuerit tributum existimantibus 
amplissimo ordini, aliis demptum ex dignitate populi quidquid maiestati 
patrum adiectum esset interpretantibus…nouam, superbam libidinem, ab 
nullius ante gentis senatu neque desideratam neque institutam. (34.54.3-5, 
7) 
 
At the Megalesia, the curule aediles A. Atilius Serranus and L. Scribonius 
Libo put on dramatic festivities for the first time. At the Ludi Romani of 
                                               
4 34.44.5: gratiam quoque ingentem apud eum ordinem pepererunt, quod ludis Romanis aedilibus curulibus 
imperarunt ut loca senatoria secernerent a populo; nam antea in promiscuo spectarant. “They gained a 
great deal of gratitude from this order [the Senate] because they gave orders to the curule aediles to 
separate the Senatorial seating from the people, for before this they had watched without distinction.”  
5 F 41 FRHist = Ascon. Corn. 55st: factum id esse autem Antias tradidit ludis Romanis quos fecerunt 
aediles curules <A> Atilius Serranus L. Scribonius Libo, et id eos fecisse iussu censorum Sex. Aeli Paeti C. 
Corneli Cethegi. “Antias records, however, that this was done at the Ludi Romani which the curule aediles 
A. Atilius Serranus and L. Scribonius Libo held and that that they did so by the order of the censors, Sex. 
Aelius Paetus and G. Cornelius Cethegus.”  
6 In this fragment for the Pro Cornelio, F27 Crawford, and, again, at Har.. Resp. 24.  
7 Cic. Har. Resp. 24.10: quibus ludis primum ante populi consessum senatui locum P. Africanus iterum 
consul ille maior dedit, “at which Ludi [the Megalenses] P. Africanus the Elder, consul for the second time, 
granted the Senate first position before the people had gathered.”  
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these same aediles the senate for the first time watched the shows apart 
from the people and this produced gossip, as happens with every new 
custom. Some were considering that this was an honor given at long last 
to a most deserving order which ought to have been granted much earlier. 
Others concluded that anything that added to the grandeur of the senators 
was subsequently taken away from the dignity of the people…this is a 
strange and arrogant new inclination, neither hoped for nor established by 
the senate in any previous generation.  
 
Livy combines here references to both the Ludi Megalenses and Romani for 194. He also 
continues in this notice to describe how Scipio comes to regret being the author (auctor) 
of the idea of separating the seating according to rank.8 The combination of these notices 
alludes to the variant tradition that Cicero describes in his two speeches, namely, that 
Scipio is responsible for the separation and that it began at the Ludi Megalenses. Livy’s 
description of the people’s responses to this event (aliis…existimantibus…aliis… 
interpretantibus) integrates the response to the separation into the voice of a body of 
internal narrators. He even makes his reference to Scipio’s feeling of grief through the 
indirect statement of the report of the populace (Africanum… paenituisse ferunt; 34.54.8). 
The concerns raised by the people mirror the very problems raised by the variant 
traditions: the timing of the change to the seating arrangement (tandem…multo ante) and 
the inception of the idea (institutam). Livy later makes a third reference (36.36.4) to the 
issues linked to the dramatic festivals at the Ludi Megalenses, noting how Antias places 
them in the year 191, to coincide with the completion and dedication of the temple to 
                                               
8 34.54.8: postremo ipsum quoque Africanum quod consul auctor eius rei fuisset paenituisse ferunt. “They 
say that in the end even Africanus himself came to regret the fact that he was the author of this idea while 
he was consul.” Cornell 2014: 3.348 notes that Quadrigarius or Piso could be the source of Livy’s note 
here.  
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Magna Mater.9 Livy’s attribution of this information to Antias contradicts Asconius’ 
notice of Antias’ dating of the games (F41 FRHist). While scholars have made various 
proposals to explain the various attributions—often resulting in Livy being a clumsy or 
unfaithful reporter10—Livy’s multiple references to these events highlight the very 
confusion borne out by the sources. Livy’s use of the people’s reaction as an internal 
narrator calls to mind the variant traditions and represents the issues raised by the 
discrepancies through the rumors he reports.  
 The methodology I use in this project easily transfers to work on other historians. 
Beyond the speeches that frequent ancient historiography, other types of internal 
narrators appear in historical texts. A fragment of Sallust’s Histories (F98 Reynolds), for 
example, contains a report of a letter by Pompey to the Senate reporting his current 
progress in his campaign in Spain.11 As part of this letter Pompey discusses his zeal for 
the campaign and the path he has taken so far:  
Equidem fateor me ad hoc bellum maiore studio quam consilio profectum, 
quippe qui nomine modo imperi a vobis accepto, diebus quadraginta 
exercitum paravi hostisque in cervicibus iam Italiae agentis ab Alpibus in 
Hispaniam submovi; per eas iter aliud atque Hannibal, nobis 
opportunius, patefeci. Recepi Galliam, Pyrenaeum, Lacetaniam, 
Indigetis. (F 98.4-5 Reynolds) 
 
Indeed, I admit that I set out for this war with more eagerness than 
planning, in as much as I gathered an army within forty days of when I 
                                               
9 36.36.4: ludique ob dedicationem eius facti, quos primos scenicos fuisse Antias Ualerius est auctor, 
Megalesia appellatos. “Ludi were held for the dedication of this [temple] and Valerius Antias is the author 
that these were the first dramatic festivals at the Ludi, called the Megalesia.” On issues with Livy’s 
chronology for the dating of the temple’s dedication to 191 BCE, Briscoe 1981: 274-75.  
10 Tränkle 1977: 67 n. 46, Briscoe 1981: 276, and Cornell 2014: 3.350, e.g.  
11 F98 Reynolds = F82 McGushin = Codex Vaticanus Lat. 3864 (V). McGushin 1992: 242-47 discusses the 
letter at length. Badian 1962 discusses the position of Sallust’s Histories within the context of other 
historical accounts of the age of Sulla.  
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accepted from you a command in name only and I drew away an enemy 
that was already operating in the neck of Italy from the Alps to Spain. I 
opened up a path through the Alps, one that is different than what 
Hannibal used and more advantageous for us. I recovered Gaul, the 
Pyrenees, Lacetania, and the Indigites.  
 
Although Pompey’s letter relates the opening of his campaign against Sertorius, it bears 
striking parallels to the traditional accounts of the Hannibalic War. Pompey’s claim to 
pursue the war with great zeal recalls Hannibal’s eagerness to undertake a war with Rome 
(Polyb. 3.8, Livy 21.5.1-3, e.g.). Pompey raises an army in a short amount of time, as 
Hannibal does before invading Italy (Polyb. 3.33.5-18, Livy 21.21-22, Nep. Hann. 3.2-3). 
As Pompey claims to have recovered various territories along his march, he reverses the 
path taken by Hannibal from Spain to Italy. Just as some narratives of Hannibal’s 
crossing note how he cuts open a new path along his journey (Nep. Hann. 3.4, Livy 
21.36-37), Pompey, too, describes how he himself has opened (patefeci) a road.12 While 
Livy’s and Nepos’ accounts postdate Sallust’s Histories,13 the facets of the narrative of 
the crossing of the Alps alluded to here exist within the traditional accounts of Hannibal’s 
transalpine expedition. Pompey therefore makes reference to the larger tradition 
surrounding Hannibal with his letter here. When he opens a new path, one more 
opportune for the Romans (nobis opportunius), he is directly outdoing even Hannibal, 
who had surpassed all those before him during his crossing.  
                                               
12 On Livy’s account of Hannibal’s new pathway, cf. Chapter 2, Part 4, above.  
13 McGushin 1992: 3-4: Sallust’s Histories have a terminus ante quem of 35 BCE, the date of Sallust’s 
death. Stem 2012: 12-14 and 29-30 dates Nepos’ On Foreign Generals to 35-32 BCE; cf. Chapter 1, Part 1, 
above, on this date and its relation to Livy’s Third Decade.  
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Pompey closes his letter with a plea for the Senate to send reinforcements (F 98.6-
10 Reynolds). His final thought, which warns the Senate of what is to come if they ignore 
him, draws upon his reference to Hannibal made above:  
nisi subvenitis, invito et praedicente me exercitus hinc et cum eo omne 
bellum Hispaniae in Italiam transgredientur. (F 98.10 Reynolds) 
  
If you do not come to my aid, the army and, with it, the entire war for 
Spain will cross over from here into Italy even though I do not want this 
and am giving you forewarning.  
 
Pompey speaks in general tones about the war (exercitus, bellum). The only specific 
details he notes are the origin (hinc, Hispaniae) and destination (in Italiam) for the war. 
He does not bring up Sertorius’ name nor the identity of Sertorius’ troops as Roman, 
Pompey allows the generalities to recall Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps into Italy. 
Above, Pompey claims in his efforts so far to have surpassed Hannibal’s deeds. Here, 
however, he warns that failure will result in what amounts to a renewal of the Second 
Punic War. With Pompey having already outdone Hannibal, any invasion of Italy that 
results from his defeat is likely to surpass the danger that Rome experienced in the 
Second Punic War. Pompey’s argument could not make the stakes higher for the Senate. 
Their response, however, gives Sallust the opportunity to contrast the take of an internal 
narrator with an audience and demonstrate his own ability to surpass one of his 
predecessors.  
 As I argued with internal narrators in Livy, above, Pompey’s voice as a narrator in 
the Histories provides for Sallust an opportunity for Pompey to represent the author and 
his text. In fact, Pompey’s role as an internal narrator in his letter also draws upon larger 
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themes for Sallust’s Histories and, in fact, his entire oeuvre. Pompey looms large in the 
surviving fragments of Sallust’s Histories, which suggests that he plays for Sallust a large 
part in the cause and outcome of the civil wars.14 Sallust is well recognized by scholars 
both ancient and modern for his incorporation of themes, language, and allusions that 
draw upon Thucydides’ work.15 Even with the limitations of the fragmentary state of 
Sallust’s Histories, Thucydidean parallels in the work have been noted, notably from the 
very preface of his Histories where Sallust alludes to Thucydides.16 The themes and 
language of Pompey’s letter, too, have been shown to create an allusive relationship to 
Thucydides’ letter of Nicias (7.11-15).17 Meyer argues that the narrative situations 
surrounding the letters, too, encourage Sallust’s audience to compare the letters’ 
recipients and their responses, thereby encouraging Sallust’s readers to become better 
readers of Thucydides as well.18  
The allusive relationship between Pompey’s letter and Thucydides’ text extends 
further when Pompey’s role as an internal narrator is contrasted with the reaction of the 
                                               
14 McGushin 1992: 17-18, Meyer 2010: 116. Scanlon 1980: 215 also notes that Sallust focuses on “crucial 
points in Rome’s decline.” Pompey’s disagreement with the Senate in this letter likely plays a large role as 
one of these pivotal moments.  
15 Ancient references to Sallust’s Thucydidean parallels include Vell. 2.36.2, Sen. Suas. 6.21, Quint. Inst. 
10.1.101 and 10.2.17. Modern work on the topic is vast: e.g. Scanlon 1980: 11-19 and 31-48, Woodman 
1988: 126-28, Nicols 1999: 331-32, Renehan 2000, Schmal 2001: 148-53, and Grethlein 2006. Scanlon 
1980 includes a helpful list of the references discussing the Thucydidean aspects of Sallust’s work.  
16 On the Thucydidean preface to Sallust’s Histories: Scanlon 1998 and Meyer 2010: 114-15. Meyer notes 
the presence of insistence on truth (vero; Hist. F1.6) and clarity (satis clara; Hist. F2.98.6) in the fragments 
as recalling the Thucydidean assertion of ἀλήθεια and invoking the historical situation clearly (σαφῶς). cf. 
Büchner 1963: 249-52. 
17 Renehan 2000 argues mainly for Sallust’s use of context-to-context allusion, while Meyer 2010 argues 
for direct verbal references to Thucydides throughout the letter, contra Scanlon 1980: 203.  
18 Meyer 2010: 109-17. Meyer also discusses the differences between the authors of the two letters, 
Pompey and Nicias, and draws on the striking parallels between Pompey and Alcibiades and how these 
comparisons highlight larger issues that lead to civil discord.  
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Senate. Pompey follows his narrative of his own Alpine crossing with a rhetorical 
question: “Why, then, should I list out battles or winter campaigns, towns either 
destroyed of recaptured when actions are more powerful than words?” (Quid deinde 
proelia aut expeditiones hibernas, oppida excisa aut recepta enumerem, quando res plus 
valet quam verba?; F98.6 Reynolds). He follows the claim with a list of his deeds, meant 
to prompt the Senate to act. His question, however, contrasts words and deeds. A central 
and well-recognized feature of Thucydidean historiography is the interplay and dialogue 
formed between logos and ergon in his text.19 Sallust’s Pompey as an internal narrator in 
his letter alludes to a central Thucydidean concept. Pompey, however, contends that 
actions override words, in opposition to Thucydides’ focus on how words lead to action.  
The Senate receives Pompey’s letter and, after some initial delay spent allocating 
the proconsular provinces for the coming year, the consuls begin to secure the assistance 
that Pompey had requested (F98.11-12 Reynolds). Sallust then describes the rest of the 
nobility following suit: “the nobles, for the most part, were assisting and many of them 
now were exhibiting their ferocity in speech and were not following up their words with 
deeds” (adnitente maxume nobilitate, quoius plerique iam tum lingua ferociam suam 
<ostentabant n>ec dicta factis seque<bantur>; F98.12 Reynolds). Unfortunately, textual 
problems cloud the exact force of the passage.20 However, the portion of the line that 
                                               
19 Parry 1957 remains a seminal study of the topic. Immerwahr 1960 followed shortly behind Parry’s work 
with a reevaluation of how Thucydides compares his task to Herodotus’ based on Parry’s work. More 
recently, Price 2001 has used the contrast and interplay between logoi and erga as an organizing principle 
for his analysis of Thucydides’ narratives of stasis (v. esp. pp. 1-5, 79-81, and 205-07). Greenwood 2006: 
57-82 also explores how speech and truth define action for Thucydides.  
20 Here, I have followed Shackleton Bailey’s suggestion to n>ec. Diggle 1983 first suggested aegue<bant 
for  seque/, which Reynolds 1991: 183 thinks likely.  
 250 
 
contains the contrast between words and deeds (dicta factis) is clearly preserved. 
Regardless of the suggested emendations to the final verb of the passage (aequebant or 
sequebant) the overall meaning of the Senate’s reaction is clear: there is a discrepancy 
between their words and their deeds and only Pompey’s letter is able to spur them to 
action.  
As I argued with Livy’ internal narrators above, Pompey’s letter—a type of 
internal narration—creates for Sallust’s Histories, too, an opportunity to assert his own 
methodological approach. As a central figure in the remaining fragments of the Histories, 
Pompey represents the power of deeds for his text. As Pompey’s actions force the Senate 
to move beyond mere debate and respond with monetary and military support of the 
campaign against Sertorius. Where the failure of the Athenian assembly in Thucydides’ 
narrative fails to respond to Nicias’ letter, Pompey is successful in forcing response from 
the Roman Senate. Sallust’s internal narrator succeeds where Thucydides’ fails, 
demonstrating the superiority of his historiographic approach to that of a predecessor to 
whom he so often shows deference.  
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